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Abstract 
 
 
This dissertation discusses United Arab Emirates (UAE) state-society relations in 
historical perspective; analyses qualitatively the Emirati political culture; examines how 
the latter affects governmental policies in the UAE; and evaluates both qualitatively and 
quantitatively the political orientations and values of the Emirati educated youth. 
Through a discussion of existing theoretical and conceptual approaches, and the 
observation of the UAE case study, it argues that an important and overlooked 
dimension among students of state-society relations in authoritarian rentier states is 
citizens’ political culture, which should nonetheless be examined within a more 
integrative framework of analysis.  
Accordingly, this study employs a refined version of the holistic ‘state-in-society’ 
approach (Kamrava, 2008), in combination with rentier state theory (RST) and the 
political culture perspective (Almond & Verba, 1963), to qualitatively discuss the 
general Emirati political culture (agency/input), and assess how the latter affects 
governmental performance/policies (output); and to evaluate, both qualitatively and 
quantitatively, the political culture of the educated Emirati youth as the main potential 
supporters or opponents (agency/input) of the ruling elite. 
Adding to the debate around the continued significance and scope of RST, the 
dissertation concludes that the rentier nature of a state does not necessarily determine 
its people´s lack of interest in politics, but can actually empower them to challenge 
authoritarianism through political socialization. The historical approach to UAE political 
movements and discussion about contemporary political standpoints demonstrate that 
governmental policies (redistributive, co-optative, repressive, or reformist) are mainly 
driven by domestic pressure and run parallel to historical development of domestic 
political activism. Hence, rentierism by itself does is not sufficient to explain state-
society relations in the Gulf region.  
Finally, the analysis and measurement of cognitive, affective and evaluative political 
orientations of Emirati UAEU students reflects that there is adherence to ‘post-
materialistic’ and ‘self-expression’ values among important sectors of the Emirati 
educated youth, which are associated with the emergence of a participative political 
culture (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005): an ‘aspiring participant’ political culture. 
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Translation and Transliteration Note 
 
Translation: 
In this dissertation, all sources in other languages than English1 have been translated 
into that language by the author (and for the summary in Spanish, English sources into 
Spanish).  
Transliteration of Arabic words: 
 All transliterated Arabic words have followed the International Journal of Middle 
East Studies (IJMES) transliteration system (See Annex 1).  
 All technical terms have been italicized and fully transliterated with diacritical 
marks. 
 Terms that appear in Merriam–Webster or the IJMES Word List have been 
spelled as they appear there, not italicized and with no diacritics. 
 Personal names, place names, and names of political associations and 
organizations have been spelled in accordance with the IJMES transliteration 
system but without diacritics (ʿayn and hamza have been preserved in all 
cases; except for initial hamza, which is dropped). 
 The Arabic tāʾ marbūṭa has been rendered a not ah, but in iḍāfa constructions, 
it has been rendered at. 
 The nisbi ending has been rendered - ī / -iyy (masculine) and –iyya (feminine). 
 Inseparable prepositions, conjunctions, and other prefixes have been 
connected with what follows by a hyphen (bi-, wa-, li-, etc.); and when it is 
followed by the article al, the a has been elided, forming a contraction (rendered 
as wa-l-, bi-l-, li-l-,etc.). 
 Initial hamza has always been dropped.  
 
Exceptions: 
Translation of Arabic terms has been provided throughout the text, except in the 
following cases: 
 Technical terms2 have not been translated (e.g. wasta). 
 The names of the seven emirates and main towns have been transliterated in 
the official form used by UAE institutions and on the national media (e.g. al-Ain, 
Abu Dhabi, Ras al-Khaimah, etc.) 
 Names of Arab authors/personalities cited are written as the persons carrying 
that name normally uses (e.g. Sultan Al-Qassemi for the commentator, but al-
Qasimi for the Emir of Sharjah; Abdulkhaleq Abdulla rather than ‘Abd al-Khaliq 
‘Abd Allah). 
  
                                                            
1
 Regarding Arabic terms, the translation and transliteration system used in this dissertation has 
been the IJMES system. A summary of its use in this dissertation is described below. For a 
thorough description of this system see IJMES website at: 
http://ijmes.ws.gc.cuny.edu/authorresources/ijmes-translation-and-transliteration-guide/ 
2
 Defined on IJMES website as “a word for which there is no English equivalent and that is not 
found in Merriam–Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, or a multi-word phrase excluding names and 
titles.” 
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SUMMARY IN SPANISH 
RESUMEN EN ESPAÑOL 
A través del estudio del caso de los Emiratos Árabes Unidos (EAU), esta tesis 
presenta nuevas aportaciones al debate en torno a la importancia de la Teoría 
del Estado Rentista (TER) para el estudio del cambio y la estabilidad política en 
los regímenes del Golfo. Las relaciones estado-sociedad en el Golfo han sido 
fundamentalmente explicadas a través de la TER, que asume que en los 
estados que reciben la mayoría de sus ingresos de rentas externas, los 
ciudadanos permanecen indiferentes a la política. Además, la estabilidad del 
régimen autoritario está garantizada mientras no haya tributación o crisis fiscal. 
En este sentido, la relación gobernante-gobernado está basada en un contrato 
social negociable, sostenido por los ingresos derivados de la explotación de los 
hidrocarburos por el estado (Beblawi & Luciani, 1987). Sin embargo, son varios 
los teóricos de la TER que han sugerido que otros factores deben ser tenidos 
en cuenta para el estudio de las dinámicas sociopolíticas en los estados 
rentistas (Capítulo 1). De hecho, las diferentes experiencias políticas de 
estados rentistas alrededor del mundo demuestran la invalidez de la ecuación 
que vincula exclusivamente las rentas del petróleo con el autoritarismo, así 
como también las diferentes historias políticas de los seis estados del Consejo 
de Cooperación del Golfo. 
En primer lugar, el activismo político ha existido en diferentes formas y con 
diferente intensidad en todos ellos, antes del período británico y del 
descubrimiento del petróleo. En segundo lugar, siendo todos rentistas, 
circunstancias específicas en cada uno de los estados del Golfo han 
contribuido enormemente al establecimiento de diferentes sistemas políticos, 
con niveles variables de participación política. A pesar de los análisis que 
presentan a los estados del Golfo como una unidad de estudio uniforme, 
existen diferencias radicales entre las trayectorias políticas de cada país, en 
particular de Kuwait y Bahréin que, desde la independencia, han tenido 
parlamentos electos con cierto poder legislativo.  
En los Emiratos han existido, al menos desde principios del siglo XX, 
demandas de reforma política, antes del descubrimiento del petróleo, pero bajo 
las estructuras rentistas derivadas de la relación con Gran Bretaña (Capítulo 2). 
Éstas se han centrado en el deseo de determinados sectores de la sociedad de 
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tener una cámara legislativa representativa. Sin embargo, el sistema político 
autoritario establecido tras la independencia en 1971 ha perdurado durante 
más de 40 años. Este hecho ha sido atribuido, en gran medida, a que los 
ingresos de los hidrocarburos serían suficientes para mantener la relación 
rentista estado-sociedad durante un futuro cercano. A pesar de lo anterior, en 
diciembre de 2005 el presidente de los EAU, Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan, 
anunció que había llegado el momento de implementar gradualmente reformas 
hacia un sistema político más participativo. Hasta la fecha, los eventos más 
significativos de este proceso han sido las elecciones para el Consejo Nacional 
Federal de 2006 y 2011. A pesar de que ello satisfizo a algunos sectores de la 
sociedad, fue considerado irrelevante por muchos e insuficiente por otros. La 
mayoría de los analistas han interpretado este movimiento como una respuesta 
a presiones externas desencadenadas por la liberalización económica y los 
ataques terroristas del 11 de septiembre, aunque se ha prestado muy poca 
atención al papel de las presiones internas. Más recientemente, y tras el inicio 
de la llamada ‘Primavera Árabe’, las autoridades emiratíes han adoptado un 
enfoque más represivo hacia las demandas internas de cambio político. Como 
resultado, un importante número de activistas políticos han sido detenidos, 
juzgados y condenados, bajo alegaciones de conspirar para derrocar el 
gobierno de los EAU. Más aún, el estudio de los distintos posicionamientos 
políticos de los emiratíes, demuestra que no hay una cultura política uniforme 
en el país (Capítulo 3).  
En este contexto, el presente trabajo llama la atención sobre la necesidad de 
examinar las dinámicas que explican la persistencia del gobierno autoritario y 
los factores que podrían traer cambio o crisis políticos en el Golfo, desde 
nuevas perspectivas. En este sentido, se argumenta que la naturaleza rentista 
del estado, en vez de mantener a la población indefinidamente indiferente, 
puede de hecho empoderar a sus ciudadanos a desafiar el autoritarismo e 
implicarlos políticamente, de modo gradual, a través de la exposición a 
‘agentes de socialización política’ reformulados (educación, TICs, profesores y 
compañeros extranjeros, viajes, etc.). Estos factores, sumados al estrepitoso 
crecimiento demográfico, y la integración en el sistema capitalista global, 
determinaron el establecimiento de un sistema político autoritario en 1971, así 
como de una sociedad extremadamente jerarquizada, en la que cada grupo (ya 
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sea étnico o relacionado con sus ingresos) ocupa generalmente roles y 
sectores económicos específicos.  
Las estructuras socio-económicas y políticas resultantes son legitimadas 
mediante un discurso oficial, que pone el énfasis en el pasado tribal de las 
élites gobernantes y sus aliados cercanos, ignorando otras identidades que 
conforman la sociedad actual emiratí. Por ello han emergido varios problemas 
sociales, como el desequilibrio demográfico, las dificultades de acceso a la 
nacionalidad o conflictos de identidad. Si bien estos asuntos despiertan 
sentimientos ‘alienantes’ entre las clases menos privilegiadas y las más 
educadas, sirven al mismo tiempo para justificar el status quo, bajo el pretexto 
de la preservación de la ‘seguridad nacional’.  
En consecuencia, los siguientes capítulos exploran cómo la complejidad de una 
sociedad más urbana, cosmopolita, globalizada e instruida, afecta a las formas 
en las que el estado es gobernado, cómo nuevos o actualizados mecanismos 
de gobierno son adoptados y cómo los ciudadanos ven y reaccionan ante estos 
acontecimientos. Esta tesis emplea el enfoque holístico ‘estado-en-sociedad’ 
(Kamrava, 2008)3, combinado con la TER y la perspectiva de la cultura política 
(Almond & Verba, 1963; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005)4, analiza cualitativamente la 
cultura política emiratí en general (agencia/input), y valora, en perspectiva 
histórica, cómo ésta última afecta a las políticas y el comportamiento 
gubernamental (output). Finalmente evalúa, tanto cuantitativa como 
cualitativamente, la cultura política de los jóvenes emiratíes instruidos, que son 
considerados como los principales partidarios u opositores potenciales 
(agencia/input) de la élite gobernante.  
Con estos objetivos, se contrastan tres hipótesis: 
1 – La naturaleza rentista de un estado no determina 
necesariamente la falta de interés de sus ciudadanos en la 
política, sino que, de hecho, les empodera para desafiar al 
autoritarismo a largo plazo (a través de la socialización política). 
                                                            
3
 La versión actualizada Mehran Kamrava (2008) del paradigma desarrollado por Joel S. Migdal 
de ‘estado en sociedad’(1988). 
4
 Que tiene en cuenta las orientaciones o actitudes políticas de un grupo social hacia el sistema 
político sin entenderlas como una característica específica o intrínseca de dicho grupo (Almond 
y Verba, 1963). 
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2 – El comportamiento del gobierno (redistributivo, cooptativo, 
represivo o de reforma controlada) está principalmente 
determinado por presiones internas (y opera paralelamente al 
desarrollo histórico del activismo político interno). 
3 – Hay una adhesión a los valores ‘post-materialistas’ y de 
‘auto-expresión’ en importantes sectores de la juventud emiratí 
instruida (los cuales están asociados con la emergencia de una 
cultura política participativa). 
 
A través de la revisión de los enfoques teóricos y conceptuales existentes, esta 
tesis argumenta que la TER, por sí sola, no explica las dinámicas socio-
políticas actuales de los EAU, y que la cultura política es un indicador 
importante para la explicación del cambio o el estatismo político. A pesar de 
que EAU es un estado rentista, hay sectores de la sociedad emiratí 
políticamente activos, que demandan cambio político. Sin embargo, una 
combinación de medidas redistributivas, cooptativas o represivas, junto con la 
reforma política ocasional y limitada, han sido históricamente empleadas por la 
élite gobernante para obstruir demandas domésticas de cambio, lo cual perdura 
hoy. En este sentido, una de las conclusiones alcanzadas es que el 
comportamiento del gobierno está determinado, en gran medida, por presiones 
domésticas y opera paralelamente al desarrollo histórico del activismo político 
interno (es decir, la agencia determina las políticas). 
Por tanto, el rentismo es visto en este trabajo como el catalizador para los 
rápidos cambios experimentados por los principales agentes de socialización 
política en los EAU -familia, instituciones educativas y Tecnologías de la 
Comunicación y la Información-, mientras que la presión externa parece no ser 
determinante para el cambio político, debido al interés de las élites capitalistas 
y políticas globales en preservar el status quo en los países exportadores de 
petróleo. Consecuentemente, y cuestionando la TER, esta tesis argumenta que 
la naturaleza rentista de un estado no determina necesariamente la falta de 
interés político de su población sino que, de hecho, puede empoderarla a 
través de la socialización política, para desafiar al autoritarismo.  
Finalmente, el análisis de datos obtenidos mediante una encuesta y entrevistas 
realizadas durante un extenso trabajo de campo en EAU, muestra que la 
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juventud emiratí instruida tiene escaso conocimiento político y, generalmente, 
una orientación evaluativa positiva. Sin embargo, los estudiantes tienen un 
interés relativamente elevado sobre acontecimientos políticos y una 
preocupación particular por ciertos temas. Por ejemplo, el desequilibrio 
demográfico entre extranjeros y nacionales, las prácticas de wasta y tribalismo 
y la falta de libertad de expresión y elección. Todos ellos son indicadores de 
una cultura política ‘aspirante a participante’. Además, los datos analizados 
indican que las orientaciones positivas hacia la reforma política son limitadas, 
debido a la percepción de inseguridad regional y al miedo a las posibles 
consecuencias del cambio, lo que también explica la tendencia a la 
autocensura y la falta de debates abiertos.  
La investigación coincide, hasta cierto punto, con el argumento de Cristopher 
Davidson (2012) de que las élites dirigentes de Emiratos (y del Golfo) no 
cuentan con una legitimidad imbatible. También coincide con la hipótesis de 
Abdulkhaleq Abdulla (2010), de que la región se encuentra en un momento 
determinante de su historia (el “momento del Golfo”) y de que las “fuerzas del 
cambio” no deberían ignorarse. Sin embargo, esta tesis no prevé el “colapso” 
de los regímenes que nos ocupan, ni que las emergentes clases medias tengan 
la capacidad de promover, de forma inminente, “un futuro democrático” 
(Abdulla, 2010: 15). Al examinar la congruencia entre cultura política y 
estructura, y siguiendo el marco teórico de Almond y Verba (1963), se 
demuestra que la mayoría de individuos ‘sujetos’ coincide con la estructura 
autoritaria, y cada vez más centralizada, de EAU.   
Por tanto, no es de esperar que, en el corto plazo, el sistema político emiratí se 
desestabilice o sufra reformas políticas significativas. No obstante, es evidente 
que la cultura política emiratí está evolucionando hacia un modelo más 
complejo, en el que importantes sectores de la juventud instruida muestra 
opiniones críticas ‘post-materialistas’ y valores de ‘autoexpresión’, así como 
actitudes ‘alienantes’ hacia el autoritarismo en general, y con respecto a 
políticas y problemas sociales específicos. Puesto que las élites dirigentes no 
pueden depender exclusivamente de la redistribución de la renta para acallar 
las críticas o las demandas de reforma, esta tesis concluye que la cultura 
política ‘aspirante participante’ de EAU del siglo XXI ha introducido cierta 
incongruencia en la relación Estado-sociedad. Inicialmente, ésta facilitó la 
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implementación de reformas políticas superficiales, pero ha desembocado en 
un sentimiento de amenaza entre las élites y, consecuentemente, en una 
respuesta coercitiva. Para bien o para mal parece que, en los próximos años, la 
estabilidad en los EAU será protagonista en las relaciones entre gobernantes y 
gobernados y, por tanto, el cambio político es poco probable.   
La estructura de esta tesis integra un primer capítulo introductorio, dos partes 
centrales, y una conclusión: 
         El capítulo 1 incluye la justificación, el marco teórico y conceptual, la 
revisión de la literatura existente sobre los EAU y la metodología de 
investigación implementada para este estudio.  
         La primera parte, integrada por dos capítulos, examina el proceso de 
formación del estado y la sociedad, así como la evolución de las relaciones 
estado-sociedad en los EAU.  
         El capítulo 2 trata sobre la evolución de las estructuras socio-económicas 
y políticas desde el período previo a los británicos y al descubrimiento del 
petróleo, y examina el impacto que el rentismo tiene en las políticas internas.  
         El capítulo 3 explora el activismo político y las respuestas del régimen a la 
potencial oposición.  
         La segunda parte, también compuesta por dos capítulos, analiza los 
datos recogidos a través de entrevistas y de una encuesta realizada a 
estudiantes de la Universidad de los Emiratos Árabes Unidos, y evalúa la 
cultura política de los jóvenes emiratíes instruidos.  
         El capítulo 4 valora el conocimiento e interés político, teniendo en cuenta 
las preocupaciones más importantes expresadas por los sondeados, y sus 
percepciones de los derechos humanos.  
         El capítulo 5 examina el alcance del apoyo de los estudiantes al sistema 
político y la idea de reforma política.  
         El capítulo concluyente presenta una discusión de las tres hipótesis 
contrastadas y su validez de acuerdo con la investigación realizada para esta 
tesis. Por consiguiente, cabe destacar que esta investigación hace 
contribuciones empíricas, teóricas y metodológicas a los estudios del Golfo y a 
la política comparada. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation presents new input on the debate around the significance of 
the rentier state theory (RST) for the study of Gulf regimes’ stability and change 
through the study of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) case. It suggest that, in 
addition to oil rent, other variables should be observed more closely for the 
understanding of the persistence of authoritarian rule in the region. Through the 
holistic ‘state-in-society’ approach, and in combination with RST and the 
political culture perspective, this research discusses state-society relations in 
historical perspective; analyses qualitatively the Emirati political culture; 
examines how the latter affects governmental policies in the UAE; and 
evaluates both qualitatively and quantitatively the political orientations and 
values of the Emirati educated youth. As such, it makes empirical, theoretical, 
and methodological contributions to Gulf and comparative politics studies. 
In defiance of RST, this dissertation argues that the rentier nature of a state 
does not necessarily determine its people´s lack of interest in politics, but can 
actually empower them in the long term to challenge authoritarianism through 
political socialization. Through a discussion of existing theoretical and 
conceptual approaches, rentierism is regarded in this study as the catalyser for 
the rapid changes experienced by the main agents of political socialisation in 
the UAE -family, educational institutions, and Information and Communication 
Technologies-, while external pressure seems not to be determinant for political 
change, due to global political and capitalist elites’ interest in preserving the 
status quo in the oil exporting countries. Thus, the dissertation claims that RST 
used on its own does not explain current UAE socio-political dynamics, and that 
a more integrative framework of analysis that takes into account political culture 
is necessary for the explanation of political change or stasis.  
Despite the UAE being a rentier state, there have historically been sectors of 
Emirati society that are politically aware and demand political change. However, 
a combination of redistributive, co-optative, and repressive measures, in 
addition to the occasional and limited political reform, has historically been 
employed by the ruling elite to obstruct domestic calls for change, and this 
continues today. In this regard, another conclusion is that government 
performance is, to a large extent, driven by domestic pressure and runs parallel 
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to the historical development of domestic political activism (i.e. agency 
determines policies).  
The analysis of survey and interview data obtained through extensive fieldwork 
shows that the Emirati educated youth have low political knowledge, and 
generally positive evaluative orientations. However, data indicate that positive 
orientations toward political reform are limited by a sense of regional insecurity 
and fear of possible consequences of change, which also explains the tendency 
for self-censorship and lack of open debates. Moreover, students show 
relatively high interest in political developments, and many depict ‘post-
materialistic’ critical positions and ‘self-expression’ values, as well as particular 
concern about a number of issues, including the demographic imbalance 
between foreigners and nationals; the practices of wasta and tribalism; and the 
lack of freedoms of expression and choice. Hence, these are considered in this 
dissertation as indicators of an ‘aspiring participant’ political culture in the UAE.  
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CHAPTER 1. THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL 
FRAMEWORK 
1. Rationale and structure 
State-society relations in the Gulf have been mainly explained through the RST, 
which assumes that in states that receive most of their revenues from external 
rents, citizens are uninterested in politics. In addition, authoritarian regime 
stability is guaranteed, as long as there is no taxation or fiscal crisis. In this 
regard, rulers-ruled relationship is based on a bargaining social contract, which 
is sustained by the income derived by the state from the exploitation of 
hydrocarbon resources (Mahdavy, 1970; Beblawi & Luciani, 1987). 
However, comparative political scientists and Gulf area specialists have put 
forward refinements of the early RST that suggest other factors should be taken 
into account for the study of socio-political dynamics in rentier states. In fact, the 
different political experiences of rentier states around the world show the 
invalidity of the equation that exclusively links oil rent to authoritarianism, as do 
the dissimilar political histories of the Gulf states. Firstly, political activism has 
existed in different forms and with different intensity in all Gulf states since pre-
British and pre-oil times. Second, having all become rentier states through their 
trucial relations with the British and the discovery of hydrocarbons, specific 
circumstances in each of the six GCC states has greatly contributed to the 
establishment different political systems with varying levels of political 
participation. Despite analysis of the Gulf states as a uniform unit of study, there 
are striking differences between the political trajectories of each country, in 
particular Kuwait and Bahrain, which have had elected parliaments with some 
legislative power since independence. 
In the UAE, calls for political reform have existed since pre-oil days. These have 
centred on the desire of certain sectors of society to have a representative 
legislative chamber. However, the authoritarian political system established 
upon independence in 1971 has endured for more than 40 years. This has been 
largely attributed to hydrocarbons revenues being sufficient enough to maintain 
the state-society rentier relationship for the foreseeable future. Despite the 
former, in December 2005 the UAE President, Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan, 
announced that the time had arrived to gradually implement reforms towards a 
more participatory political system. So far, the most significant events of this 
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process have been the 2006 and 2011 Federal National Council (FNC) 
elections. While this has satisfied some sectors of society, it was considered 
irrelevant for many, and insufficient for others. Most analysts interpreted the 
move as a response to external pressures, triggered by economic liberalisation 
and the 9/11 terrorist attacks, but paid very little attention to the role of domestic 
pressures. More recently, and after the beginning of the so-called ‘Arab Spring’, 
UAE authorities have adopted a more repressive approach to domestic 
demands for political change. As a result, an important number of political 
activists have been detained, judged, and condemned under allegations of 
plotting to overthrow the UAE government. 
It is within this context that this dissertation seeks to present new input through 
the analysis of the UAE. It suggests that it is necessary to examine the 
dynamics explaining the persistence of authoritarian rule and the factors, which 
could bring about political change or crisis in the Gulf through a new lens. 
Moreover, it argues that the rentier nature of a state, rather than keeping people 
uninterested indefinitely, can actually empower its citizens to challenge 
authoritarianism and gradually make them politically aware through the 
exposure to reshaped ‘agents of political socialization’ (education, ICTs, foreign 
peers and professors, travelling, etc.). Accordingly, the following chapters 
explore how the complexity of a more urbanite, cosmopolitan, globalised and 
educated society affects the ways in which a state is ruled; how new or updated 
ruling mechanisms are implemented; and how citizens regard and react to 
these developments.  
This dissertation employs the holistic ‘state-in-society’ approach, 5  in 
combination with RST and the political culture perspective, 6  to qualitatively 
discuss the general Emirati political culture (agency/input), and assesses, in 
historical perspective, how the latter affects governmental performance/policies 
(output). Finally, it evaluates, both qualitatively and quantitatively, the political 
culture of the educated Emirati youth as the main potential supporters or 
opponents (agency/input) of the ruling elite.  
                                                            
5
 Mehran Kamrava’s (2008) updated version of the Joel S. Migdal ‘state-in-society’ paradigm 
(1988). 
6
 That looks into the political orientations or attitudes of a social group towards the political 
system without regarding them as specific or intrinsic characteristics of that group (Almond & 
Verba, 1963). 
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For these purposes, three main hypotheses are tested: 
1 - The rentier nature of a state does not necessarily determine its 
people´s lack of interest in politics, but does actually empower them to 
challenge authoritarianism in the long term (through political 
socialization). 
2 - Government performance (redistributive, co-optative, repressive, or 
reform policies/strategies) is mainly driven by domestic pressure (and 
runs parallel to historical development of domestic political activism). 
3 - There is adherence to ‘post-materialistic’ and ‘self-expression’ 
values among important sectors of the Emirati educated youth (which 
are associated with the emergence of a participative political culture). 
The dissertation consists of an introductory chapter, two central parts, and a 
conclusion. Chapter 1 includes the rationale, theoretical and conceptual 
framework, literature review on the UAE, and the research methodology 
implemented for this study.  
Part I, integrated by two chapters, discusses the processes of state and society 
formation, as well as the evolution of state-society relations in the UAE.  
Chapter 2 deals with the evolution of socioeconomic and political structures 
since pre-British and pre-oil days, and examines the impact that rentierism has 
on domestic politics. Chapter 3 discusses political activism and regime 
responses to potential opposition.  
Part II, also consisting of two chapters, analyses the data collected through 
interviews and a survey among United Arab Emirates University (UAEU) 
students, and evaluates the political culture of the Emirati educated youth.  
Chapter 4 assesses political knowledge and interest, discussing the major 
concerns expressed by respondents, and their perceptions of human rights. 
Chapter 5 examines the extent of the students’ support for the political system 
and the idea of political reform.  
The concluding chapter provides a discussion of the three tested hypotheses 
and their validity according to the research that was conducted for this 
dissertation. 
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2. Theoretical and conceptual framework   
State-society (or rulers-ruled, to be more precise) relations in the Gulf have 
been largely explained through the political economy paradigm of RST, which 
puts emphasis on oil wealth as the main factor determining authoritarian rule 
and the lack of popular pressure to democratise. However, in parallel to 
comparative political studies dealing with other regions’ or global political 
systems’ trends, this dissertation combines the RST and the political culture 
approach in an attempt to bring the role of ‘agency’ into the analytical equation. 
More specifically, this research is primarily concerned with the role of rentierism 
in the evolution of the political culture of the Emirati educated youth, and with 
the ultimate impact that politically aware nationals have had, have, or may have 
on elite political performance. In order to justify the framework chosen, this 
section reviews the main perspectives that have been applied for the study of 
democracy and authoritarianism in general, and for the Middle East and the 
Gulf in particular, as well as the literature on the specific case of the UAE.  
2.1. The end of the transitology paradigm? 
The rise of communist and fascist regimes before Second World War, and of 
new authoritarian regimes with de-colonisation after it, proved the early 
institutional and historical unilinear evolutionary models of democratisation 
wrong and evidenced that the existing categories and concepts that had been 
conceived with Western Europe and the United States in mind did not fit all 
countries. Accordingly, some scholars started inquiring about the socio-
economic conditions making democracy survive in some countries and collapse 
in others by developing a ‘pluralistic theory’ that sought answers in socio-
political structure or institutions (Schumpeter, 1942; Almond, 1956; Rostow, 
1960; Lipset, 1960; Linz & Stepan, 1978). Indeed, as some have suggested, the 
works of Seymour Martin Lipset on the relation between democracy and 
economic development (or ‘modernisation’) have “generated the largest body of 
research on any topic in comparative politics” (Limongi & Przeworski 1997: 
156). Moreover, influenced by sociology, social anthropology and biology, 
comparative political scientists widely adopted positive science research 
methods (empirical observation, large-scale comparisons, and statistical 
techniques) in search of more abstract and universal theories, categories and 
concepts (Sartori, 1970; Lijphart, 1968b).  
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Disagreement has been a constant about whether there is a causal relationship 
between wealth and democracy, or if this correlation is explained by something 
else; and about the preconditions and processes producing different political 
outcomes. During the 1960s more attention was paid to the role of agencies 
other than institutions, such as civil society, social movements, public opinion, 
or political culture and behaviour. Accordingly, that trend became known as the 
behaviouralism or structural/systemic functionalism (Almond & Verba, 1963; 
Almond & Powell, 1966; Dahl, 1966; Easton, 1966). Almond and Verba’s ‘The 
Civic Culture’ (1963) is considered the milestone of this period, for it was the 
first attempt to survey representative samples of countries, and to statistically 
test the theories linking political culture and democracy. However, some 
considered that the ahistorical categories of systemic functionalism were not 
valid to understand concrete cases, which was in fact its main objective, and 
that institutions (understood in a broader sense than previously) and history 
should still be taken into account (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967; Rustow, 1970; 
Powell, 1982; Lehmbruch & Schmitter, 1982; Lijphart, 1984; Skocpol, 1985; 
Przeworski 1985; March & Olsen, 1989). Hence, the latter is known as the neo-
institutionalist approach, which included grounded and rational choice theories, 
as well as case-oriented analysis. Building from earlier perspectives, these 
authors claimed that socioeconomic structure works through political, social and 
economic institutions to shape the orientations of political actors (Caramani, 
2011: 7-8).  
Alternative or complementary to modernisation theories were the dependency 
(Cardoso, 1973; O’Donnell), the world systems (Wallerstein, 1974), the 
globalisation theories (Rosenau, 1969), and the more balanced ‘state-in-society’ 
paradigm (Migdal, 1988). Furthermore, the establishment of democratic 
systems of government in Southern Europe and South America during the 
1970s and 1980s initiated what Samuel Huntington (1991) called later the ‘third 
wave’ of global democratization. The emergence of different types of regimes 
which adopted democratic practices around the world, but did not fulfil the listed 
socioeconomic requisites of democracy, made scholars point out the weakness 
of the existing theories and concepts for the study of political transition, and new 
perspectives and concepts were proposed to classify the emerging systems.  
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Very much influenced by ‘modernists’ Lipset and Lijphart, analysts of 
democratisation processes embraced the ‘transitology’ 7  paradigm, which 
regained interest in transnational comparisons and adopted a simplified 
analysis of dominant factors. Transitology emerged mainly from Guillermo 
O’Donnell, Philippe Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead’s ‘Transitions from 
Authoritarian Rule’ (1986) as a universal theoretical framework for the study of 
the interval between one political regime and another; and in the context of the 
fall and replacement of authoritarian regimes. Consequently, proliferations of 
concepts to define the new types of ‘democracies’ unfold: O’Donnell and 
Schmitter (1986) emphasized the uncertain outcomes of transitions when they 
established that these could end in democracy, a liberalized authoritarian 
regime (dictablanda), or a restrictive, illiberal democracy (democradura). In this 
regard, Hermet, Rose and Rouquié (1978) were among the first academics to 
describe the implementation of elections in authoritarian regimes as a 
legitimising mechanism in response to domestic and external pressures. In 
1989 Juan Linz, Seymour Martin Lipset and Larry Diamond dubbed 
‘semidemocratic’ those regimes in which the power of elected officials is limited, 
political liberties are constrained and the outcome of competitive elections 
deviate from popular preference. Moreover, as the emergence of new 
democracies slowed down, political scientists concentrated on the study of 
consolidation and then of the quality of democracy. Terry Lynn Karl spoke in the 
early 1990s of ‘hybrid regimes’ (as did Diamond in 2002), and of ‘electoralism’ 
meaning “the regularized holding of elections, even as they continue to restrict 
the other political rights and opportunities of their citizens” (Karl, 1990: 14-15). 
By the same token, Fareed Zakaria later discussed the rise of ‘illiberal 
democracies’ (1997), but the most inclusive and still in use concept is ‘hybrid’, a 
type of regime that has been defined as combining:  
“(…) democracy elements –such as pluralism, representative 
institutions, elections or constitutionalism- with other authoritarian 
forms of power. Thus, political competition can be restricted, or some 
groups with relevant social support can be excluded; decision-
making political actors may exist, but without being subject to the 
political responsibility which limits the autonomy of representative 
                                                            
7
 Dankwart Rustow is considered the father of ‘transitology’ for having broken with the prevailing 
schools of thought with his seminal work “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model” 
(1970), in which he suggested democracy come into being through a gradual evolution from 
oligarchy and that only national unity is a necessary precondition for democracy. 
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institutions; and diverse forms of political rights and public freedom 
may be restricted, despite being formally guaranteed” (Szmolka 
2010: 15). 
As democracies of the so-called ‘third wave’ (Huntington, 1991) failed to 
consolidate, the transitology paradigm was criticised (resembling earlier 
criticism of modernisation theories) for excessive generalisation and for the 
inability to produce testable hypotheses (Bunce, 1995). Thomas Carothers 
(2002) considered that transitional countries were in fact stuck in a ‘grey zone’ 
and declared transitology had “outlived its usefulness.” He considered it no 
longer appropriate to assume that “any country moving away from dictatorial 
rule is a country in transition towards democracy; [t]hat democratization unfolds 
in a set sequence of stages (opening, breakthrough and consolidation); [t]hat 
elections foster a longer term deepening of democratic participation and 
accountability; [t]hat structural features or ‘preconditions for democracy’ are not 
major factors in the transition process, and that the process depends primarily 
on the political intentions and actions of its political elites; [t]hat democratic 
transitions making up the third wave are being built on functioning states and 
(...) state-building is secondary to democracy-building and compatible with it” 
(Carothers, 2002: 6-17).  
In this regard, Laurence Whitehead wisely affirmed that if democracy is 
essentially a contested concept, so must be the process by which democracy is 
achieved (Whitehead, 2002: 30). Indeed, there is not one unique political path 
followed by countries, nor one single outcome or one type of democracy, and 
definitely not a perfect type of democracy. Therefore, no set of fixed conditions 
or sequences will be met by every country moving towards democracy, and 
those following some of the expected steps do not necessarily qualify as 
democratizing. It is uncertain which path ‘transitional’ countries will follow -and 
towards what kind of political system-, and therefore the process should be 
regarded as “open-ended” (Whitehead, 2002: 27). This is related to the 
‘contingency’ or ‘randomness’ area of analysis, and is very much in line with 
what Mehran Kamrava has called ‘the uncertainty principle’ (2008: 61), which 
he links very neatly with quantum mechanics to explain how “a single definite 
result” cannot be predicted from an observation but, instead, “it predicts a 
number of different possible outcomes and tells us how likely each of these is”  
(Hawking, 1988: 55-56; in Kamrava, 2008: 62). The uncertainty principle, he 
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argues, “can be caused by any of four inter-related and complementary factors:  
circumstances and opportunities; historical accidents; unintended 
consequences; and personal initiatives” (Kamrava, 2008: 62).  
Moreover, it is now clear that the holding of elections is not a factor making a 
country democratic or in the process to democratize. On the contrary, many 
authoritarian regimes have implemented elections to choose the members of 
non-democratic institutions, which are only advisory or consultative, while 
maintaining legislative, executive and judicial powers under the rulers’ grip 
(Levitsky & Way, 2002; Schedler, 2002 & 2006). Thus, since the late 1900s or 
early 2000 it is widely accepted that we can no longer consider political regimes 
as clearly democratic or absolutely authoritarian, and not necessarily in the way 
towards democracy. In this regard, we can say that the notions of  ‘democracy’ 
and ‘authoritarianism’ for the study of contemporary regimes are still useful, 
although the conceptual and theoretical frameworks with which we refer to 
regimes has moved from a binary opposition democracy-authoritarianism to a 
‘hybrid regime’ classification; and from an inevitable development into 
democracies to an uncertain future of how regimes evolve. In line with this, 
Francis Fukuyama (2010) explores why transitions to the rule of law have 
proven so much harder than transitions to ‘electoral democracies’.  
Notwithstanding, although his 2002 article generated much debate, Carothers 
failed to eradicate the transition paradigm. The so-called ‘colour revolutions’ 
and, more recently the ‘Arab spring’, have made some political scientist 
reconsider its usefulness (Diamond, Fukuyama, Horowitz & Plattner, 2014). In 
fact, the accumulation of research in the field of democratisation leaves one 
main conclusion: that there are many sequences, actors and stages involved in 
the process. It cannot be denied, however, that the factors that are seen by 
some as preconditions for democratisation do cause more or less alterations in 
social structures, which can ultimately affect the ruling order. Hence, we must 
still analyse them, even if we do not consider them conditional, taking place in a 
particular order, or leading to specific outcomes.  
2.2. Explaining MENA’s authoritarianism  
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) area studies’ scholars have traditionally 
devoted their efforts to analysing particular cases rather than developing 
theories or concepts. On the other hand, seminal works on democratisation by 
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comparative politics scientists have largely excluded the MENA Islamic 
countries (O’Donnell, Schmitter & Whitehead, 1986; Diamond, Linz & Lipset, 
1988). Moreover, some authors touching upon these countries linked the lack of 
political liberalisation to cultural and historical exceptionalism of this region 
(Huntington, 1984; Sharabi, 1988; Kedourie, 1992), as well as to the political 
economy of rentierism (Mahdavi, 1970; Beblawi & Luciani, 1987; Anderson, 
1991). However, during the 1990s the aim of several works focused on 
demonstrating that “Arab politics should no longer be perceived as being 
peculiarly and uniquely Arab” or Islamic (Ayubi, 1995: xi; also Esposito & 
Piscatori, 1991), and on the necessity to employ broader comparative 
perspectives and frameworks for the study of political processes in the Arab and 
Islamic world (Murphy & Niblock, 1993; Salamé, 1994; Brynen, Korany & Noble, 
1995; Norton, 1995; Esposito & Voll, 1996).  
Influenced by the transitology paradigm, some of the most relevant specialists 
on Middle East politics put forward valuable frameworks in ‘Democracy without 
Democrats’, under the question of “Why…is the Arab world not democratic” 
(Salamé, 1994). Similarly, Rex Brynen, Bahgat Korany & Paul Noble (1995) 
made a notable effort to address the specific factors in the democratization of 
the Arab World in their seminal work ‘Political liberalization and democratization 
in the Arab world.’ In the first volume of this work they establish the core 
aspects for the study of political liberalization and democracy in the Arab world 
as follows: political culture and discourse; civil society; political economy; and 
regional and international context. In addition, they make two further 
observations: they stress the need to consider the impact of liberalisation on 
different sectors of society (class, gender, religion...); and the need to combine 
both theoretical and comparative empirical insights, thus highlighting the 
importance of case studies in addition to comparative perspectives (Brynen, 
Korany & Noble, 1995: 6-21). Regarding the specific role of agency, Richard 
Norton “Civil society in the Middle East” (1995) examined the existing varieties 
of civil society in the region, hence challenging the myth that this was lacking in 
the MENA countries; while the volumes by Ilya Harik and Dennis Sullivan 
(1992) and by Tim Niblock and Emma Murphy (1993) touched upon the 
linkages between economic and political liberalisation. All these works 
succeeded in bringing together social science theory and MENA area expertise 
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and, despite the diverging views over the importance of potential explanatory 
variables, agreement was reached on the fact that different types of impulses 
towards liberalisation could be identified. These ranged from “mass pressures 
(caused by changes in the implicit ‘social contract’ driven by state failure, 
financial crisis, and the effects of globalization-induced economic reform); to 
external pressures; and, third, voluntarily limited reform from above” 
(Nonneman, 2001: 144-145). Moreover, as Gerd Nonneman (2001: 145) 
explains, the limitations to liberalization were explained by two structural factors: 
rentierism and a bourgeoisie that shares interests with the regime and has no 
interest in real economic or political opening (also Hinnebusch, 1995). 
The social movements described by some of the abovementioned works, and 
the limited economic and political liberalisation that was implemented by the 
regimes (both in response to domestic and external pressures, and especially in 
post- 9/11 times) did not seem to significantly transform the authoritarian 
structures of the Arab states. Reflecting in which social science theories and 
MENA area studies publications explaining democratic deficit and the 
authoritarian persistence, Raymond Hinnebusch (2006) provided a 
comprehensive summary of the ways in which the former has helped improve 
the latter, as follows: 
“Early modernization theory’s analysis of ‘requisites’ proved 
indeterminate and cultural exceptional arguments identified merely 
an intervening variable. Later theories of developmental imbalances 
and nation-building dilemmas explained more convincingly why 
democracy failed in the Middle East. Historical sociology, in 
identifying the social structural bases of alternative regime paths, 
showed what put Middle East states on their own distinctive 
authoritarian pathways. Institutionalist approaches to state-building 
helped explain the consolidation of authoritarian regimes in the 
region while political-economy analysis showed how these regimes 
adapted to changes in their environment. Rational choice 
approaches help show why the agency to lead democratic transitions 
has been lacking. Analysis of the impact of globalization and the 
United States hegemon suggest the international variable is 
compatible with liberalization of authoritarian regimes but not with 
democratization” (Hinnebusch, 2006: 373). 
Accordingly, a number of analysts focused their research on the nature of the 
authoritarian states. As explained by Schlumberger, it was time to search 
beyond the democratisation paradigm in order to understand “how [Arab] 
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authoritarianism works in practice and how it can be grasped conceptually” 
(2007: 1), and to examine the ‘upgrading’ of these authoritarian regimes 
(Heydemann, 2007; also Pripstein & Penner, 2005; Pratt, 2007). In this regard, 
Daniel Brumberg considers ‘liberalized autocracies’ those regimes where “the 
trademark mixture of guided pluralism, controlled elections, and selective 
repression…is not just a ‘survival strategy’ adopted by authoritarian regimes, 
but rather a type of political system whose institution, rules, and logic defy any 
linear model of democracy”(Brumberg, 2002: 56-68). However, trapped in 
understanding the region’s authoritarian regimes, and with the focus set on 
institutions and elites, the Arab spring events caught most specialists by 
surprise.8 Reflecting on this issue, Gregory Gause (2011) has suggested that:  
“Explaining the stability of Arab authoritarians was an important 
analytic task, but it led some of us to underestimate the forces for 
change that were bubbling below, and at times above, the surface of 
Arab politics… academics must reexamine their assumptions on a 
number of issues, including the military's role in Arab politics, the 
effects of economic change on political stability, and the salience of a 
cross-border Arab identity, to get a sense of how Arab politics will 
now unfold”. 
2.3. Explaining Gulf regime stability through rentierism 
One of the first explanations for the stability and the democratic deficit of the 
Gulf states came from the rentier state theory (RST) political economy approach 
in the late 1980s (Beblawi & Luciani, 1987). Building on the earlier work by 
Mahdavy (1970), RST establishes that states deriving a substantial percentage 
of the national revenues from external rents are unlikely to democratise. In 
accordance to it, in states that derive most of their income from external rents 
rather than from taxes, and where people are engaged in the consumption and 
redistribution of the rent, there is a low probability that movements for social or 
political change emerge. Accordingly, early RST assumes that the rentier nature 
of the Gulf states has maintained people uninterested in politics and has made 
authoritarianism persist until today. Hence, under a ‘rentier bargain’ scheme 
and under the premise of ‘no representation without taxation’, regime stability is 
guaranteed as long as there is no taxation or fiscal crisis (Mahdavy, 1970; 
Beblawi & Luciani, 1987). Finally, it combines with neo-patrimonial theory to 
                                                            
8
 Some exceptions worth mentioning are the works by Bayat (2009) and Benin (2010), who 
anticipated the strength of ordinary people in causing political change through everyday actions.  
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explain “the mechanisms by which the allocative state distributes oil wealth and 
manages the elite relationships” (Gray, 2011: 6-7).  
In agreement with the early RST formulation, most authors acknowledge that 
there is a correlation (or causal link) between oil wealth and authoritarianism, 
and that the ruling elite is autonomous from the people (Ross, 2001; Cebolla, 
2006). However, the validity of this approach has been revised along the 1990s 
and 2000s, by scholars who argue “reductionism is inherent in simple 
regression modelling or in making economic generalizations without sufficient 
political context” (Rosser, 2010 in Gray, 2011). Accordingly, most Gulf experts 
suggest that other factors, such as historical dynamics, social or developmental 
exceptionalisms, and external influences should be included into the analysis of 
rentier states.9 Finally, and with the focus on the GCC states, Mathew Gray 
(2011) brings into the equation the evolution that the political economies of 
these countries have experienced. In his opinion, RST remains “core to 
understanding Gulf states’ politics” but several factors have changed the 
context of rentierism, including but not limited to: state maturity, globalisation, 
development policies, population and employment pressures. Consequently, 
the political elite has “developed a more nuanced, engaged and complex 
approach to society” (Gray, 2011: 18-37) and has had to gradually become 
more responsive do domestic and external pressures to liberalise, not only 
economically, but also politically. 
The evolution of RST reflects that of comparative politics, and its 
democratization studies sub-discipline, in the sense that it has adopted more 
integrative and holistic approaches. In this regard, al-Naqeeb tried to apply a 
different perspective to the study of the relationship between state and society 
in the Gulf, using a set of conceptual tools to generate a “theoretical model of 
society which permits the deduction of a number of postulates concerning the 
active social-cultural dynamics in this society” (1990: 119). With the focus on 
the state within the world system, Ayubi (1995) asserts that persistence of 
authoritarianism in the Gulf is related to change in the mode of production from 
a tributary to a capitalist (and distributive) system that id dependant on global 
                                                            
9
 Among these, the most relevant are: Crystal (1990 & 2005); Chaudhry (1997); Gause (1994); 
Hudson (1995); Herb (1999, 2005 & 2009); Aarts & Nonneman (2005); al-Naqeeb (2006); 
Niblock & Malik (2007); Schwarz (2008); Valeri (2009); Hertog (2006, 2010a & 2010b); Foley 
(2010). 
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dynamics. John E. Peterson has been studying the Gulf for a long time and has 
made some important contributions to the study of political development of 
these states. In his The Arab Gulf states: steps towards political participation 
(Peterson, 1988) he argues that the Gulf monarchies endured because they 
had sought to be accountable to their citizens through a flexible mixture of 
traditional and modern political structures. In “The Arab Gulf states: further 
steps towards political participation” (Peterson, 2006), an update of his earlier 
study, Peterson says that the willingness of the regimes for political reform is 
falling far behind and that there is a reluctance to make fundamental changes. It 
is interesting to note that his view has changed from an appreciation of the 
relationship established between the rulers and the people, to the recognition 
that the reforms are nothing more than cosmetic.  
Anoushiravan Ehteshami has produced several works on political change in the 
oil monarchies. In a political economy analysis he argued that in face of “the 
grave economic differences and social tensions that confront them, the GCC 
rulers have had little choice but to consider the introduction of economic and 
political reforms” (Ehteshami, 2003: 57). He later established the rulers as the 
main “drivers of change”, and concluded that while they “hold power so tightly, 
change will only come if those in power choose to implement it” (Ehteshami & 
Wright, 2007: 914-915). Regarding the key contextual factors on the reform 
agenda he distinguishes between domestic and external, stressing the 
“combination of demographics and unemployment” and the “indirect geopolitical 
effects of the US invasion and occupation of Iraq” respectively (Ehteshami & 
Wright, 2007: 916). Thus it can be seen that he first thought reform was 
inevitable, but has since stated, along the lines of Peterson, that reform can 
only happen if that is what the rulers wish.  
Michael Herb (1999) acknowledges the power that oil rent bestows on the ruling 
elites, but considers it should be treated as an “intervening variable.” Moreover, 
his 2005 statistical analysis of the causes of democratisation in oil-rich countries 
shows that by using a measure of development that excludes the effect of oil on 
the economy in the place of GDP per capita, these countries fit the same 
patterns as other cases; and that measured separately, rent dependence has 
no effect on political change (Herb, 2005).  
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Commenting on the RST, Gregory Gause III argues that depoliticizing effects 
are real, but only at the beginning stages of rentier state development (1994: 
81); and, in his comprehensive account of the international relations of the Gulf 
states, he gives importance to the fact that the region became a “special 
security zone” as Britain’s Labour government decided to withdraw by 1971, 
and that regional states act “more against perceived threats to their own 
domestic stability emanating from abroad” arising from “the salience of 
transnational identities” (2009: 9). Similarly, Marc Valeri (2009) and Calvert 
Jones (2010) reject the idea of rentierism as a model for the Gulf states political 
structure and rather regard it as one of its characteristics. 
In an effort to identify specific variables involved in political change in the Gulf, 
Jill Crystal (1990) has disputed the modernisation theory that rapid social and 
economic change leads to democratisation. Taking Kuwait and Qatar as her 
case studies, she explains how bargaining mechanisms had shifted from the 
rulers depending on the merchants to the merchants depending on the rulers. In 
this sense she borrows much from rentier state theory: political activism is co-
opted, in her view, by oil wealth. However, she finds differences between the 
two cases and makes it clear that the specific characteristics of each Gulf 
monarchy should be considered even if they all share some commonalities. In 
2005 Crystal produced an interesting report on political reform in the GCC. She 
analyses the reforms undertaken by each GCC state and maps out the factors 
which make it more or less likely that efforts for reform will succeed in these 
countries, stressing that although “external factors have played a role, however, 
the driving force for democratisation has been internal” (Crystal, 2005: 5), as 
follows: 
• Internal factors 
- Economic Factors: giving importance to the existing correlation between 
the level of economic development and the likelihood of democracy.  
- Social Structural Factors: discussing the need to experience the 
emergence of middle and working classes; national unity; and civil society.  
- Institutional Factors: considering the building of democratic institutions as 
critical to democratic transition.  
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• External factors: mainly referring to the pressure for political reform 
primarily from the USA, but also from the EU and from other Gulf States 
(in an emulating move).  
A valuable theoretical approach to these matters can be found in the chapter by 
Gerd Nonneman in Reform in the Middle East Oil Monarchies (Ehteshami & 
Wright, 2008). Comparative studies have, as Nonneman stresses, established a 
variety of factors involved in liberalisation and democratisation processes which 
include “the role of domestic actors” and “environmental / structural factors 
(domestic and external) and external actors” (2008: 14). After elaborating on the 
main lessons of democratisation theories, this author provides a list of “key 
factors relevant to liberalisation in the GCC states”, although indicating that 
these aspects “overlap and interlink” (Nonneman, 2008: 18), including: socio-
economic development, the middle class and civil society; state and regime 
types; cultural factors and political culture; and external factors. 
The perspective adopted by Adam Hanieh gives weight to the globalisation 
factor. He explains that despite oil being the “major factor differentiating the 
region from any other in the world”, it should be regarded as “a commodity 
embedded in a set of (globally determined) social relations” (2011: 15-16). 
Hanieh explains that it cannot be assumed that rentierism, or the actions and 
decisions by rentier elites, determine social relations (and political orientations) 
by themselves. Conversely, he puts the focus on Gulf capitalism and he 
considers Gulf class formation to have “evolved alongside and within the 
development of a global capitalist system” and that nor oil neither the state are 
the only catalysts for social and political change (Hanieh, 2011: 15-16). 
However, one of the most influential views over rentierism is currently that of 
Steffen Hertog. He has identified historical continuities in the way politics and 
state-business relations function in the Gulf, and argues that several of these 
continuities do not fit the ‘resource curse’ theory of rentier states (2006, 2010a 
& 2010b). In this regard, he argues that most Gulf capitalists’ “activities still 
amount to more sophisticated rent recycling rather than autonomous 
diversification…[and that this explains their] weak role in today’s political arena 
despite a strong pre-oil history of collective action” (Hertog, 2013: 1).  
Although some scholars mention political culture as an important factor when 
studying Gulf political developments, when it comes to the empirical research 
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most research has been done from political economy and international relations 
perspectives, and less attention has been paid to the impact of domestic 
dynamics on political change or stasis. Behavioural and political culture 
approaches have been largely avoided, with only a few scholars studying the 
role of ‘agency’ in Gulf state-society relations and political performance, and 
even less within social sciences theoretical frameworks, or indeed applying 
quantitative methods. Among these, the most relevant are those of Carapico 
(1998) on civil society in Yemen; Longva (1997) and Tétreault (2000) on society 
structure and political participation Kuwait; Eickelman (1984, et al.) and Valeri 
(2009, et al.) on the socio-politics of Oman; Rugh on leadership political culture 
in the UAE (2007); and Krause (2008) on women civil society in the UAE. More 
recently, however, some scholars have questioned more explicitly that a rentier 
economy automatically depoliticizes the population (Mitchell, 2010); and Gray 
stresses that rentierism should take into consideration the changing 
socioeconomic demands of the population (2011: 23). Adding to this list, a more 
comprehensive source that to some extent distances from previous theories of 
democratisation, identifies four forces as the main shapers of current political 
attitudes and behaviour across the Gulf (Tétreault, 2011 et al.):  
 - Movements to broaden women’s political participation. 
 - The media. 
 - Current US national security policy. 
 - Regional defence cooperation. 
Even if I do not neglect the relation between socio-economic conditions and the 
political orientations, it seems not to be the determinant variable for political 
change, but rather many other factors also have a role in these dynamics 
(including, but not limited to, institutional factors). In this regard, the suggestion 
by Jackman and Miller (1996) that the political culture approach needs to recast 
in institutional terms makes a lot of sense, but the same is valid in the opposite 
direction: structural approaches should not ignore the importance of political 
culture. 
Authoritarian politics in the MENA region has been a key focus of research in 
the Spanish academia, despite the lack of audience these works have enjoyed 
among English literature. However, only a few of them deal with the political 
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experiences of the GCC states. An early work by Bernabé López García and 
Cecilia Fernández Suzor on the Arab regimes and their constitutions included a 
chapter on Saudi Arabia and one on the smaller Gulf monarchies (1985). López 
García’s later monograph and his later book written in collaboration with 
Fernando Bravo (2011) on political history in the Arab and Islamic world, are 
two valuable titles but only cover briefly the Gulf cases. Similarly, the 
comprehensive volume on the Arab state ‘crisis’ by Gema Martín Muñoz does 
not get into much detail with regard to these countries, except for an interesting 
discussion on the Kuwaiti electoral system and of the shura practices in Saudi 
Arabia (1999: 140-150). Likewise, the edited book by Ferrán Izquierdo Brichs 
(2009; and published in English in 2012) includes a chapter by Eduard Soler 
and Luciano Zaccara (and a commentary by Fred Halliday) on Saudi Arabia 
state-society relations. The latter forms part of the several efforts made by 
Izquierdo to explore the forces behind the persistence of authoritarianism in the 
MENA region, and which have materialised in his eloquent sociology of power 
theoretical framework that explains regime stability or crisis through elite-people 
relations and the level of elite control over resources of power (2007-2012). 
Finally, the Hesperia Journal monograph on Qatar includes an article on 
political reform by Ignacio Gutiérrez de Terán and Leyla Hamad Zahonero 
(2009); and the volume by Gutiérrez de Terán and Ignacio Álvarez-Ossorio a 
chapter on the case of Bahrain by Luis Mesa (2011).  
Other relevant works concerned with democratisation and authoritarianism in 
this region, but which do not study the Gulf, are the volumes by Lopez García, 
Martín Muñoz y Miguel Hernando de Larramendi (1991), Álvarez-Ossorio and 
Zaccara (2009), María Angustias Parejo (2010), Álvarez-Ossorio (2013); and 
the articles by Luciano Zaccara on elections in the GCC (2012; 2013). Finally, 
researches by Inmaculada Szmolka on regime types (2010; 2011) and on 
processes of political change in the Arab world (2012; 2013) are also relevant 
for the present study. 
2.4. The political culture perspective 
“The notion of political culture has been around as long as men have spoken 
and written about politics” (Almond, 1989: 1). In their seminal work ‘The Civic 
Culture’ (1963), Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba explain how the designed 
theoretical and methodological framework had received influences from 
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“historians, social philosophers, anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists, 
and psychiatrists who have been concerned with the relations between the 
psychological and political characteristics of nations” since ancient times 
(Almond & Verba, 1963: 13). However, it was not until their study that an 
attempt was done “to explore empirically one of the less studied (...) realms of 
politics, namely, the role played by the political culture” (Wiatr, 1989: 103); and 
with a focus on the “relationship between political culture [agency] and political 
structure” (Lijphart, 1989: 37). Although The Civic Culture deals with the political 
orientations in five countries with established democratic systems, the 
categories and classifications developed by its authors are useful for the study 
of the political culture of citizens in any regime type because they enable us “to 
formulate hypotheses about relationships among the different components of 
culture and to test these hypotheses empirically” (Almond & Verba, 1963: 14). 
Hence, it is from them that I borrow the framework for the analysis of the Emirati 
educated youth political orientations, as well as the definition of the concept 
political culture: 
 “[T]he particular distribution of patterns of orientations towards 
political objects among the members of a nation”; the “political 
orientations–attitudes toward the political system and its various 
parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system” (Almond 
& Verba, 1963: 13).  
 
Emerging in the aftermath of World War II and under the auspice of the 
behavioural revolution, the political culture perspective states that there is a 
direct and causal relationship between socio-economic structures, the shaping 
of ordinary citizens’ political orientations, and the development and 
maintenance (or failure) of democracy. Thus, it argues that political orientations 
and mass beliefs (which are inferred from individual level findings) have an 
aggregate effect on political change, legitimacy and stability of regimes 
(Inglehart & Welzel, 2009b: 298). Following Parsons and Shils, Almond and 
Verba identified three types or modes of political orientations toward political 
objects (1963: 15): 
- Cognitive orientation: knowledge of and belief about the political system, 
and its roles and incumbents of these roles. 
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- Affective orientation: feelings about the political system, its roles, actors 
and performance. 
- Evaluational orientation: judgments and opinions about political objects.  
 In Almond and Verba’s work, the ‘general’ political system (including structures, 
actors and policies) and the ‘self’ as political actor are differentiated. Thus, 
evaluation of  the political culture of an individual should incorporate an 
exploration in his orientations towards the system as a general object (state and 
political system’s history, size, location, power, constitution, etc); towards ‘input’ 
objects (structures and roles, political elites and policy proposals they are 
involved in the upward flow of policy making, such as political parties, interest 
groups and the media); towards ‘output’ objects (downward flow of institutional 
policy enforcement, structures, individuals and decisions involved in these 
processes, such as bureaucracies and courts); and towards himself as a 
member of his political system (the “self” as an object). Hence, “characterizing 
the political culture of a nation means (...) filling in such a matrix for a valid 
sample of its population” (Almond & Verba, 1963: 17). 
Despite Almond and Verba’s categorisation of political culture in three main 
types (parochial, when orientations towards objects approaches zero; subject, if 
high frequency of orientations towards the system and its output aspects, but 
orientations towards input objects and the self as active participant approach 
zero; and participant, when its members are oriented towards all objects), they 
clarify that one orientation does not necessarily replace the others and that this 
classification “does not imply homogeneity or uniformity of political cultures” 
(Almond & Verba, 1963: 20), meaning all of them can be present and interact 
with each other in one country. Accordingly, they present a classification of 
political culture subclasses (parochial-subject, subject-participant and parochial-
participant), and an ideal culture: the civic culture, which they describe as a 
pluralistic culture of consensus and diversity that permits changes but 
moderates them. Moreover, as long as it refers to some collective unit, political 
culture can be studied at different levels (e.g. elites, masses, technocrats, 
students, etc.).  
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Table 1: Congruence of political cultures10 
 Allegiance Apathy Alienation 
Cognitive orientation + + + 
Affective orientation + 0 – 
Evaluative orientation + 0 – 
 
Finally, The Civic Culture explains how “political cultures may not be congruent 
with the structures of the political system”: a parochial culture would be 
congruent to a ‘traditional’ political system; a subject culture to a centralized 
authoritarian structure; and a participant one to a democratic structure; and how 
they tend to be incongruent to each other, especially in ‘transitional’ countries. 
For the study of congruence between political culture and structures the authors 
provide a scale by which ‘allegiance’ is predominant if orientations to objects 
approach unity; ‘apathy’ when congruence is weak (political structure is 
cognized but the frequency of positive feeling and evaluation approaches 
indifference or zero); and ‘alienation’ when a culture shows signs of 
incongruence (negative affect and evaluation) (See Table 1). This scale can, 
moreover, reflect the stability or instability of a system because incongruence 
“may take the form of a simple rejection of a particular set of role incumbents 
(e.g. particular dynasty and its bureaucracy); or it may be an aspect of a 
systemic change, that is, a change from a simpler pattern of political culture to a 
more complex one” (Almond & Verba, 1963: 20-26). 
‘Political socialisation’ is understood in the political culture approach as the 
process by which people acquire political cognition, attitudes, and behaviours 
(Greenstein (1965); Hyman (1969); Niemi (1974, 1995); Sapiro (2004); Sigel 
(1965); et al.) or, in other words, the process by which a given ‘political culture’ 
is attained (Almond & Verba (1963 & 1980); Pye (1971); Inglehart (1988, 2000, 
2005); et al.). Political socialisation takes place through the exposure to new or 
reshaped ‘agents of political socialisation’, including the family and friends, the 
school, the religious temple or clerics (if there are any involved), the work group, 
associations and/or political parties, the media, and the government institutions. 
Moreover, this process can take place in ‘manifest’ or ‘latent’ ways, for it 
involves the direct communication of information, values or feelings towards 
                                                            
10
 Source: Almond & Verba (1963: 22). 
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political objects, for instance, through school curricula; while they also entail the 
transmission of non-political values that affect attitudes towards analogous roles 
and objects in the political system, for example, through family interaction. In 
this regard, Almond and Verba observe “how men and women, occupational 
and income groups, educational and religious groups are oriented toward the 
political structure” and that the educational level was the variable having the 
strongest relationship with political attitudes (Almond & Verba, 1963: 377). This 
attests to the relevance of conducting surveys at different levels, and more 
specifically to the importance of analysing the political culture of the educated 
youth, as this dissertation does.  
In sum, the political culture perspective is concerned with the link between 
people’s political orientations and regime types, and it sees socioeconomic 
development favouring democracy, but because people become increasingly 
articulated, capable, and “motivated to demand democratization from the elites” 
(Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). On the other hand, authoritarianism persists while 
elites are not confronted with well-organised and motivated masses, and not 
only as a consequence of repression or co-optation (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). 
Moreover, the analysis of the effects of globalisation (economic, cultural and 
political) on societies, and of their political orientations as an intervening 
variable between the socioeconomic conditions and political change are 
relevant for this study, for “people’s prevailing beliefs translate socioeconomic 
conditions into the collective actions that attain, sustain, and deepen 
democracy” (Inglehart & Welzel, 2009b: 301) or other types of regime. In this 
regard, a supportive perspective comes from international relations and 
globalisation academic James N. Rosenau who argues that the decline of ‘fixed 
identities’ leads to “the imposition of an inescapable and unrelenting autonomy 
on many people” (Rosenau, 2003: 25); that a ‘skill revolution’ has been taking 
place for some years and that “ordinary persons (…) are increasingly 
competent” (Rosenau, 2008: 15); and that individuals become key variables for 
macro structures, which interact at different levels (Rosenau, 2008: 15). 
Accordingly, he claims the need is for a “heightened focus on demographic 
trends, social capital, immigrants and reactions to them, the role of networks 
and smart mobs, emerging identities, corrupt officials and executives…” 
Rosenau (2008: 7-15). By the same token, I argue here that rentierism fast-
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forwarded the incorporation of Gulf society into the globalisation processes, not 
only in its economic dimension, but understood as the growing 
interconnectedness between people and places worldwide, and between time 
and space (Giddens, 1990). 
As explained above, the debate between advocates and opponents of this 
approach has run since The Civic Culture was published until today, which 
indicates the contribution that this work has made to the social sciences. One of 
its main supporters, who has further elaborated the theory of political culture is 
Ronald Inglehart, who contends that “political culture may be a crucial link 
between economic development and democracy” (1990: 45), and that regime 
“survival depends on the values and beliefs of ordinary citizens” (2000: 96). In 
an analysis of global World Values Survey (WVS) data, himself and Christian 
Welzel (2005) have found a significant relationship between demands for 
democracy and peoples’ adherence to secular and self-expression values, as 
well as the emphasis on human freedom. Moreover, in a ‘revised theory of 
modernisation’, they explain that socio-economic development is associated 
with the fading of “existential threats” on a mass level. However, they argue that 
at different phases of development different values emerge, that secular values 
are compatible with certain forms of authoritarianism, but that self-expression 
values are not because these encompass a “humanistic transformation” through 
which people become gradually empowered to challenge authoritarianism 
(Inglehart & Welzel, 2005: 150-157). Finally, “trust, tolerance, and feelings of 
efficacy represent ‘civic virtues’ that enable democratic regimes to function 
effectively” (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005: 157). By the same token, they claim that, 
in the absence of those attributes, it is unlikely that democracy emerges, 
survives or consolidates.  
Criticism against the political culture approach mainly emerges from the neo-
institutionalist that think democratic values or attitudes follow growing income 
equality, capital mobility, and elite-led political reform (Schmitter, et al. (1991); 
Jackman & Miller (1996); Acemoglu & Robinson (2006)). In this regard, 
Jackman and Miller affirmed they found “little evidence to indicate a systematic 
relationship between political culture and political and economic performance” 
and considered the political culture approach needs to acknowledge a more 
relevant role of institutional/structural factors (Jackman & Miller, 1996: 632-633). 
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These authors seem to understand political culture studies as willing to 
demonstrate that particular cultures have specific characteristics that make 
them different to other societies, and ultimately determine economic and 
political outcomes. They are right in their understanding of correlation between 
culture and outcome, but they miss the fact that, although political culture 
proponents tends to use normative terms which may lead to confusion (e.g. 
culture, traditional, modern/isation, et al.), they do not consider the different 
political culture types as intrinsic to one or another society.  
Moreover, rather than linking more or less ‘democratic’ beliefs to certain 
cultures, the political culture approach associates them to historical, social and 
economic circumstances: “social configurations that induce more secure 
existential conditions (e.g. economic prosperity, physical security, cross-cutting 
cleavages, and moderate social polarization) nourish open belief systems”; 
while “social configurations that induce existential pressures (e.g. precarious 
economic conditions, crime and war, conflated cleavages, and extreme social 
polarization) are conductive to closed belief systems” (Inglehart & Welzel, 2009: 
300). Accordingly, the political culture approach must be well differentiated 
other ‘cultural’ approaches that make generalisations about the beliefs, norms 
and values of societies and treat them as stable mentalities belonging to 
particular nations or regions (e.g. Huntington, 1996). Finally, Muller and 
Seligson (1994: 646) have challenged idea that interpersonal trust is an 
attitudinal prerequisite for stable democracy, which is one of the main 
assumptions of the paradigm; and they suggest that the study of political culture 
of elites might be more appropriate. 
Following decades of encountered debates on this issues, students of 
democracy and authoritarianism have agreed that “context matters,” and 
therefore gradually adopted approaches that took in to account “structural, 
cultural, institutional, and strategic; social, economic, and political; international, 
domestic and local” (Franzese, 2007: 29); as well as historical factors. Yet some 
proponents still put more emphasis on structural and others on systemic factors. 
In this regard, an updated version of the ‘state-in-society’ paradigm put forward 
by Kamrava (probably with the Middle East in mind), which suggests that six 
elements should be considered in these kind of analysis: state; society; political 
culture; political economy; extra-national influences and forces; and random 
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occurrences (2008: 47), seems holistic and flexible enough to better understand 
state-society relations in the UAE. Furthermore and again influenced by other 
social sciences approaches, there is wide agreement that a combination of 
qualitative and quantitative research methods is the most desired choice to 
conduct comparative politics research. Accordingly, this dissertation uses both 
methods.   
2.5. Literature on the UAE case 
The abovementioned edited books and articles on political liberalisation in the 
Gulf published since the 2000s dedicate little space to the UAE case, and only a 
few chapters and articles have commented on aspects directly related to the 
topics of this dissertation. Commenting on the prospects for political change in 
the UAE, Sean Foley supports a ‘necessity’ thesis which sees the rulers obliged 
to reform the political systems if they want to survive and in face of “domestic 
and security challenges” (Foley, 1999: 25); while Fatima al-Sayegh sees the 
9/11 terrorist attacks as the main factor pushing towards reform and argues that 
“diversification away from oil dependency (...) will fuel success for 
[democratisation]” (al-Sayegh, 2004: 123). Similarly, Frauke Heard-Bey, also 
pointed at 9/11 as the turning point that made the UAE tackle the democratic 
deficit with more urgency (Heard-Bey, 2005: 367). Moreover, she is confident 
that changes will “come about through consultation rather than confrontation” 
(Heard-Bey 2005: 375). In a more inclusive position, Christian Koch supports 
the idea that political reform was “accelerated by pressures from globalization 
and political fallout from events such as the 9/11 and the Iraq War,” but adds 
that “local observation of reform measures implemented elsewhere in the 
region,” “a better education system and a freer media environment” also 
contributed to the enhancement of political awareness among Emiratis (Koch, 
2011: 173).  
In a comparison of the cases on Kuwait and the UAE, Michael Herb argues that 
the fact that “political liberalisation and economic diversification have not gone 
hand in hand (...) is no accident” (Herb, 2009: 375), and that while “Kuwait’s 
higher levels of political participation have exacerbated its economic 
dependence on oil,” in the UAE “a Kuwaiti-style parliament…would repudiate 
[its] economic model” (Herb, 2009: 390-392). Citing Adam Przeworski, he 
explains that the reasons for this “are specific to the peculiar political economy 
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of these labour markets: in these richest of rentier-states, there is little need for 
the class compromise between capitalists and workers on which capitalist 
democracy usually rests” (Herb, 2009: 375). Christopher Davidson had only 
touched on this topic in his initial works and agreed that rentierism hindered 
political liberalisation in the UAE (Davidson, 2005; 2008a; 2009a). Davidson 
focused on the economic aspects of this process, as the title of one of his 
chapters reflects: ‘The United Arab Emirates: economy first, politics second’ 
(2009b), and argued that “the UAE’s rapid economic development may soon 
serve as a catalyst for more meaningful political reform” (Davidson, 2008b: 
118). In fact, he was confident that a “major boost for the prospects of 
meaningful civil society, and perhaps the most important glimmer of hope for 
political liberalization in the UAE, has been the state’s enforced retreat from the 
control of information” (Davidson, 2008b: 125). Finally, in his post-Arab spring 
monograph Davidson elaborates on the variables relevant for monarchical 
survival or collapse, and concludes (not very convincingly) that rising domestic 
and external pressures will inevitably cause the collapse of the Gulf monarchies 
in a scope of two to five years (Davidson, 2012: ix).  
Authors have broadly commented on the political culture of Emiratis (normally 
insisting in the lack of political awareness), but very little systematic research 
has been conducted on Emirati nationals political culture as it relates to the 
potential for political change. Two relevant works are the PhD dissertations by 
Abdulkhaleq Abdulla (1984), and by Hendrik Van Der Meulen (1997). Abdulla 
focuses on the internal political consequences of the integration of the UAE into 
the global capitalist system that make the UAE an authoritarian “dependent 
capitalist country” (1984: 288); while Van Der Meulen provides an extensive 
survey of the role of tribal and kinship ties in UAE politics. Additionally, a 
comprehensive study of the UAE leaders’ political culture is ‘The Political 
Culture of Leadership in the United Arab Emirates’ by Andrea Rugh, which 
describes the history of leadership in the UAE and explains how tribal political 
culture has evolved in parallel to the political system, but maintaining many 
aspects of the ‘tribal culture’. However, the approach of Rugh is historical–
anthropological oriented rather than focused on people’s political attitudes or 
orientations.    
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Regarding the study of UAE political culture through the analysis of 
representative survey data it is worth mentioning the work by Mohammed 
Khalfan (1997), in which he examines the opinions of FNC members and the 
intellectual elite towards the practicality of having the Federal National Council 
of the United Arab Emirates become an elective body. Since it analyses 
orientations towards hypothetical political reform, this may be considered an 
elite political culture study. Other public opinion surveys have been conducted 
in the UAE by specialized polling institutions, including Zogby, Gallup and Pew 
centers, as further reviewed in part II of this dissertation. These, nevertheless, 
tend to exclude sensitive political questions and therefore barely qualify as 
political culture research. 
3. Research methodology 
This research is multidisciplinary not only theoretically, but also 
methodologically since political science borrows research techniques from 
different social sciences, mainly sociology and social anthropology. Thus, a 
balance has been kept between qualitative and quantitative research 
techniques in order to offer more a comprehensive analysis, and to present a 
broader picture of UAE state-society relations. 
At the initial stages, an extensive review of all works relevant to the research 
questions and the hypotheses was done to identify the topic’s “state of the art”, 
covering both area studies and disciplinary publications. Being a case study as 
it is, the most appropriate theories and approaches were identified, in order to 
decide on the research techniques and strategies that should be tested and 
applied in the process of elaborating the research, conducting it, and analysing 
obtained data for this dissertation.   
The most common technique borrowed from sociology employed by political 
scientists to evaluate the political culture of people has been surveying, thus its 
use was considered as a key technique for this research since the beginning. 
However, since quantitatively gathered and analysed data only was not 
considered to be fully reliable on its own, qualitative data that provides direct 
input from people was also included to complement the survey quantitative 
data, as it will be explained in detail in the following sections.   
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Other qualitative techniques borrowed from social anthropology by political 
scientists in order to capture the general picture as well as the particular stories, 
impressions and experiences of people include participant observation, semi-
structured interviews and informal conversations, all of which have been 
implemented during the course of this research.  
Participant observation took place for almost a year, from 4th April 2011 to 4th 
March 2012. During these months several courses at the Humanities and Social 
Sciences Faculty at the UAEU were attended, where I participated in the 
discussions held in the classroom, while observing the teaching dynamics and 
the taught curricula. This technique allowed the establishing of relationships 
with students, an important part of the survey’s population. Likewise, the 
coexistence with students at the University residence facilitated a better 
understanding of the type of life students from other emirates have, and about 
the topics they discuss in their free time during their university studies. 
Moreover, some of them were eager to be interviewed, since this personal 
contact allowed them to fully understand the aim of my research, and had no 
doubts about second intentions.  
In addition, during the same period over 50 in-depth semi-structured interviews 
and countless informal conversations were conducted with university students, 
professors, politicians, members of parliament, political and human rights 
activists, and journalists in several cities of the country (Abu Dhabi, al-Ain, 
Dubai, Sharjah). The information obtained through these qualitative techniques 
has been documented either on recording transcriptions and written notes or 
only written notes, in the cases where recordings made participants uneasy. 
All the data obtained through the survey, participant observation, semi-
structured interviews and informal conversations have followed the same 
principles: detailed information on the research has been given to participants 
before they took part in it; their consent has been obtained; their anonymity has 
been protected, using a pseudonym system that assigns one to each of them in 
the stored data, and without mentioning them throughout research and writing 
of this dissertation (unless they wanted it differently); in the case that any 
participant’s responses have been found ambiguous or unclear, they have been 
contacted to check with them about the exact meaning/wording. 
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Finally, it is worth mentioning that during this period several academic events in 
al-Ain, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and in other GCC states (Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain) 
were attended; the 2011 Election Day was observed by accessing one of the 
polling stations in Dubai; and a session of the FNC was witnessed. All of these 
experiences facilitated the acquisition of a broader understanding of UAE’s 
political scene. 
3.1. Surveying the Middle East 
 The conduction of public opinion surveys on political issues is relatively recent 
in the MENA region due to constrains that restrict this kind of polling in 
authoritarian regimes, and only became widespread after the September 11 
attacks, when interest about Arab views grew in the United States. Accordingly, 
several institutions engaged in the complicated task of gathering opinions in this 
region, including renowned University of Michigan World Values Survey,11 the 
World Public Opinion,12 the Pew Research Center,13 the Gallup Center, and 
James and John Zogby’s polling companies.14  
Among these, the most comprehensive surveys on political issues have been 
conducted in the MENA countries by the Zogby brothers for the Arab American 
Institute Foundation (AII), 15  as well in collaboration with Professor Shibley 
Telhami from the Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development at the 
University of Maryland.16 Since 2002 the AAI has conducted dozens of polls in a 
number of Arab countries, including the UAE, but these mostly focus on 
gauging the opinion about regional conflicts and perceptions over terrorism and 
US foreign policy, and are generally not concerned about domestic politics. 
However, a few of them have included questions related to internal issues, 
including satisfaction regarding authorities, the need for political reform, as well 
as identity and leadership.  
Under the label of ‘Annual Arab Public Opinion Survey’, the Sadat Chair in 
collaboration with Zogby has conducted surveys on a yearly basis since 2003. 
These have also enquired mainly about the US, Iran, the Palestinian conflict, 
the Iraq war or the Arab Spring; and have also been conducted in several Arab 
                                                            
11
 www.worldvaluessurvey.org  
12
 http://worldpublicopinion.org/ 
13
 www.pewglobal.org/ 
14
 www.zogbyanalytics.com; www.zogbyresearchservices.com 
15
 www.aaiusa.org 
16
 http://sadat.umd.edu/ 
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countries, including Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and the 
UAE. Yet their results are unfortunately not available disaggregated by country 
and it is therefore only possible to explore them combined. While based in the 
UAE, Gallup surveyed the GCC populations (with the exception of Oman) in 
their 2011 survey ‘Progress and Tradition in the Gulf Cooperation Council 
States’. Although the survey focused on “issues ranging from wellbeing and 
education to family and religion” (Gallup, 2011), section four explored attitudes 
toward religion, migration, and civic engagement. It did however not include any 
specific questions about internal or regional politics. 
Additionally, the Arab Barometer (AB) under the leadership of Professor Mark 
Tessler at Michigan University; 17  and the ‘Arab Opinion Index’ of the Arab 
Center for Research and Policy Studies in Doha (Qatar), 18  have also 
contributed with important polls in Arab countries during the last decade; but 
none of them have included the UAE among the countries surveyed. The works 
by the AB are nonetheless the most significant of all the above for this 
dissertation since they are concerned with national political culture, and 
therefore “measure and track over time citizen attitudes, values, and behavior 
patterns relating to pluralism, freedoms, tolerance and equal opportunity; social 
and inter-personal trust; social, religious and political identities; conceptions of 
governance and an understanding of democracy; and civic engagement and 
political participation.”19 The AB polls have been conducted in six Arab countries 
including Morocco, Algeria, Kuwait, Palestine (West Bank and Gaza), Jordan, 
Lebanon and Yemen. With the aforementioned political culture theorists in mind 
(Almond & Verba; Inglehart & Welzel), Tessler and Gao select six elements that 
they consider relevant for the study of political culture orientations: support for 
gender equality, tolerance, interpersonal trust, civic participation, political 
interest, and political knowledge (2009: 198). Tessler, Amaney and Robbins 
(2012) use the former in a post-Arab spring analysis, which makes interesting 
findings through the examination of public opinion data gathered by the Arab 
Barometer in the periods of 2006-2007 and 2010-2011. First, they identify that 
one constant has been the “overwhelming support for democracy” (2012: 89); 
second, they observe that support for the role of religion in politics and for 
                                                            
17
 http://www.arabbarometer.org/ 
18
 http://english.dohainstitute.org 
19
 http://www.arabbarometer.org/content/arab-barometer-i 
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government declined; and third, that support for political diversity increased 
(Tessler, Amaney and Robbins, 2012: 89).  
Some more specific surveys have been conducted in the UAE in recent years 
that are of relevance to this research. Muhammad Khalfan’s 1997 PhD 
dissertation on the practicality of having the FNC become an elective body; 
several surveys by the Dubai think tank B’huth; 20  the Dubai School of 
Government survey on the role of women in the 2006 FNC elections (mentioned 
in chapter 3); a government ordered survey for 800 Emiratis by Zogby to gauge 
Emirati perceptions of the 2011 election process; a study of 200 university 
students by UAEU senior student Fatima Al Maamari (Salem, 2012); the survey 
conducted by Calvert Jones to over 5,000 youth at schools across the UAE for 
her PhD dissertation on social engineering (Jones, 2013); and an unpublished 
study by Georges Naufal, Ismail Genc, and Carlos Vargas-Silva (2014) that 
surveys Arab students perceptions of the Arab Spring at UAE universities, 
which was prepared for a CIRS workshop. Unfortunately, though, only some of 
these polls could be accessed for the elaboration of this research, being most of 
them not available to the public.  
3.2. The survey: obstacles faced and implementation 
For the purposes of this research the ideal would have been to conduct a 
survey among all UAE’s citizens, but due to the restrictions and sensitivity of the 
Emirati security apparatus with regards to political research, it was considered 
more attainable to limit the survey to a smaller population: the Emirati university 
students.21 
Initially, the survey was going to be conducted in several universities of each of 
the seven emirates, and in both private and public universities, however due to 
approval issues with several institutions it was decided to limit the 
implementation of this technique to only one, the United Arab Emirates 
University (UAEU, in Al-Ain, Abu Dhabi). The reasons to choose this institution 
were many: it is the first and oldest of the three main public universities 
                                                            
20
 www.bhuth.ae 
21
 Initially it was also planned to pass a second questionnaire to the members of the FNC, but 
after several tries through different channels this could not be achieved. 
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(established in 1976) in the country,22 it has the largest ratio of Emirati students 
and professors to that of foreigners (which was of much relevance to my 
research), which come from the seven Emirates, and it has the first and one of 
the very few departments of Political Science in the country. Moreover, several 
professors of this department had publishing quite controversial articles in 
Emirati newspapers prior to my first fieldwork visit to the UAE, through which 
they both advocated for political reform and democracy in a very open way, and 
were therefore identified as key informants for this research. 
Nevertheless, getting the approval at UAEU was not easy, as it took almost one 
year to redesign the questionnaire, do the pilot study, make some final changes, 
and finally get the approval from the university authorities to distribute the 
questionnaire to the students.  In this regard, several professors at UAEU were 
very helpful for they explained the steps that should be followed to get the 
authorisation from the university. First an application, along with the 
questionnaire, a summary of the research project, and the ethical approval 
granted by the University of Exeter had to be submitted to the UAEU Ethical 
Committee.23 After some months without a response to the request, the initial 
permission granted by Zayed University (ZU) to broadcast my questionnaire 
(which was finally rejected) seemed to be the turning point that made the UAEU 
grant their approval in just a few days. By the time the official authorization was 
given the research fieldwork was by, hence the questionnaire could not be 
personally distributed as was initially devised, but an online platform to publish it 
and collect the responses could be used to implement this technique. Finally, 
the link to the questionnaire was sent by email to the surveyed population on 7th 
March 2012. 
The implementation of the survey through an online platform carries both 
disadvantages and advantages. Firstly, not being able to include in the sample 
a specific number of random students from each degree meant it would be a 
“volunteer” sample because people from the population would choose to 
respond or not and, therefore, there would be issues of sample selection (i.e. 
representativeness) (Evans & Mathur, 2005: 201). On the other hand, online 
                                                            
22
 The other two are Zayed University (which used to be only for female students, but now offers 
some programmes for male students too), located in Dubai, and the Higher Colleges of 
Technology, which are spread around the different Emirates. 
23
 See Ethical Approval Certificates in Annex 3. 
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surveys are thought to obtain higher response rates than do other survey types 
(Fricker & Schonlau, 2002), thus this way of implementing the survey might 
have had a positive impact as it allowed a large number of responses, despite 
not being selected according to a sample. Secondly, not having human contact 
in online surveys can have a positive or negative impact, since it limits the 
ability of the interviewer to explain unclear questions or terms, but it also avoids 
any influence that the interviewer’s body or explicit language can have on the 
respondent. Moreover, regarding the data analysis, using an electronic survey 
environment avoids the manual input of each response, therefore saving a lot of 
time and effort. 
Finally, as it happens in authoritarian contexts, students might have 
encountered some privacy and security issues mainly associated with the level 
of anonymity of the information they provided and with the ways in which the 
data was going to be treated (Berry, 2004). These issues may have aroused in 
this case because participants received the link to the questionnaire through 
their university, thus some responses may have been influenced by the fact that 
some participants might fear that someone unrelated to this research could 
have accessed them. However, the online platform chosen to implement the 
survey (SurveyMonkey) sticks to a privacy policy that in principle guarantees a 
high level of security regarding the data collected through their website, where 
they state that they “will never use your survey questions or responses other 
than in accordance with this privacy policy unless we have your consent,” and 
that “SurveyMonkey does not ever disclose your survey questions or responses 
unless you permit or request for us to do so.” Furthermore, they explain that 
surveys are stored in a certified ‘SunGard’ data centre protected by various 
means, which should be very difficult to penetrate by the UAEU or UAE 
authorities, if they had any interest in having a look at the responses.24 
3.3. The design of the questionnaire  
In order to design the questionnaire, instruments prepared by organizations with 
experience in the region such as the Arab Barometer, the Gallup Center, and 
the Dubai School of Government, among other institutions that conduct surveys 
around the world were closely studied (e.g. World Values Survey, Zogby 
                                                            
24
 See SurveyMonkey (2013, September 9) and SurveyMonkey (2013, October 29) for more 
details. 
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surveying companies).  An interview with a member of Gallup Center in Abu 
Dhabi25 helped in identifying the challenges faced when conducting surveys in 
the UAE, and to learn from their experience in the region. Among the things 
mentioned was the fact that in the surveys Gallup conducted in the Gulf they 
had to remove some of the political questions they normally ask in other 
countries.26 
Also, the advice of several professors at UAEU was very helpful in the 
rephrasing of some questions to make them less sensitive, but keeping their 
relevance and with no impact in the content itself. An example of it may be 
changing “what is your level of trust in the following institutions” for “how 
effective you think” they are; or putting “general working class” rather than 
“lower class” to avoid potential offenses.  
Table 2: Total population (2012 Spring semester) and survey responses 
Total population (Emirati non-1st year 
undergraduates)27 
6,629 
Total responses 689 (10.39%) 
Total valid responses (Sex non-missing) 469 (7.07%) 
 
Finally, the involvement of some female UAEU students28 in the conduction of 
the preliminary pilot study (gathering ten students enrolled in different years and 
disciplines as respondents), and the final version of the questionnaire was also 
very helpful, as it ensured all questions were understandable in both English 
and Arabic. Moreover, it also facilitated to build a trustful relationship with them, 
to make them familiar with the research (and its genuine intentions), and to gain 
through them the confidence of other students who were not met personally.  
The surveyed population were all UAEU non-first year undergraduate students 
registered at the UAEU during the spring term of 2012.29 The questionnaire link 
                                                            
25
 The centre was closed in 2012 under unclear circumstances, which may point at 
disagreement with the authorities (Personal interview with Emirati professor, Dubai, April 2013). 
26
 This interview took place in May 2011. 
27
 The total number of undergraduate students registered in the UAEU during the 2012 Spring 
semester was 11,649, of which 9,621 were Emiratis (and children of National women), being 
6,629 undergraduate and not 1
st
 year students.  Source: UAEU Statistical Year Book 2011-2012. 
28
 These students made up also the bulk of the semi-structured interviews and informal 
conversations conducted while in the UAE (and later by e-mail and Facebook). 
29
 The decision of not surveying first year students was based in the understanding that after 
one year of study at university, during which people are exposed to a broader range of ideas 
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was sent by email on 7th March 2012, and responses started to arrive the same 
day, unexpectedly reaching the number of 414 only in the first 24 hours. After 
this surprising beginning, the number of responses per day decreased 
gradually, and completely stopped during two weeks before the closing of the 
collection period on 15th April 2012. Since all the literature on UAE society 
describes Emiratis as uninterested in politics, it was expected to have a low 
response rate, which would not allow making any inferential assumptions.  
Nevertheless, the final response rate (or participation rate, as some prefer to 
call it for being self–selected)30 was 689. As shown on table 2, this number 
meant that over 10 per cent of the total population did respond, and more than 
seven per cent of them were valid responses. 
3.4 Preliminary analysis of data 
Adding to the aforementioned disadvantages of the online collection of 
responses, a further problem arose when data was looked at closely: there was 
a high risk of having ‘non-response’ bias. Not requiring the participants to 
answer every single question, and the length of the questionnaire due to the 
high number of issues addressed (See Survey Questionnaire in Annex 2), made 
an important number of people leave some questions unanswered, especially 
those at the end (i.e. the demographic ones which were to serve as 
independent variables).  
Despite this bias potentiality, the weighting of some of the variables allowed the 
sample to better reflect the population, not only avoiding the ‘non-response’ 
bias, but also reducing the ‘self-selection’ bias (i.e. the fact that only the people 
who chose to did respond), even if the latter is impossible to completely 
remove.  In order to decide by which variables was most appropriate to weight 
the data, some frequency analyses were run in order see a better picture of the 
missing values. These test showed that around 200 values were missing in all 
the demographic questions, thus confirming that the ‘non-response’ pattern had 
most probably not to do with the sensitivity of the topics being asked (or the fear 
to answer to specific questions), but rather with a matter of lack of time or 
willingness to fully complete it.  
                                                                                                                                                                              
and experiences, they develop a political culture more independent from the official discourse 
and the positions of their families. 
30
 See AAPOR (2011). 
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Moreover, the raw data indicates that the distribution of students among the 
different degrees reflects quite well the population, and that the larger number 
of responses does not come from students of disciplines more related to 
political topics, but rather from biological or physical sciences, which are the 
largest departments at the UAEU. Likewise, only around 30% of respondents 
are from the social sciences degrees, and around 20% from Business and 
Economics, which again is very similar to the population distribution (See figure 
1, and table 3). 
Figure 1: Sample Emirati Students 
 
 
Table 3: Percentage of Students in Population and Sample by College 
College 
Percentage of 
students in population 
Percentage of 
students in sample 
Humanities & Social Sciences 27% 32.5% 
Business & Economics 21% 16% 
Engineering 17% 17% 
IT Sciences 8% 6% 
Law 7% 7% 
Science 6% 8.5% 
Education 6% 5.5% 
Food science & Agriculture 5% 4.5% 
Medicine & Health sciences 3% 1.5% 
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Furthermore, the distribution of respondents from the Humanities and Social 
Sciences College, show that the percentage of students from disciplines which 
could be considered as more politically exposed (i.e. political science or 
sociology) is low compared to those enrolled in other degrees (See table 4). 
Interestingly, this fact allows affirming that the respondents belonged to all 
segments of the population, and that there is not a particular group which is 
over-represented 31 . Thus, there was not a real need to weigh the sample 
according to discipline of study, as it was initially thought of doing to reduce the 
‘self-selection’ bias.  
Table 4: Percentage of Students in Sample by Degree 
Degree 
Percentage of students in 
population 
Percentage of students in 
sample 
Social work 2.7% 6.0% 
Mass Comm. 2.5% 5.0% 
Linguistics 2.3% 5.0% 
Political Science 1.6% 0.2% 
Literature 1.5% 6.7% 
History 0.6% 6.0% 
Sociology 0.3% 1.2% 
Tourism 0.2% 7.0% 
 
However, the number of female respondents quintupled that of men, which did 
not quite reflect the population surveyed, even if female are still over three times 
UAEU’s male students. Therefore data had to be weighted by sex, as ideally the 
proportions of a sample should reflect the proportions of the population 
surveyed. By weighting the collected data the vulnerability of having different 
balance between these proportions is removed, helping to make the results 
better reflect the population which inferences are going to be made of. 
Moreover, weighting the collected data by sex does not eliminate the answers 
to questions by the approximately 200 people who did not answer to the ‘sex’ 
question, but gives them larger proportional value (See table 5).  
 
                                                            
31
 This is something that was questioned when some preliminary results were presented at the 
2012 Gulf Conference at the University of Exeter (July 2012). 
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Table 5: Percentage and Proportion of Students in Sample by Sex 
 
Female Male Total 
Students 5,313 1,316 6,629 
Percentage 80% 20% 100% 
Proportion 0.801478353 0.198521647 1 
 
3.5 The statistical tests run 
The tests chosen to evaluate whether the data collected was statistically 
significant enough to make some inferences about the population from the 
sample were: 
- Chi-Square Pearson – Run for nominal variables.  
- Chi-Square for linear by-linear association/trend – Run for ordinal/ranking 
variables.  
These are bivariate statistical tests that show whether any differences in the 
responses received between categories of variables (males/females, emirates 
of origin, social class…) are statistically significant. “If the probability of 
obtaining the value of our test statistic by chance is less than .05 then we 
generally accept the experimental hypothesis as true: there is an effect in the 
population” (Field, 2009: 53) at the 5% level. However, if that p-value is 
between .05 and .1 at the 10% level, it is accepted that there is a high 
probability that the same result would be obtained if the whole population were 
surveyed. Therefore, it was considered that these tests sufficed for the purpose 
of this study of evaluating the general political culture of the UAEU educated 
youth. More sophisticated statistical analyses, such as regression, could not be 
conducted for this dissertation due to time and space limitations, and are left for 
future exploration of the effect of combined independent variables on dependent 
variables, as well as the strength and direction of these effects.  
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PART I STATE AND SOCIETY IN THE UAE 
Part I of this dissertation looks into the history of state-society relations in the 
UAE from a holistic and integrative perspective that takes into account local, 
regional and global dynamics, as well as political, economic, cultural and 
environmental factors that have affected the specific context of that country. 
With the aim of framing the setting in which contemporary Emirati citizens 
understand, evaluate and feel with regard to the UAE political system and ruling 
elites, Chapter 2 explains how the composition of society and the nature of 
rulership have changed over time, and concludes that rentierism is not the main 
or only factor affecting people’s political culture. Furthermore, it argues that 
rentierism can actually empower people to become more politically aware in the 
long term, through the exposure to new or reshaped agents of political 
socialization.  
Chapter 3 deals with the episodes of political activism that have taken place in 
the UAE and the approach of authorities regarding the political socialization of 
its citizens. This chapter also presents an assessment of the different political 
standpoints that have existed in the past and exist today in the UAE, to later 
focus on the most recent domestic calls for political reform and the different 
responses that the ruling elites have chosen to give at different times. The main 
conclusion is that leadership strategies of legitimization vary and are combined, 
depending on the challenge being faced, whether these are ideological, 
redistributive, co-optative, limited power sharing, or coercive measures. Hence, 
it supports the main hypothesis of this dissertation that rentier state theory does 
not by itself explain the survival of authoritarian rule in the UAE, and that 
effective redistribution of oil rents is not sufficient to prevent the cyclically 
emergent calls for political reform.  
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CHAPTER 2: UAE SOCIETY: FROM TRIBAL TO GLOBALISED?  
This chapter discusses the processes of state and society formation in the UAE, 
and the factors determining their relationship, in historical perspective. The first 
section presents an explanation of the tribal system of social organization 
predominant in pre-British days, which is relevant to understand contemporary 
political structures, while explaining it was significantly affected by British 
interference (and later by the discovery of oil).  The second section 
complements the previous one with an account of the commercial activities and 
population fluctuation that took place in the Gulf during the centuries prior to the 
British arrival to the region, challenges the generally accepted assumption that 
Gulf people (or khalījī) lived isolated until the discovery of oil, and provides an 
explanation for the culturally mixed backgrounds of Emirati citizens. Section 
three outlines the steps taken for the establishment of the UAE Federation and 
analyses the political system; while section four discusses the fundamental 
aspects of citizenship and national identity crafting by governmental policies. 
This discussion provides the necessary background for the social stratification 
of the UAE, which is examined in section five. Finally, sections six and seven 
argue that rentierism cannot be considered the main or only factor affecting 
political culture in the UAE, and lays out the main elements involved in the 
process of political socialization in that country. 
1. The pre-British tribal setting 
Arab tribes have been described by anthropologists as being agnatic, patrilineal 
descent social groups who name themselves after an eponymous founder (an 
apical descendant); that organize under and are loyal to a chieftaincy or sheikh; 
which have the sense of collective responsibility over the protection of the 
group; and who are linked by ‘aṣabiyya 32 (Barfield, 1990; Gellner, 1990; Khoury 
& Kostiner, 1990; Ibn Khaldun, 1967; Wilkinson, 1977). However, despite being 
a category widely used to describe Arab societies, controversy over this 
concept has been determined by its use to support theories of socio-cultural 
                                                            
32
 ‘Aṣabiyya (from now on ‘asabiya) is often glossed as social cohesion or social solidarity 
among a human group, mainly among tribal groups. This term became popularized after Ibn 
Khaldun's use of the concept as the essential bond among humans in a group (stronger in the 
tribal stage, diminishing as it evolves into states and empires) and the fundamental force driving 
human history in his circular model (see below for details). 
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evolution33 and is today considered by many social scientists an ethnographic 
fiction or a creation of colonial administrators (Tapper, 1990: 48-51). 34 
Moreover, since ‘tribe’ has been so widely and differently used in social 
sciences as befitting the analysis of a particular society,35 and hindering rather 
than increasing its understanding, “it has almost ceased to be of analytical or 
comparative value” (Tapper, 1979: 6). Nevertheless, since the concept has 
been, is, and will surely continue to be used to describe Arab societies,36 a brief 
summary of the main theoretical models of how tribes form, organize and 
function in the Arab world is provided as follows. These comprise Ibn Khaldun’s 
14th century theory, Evans-Pitchard segmentation theory, and several authors’ 
reformulations or criticisms of the latter. 
The concept of khalījī is essential to understanding Ibn Khaldun’s37  circular 
model of human history: in his view, the primary stage of human social 
organizations relates to tribes, which are composed of Badū 38 and are the most 
                                                            
33
 Views regarding ‘tribe’ as one of the first (or the first) stage in human social evolution include 
the Ibn Khaldunian model, the unilinear evolutionist model (Morgan and Tylor) and neo-
evolutionist model (White and Steward), the Marxist (Marx and Engels) and neo-Marxists 
models, or the sociological French school (Durkheim). Despite the many differences these 
paradigms show, they all agree that ‘tribe’ is a primitive stage in social organization, which will 
ultimately evolve into a final stage, which varies in nature according to each paradigm 
(bureaucratized state, civilized state, Asiatic/Germanic organization, etc.). 
34
 See Amin (1970), Asad (1972), Bourdieu (1962), Caton (1990), Christensen (1986), Cole 
(2003), Fernea (1970), Fried (1975), Glatzer (1983), Peters (1967), and Tapper (1979, 1983) for 
works revealing the use of the concept ‘tribe’ as a tool used by colonialist states (both modern 
and pre-modern) to expand their empires and increase their control over remote, mobile 
populations. 
35
 Each author stresses a particular or several characteristics when defining ‘tribe’: a common 
language, a common genealogy (common ancestor), a common self-identity, a common 
political autonomy, a common shared space, a common simple technology, a common self-
sufficient economic system, a common religion, a common illiteracy, a common social 
homogeneity, etc. 
36
 This is especially the case with regards to the GCC states because the regimes base their 
legitimacy upon ‘traditional’ practices and institutions as they have reformulated them (majlis, 
shūrā, sheikh, etc.). See section on Statecraft in the UAE in this chapter. 
37
 Ibn Khaldun (1332 AD – 1406 AD) was an Arab Muslim historian and philosopher, considered 
one of the founding fathers of modern sociology, economics and historiography. His best-known 
work is “al- Muqaddima” (written in 1377, Prolegomena in Greek or Introduction in English), 
which discusses the notion of ‘asabiya; presents his human history circular model; developed 
the dichotomy of Ḥādhar versus Badū; and also makes a clear distinction between two types of 
Arab people: Arab by descent (i.e. of ethnic Arab descent) and Arab by language (i.e. ethnically 
non-Arab populations who speak Arabic as a first language). He never refers to the latter as 
Arabs, but rather calls them by their ethnicity or places of origin (ex. Persians or Egyptians) 
(Cruz Hernández, 1996: 697-700). 
38
 The Arabic word Badū (singular Badawī) may be interpreted as “desert-dwellers” and from it 
derives the English term Bedouin. They have been generally linked with the raising of livestock 
(mainly camels and goats, but also sheep, cattle, horses, etc.) in the Bādiyya (which can be 
translated as “range, steppe, desert”). Despite most Bedouins are semi-nomad, having 
seasonal settlements in oases or coastal sites, it has been commonly misunderstood that 
Bedouins are nomads, in contrast with Ḥādhar as sedentary. In this sense, Bourdieu (1962: 66-
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cohesive social group due to the strong ‘asabiya of its members. Over time 
tribes settle down, becoming Ḥādhar,39 diminishing the ‘asabiya among them, 
and forming states.40 Eventually, his theory goes, states grow into empires, 
which further lessens the ‘asabiya among its members, thus causing its 
weakness and downfall, and are finally defeated by tribes that have developed 
into a state holding a stronger cohesion. The Khaldunian model considers 
kinship ties essential since “affection for one’s relations and blood relatives (…) 
is a natural urge in man, for as long as there have been human beings” (1967: 
98). These blood ties, together with the closeness of a common shared space 
and interests, are the main factors strengthening ‘asabiya. Hence, for Ibn 
Khaldun, the same ‘asabiya that holds groups together and leads them to power 
contains within itself the seeds of the group's downfall, to be replaced by a new 
group bound by a stronger cohesion. Moreover, as Caton (1990: 86) points out, 
this model implies that the Bedouins/tribes are the human group with the “purest 
lineage”41 and therefore the most “cohesive”. However, despite being the most 
cohesive, the tribal system is not egalitarian in Ibn Khaldun’s view,42 but is 
unequal due to the existing state within the tribal order, which allows that order 
to survive (Caton, 1990: 87). This state within the tribal order of the Bedouins 
“results from the great respect and veneration they [sheikhs]43 generally enjoy 
among the people” (Ibn Khaldun, 1967: 97). In his view, the leader of a tribe is 
expected to be “obeyed, but he has no power to force others to accept his 
rulings” (Ibn Khaldun, 1967: 108). Thus, he is forced to seek consensus among 
the ruled and to elude confrontation with them, being his basis of power not 
coercion but ‘asabiya. 
                                                                                                                                                                              
67) warned, “one must be careful not to regard [the Badū] as radically different from the 
sedentary peoples.” 
39
 Is the antonym of Badū and can be glossed as “sedentary, urban”, as they permanently live in 
towns and cities. The Khaldunian dichotomy of Badū versus Ḥādhar in Arab societies, which 
conceives the central social conflict (“town” versus “desert”) by which the Badū necessarily 
loosed power when they became Ḥādhar, has been used by many over the centuries to explain 
the social conflict happening in a given Arab society. From now on these two terms will be 
simplified into ‘badu’ and ‘hadhar’. 
40
 To Ibn Khaldun, the ‘state’ is the restraining influence among a given human group and 
contains man's naturally aggressive nature. Nevertheless, as Ibn Khaldun argued, “tribes and 
states maintain each other as a single system rather than function as two separate and 
opposing systems” (Christensen, 1986: 286). 
41
 According to Ibn Khaldun these are people whose “pedigree can be trusted not to have been 
mixed up and corrupted” (1967: 99). 
42
 As it will be discussed below, this clearly contradicts the segmentary-lineage model. 
43
 See Amin (1970: 83-86 and 104-107), Cole & Altorki (1998: 67-74 and 210-213), Fernea 
(1970: 105-107), and Salim (1962: 27-33), for analysis of the sheikhs’ (and other tribal leaders) 
role in tribal communities. 
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The segmentary–lineage model defined by Evans-Pritchard and Fortes in the 
1940s describes tribes as organised according to an egalitarian segmentary 
opposition of descendent groups; a way in which each segment “sees itself as 
an independent unit in relation to another segment of the same section, but 
sees both segments as a unity in relation to another section” (Evans-Pritchard, 
1940: 147).44  These segments arguably emerge as subgroups of a tribe that 
split, grow in size and gain importance, giving birth to new segments that either 
stay under the paramount rule of the clan from which they descend or join a 
different confederation. Moreover, lineages are, in theory, “supported by, or 
opposed to, one another based on their degrees of relatedness [giving] rise to 
the ethnographic cliché often cited by anthropologists and tribesmen alike: Me 
against my brothers; my brothers and me against our cousins; my brothers, 
cousins, and me against the world” (Barfield, 1990: 160). Thus, tribal segments 
unite when they have to fight an opponent, transforming social conflict into 
social order, because these opposed forces are supposed to be equal, or 
otherwise the system would collapse (Caton, 1990: 92).   
Tribes, therefore, ally with each other depending on who their enemy is at a 
specific moment; protecting the closer relatives but not so worried about the 
wellbeing of the other groups they are also related to; and sometimes fighting 
against segments of the same tribe. Following this same survival and self-
interest rationale, clans or families could shift their loyalty to another sheikh if 
the felt unhappy or unprotected under the sheikh to which they had pledged 
bay‘a or allegiance.45 Like in the Khaldunian model, in the segmentary-lineage 
model loyalty to a sheikh is not determined by coercion or inheritance, but by an 
idealistic segmentary logic based on kinship and common interests between the 
sheikh and his people. Nonetheless, as discussed below, these principles as 
basis of tribal allegiance have been challenged as not egalitarian (even 
authoritarian) and including some principles of succession for the case of 
Southeast Arabia during the pre and post-British periods.  
                                                            
44
 According to the segmentary-lineage model applied to Arab tribes, families group together in 
lineages, which “are named collectivities that group together all male and female descendants 
through the patriline from an eponymous ancestor who existed at about five generations” back 
(Cole, 2003: 261); lineages then form clans (due to their claimed common ancestor), and these 
in tribes and tribal confederations (again, as descendants of a common ancestor). 
45
 “Oath of allegiance to a leader. Unwritten pact given on behalf of the subjects by leading 
members of the tribe with the understanding that, as long as the leader abides by certain 
responsibilities toward his subjects, they are to maintain their allegiance to him” (Esposito, n.d.). 
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Finally, authors that have reformulated or criticised the aforementioned 
theoretical models have been many.46 Ibn Khaldun’s ideas, and especially the 
concept of ‘asabiya, have been used to explain the cohesiveness of human 
groups or even to understand the social conflict (and bonds) existing between 
badu and hadhar. Likewise, the segmentary–lineage model has been widely 
used to understand Arab societies, but it has been criticised on three grounds. 
Firstly, since inequality is manifest due to different variables (demographic, 
ecological, or economic) rarely, if ever, allowing tribal segments to be equal, the 
segmentary-lineage principle of egalitarian opposition is not to be found in 
practice (Peters, 1967: 281). As explained above, even at the segments’ level 
the Khaldunian model challenges this presumed egalitarianism, since the 
existing state within the tribal order grants its unavoidable unequal feature. 
Secondly, the segmentary-lineage model stereotypes tribal societies as 
stagnant, which is a feature long discredited in all social sciences, as today is 
taken for granted that the understanding of any society requires a diachronic 
analysis of the processes of change. Lastly, this model presents tribes as 
isolated, reinforcing the tribe/state dichotomy and despite the evidence that “the 
tribes and the state have never lived in isolation from each other but have 
always been interdependent” (Caton, 1990: 102). 
In this regard, Ernest Gellner adopted a corrective model of the segmentary-
lineage system by including the Khaldunian concept of the state, in which the 
sheikh surpasses the segmentary tendency of tribal society (Caton, 1990: 94-
96) and there is an institutionalization of collective responsibility in the system 
(Van Der Meulen 1997: 18-30). In his words, “the persistence of a segmentary 
society requires, paradoxically, that its mechanisms should be sufficiently 
inefficient to keep fear in being as the sanction of the system” (Gellner, 1981: 
53). Similarly, Tapper (1979: 6) points out that tribes should not be analysed in 
isolation from the political, economic and cultural contexts in which they appear, 
because “there is ‘state’ within every tribe, and ‘tribe’ within every state; state is 
                                                            
46
 Examples of it are the works by Amin (1970), Asad (1972), Barfield (1990), Bourdieu (1962), 
Caton (1990), Cole & Altorki (1998), Cole (2003), Christensen (1986), Eickelman (1980, 2002), 
Fenelon (1976), Fernea (1970), Fried (1975), Gellner (1981), Glatzer (1983), Khalaf (1990), 
Khazanov (1984), Lienhardt (2001), Peters (1967), Peterson (1977), Onley & Khalaf (2006), 
Salim (1962), Sahlins (1961), al-Sayegh (1998), Tapper (1979, 1983), etc. 
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partly defined in terms of tribe, tribe in terms of state” (Tapper, 1983: 45).47 
Thus, tribes and states should be understood as interrelated in mutually 
engendering and transformative ways. 
Accordingly, talking about UAE’s socio-economic and political structures, and 
the ‘tribal’ side of these, requires some conceptual precisions for which I mostly 
rely on Dale F. Eickelman’s definitions. Tribalism or tribe is understood as a 
form of social organisation that “signifies a group of people often conceptualized 
in terms of genealogy” (Eickelman 2002: 65).48 In this regard, the concept badu 
or Bedouin refers to nomad or semi-nomad “peoples who live in a symbiotic 
relationship with settled [or hadhar] peoples” and who organise tribally or 
according to kinship ties (Eickelman 2002: 65).49 Thus, being tribal in Southeast 
Arabia did not necessarily mean being nomad or Bedouin, for these societies 
integrated both tribal badu and tribal hadhar, in addition to non-tribal hadhar 
people (i.e. people not claiming kinship ties to the local tribes, who were settled 
and living in towns and cities, and were linked by tributary or mercantile 
interests to the kin-ordered group). Hence, this dissertation refers to 
contemporary Emiratis that descend from the Bedouin, including those 
segments that had been settled for long time, as ‘tribal’ or of Bedouin origin. 
Taking all these views and concepts into account, the UAE’s pre-British ‘tribal’ 
social system may be described as one in which semi-nomadic Bedouins 
coexisted with settled people who had tribal origins, and to whom they were 
linked to each other by kinship or other ties (commercial, political, slavery, etc.). 
Likewise, “no single mode [of economic modes of production – household, kin-
ordered, tributary and mercantile] was dominant; they were all present in 
varying degrees in different situations” (Cole, 2003: 240), thus further 
complicating the description of the pre-British tribal setting, which is often 
presented in an essentialised and idealised way. In this regard, scholars like 
                                                            
47
 Essentialist definitions of either ‘pure’ tribe or ‘pure’ state are an empirical impossibility 
(Tapper, 1983: 66-67), because “these ideal-types are only rough approximations to the social 
reality which they purport to explain” (Christensen, 1986: 290). 
48
 It is important to note that the belief of a tribal decent form a common ancestor is simply a 
misfit, because “all societies play genealogical tricks and commit genealogical frauds. 
Constructing and deconstructing their origins, people blend myth and reality into firmly held 
beliefs” (Fried, 1975: 16). However, as Fried points out, genealogies do play an important role in 
social life, since they act as agreements among people, which provide each member a position 
in society and legitimize everyday relationships amongst them (1975: 16). 
49
 In this regard, Cole (2003: 237) stresses that “today, ‘Bedouin’ refers less to a ‘way of life’ 
than to an ‘identity’. The way of life was grounded in ecology and economy, the identity in 
heritage and culture.” 
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Cole and Altorki (1992) argue that coastal inhabitants did not exactly reproduce 
the inland structures or ways of life since these were more heterogeneous and 
mixed communities. Moreover, economic activities varied depending on the 
location were a specific group spent most time (a coastal town or an inland 
oasis) and on the season of the year (summer or winter). 
As further explained below, 50  following political instability in Persia and the 
decline of the port of Linga commerce flourished in the Trucial States at the turn 
of the 20th century. Its ports became major trading centres, incrementing notably 
the non-tribal hadhar elements of their social system. Especially Dubai 
consolidated as a cosmopolitan ‘City of Merchants’, as it has since been known, 
while Ras al-Khaimah and Sharjah were the other two most important ports 
during those days. Abu Dhabi had a lower profile in sea trade for a longer 
period of time –probably due to the predominantly inland (and mainly badu) 
character of its population, which had its main settlements in the oases of Liwa 
and Buraymi (today divided between the Omani city of the same name and the 
Emirati city of al-Ain). Thus, the main economic activity at that time in the 
Trucial States was based on the primary sectors of fishing, agriculture and 
animal husbandry, as well as on sea and land trade, and the pearl industry. 
Badu and hadhar, coastal and inland inhabitants, carried out different activities–
which were determined by seasons–and complemented each other. The badu 
were mainly camel-herding tribes that migrated “in regular patterns throughout 
the year in search of water and pasture” (and were therefore pastoralist); while 
the hadhar’s activities varied whether they lived in inland oases or the coast, 
and whether they were linked by kin-based ties to the badu or not. In the oasis 
they would harvest the palm tree farms, while in the coastal towns they would 
be more engaged in trade or fishing and pearling activities. Moreover, some 
combined nomadic and sedentary activities existed and, especially during the 
summer when they faced bad weather conditions inland, the badu abandoned 
their nomadic activities (and left women and children behind) to embark in the 
boats of pearl merchants; thus existing a symbiotic relation among settlements 
(Eickelman, 2002: 64-65).  
In the coastal towns, all revolved around the maritime activities and the pearling 
industry. Pearl diving took place in four phases from April to September, being 
                                                            
50
 See section on traditionally globalised society in this chapter. 
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the most important the one between June and late August. Merchants, who 
played “a key role in (…) government decision-making process” and “were the 
driving force behind development” (al-Sayegh, 1998: 87), made large fortunes 
with the pearl business; while “the rulers who levied a tax on every boat relied 
on the industry as their main source of revenue. The divers and other members 
of the crews, however, did not fare so well” (Fenelon, 1976: 53). Many products 
coming from around the world were traded through these ports. During the rest 
of the year, they had to earn a living by fishing, building ships, or as craftsmen 
who made agricultural and fishing tools, fabrics, and household utensils; or they 
either returned to the inland settlements or engaged in nomadic herding.  
Regarding leadership in the pre-British setting, among tribes no fixed principle 
of succession existed, and in practice rulership was semi-hereditary (Herb, 
1999: 22). They arguably followed a mix of personal interest and internal 
dispute with the Islamic principles of ijtihād (interpretation) and shūrā 
(consensus) in order to choose the best ruler from the possible members of the 
tribe. Thus, although the sheikh was the sovereign over the territories under his 
control, his authority was to some extent “limited by tribal custom and the laws 
of Islam” (Kour, 1991: 187). Thus maintaining political authority by one sheikh 
for long periods of time was very difficult, and rulers who succeeded in this 
enterprise “did so by acting in consensus with the opinions of the leading 
citizens of their domains” (Eickelman, 1980: 20).  
James Onley and Sulayman Khalaf have quoted Gellner’s description of the 
pre-oil sheikhdoms as “tribal proto states”, and have explained how inhabitants 
pledged allegiance (‘asabiya) to the ruling sheikh, and how the boundaries of 
their domains were “defined by loyalty” (Onley & Khalaf, 2006: 191). Main 
settlements of Southeast Arabia were along the coast or in the oases, which 
were controlled by the ruler, while smaller inland settlements were under the 
control of members of the ruling family or other tribes chiefs allied to the ruling 
family, thus giving important roles to any potential opponent. However, the 
bay‘a or “oath of loyalty taken by a tribesman to a ruler was explicitly considered 
to be a contract (‘aqd), revocable in theory and often in practice” (Eickelman, 
1980: 20). In addition, the social system situated the family of the ruler as a 
challenge for his power and therefore he had to be aware of their concerns and 
aspirations, as well as of the rest of the community, because they could be 
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deposed by a member of their own family, or be abandoned by other clans or 
families who could indeed shift their loyalty to another ruler from another tribe, if 
they decided the existing ruler was incapable of fulfilling the necessities of the 
group. In this regard, Peterson agrees that the size of the dirah (the territory 
under control of a Sheikh) varied depending on the loyalties of the tribes, and 
has explained how the “settled tribes are more likely to possess a strong central 
organization whereas the nomadic tribes generally are divided into independent 
family units” (Peterson, 1977: 2).  
Moreover, rulers were dependent on the taxes they levied from economic 
activities, therefore not only Arab tribal, but also non-tribal and non-Arab 
merchants had a say in politics. Distribution of revenues among notable 
members of the community was accordingly important. These strategies would 
normally maintain stability as long as the ruler provided the community with 
what they needed and was capable of protecting them from potential threats. In 
this regard, growth of the ruling families is thought to have been one of the main 
causes of strife with potential rulers when the revenues did not increase at the 
same time as the members of the family did (Lienhardt, 2001: 165-166, 187). 
However, as explained in more detail below, with the coming of the British and 
the legitimization of particular sheikhs as leaders of their communities, these 
principles were transformed into the more authoritarian ruling system that is in 
place today. It is important not to forget that, as in other colonized territories, 
sheikhs and tribal elites in the areas were used by the British “as a means to 
govern a remote, mobile population located in a difficult or nearly inaccessible 
terrain, making direct rule virtually impossible” (Caton, 1990: 99). In this sense, 
Asad (1972: 137) asserts that the tribal political elite acted as “entrepreneur, 
middleman or representative, but it does so as a middleman who has a 
privileged monopoly in relation to his tribal [and non-tribal] ‘clients’.” 
Social structures of Southeast Arabia have adapted to regional economic, 
political and religious circumstances along history (as was the case with the 
embracement of Islam), but further structural changes that forever changed the 
socio-political system took place already during the pre-oil days with the British 
interference in the sheikhdoms’ affairs. Their presence should therefore be 
considered the main catalyst of the establishment of the Gulf nation-states as 
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we know them today, followed by the discovery of oil that prompted even more 
dramatic socio-economic and political transformation. 
2. A traditionally globalised society 
Scholars have not been able to provide enough evidence to form one view on 
the distribution of the population of the Arabian Peninsula in ancient times and 
what can be said comes mainly from orally transmitted stories, travellers’ 
accounts or literary sources. Nonetheless, it is widely accepted that the Arabs of 
today descend from a same ethnic origin that was divided in two groups at 
some time in history: the Qaḥṭānī (southern, al-‘arab al-‘ariba, or Ḥināwī) and 
the ‘Adnānī (northern, al-‘arab al-must ‘ariba, or Ghafīrī). The former group is 
believed to be originally from Yemen and the latter from the Hejaz region (on 
the Northwest of the Arabian Peninsula), being the segment from which Prophet 
Muhammad descended. There is a third group of Arab tribes known as the 
“perishing Arabs” (al-bā’ida) mentioned in the Quran as those tribes that 
disappeared because of their decadence. Although there is evidence of the 
presence of Arab tribes in the Southeast region of the Arabian Peninsula since 
of the first millennium BCE (Wilkinson, 1977: 126), there is consensus among 
scholars that several important migrations from the Southwest and the North of 
the Arabian Peninsula (mainly of the Qaḥṭānī tribes) took place since the 2nd 
century BCE and that these migrations increased especially after the decline of 
the Yemeni Sabean Kingdom in the 3rd century (Anani & Whittingham, 1986: 
24), making the population of the Southeast coast of the peninsula be 
“predominantly of Arab stock” (Heard-Bey, 1996: 21). However, the former does 
not mean that the people living in that region have always and only been Arabs, 
for it is well documented that different peoples have lived there since at least 
the 6th century BCE; and that these had for millennia been involved in sea and 
land trade routes of the region, connected to other parts of the Gulf and the 
Arabian Peninsula, East Africa, South Asia, and even to the Far East.  
The oldest known written records regarding the Southeast region of the Arabian 
Peninsula are the Sumerian cuneiform texts (ca. 2300 BCE), which refer to it as 
the land of Magan, which was “a source of copper and diorite for the flourishing 
city-states of Mesopotamia” (Bhacker & Bhacker, 1997: 1).51 Dionisius Agius 
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 The region has also been mentioned in Greek, Roman, Persian, Arab and Ottoman texts; and, 
later, in Portuguese, Italian, Dutch and British official and travellers’ records. 
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has explained how “material culture of coastal existence unearth (…) present a 
picture of coastal communities who interacted with their neighbours while at the 
same time undertaking long distance trade with the great cities of the Indus 
civilisation” as far as in the third millennium CE (Agius, 2012: 60). Moreover, 
archaeological excavations in several locations in the UAE are evidence of 
cultures “earlier and contemporary to that of Dilmun”, and of the “transnational 
character of the peoples of this region” (Potts, 2000). Furthermore, 
archaeological research shows that different beliefs must have coexisted in the 
region, which eventually eroded with the gradual embracement of Islam since 
the 7th century CE (King, 2001: 80).52 South-east Arabia fell since that period 
under the influence of the subsequent Islamic Empires and other regional 
powers (importantly the Persian), but a high level of political autonomy is 
thought to have been maintained by the Arab tribal rulers who had gradually 
gained power over these territories (King, 2001: 74-84), probably because of 
the lack of interest in an eminently infertile territory.53  
It was not until the 15th century that Europeans arrived to the Gulf, after the 
Portuguese discovery of the route to Asia through the Cape of Good Hope, 
which needed stability in the waters surrounding their new colonies. 54  In 
addition, the Ottomans made their appearance in the region in the 16th century, 
and maintained a claim for the Arabian Peninsula until the early 19th century 
(Anscombe, 1997: 12). Thus, the rivalry in the Gulf waters was at that time 
between the Ottoman, the Safavid (Persian) and the Portuguese Empires (and 
later the Saudi), making the Gulf “inextricably linked with the commercial and 
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 Syriac sources speak of Christian monasteries in the Gulf as early as the 4
th
 century. 
Unfortunately, the uncontrolled construction of cities, and the lack of cultural awareness during 
the first decades of development in the UAE, “means that it is probably no longer possible to 
assess the archaeology of the towns of Umm al-Qawain, Ajman, Sharjah and Dubai in the 6
th
/7
th
 
century AD and in the Islamic period generally” (King, 2001: 75); but the few remaining ruins 
and the accounts of Arab medieval scholars and travellers help imagine how this region might 
have been in the centuries following the advent of Islam. 
53
 Arab authors that have mentioned the Islamic period of south-east Arabia are: al-Dinawari 
(ca.895 AD), 
Muhammad ibn Habib al-Baghdadi (also known as Ibn Habib al-Muhabbar) (d.859 AD), Al-Idrisi 
(1100 – 1165/1166 AD), Yaqut al-Hamawi (1179–1229 AD), Ibn Jubayr (1145-1217 AD), and 
Ibn Battuta (1304 – 1368/1369 AD), among others. 
54
 It is thought, according to Portuguese accounts, that during this period the town of Julfar (now 
in ruins in the outskirts of Ras al-Khaimah) “enjoyed great prosperity as a regional trading 
entrepôt. Its connection with the Indian Ocean commercial network is reflected in the quantities 
of Chinese, Vietnamese and Thai ceramics recovered in excavation, along with Indian glass 
bangles and Iranian pottery”. This period has been mentioned by Italian Gasparo Balbi (ca. 
1580 AD); by the local Arab navigator, Ahmad Ibn Majid (latter half of the 15
th
 century AD); and 
by Duarte Barbosa (1617 AD) (King, 2001: 85-91). 
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political rivalries of western countries” (Zahlan, 1998: 10), including those of 
Holland, France, Germany, and finally Britain, who eventually got the upper 
hand.55 
Within that context, fluctuation between both shores of the Gulf, and with ports 
in other parts of the Indian Ocean was common. People chose to settle on one 
place or another depending on economic, political and climate conditions, 
mixing with the local communities by engaging in the local economic activity, as 
well as through marriage. In this regard, it is important to note that, even if Arab 
tribal women were (and still are to a large extent) not married outside the 
kinship relations, it was not uncommon that Arab tribal men married women 
from different backgrounds, thus introducing different ethnicities into the Arab 
tribes.56 Moreover, it has been argued that occasionally men “who were not 
originally part of a tribe, became integrated into the tribal system” (Heard-Bey, 
2008: 11). For instance, a given tribe could eventually assimilate someone who 
had to abandon his tribe for some reason, or a traveller who had got lost.57 
Reasonably, migrants arriving from Muslim, Arab, and/or tribally organised 
societies (such as the Baluchi) were more easily integrated into the local 
communities (Wilkinson, 1977). 
The slave trade was another way through which the non-Arab population 
increased in the region. It was a common and profitable practice to bring slaves 
from East Africa, which declined mainly because the British gradually imposed 
treaties to ban slavery in the Western Indian Ocean during the 19th century,58 
but also because of the rise of Baluchi slave trade that “came to replace east 
Africa as the main source of new labor for eastern Arabian markets by 1920” 
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 For a thorough analysis of the Portuguese presence in the Gulf area, see Handhal (1997). 
Similarly, the Ottoman influence is described to some detail in Lorimer (1915). 
56
 J.E. Peterson explains this with regards to “Omanis who went to Africa decades and in some 
cases centuries ago…and frequently inter-married with African women” (Peterson, 2004: 46). 
Similarly, tribal Arabs who travelled elsewhere must have married local women. 
57
 In the Arab tribal social system there were two ways of becoming part of a tribe:  by descent 
(ḥamūla) or by ‘association’/‘incorporation’ (‘ashīra), which is through marriage or by 
consideration of a tribe member that a person deserves to join the tribe (Personal interview with 
member of the al-Suwaidi tribe. Doha, January 2014). This system was the base for the design 
of today’s nationalisation policies as explained in more detail below. 
58
 Also, due to the interference of Mozambique’s Portuguese colonial government. According to 
Heard-Bey (1982: 211; 231-2; 290), importation of slaves was officially outlawed in the ‘Trucial 
States’ in 1847 by an agreement with the British, although they were still bought and sold in the 
main markets, as they were crucial in the pearling industry. Slavery was only officially declared 
illegal in 1962. 
74 
 
(Hopper, 2011: 54-59). 59  In this regard, J.E. Peterson explains that slaves 
adopted the name of the family or tribe in which they served, but used to carry 
the word ‘khādim’ (servant) to make clear their condition (e.g. Muhammad 
Khadim bani Fulan). That appellation was abandoned once they were freed, 
and they since became known plainly by the name of the tribe (e.g. Muhammad 
al-Fulani) (Peterson, 2004: 47). Hence, the descendants of these slaves were 
integrated into the Arab tribal hierarchy (but keeping their lower social status60), 
and form part of the contemporary Emirati population. Finally, the vestiges from 
regional languages in the Arabic dialects spoken in contemporary UAE also 
attest to the multicultural nature of the Emirati society. The Kumzari-Shehhi 
dialect spoken in the Musandam Peninsula is especially illustrating since it is 
considered to be “a remnant of a south semitic language that predates the 
Arabic dialect of surrounding areas…but has characteristics of Sassanid Middle 
Persian” (Zacharias, 2013, May 17). Likewise, all other Arabic dialects spoken 
in the country do also include words from Persian, Urdu and Hindi.  Accordingly, 
it is impossible to say nowadays who is an ‘original’ (uṣulī) or ‘pure’ Arab, as 
some Emiratis like to assert. 
Furthermore, at the turn of the 20th century, many Arab, Persian and Baluchi 
migrants were encouraged to move to the coast of southeast Arabia by the 
enhanced job opportunities emerging from “the abolition of a 5 per cent customs 
duty following the declaration of Dubai as a ‘free port’” in 1904 (after the port of 
Linga in Persia fell in decline in 1902, when the Qajar Shah increased taxes 
imposed to merchants) (Davidson, 2008: 67-76; Elsheshtawy, 2010: 64). 61 
Especially during the first two decades of that century, the opportunities that the 
lower Gulf towns offered in trade or in the pearl industry–which was the most 
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 The desperate times in Baluchistan [drought and locust invasion in Baluchistan-a 
mountainous region on the Iranian plateau, located in present western Pakistan, south-eastern 
Iran and south-western Afghanistan- in the early 20
th
 century devastated agriculture and led to 
widespread desperation and famine] coincided with much better economic times across the Gulf 
and Baluchi “women, children, and young men were captured and sold across the Gulf to Batina 
or the Trucial Coast” (Hopper, 2011: 54-59). Others, however, chose to cross the waters of the 
Gulf to find a job, even if it was as slaves. There are accounts that relate how some Baluchis 
that were freed by the British and sent back to Baluchistan did return to Arabia in search of a 
better life (Hopper, 2011: 54-59). 
60
 For this reason, many decided (and still do) to marry women with lighter skin, in order to have 
less black children that could integrate better in society (Personal interview with Qatari with 
Emirati mother of slave-Nubian origin, March 2014). 
61
 In 1925, for instance, many Persian merchants settled in Dubai after the ruler offered them to 
stay in the city and even gave them some land in the area known as Bastakiyya, since many 
came from Bastak, in Iran (Elsheshtawy, 2010: 64). 
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profitable activity during those decades-, had an impact on the demographics of 
the already called ‘Trucial States’:62 “many families moved to live permanently in 
one of the coastal settlements, increasing, in particular, the size and importance 
of Abu Dhabi and Dubai. Sharjah, Ra’s al-Khaimah and the intervening coastal 
villages were already long-established as ports of the tribal Arabs” (Heard-Bey, 
2001: 106), and population rose significantly. According to Lorimer, at the 
beginning of the 20th century the estimated population of the ‘Trucial States’ 
were 80,000 people, being 8,000 of them nomads (1908: 1432-36).63 Although 
this data probably covered only the coastal towns and therefore might have 
missed other nomad or semi-nomad inland inhabitants, and unfortunately does 
not specify the ethnicities of people, other sources claim that at that time around 
500 Persians and 52 Banians, and 96 Persians and 39 Banians lived in Dubai 
and in Abu Dhabi respectively (Abdullah, 1978: 105).  
However, the 1930s were tough years for the inhabitants of the Trucial States: 
the intra-war period and the world economic crisis made the global (and 
especially the European) demand of pearls decrease, at the same time that 
cultured pearls begun to be produced in Japan, driving many of the merchants 
and divers to migrate elsewhere or become indebted (Heard-Bey, 2008: 61). 
European presence meant that the Gulf tradesmen lost control over the Indian 
Ocean, but the major decline in their mercantile activities occurred as the British 
became the paramount power in the region. The former, in addition to the 
arbitrary policies and restrictions on international commercial ties that the British 
imposed (which mainly benefited them and their Indian subjects), made it 
difficult to compete for the long-established merchants who were, moreover, 
“deprived of their social and political privileges” (al-Sayegh, 1998: 94). By 
incorporating the Trucial States into the global economic system, or rather by 
imposing limits to their economic system and links with other commercial 
partners (Kechichian, 1999: 22), the British were also the main catalyst for 
change in socio-economic and political patterns which begun to undergo 
important structural changes during these pre-oil decades. In this regard, as the 
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 Several sheikhdoms of southeast Arabia started to be known as the Trucial States (or the 
Trucial Coast) after the signature of the Perpetual Maritime Truce of 1853 with the British. 
63
 See Annex 4 UAE Population. 
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rulers began to receive rents from the British, they became economically 
independent from the merchants and therefore more authoritarian.64  
In spite of their hardship, however, some scholars state that before the 
establishment of the UAE Federation, local communities “allowed no major 
distinction between the ethnic groups which lived and traded” in coastal towns 
(al-Sayegh, 1998: 88). Furthermore, Beeman (2009: 150) recalls that, in the 
early 1960s he was “friends with many extended families, who had brothers, 
sisters and cousins living all over the Gulf on both sides,” and that there “were 
households everywhere and widespread intermarriage”. Thus, he claims this 
society “was vastly different than either the general non-tribal Iranian population 
or the other Arab populations of the Arabian Peninsula”. Finally, it was an 
“integrated culture” which “persist[s] until today (…) but [has been] eroded and 
compromised by political processes” (Beeman, 2009: 150). This might have 
been true in the sense that anyone was welcome to engage in business or 
become part of the workforce in the main ports, and that mixed marriages took 
place more often than in post-Federation days, but there is no doubt that a 
social hierarchy was already in place, in which the ruling tribes and affiliated 
families were at the top. 65  In fact, others recall that many of the Persians 
“remained socially and legally outsiders [even if] they were economically fully 
integrated”, being the Khamirī66 the only ones with temporary residence permits 
in Dubai since the 1920s and with important presence in Abu Dhabi; and that 
Indians, whether Hindu or Muslim, were yet then more difficult to integrate 
(Heard-Bey, 1982: 216-245), probably because of their condition of British 
subjects. Nevertheless, some adopted more tribal and Arab names for their 
families in order to improve their position within society. Examples of this are 
the prominent Bin Lootah family, which Heard-Bey (1982: 212) explains is of 
Banian origin (Indian-British subjects); or the al-Sayegh family (meaning 
jeweller) that, Peterson explains for the case of the Omani branch of this family, 
migrated also from India and adopted the Arabic name of their profession 
(Peterson, 2004: 39). 
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 The evolution of the political structures is further explained below. (See section on State 
formation and Political System in this chapter). 
65
 See section on the Tribal pre-British tribal setting, and the section on State formation and 
Political System in this chapter. 
66
 Arab people (non-tribal Sunni Muslims) from the Persian town of Khamir, who resettled on the 
Arab littoral of the Gulf. Since the foundation of Abu Dhabi town in 1761 until early 20th century 
about 500 Khamirī settled there  (Heard-Bey, 1982: 201). 
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With regard to religion, most of the inhabitants of this area belonged at the time 
of the arrival of the British to the Maliki (especially those of the southern Arab 
tribes, such as those belonging to the Bani Yas confederation), the Shafa’i 
(followed by some southern Arab tribes, such as the Shihūh), and the Hanbali 
(especially the northern Arab tribes, such as the Qawasim) schools of Sunni 
Islam, while a minority followed the Ibāḍī creed (Heard-Bey 1982: 133), which is 
the case of the majority in neighbouring Oman. Likewise, some non-tribal 
Arabs, Persians and Baluchis followed Sunni Islam; other Persians, but also 
some Arabs, were Shiʿa; while Indians mainly followed Hinduism. Finally, any 
vestiges of Judaism or Christianity (and older religions like Zoroastrism) had 
already disappeared. Since the ruling tribes of the most powerful sheikhdoms 
ascribed to Sunni Islam, people gradually assimilated to it as a way of climbing 
up the hierarchical social structure, and today most Emiratis are Sunni.67 
In terms of population, this impoverishment period implied that many inhabitants 
had to leave in search of better lives, or simply suffered scarcity if they stayed. 
During those years of hardship, many migrated elsewhere in the Gulf, including 
the already oil producing Gulf Sheikhdoms of Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar68 in 
search of jobs, which were mostly lower-paid manual jobs, since people lacked 
any special skills (Fenelon, 1976: 64). The once growing population was 
reduced significantly until the discovery of oil (Heard-Bey, 1982: 26), but the 
numbers are unknown since there is no demographic data available for this 
period. Thus, between the 1930s and the 1960s the Trucial States went through 
adversity and isolation, which has led many to think that the people of the UAE 
were secluded from the world before the discovery of oil. On the contrary, 
southeast Arabian was connected to the world during centuries (not only as a 
consequence of the discovery of oil), and it was only during those three-four 
decades that commercial activities had to be restricted to their closer 
neighbours, as well as subject to the rules imposed by the colonial power.  
Emirati society has, therefore, been “a ‘globalized’ community from time 
immemorial” (Nicolini, 2007: 84) and, even if “one must be careful about any 
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 Although there is no demographic data on religious affiliation available, nowadays 
approximately 85 percent belong to the Sunni branch and 15 percent are Shiʿa, mostly Twelvers. 
See Sison (2006, April 15). 
68
 Oil was discovered in Bahrain in 1932, in Kuwait in 1938, and in Qatar in 1940, so they 
needed workforce earlier than the UAE. At that time, Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar (to a less 
extent) had more developed administration and services than those of the Trucial States, who 
had the most underdeveloped infrastructures and political institutions of Eastern Arabia. 
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implication that Emiratis of today are direct descendants of the inhabitants of 
the region in antiquity” (Szuchman, 2012: 42),69 it must be kept in mind that the 
region is today “home to an intriguing variety of religious, social, and/or ethnic 
minorities and communities who, in many cases, have been (…) [there] for 
centuries” (Peterson, 2009). The bulk of photographs taken by foreign visitors to 
the region in the years prior to the establishment of the Federation constitute a 
unique portrait of pre-oil UAE that reflects the hard years people went through 
and the very simple conditions in which they were living.70Furthermore, the 
sailing boats, agricultural systems, and architectural techniques that were used, 
and even the clothes and hair arrangements people displayed, show similarities 
with other regional communities and, therefore, are further evidence of the 
influences that the local population had received from several cultures 
throughout history (see photographs in Annex 5). 
3. UAE State Formation and Political System 
As the British arrived to the Gulf during the mid-eighteenth century, the Al 
Qasimi (plural Qawasim)71 family ruled over most of the area –even over some 
coastal settlements in the Persian shore of the Gulf– and controlled very much 
maritime trade. Thus, they became the main target of the British who fought 
them until their defeat and made them (and the rulers of neighbouring 
sheikhdoms)72 sign the 1820 ‘General Treaty of Peace’. This treaty aimed at 
protecting British subjects in their maritime trade routes throughout the Indian 
Ocean from the alleged raiding by Arabs of the lower Gulf, something that has 
been portrayed in British official sources as ‘piracy’, but is widely interpreted 
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 The long history of “population movements within Arabia and between Arabia, East Africa, 
and South Asia precludes drawing direct links between modern Emiratis and the peoples of 
ancient southeast Arabia” (Szuchman, 2012: 42). 
70
 Examples of these photographic testimonies are Major Sir Wilfred Patrick Thesiger’s, who 
between 1945 and 1949 explored the southern of the Arabian Peninsula and took many 
photographs (his vast collection of 23,000 negatives belongs today to the Pitt Rivers Museum in 
Oxford). His pictures attempt to capture the life of the badu in his work “Arabian Sands” ([1959] 
1991, London, Penguin Books). Also Ronald Codrai’s (who arrived to the UAE in 1949, after 
taking a job with Petroleum Concessions Limited). His pictures are a rare and unique visual 
documentation of the pre-oil Trucial States, collected in several books, like “Faces of the 
Emirates. An Arabian album: a collection of mid-20th century photographs” (2001, Abu Dhabi, 
Motivate Publications), or “The Seven Shaikdoms: Life in the Trucial States Before the 
Federation of the United Arab Emirates” (1990, London, Stacey International). Likewise 
Gertrude Dyck’s, a Canadian nurse who lived and worked in the oasis city of al-Ain from 1962 to 
2005, and whose pictures strongly complement her comprehensive description of the city during 
the 1960s-70s in her book “The oasis. Al Ain memoirs of ‘Doctora Latifa’” ([1995] 2010, Abu 
Dhabi, Motivate Publications). See photographs in Annex 5. 
71
 The Qawasim are the current ruling families of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah. 
72
 These included the sheikhs of Ajman, Umm al-Qawain, Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Bahrain. 
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today as pure commercial rivalry by historians.73 This treaty was followed by the 
signature of several others, being the most important one the ‘Perpetual 
Maritime Truce’ of 1853,74 by which the rulers compromised to stop all hostilities 
at sea, and the ‘Exclusive Agreements’ of 1892, by which they ceded control 
over their external affairs to the British Government (Onley, 2004: 31-32), thus 
becoming de facto protectorates (Davidson, 2011: 7).  
At first instance, British authorities did not interfere much in Gulf internal affairs. 
However, as the oilfields were discovered elsewhere in the Gulf -and suspicion 
grew that plenty were to be found in the region-, British interest shifted towards 
higher domestic political control and internal stability in the lower Gulf 
sheikhdoms. In this regard, exploration and commercialization agreements were 
signed with Great Britain during the first half of the twentieth century (and before 
oil was discovered in the Trucial States in October 1958),75 by which the rulers 
guaranteed not to grant any concession except to companies appointed by the 
British Government (Zahlan, 1998: 17). It was not until then, and probably not 
coincidentally, that the British started promoting the idea of defining borders and 
of introducing new forms of government, namely a federal political system for 
the Gulf sheikhdoms. In addition, the growing threat of the expansionist Saudi-
Wahhabi movement and the Iranian claims over some of the island under their 
control (as well as the interest of other foreign powers in the region), also made 
the sheikhs become more aware of the importance of establishing alliances 
under “some form of state organized on a territorial basis rather than by a 
fluctuating tribal organization” (Fenelon, 1976: 21).  
Moreover, oil had attracted other foreign powers, and the United States started 
to threat Great Britain’s hegemony. The disputes for oil concession between 
these two powers was directly related to the boundaries dispute with Saudi 
Arabia and Oman over Buraymi in 1952, which further highlighted the need for 
promoting some kind of regional unity in order to guarantee security and the 
smooth flow of oil (Zahlan, 1978: 193), and in 1951 London Foreign Office 
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 Some of the most relevant historical accounts for this period are: Lorimer (1915) and Kelly 
(1980), who present a positive view over the British presence; while the works by Taryam 
(1987), al-Qasimi (1988) and al-Naqeeb (1990) emphasize the negative aspects of this 
relationship. In a middle position, Zahlan (1998) and Onley (2007), provide a more balanced 
view of this historical period. For a discussion of the British imperial presence in the UAE see 
Hawley (1970), Fenelon (1976), Heard-Bey (1982), Zahlan (1978) and Khalifa (1979). 
74
 It was since then that they began to be known as the ‘Trucial States’. 
75
 According to Davidson (2011: 50) oil was first discovered in 1958 at Umm Shaif, Abu Dhabi; 
while Heard-Bey (2008: 65) dates it in 1960 in Abu Dhabi (and in 1967 in Dubai). 
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created the defence force of the Trucial Oman Levies (later known as Trucial 
Oman Scouts). The same year, the Trucial States Council was established in 
which the sheikhs of the seven emirates of today’s UAE were represented: Abu 
Dhabi, Ajman, Dubai, Fujairah, Ras al-Khaimah, Sharjah and Umm al-Qawain. 
Although it was merely a consultative body and had no executive powers or 
formal constitution, it was the first formal forum for debate among the rulers and 
therefore meaningful for the establishment of the federation. 
Regarding the local rulers, there was as shift in the balance of power to the 
more inland oriented Bani Yas tribal confederation, as an outcome of the 
Qawasim defeat and the consequent decline of its maritime activities. In this 
regard, a comparison of the distribution of inhabitants among emirates in 1908 
and 1968 reflects the decline of Ras al-Khaimah and Sharjah, Qawasim centres 
of power, in favour of Abu Dhabi and Dubai, Bani Yas enclaves (see Table 6). 
By then, the Bani Yas (whose paramount ruler was from the Al Nahyan family of 
Liwa; and from which both the Abu Dhabi and Dubai ruling families descend) 
had managed to gain the loyalty of the majority of tribes of the area and became 
the major tribal confederation, controlling around “85% of the territories of the 
Trucial States” (Rugh, 2007: 11) during the year prior to independence. 
Moreover, “the combined effect of the relationship with Britain and the opening 
of the region by the oil companies had a powerful local impact on the role of 
central authority. (…) The treaty system strengthened [the sheikh’s] position 
and assured the continuity of his influence. With time, it became a guarantee. 
Most important, it contributed to the institutionalization of his position” (Zahlan, 
1998: 26-27).  
Table 6: 1908-1968 Population distribution among Emirates
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Abu 
Dhabi 
Dubai Sharjah RAK Fujairah Ajman UAQ Other 
1
9
0
8
 
11,000 10,000 18,750 26,700 - 750 5,000 
8,000 
Nomads 
14% 13% 23% 33% - 1% 6% - 
1
9
6
8
 
46,375 58,971 31,668 24,387 9,735 4,246 3,744 
1,100 Trucial 
Scouts 
26% 33% 18% 14% 5% 2% 2% - 
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As previously stated, during the pre-British period sheikhs only succeeded in 
maintaining political authority by achieving consensus with his ruled, but this 
changed radically when the British entered the equation. By supporting 
economically and militarily the sheikhs who happened to be in power at the time 
when the agreements were signed, they fixed their families in power until 
today.77 The relationship established between the two parties was therefore in 
many ways symbiotic: the rulers gained their legitimacy from the British who, in 
return, protected them against any external or in fact internal threat (dissent 
emerged several times during the protectorate and was put down with British 
support, as explained in Chapter 3). This also implied that the rulers gradually 
became economically less dependent on, and politically more independent from 
the merchants, as they begun to receive rents from the British (first for the 
establishment of communication lines and airports and, later, for the exploitation 
of oil),78 initiating the first stage of the Gulf States rentier economy, as the rulers 
received most of their income from external rents rather than from taxes. 
Moreover, the British had frozen to a large extent the existing tribal 
confederations, for new tribes were more unlikely to form (or at least they lost 
that characteristic of being in constant transformation). This is not to say, 
however, that the rulers had no longer to take into account the interests of all 
groups integrating society but that, by gaining control over the revenues of the 
state, power became more centralised and autocratic. Rulers would still consult 
(and still do to some extent) with the sheikhs of the most relevant tribes and 
notable merchants, but all these have since been in less powerful positions. 
Thus, by the end of the 1960s the Trucial rulers had consolidated control over 
their territories, product of that mix of local alliance building and the legitimacy 
bestowed to them by the British. Yet, the high dependence they had developed 
upon Great Britain became evident when it was announced in 1968 that they 
would leave the region by 1971, and the rulers expressed their reluctance to 
lose their protection and even offered to subsidize the maintenance of British 
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 The ruling families of the UAE are: the Al Nahyan in Abu Dhabi; the Al Maktoum in Dubai: the 
Al Qasimi in Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah; Al Nu’aimi in Ajman; Al Mu’alla in Umm al-Qawain; 
and Al Sharqi in Fujairah. 
78
 Rentier State Theory (RST) says that in rentier states there is a low probability that 
movements for social or political change emerge and, when they do, they are easily put down 
(Mahdavy, 1970; Niblock, 1980; Beblawi & Luciani, 1987; al-Naqeeb, 1990; Crystal, 1990; 
Gause, 1994; Ayubi, 1995; Herb, 1999; Ross, 2001; Hertog, 2010a & 2010b; Gray, 2011). This 
is explained in more detail in the Theoretical Framework section (Chapter 1). 
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troops in the lower Gulf (Davidson, 2005: 45; Kéchichian, 2008: 283). This 
attitude is by large and far an exception in the Arab world colonial experience, 
and points to the special circumstances of these small sheikhdoms, as to the 
peculiar relation their rulers had established (and still have) with the British and 
other foreign powers (especially the US) that filled the relative vacuum left 
thereafter. It is noteworthy that this dependency did not only have to do with 
regional security, but also with the fact that during this phase of reconnection 
with the world (and with new worlds) the British were acting as the link between 
this emerging principalities and the world markets, for oil production was “part of 
a larger process of integration (…) into the global capitalist economy” (Davis, 
1991: 114; also Luciani, 2006; Hanieh, 2011; Gray, 2011). Reasonably, the 
need to decide under which framework they would become an independent 
state became then more urgent. The process did not take place without 
disagreement among the rulers (especially while Bahrain and Qatar were 
potential members), including on the method of voting in the Supreme Council, 
representation of the Union Council in the Constitution, and the location of the 
capital (Heard-Bey, 1996: 357). The main promoter of the Federation, Sheikh 
Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan (ruling Sheikh of Abu Dhabi since 1966) 
recognised years later that “his fellow rulers were exceptionally astute” and that 
“negotiations that led to the creation of the UAE were taxing, both politically and 
financially” (Kéchichian, 2008: 282, 340).  
Abu Dhabi’s contribution to the budget of the Trucial States Council increased 
every year, becoming the largest contributor by 1968 (Abed, 2001: 127) and, 
since the oil fields in the other sheikhdoms were not very significant (or 
inexistent), they did not count on the huge wealth Abu Dhabi (and Dubai in 
second instance) started to accrue. This indeed, situated Abu Dhabi in a 
privileged position in the negotiations towards the creation of the state. 
Moreover, there is shared scholarly opinion that the role of Sheikh Zayed was 
determinant in the establishment of the United Arab Emirates.79 He had already 
gained people’s respect by showing his intention to invest in development (even 
before oil) while he was representative of the ruler in al-Ain (Kéchichian, 2008: 
289), was able to solve long standing conflicts with the ruling family of Dubai, 
and was smart enough “to extend his influence to potential rivals by sharing his 
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 Further analysis on this will be found in the section on UAE Statecraft in this chapter. 
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wealth, assigning them positions of power, and arranging marriages to 
encourage closer relations with them” (Rugh, 2007: 219), ultimately being able 
to unite the seven Trucial States under the federal state of the United Arab 
Emirates.80  
The political independence that the rulers had acquired by means of British 
support and oil rents determined the supremacy that Abu Dhabi and Dubai–
which had the largest oil reserves–gained over the other sheikhdoms. This was 
reflected in the ‘Provisional Constitution’ of 1971,81 and tribal political structures 
were to a large extent “superseded by territory and hierarchical authority” 
(Tapper, 1990: 50). Although the text establishes a political structure at federal 
and emirate levels, in which the Emirs82 are sovereign within their emirates–and 
even if much of the decision-making process depends on the relationship 
between both these levels of authority (Heard-Bey, 2005: 358)-, the tendency 
has been toward centralisation of power. Actually, as explained in the following 
section, the political system adopted already pointed in this direction since 
representation of the emirates in the federal institutions is established 
hierarchically with Abu Dhabi at the top, followed by Dubai, Sharjah and Ras al-
Khaimah, and Fujairah, Ajman and Umm al-Qawain.  
The political system 
The Federal Supreme Council (FSC) is the highest executive and legislative 
authority of the federation. This body is comprised of the seven emirate rulers 
and is responsible for establishing federal policies and sanctioning legislation. 
There is no real separation of powers and the rulers of each emirate take all 
decisions in the last instance, with the rulers of Abu Dhabi and Dubai having 
veto power on FSC decisions as expressed in article 49: “The decisions of the 
Supreme Council on substantive matters are taken by majority of five of its 
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 Bahrain, Qatar and Ras al-Khaimah decided to go their own way, but the latter finally decided 
to join the federation two months later it was established. For details on this events see 
Davidson (2005), Heard-Bey (1982), Khalifa (1979), and Zahlan (1978). 
81
 The ‘Provisional Constitution of the United Arab Emirates’ was drafted in 1971 and came into 
effect on December 2
nd
, the day of the official establishment of the UAE. The draft was 
amended in 1972, when Ras al-Khaimah joined the federation, and in 1976 to unify the UAE 
armed forces and to extend the transitional period of the provisional constitution for five years, 
which happened also in 1981, 1986 and 1991, until it was made permanent in May 1996. Article 
121 was replaced in 2004 to establish the federation as the sole in charge of enacting laws on 
several matters. The last amendment was in 2009 (see Chapter 3 for details). The constitution 
is available in English at: http://www.almajles.gov.ae:85/Uploads/Files/2011/06/20/15206.pdf 
82
 The title of Shaykh was eventually changed by Ḥākim (ruler) and, finally by Amīr/Emir (prince). 
Nonetheless, the rulers and members of the ruling families are still referred to as sheikhs. 
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members provided that Abu Dhabi and Dubai Emirates must be among the five 
members. The minority shall abide by the opinion of the majority.” This is 
related to the abovementioned shift in the balance of power that took place from 
the Qawasim to the Bani Yas, as well as to the fact that Abu Dhabi, followed by 
Dubai, had the largest oil reserves. 
The President is the head of state. He is elected by the FSC for a five-year term 
and appoints the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, and the Council of 
Ministers. A vice president is also elected by the FSC who “shall exercise all the 
powers of the president in the event of his absence for any reason” (Article 51). 
Although is not formally established in the article, the president has been 
always the ruler of Abu Dhabi, confirming the uncontested hierarchical 
supremacy of this emirate. The first president of the UAE was Sheikh Zayed bin 
Sultan Al Nahyan, who was succeeded by his son Khalifa bin Zayed in 2004 
(see Figure 2).  
Figure 2: Federal political system of the UAE (as to 2014) 
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Another element that attests to the increasing power of Abu Dhabi in the federal 
structure was the definition of the capital. According to Article 9 of the 
constitution Abu Dhabi was to be the ‘provisional capital’ of the UAE, with the 
project of establishing the future capital in a newly constructed city between Abu 
Dhabi and Dubai territories, which would be named Karama. However, despite 
the criticism of Dubai and Ras al-Khaimah, that idea was abandoned as Abu 
Dhabi developed its infrastructures rapidly while functioning as the de facto 
capital and no new city was constructed. When in 1996 the Constitution was 
amended to become permanent, Abu Dhabi was ratified as the permanent 
capital of the federation (Abed, 2001: 131). Initially, the Prime Minister and Vice 
President positions were held by the heir apparent of Dubai, Sheikh Maktoum 
bin Rashid Al Maktoum. Only in 1979, after a confrontation over the creation of 
a federal defence force was brought to an end, the Emir of Dubai, Sheikh 
Rashid bin Said Al Maktoum, accepted to become the federation’s prime 
minister and vice-president as an expression of Dubai’s commitment to the UAE 
project.83 
The next institution on the power scale is the Council of Ministers, which is 
appointed by the President and headed by the Prime Minister. It “shall consist of 
the Prime Minister, his Deputy and a number of Ministers” (Article 55) and its 
members “shall be chosen from among citizens of the Union known for their 
competence and experience” (Article 56). It drafts decrees and laws but cannot 
approve them. The composition of the cabinets since 1971 also reflects the 
power struggle in the federal structure and the relative increment of Abu Dhabi’s 
quota of power: the first formation of 1971 included only one; the 1990 and 
1997 four; and the 2004, 2006 and 2008 seven members of the Al Nahyan 
ruling family of Abu Dhabi.84 
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 In 1978 an alliance was formed by Dubai, Ras Al-Khaimah and Umm al-Qawain, who 
temporarily announced their secession from the federation, which opposed Sheikh Zayed’s 
unilateral decision of merging of the Abu Dhabi Defence Force into the newly created Union 
Defence Force (and the appointment of Sheikh Sultan bin Zayed Al Nahyan as its commander-
in-chief). To preserve unity, Abu Dhabi postponed any further unification of the national armed 
forces (Davidson, 2009a: 63). The confrontation ended with the mediation of the Kuwaiti 
Minister of Foreign Affairs who made possible an agreement by which Sheikh Zayed had to 
temporarily postpone any further federal integration policies and Sheikh Rashid accepted to 
become the federation’s prime minister and vice-president (Davidson, 2009: 64; Peck, 2001: 
154). 
84
 See Annex 6 Main ministries by tribe. 
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The Federal National Council (FNC) is a unicameral advisory and consultative 
body composed of forty members, which reviews legislation and proposes 
amendments but cannot enact or revise legislation and does not have veto 
power. It can make policy recommendations to the Cabinet, has the power to 
question any minister regarding ministry performance, and discusses the annual 
budget. Resembling the Federal Supreme Council and Council of Ministers in 
structure, the composition of the FNC established by the Constitution favours 
the emirates of Abu Dhabi and Dubai, with eight representatives each, while 
Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah are represented by six each, and Fujairah, Ajman 
and Umm al-Qawain by only four each. 
Despite the fact that the constitution mentions in its preamble that the UAE 
government is going “towards a full-fledged representative democratic regime,” 
none of the amendments has introduced a reference to the process of popular 
election of the representatives of FNC (not even the 2009 amendment, after the 
first elections took place in 2006). Conversely, Article 69 establishes that every 
emirate “is free to determine the method of selection of its representatives in the 
FNC”, providing no constitutional justification for a permanent elective body of 
representatives. Following that article, the rulers of each emirate appointed the 
forty seats until 2006, when partial elections were introduced as the mechanism 
to choose half of the FNC seats by a selected portion of the population. The 
period of term in office was two years until Article 72 of the Constitution was 
amended in December 2009 to extend it to four years. A second election took 
place in 2011.85 
The constitution provides for a formally independent federal judiciary, as the text 
goes “justice is the basis of rule. In performing their duties, judges shall be 
independent and shall not be subject to any authority but the law and their own 
conscience” (Article 94). However, in practice “judicial decisions are subject to 
review by the government. The Ministry of Justice is directly involved in almost 
all aspects of court administration” (CEIP & FRIDE, n. d.). Moreover, the fact 
that the Federal Supreme Court–which consists of a president and a number of 
judges not exceeding five in all–, is “appointed by decree issued by the 
President after approval by the Supreme Council” (Article 96), demonstrates the 
absolute dependence of the judicial power on the will of the seven emirs. 
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 A detailed analysis and significance of the electoral processes can be found in Chapter 3. 
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Primary Tribunals organisation, formation, and chambers are regulated through 
by-laws (Article 103). 
At the local level, the highest institutions are the courts of the Emirs and of the 
heirs apparent. Abu Dhabi, due to the size of its territory also has ruler’s 
representatives and courts in the eastern and western regions. In addition, Abu 
Dhabi, Dubai and Sharjah have executive councils; and Abu Dhabi and Sharjah 
have consultative councils similar to the FNC (Davidson, 2011: 13), but 
members are appointed rather than elected. According to the constitution, each 
ruler within his emirate was preserved and gave him “the power to block the 
local implementation of any federal law or decision considered to be 
unacceptable, or incompatible with his own interests” (Abed, 2001: 142) but, as 
this brief description of the UAE political system shows, the UAE power is 
largely centralised in the hands of the President of the federation (until today the 
Emir of Abu Dhabi) and, to less extent, in the hands of the Vice-President and 
the Prime Minister (positions controlled by Dubai). Moreover, the dependence 
that the rest of the Emirates have on Abu Dhabi’s wealth has contributed to 
enhance the power of the presidency and of the Al Nahyan family in general.  
Dubai has historically been politically more autonomous since the wealth 
achieved through the diversification of its economy allowed its leadership to act 
more independently, or even contradict Abu Dhabi’s mandates (also due to the 
historical rivalry between these two).86 However, this situation changed after 
Dubai’s economy was hit by the global financial crisis in 2008 and had to rely on 
Abu Dhabi’s financial support. In return, Dubai had to give up political power, 
contributing to further centralisation of power. Remarkably, this was reflected 
and made clear to the population through the naming of landmark buildings and 
main roads in Dubai after sheikhs of Abu Dhabi: the tallest tower in the world 
(until today), which was going to be ‘Burj Dubai’ was finally named ‘Burj Khalifa’ 
(after the Emir of Abu Dhabi, president of the UAE); and the main highway 
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 The historical rivalry between the ruling families of Dubai and Abu Dhabi dates back to 1833 
when, after a series of disagreements over the chieftaincy of the Bani Yas tribal confederation, 
and a violent suppression of the perpetrators of a coup attempt against the paramount ruler (an 
Al Nahyan of the al-Bu Falah), several tribes under the leadership of Maktoum bin Butti al-Falasi 
(of the al-Bu Falasah clan) left Abu Dhabi and settled in Dubai. In 1835, the newly established 
sheikhs, the Al Maktoum, were invited to sign the new Perpetual Maritime Truce by the British, 
hence recognising their independence from Abu Dhabi. After several attempts of reabsorbing 
the seceded tribes under their rule, the Al Nahyan had to accept their counterparts and 
eventually regained them as allies, even marring women from the Al Maktoum family and thus 
established kinship ties (Davidson, 2009a: 13-15). 
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connecting all the Emirates, and which used to be called ‘Emirates Road’ was 
changed in 2013 to ‘Sheikh Mohammad Bin Zayed Al Nahyan Road’ (Crown 
Prince of Abu Dhabi and deputy supreme commander of the UAE Armed 
Forces). As an informant put it: “After Sheikh Zayed passed away, power 
became more centralised and this has been more noticeable after the financial 
crisis. Dubai has been brought to its knees and Abu Dhabi is the real decision 
maker.”87 
4. UAE Statecraft: Citizenship and National Identity 
The dramatic demographic growth, resulting from the large numbers of workers 
that started to migrate to the UAE to work in the oil industry, and in the 
enormous infrastructure and construction projects, changed very rapidly the 
composition of society to the point that Emirati nationals have become a tiny 
minority within today’s population. From a total of 80,000 inhabitants at the 
beginning of the 19th century (Lorimer, 1908: 1432-36), population has 
escalated to four million in 2005 and to around eight million in 2010, of which 
only 20 and 11 per cent respectively were Emirati citizens (see Figure 3 and 
Annex 4). These unique demographic figures probably make the UAE an 
unprecedented case in history (along only with the state of Qatar). The rapid 
and constant population growth has contributed to the shaping of a very 
heterogeneous social stratification, which is organised to a large extent along 
ethnic and nationality lines, and to the proliferation of social problems and 
identity issues among the different communities that co-exist in this country.  
Figure 3: UAE Population growth 1908-2010
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 Personal interview with Emirati intellectual. Dubai (March 2012). 
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 Several sources. See Annex 4 UAE Population. 
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Certainly, the design of nationality laws is the ‘cornerstone’ of Gulf social 
stratification (Longva, 2005: 119-120), as it is directly related to the construction 
of national identity and the legitimatisation of the rulers. Following the Kuwaiti 
model,89 the UAE initially granted nationality based on the relation people had to 
the territory (regardless of their ethnicity) or to its rulers (i.e. tribal affiliation). 
This was done according to the Federal Law Concerning Nationality and 
Passports, which established that nationality could be obtained by law (bi-l-
qānūn) to anyone who had been a usual resident of one of the emirates before 
1925; by dependence (bi-l-tab‘iyya) to wives of Emiratis, and their children; or 
by naturalisation (bi-l-tajannas) to Omanis, Qataris and Bahrainis residing more 
than three years in the UAE, other Arabs living there for more than ten years 
(five after the date of issue of the law), and others that had resided in one of the 
Emirates since 1940 or for more than 30 years (20 of them at least after the 
date of issue of the law) or have rendered “marvellous deeds for the 
country…regardless of the period of residence” (UAE Nationality Law).  
According to Colonel Ali Ghanim al-Mirri, Advisor for Naturalisation Affairs to the 
Director of the General Department of Residency and Foreigners Affairs, 
“[c]ommittees with members from reliable families with good reputation and 
well-known persons in each and every nook and corner of the country were 
formed. The members of those panels who knew every person in their 
respective regions were authorised to approve or reject the applications for 
passports those days” (al-Zarooni, 2013, 23 August). Apparently, it was not 
difficult to obtain the nationality during the first years of the federation, but in this 
too the inland-coastal factor seems to have played an important role during the 
first years of the federation. Sheikh Rashid of Dubai is supposed to have been 
in favour of recognising as citizens the inhabitants of Dubai no matter their 
origins, while Sheikh Zayed of Abu Dhabi was arguably more concerned with 
the genealogy of Arab tribes (Dresch, 2005: 141; McCoy, 2008: 78).  
Again, population data give us a hint of how social structure was in the years 
prior to the federation. The first census conducted in the country shows that the 
most populated town in 1968 was Dubai, followed by Abu Dhabi, Sharjah, Ras 
al-Khaimah, Fujairah, Ajman and Umm al-Qawain (being the total population of 
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 The Nationality Law of Kuwait was amended more than seven times in 30 years, “each time 
for the purpose of further restricting access to membership” (Longva, 2005: 121). 
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the region 180,226 people); and that only 70,000 people belonged to the Arab 
tribal population,90 reflecting the importance that the non-tribal element had in 
pre-federation times (almost 60%). Moreover, Dubai already had the smallest 
percentage of tribal population, while the emirate with more tribal population 
was Ras al-Khaimah. This might explain their reluctance of Ras al-Khaimah to 
accept the new federal setting in first instance, for in the tribal setting the sheikh 
that enjoyed allegiance from more people would have most likely become the 
paramount ruler of a confederation of tribes; whereas at that moment Abu Dhabi 
and Dubai (followed by Sharjah) were imposing themselves above the rest of 
the emirates because they had found more oil fields and therefore had more 
British support and prospective wealth revenues. The emirate with the second 
largest tribal population was Abu Dhabi, followed by Sharjah, Fujairah, Dubai, 
Umm al-Qawain, and Ajman, reflecting that physical distribution of people was 
adapting to the new oil based economy and moving away from its previous 
badu-hadhar and fishing-merchant character (see Table 7).  
Table 7: 1968 UAE Tribal – Non-tribal population
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Emirate Population Tribal % of tribal 
RAK 24,387 17,941 74% 
Abu Dhabi 46,375 17,750 38% 
Sharjah 31,668 12,769 40% 
Fujairah 9,735 9,138 94% 
Dubai 58,971 7,864 13% 
UAQ 3,744 3,209 86% 
Ajman 4,246 1,611 38% 
Total 180,226 70,282 39% 
 
It could be argued that many of the non-tribal people included in the 1968 
census could have been recent migrants and therefore would not apply for 
nationality but, it seems likely that the census had probably only counted the 
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 The 1968 census listed as ‘tribal’ the people belonging to the following clans, tribes or 
confederations, which integrated both settled, nomad and semi-nomad people: Bani Yas, al-
Sharquiyyin, Shihuh-Habus, al-‘Ali, al-Qawasim, al-Manasir, Za’ab, al-Dhawahir, Mazari’, al-Bu 
Shamis, Bani Kitab, al-Nu’aim, al-Naqbiyyin, and al-‘Awamir. There is an additional “other” 
category, under which 10,695 people were counted, but it does not specify their affiliation (Kalifa, 
1979: 97). Since slavery had already been abolished, we can assume that this numbers 
included the former slaves and its descendants. 
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 Several sources. See Annex 4 UAE Population. 
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people who were residing there permanently, excluding the temporary residents 
who were there in commercial missions. Moreover, since the population was 
small at the time when the federation was formed, both tribal and non-tribal, 
settled and nomad elements of society were recognised as citizens, including 
families of Persian origin (‘Ajami), Arabs who had forgotten their tribal 
genealogy (or had never had one, but claimed to have had it) while living in the 
Persian coast of the Gulf but claimed links to Arabia (Hawla), Baluchis and 
Africans who had worked mainly as slaves (Peterson, 1977 and 2004; Hopper, 
2011) as well as some Indians who had become assimilated to the local Arab 
society. Even people who had never lived in the Trucial States (some already 
carrying other passports) were invited to join in. In Abu Dhabi, for instance, 
these were mainly from related (and not so related too) tribes of Najdi, Omani or 
Yemeni origin (Dresch, 2005: 142), who switched their allegiance to the Al 
Nahyan rulers, and to the UAE more generally. On the other hand, however, 
some problems emerged with the new law: The seven sheikhdoms used to 
grant passports to their citizens during the pre-unification period, even if they 
had arrived after 1925, but with the new nationality law the old passports 
became invalid and many who had a pre-Federation passport were not granted 
the Emirati nationality (Shahwari & Almadani, 2011: 27). Moreover, some 
settled inhabitants who carried other regional passports did not bother to apply 
for nationality even though they were long-term residents, for they ignored the 
importance of doing it at that time and the consequences it would bring later to 
their families.92 It is thought that others (mainly badu) who did not have any 
passport at all did not apply either, probably because they were not aware of 
what was happening. In fact, “oral accounts point to a haphazard registration 
process, with a clear disparity between urban and nomadic” inhabitants, with 
the latter failing “to register for a number of reasons: illiteracy, unfamiliarity with 
the idea of documented citizenship, or lack of identifying paperwork” (Cella, 
2014, February). The cases turned to be a huge problem when the law was 
amended in 1975 and it became more difficult to obtain the nationality. In fact, 
this is the origin of the bidūn jinsiyya or just bidun (‘without nationality’ in Arabic), 
who are residents of the UAE (and other Gulf states) who do not have any 
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 Personal interview with a long-term resident family of Emirati mother (of Iranian origin) and 
Iranian father who did not apply early, and as a consequence any of their children had access to 
nationality (al-Ain, March 2012). 
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nationality up until today, and the children born in the UAE to a stateless 
father.93 Of course, there is always two sides to a story and, in this case, there 
are also cases of people who moved to the UAE after 1971 and claimed to have 
lived there since earlier times in order to be granted the nationality (mainly 
Iraqis that migrated after the 1990 Gulf War), making it more difficult for those 
that had actually lived there since pre-federation days but applied for nationality 
later.94  
The 1975 amended Nationality Law specifies that a citizen is by law “an Arab 
who was residing in a member Emirate in 1925 or before and who continued to 
reside therein up to the effective date of this law”; and adds that nationality 
could also be granted to “[m]embers of the Arabian tribes who have immigrated 
from neighbouring countries to the UAE and have been continuously and 
residing in the UAE for more than three years immediately before submission of 
application for citizenship” (UAE Nationality Law), giving much importance to 
the Arab tribal element and, one could argue, even putting in doubt the 
citizenship of the many non-Arabs who were recognised in 1971.  As Paul 
Dresch puts it, “the Abu Dhabi view…was winning” (2005: 144) and an 
Arabizing campaign was initiated which intended to erase from the historical 
memory of citizens any other heritage. This further paved the way for the 
emergence of profound identity conflicts within Emirati society, both between 
and among the national and non-national populations.  
Table 8: UAE National/Non-national population
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Year Population Nationals 
% of 
Nationals 
1908 80,000 * * 
1968 180,226 * * 
1975 557,887 201,544 36% 
1980 1,042,099 290,544 28% 
1985 1,379,303 396,114 29% 
1995 2,411,041 587,330 24% 
2005 4,106,427 825,495 20% 
2010 8,264,070 947,997 11% 
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 The situation of the bidun is further explained in the Social Stratification section of this chapter. 
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 Personal interviews with government officials and university professors. Several places and 
dates (UAE, 2011-2014). 
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 Several sources. See Annex 4. Where (*) appears, no data was available. 
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Passports, moreover, used to specify whether you were a citizen by law (who 
had obtained it by jus sanguinis) 96  or by naturalisation, effectively dividing 
society in two classes of nationals or muwaṭīn: the ‘native’ (‘Ayal al-Balad, 
literally children of the country) and the ‘naturalized’ (mujannasun), who are 
second category nationals and do not enjoy the same rights and privileges as 
the first, thus contributing to social division and discrimination (for example, they 
are normally not employed in sensitive government departments or high 
positions). To further close the ‘national club’ a marriage fund that was 
established in 1992 aimed at avoiding mixed marriages and grants generous 
subsidies to national couples, which resulted in an increase of consanguineous 
marriages from 39 per cent to 50.5 per cent in one generation (al-Gazali et al., 
1997). These policies have to do with the feeling of fear among Emiratis that the 
majority foreign population is eroding Emirati customs to a worrying level and 
that marriage outside the national population would only worsen this situation. 
Figure 4: National population pyramid (2005)
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In this regard, a debate emerged around the 2005 census data that revealed a 
huge national – non-national population imbalance, and which raised “serious 
issues regarding national identity, citizenship, residency, multiculturalism, 
sustainability and, ultimately, the question as to who [would] be in the driving 
seat of this rapidly globalising society?” (Abdulla, 2007).  Khalifa Rashid al-
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 Jus sanguinis is the legal principle of nationality law by which nationality is not determined by 
place of birth, but by having blood relationship with a national. 
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 Source: 2005 National Census, UAE National Bureau of Statistics. 
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Sha'ali, an Emirati writer who specialises in legal affairs, argued that “the 
number of naturalised people, who have been granted citizenship, should not 
exceed the number of native citizens, because this, if it happens, will pose a 
strategic threat to the nation's identity and homogeneity” (al-Sha’ali, 2012, 
March 6). In a more critical position, Mohammed al-Roken, lawyer from Dubai 
who was among the 2013 detainees sentenced to jail for alleged association 
with the Muslim Brotherhood, 98  expressed in 2007 his desire to embolden 
citizens to raise their voices against “an authoritarian government [that] caters 
to expatriates” (Shadid, 2007, May). In fact, Table 8 shows that the population 
imbalance has steadily grown from 36 percent in 1975 to 11 percent of 
nationals in 2010, while figures 4 and 5 reflect the different age and gender 
structures of the total and national populations.  
Nonetheless, research on acculturation demonstrates “that acquired cultural 
knowledge does not actually replace existing knowledge structures” and that 
“the experience of many bicultural and multicultural individuals around the world 
attests that it is possible to internalize more than one body of cultural 
knowledge” (al-Dabbagh & Gargani 2011: 13). In this regard, the Emirati 
commentator Sultan Sooud Al-Qassemi reminds that many of the 19th and 20th 
century immigrants “assimilated and enriched UAE society having become 
citizens of the newly created state,” and that “mixed marriages and a more 
globalised migration ensued, further diversifying the population” (Al-Qassemi, 
2013, December 1), thus pointing out to the fact that naturalisation of 
expatriates can have positive outcomes.99 In line with this, Jamal al-Suweidi 
(senior advisor to the Abu Dhabi crown prince) thinks that “the demographic 
fight is ‘lost’ and that ‘coexistence’ is needed” (Partrick, 2009: 30), while al-
Gergawi advocates for “offering a special permanent residency status to those 
long-term residents sharing the cultural values and (official) language of the 
country” (Partrick, 2009: 30). Interestingly, the ethnic backgrounds and tribal 
ascription of the Emiratis quoted above are very different: at least one is of Arab 
non-tribal origin; one descends from one of the tribal ruling families; one from a 
‘noble’ Arab tribe; and one is of Persian descent. Their opinions therefore 
represent important groups of society, and show that the “fluidity of identity 
[between both coasts of the Gulf] was probably always present” and that 
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 See section on the Post-Arab spring landscape in Chapter 3. 
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 See also: Al-Qassemi (2013, September 22). 
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“understanding that this is the nature of the ordinary people who live in the 
region helps explain why the battle to control and shape their identities can be 
so fierce” (Beeman, 2009: 156-157).  
Figure 5: Total population pyramid (2005)
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In this regard, Davis and Gavrielides have discussed “the relationship among 
state formation, historical memory, and popular culture” (1991: xiv) and 
explained how in the Gulf, as in other countries of the Middle East and around 
the world, the rulers have made huge efforts to reinterpret history “in ways 
intended to weaken active or potential opposition to its rule” (1991: xvi). These 
authors make a very wise distinction between the notions of ‘state formation’ 
and ‘state-craft’, which they define as “the process or mechanisms whereby a 
state enhances its power and authority” or “the skills whereby political elites or 
ruling classes promote state formation” in order to “generalize their interests to 
the populace at large” (Davis, 1991: 12). This is normally achieved -they clarify- 
through the combination of formal (establishment of institutions) and informal 
means (reinterpretation of history/culture) to build “emotive links with populace” 
(Davis, 1991: 13). In this regard, the UAE authorities “have actively promoted 
the notion of Gulf folklore as a basis for forging a more explicit political 
consciousness centred around a Gulf Arab identity” (Davis, 1991: 19) or, more 
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precisely, a Gulf Arab tribal identity. 101  Especially since 2008, which was 
declared the year for National Identity and when the Federal Demographic 
Council was established (Baharoon: 1), “images of camels, horses, forts, coffee 
pots, dhows, and falcons have been actively used by the state to symbolize 
Emirati identity” (al-Dhaheri, 2009: 276) and are “a forceful reminder…as to who 
dominates this society” (Blau, 2003: 28, in Szuchman, 2012). This serves to 
“reinvigorate tribal histories, thereby reminding the population of the historical 
roots of the traditional monarchy’s legitimacy” (Davidson, 2009a: 133), and 
leaves out of the picture many aspects of this society and ignores information 
that is useful to understand current structures and dynamics. It is moreover, 
“aimed both at Emirati nationals… [but also at] resident expats, as a visual 
reminder of their status as guests of the UAE” (Szuchman, 2012: 37).  
Regardless of the multicultural and ‘globalised’ character of an important part of 
the UAE historical society, 102  school textbooks, museums, and even the 
citizenship law, focus on the Arab tribal identity to which the rulers, and 
specifically the more inland oriented tribes belong to. In order to “maintain the 
illusion of a purified national identity” migrants are “placed historically into a 
timeline where the presence of the foreign coincides with oil,” because 
acknowledging “the long history of South Asians in the Gulf is to allow space for 
both past and present forms of hybridity and cultural exchange, which may 
create a crisis” (Vora, 2013: 63). Indeed, huge efforts have been done to erase 
any existing cultural particularities arguably to unite citizens under a common 
identity, but which has conversely enhanced differences between social groups 
and discrimination towards the “less Arab” and the “less tribal.” The emphasis 
on “a Bedouin-style cultural past even as nationals are overwhelmingly part of 
settled communities103 (…) underscores the separate identity and history of the 
individual emirates, for whom the notion of the wider Emirati nation is a 
construct with, by definition, a short-lived history” (Partrick, 2009: 17). Children 
are raised without being told that “the teak wood used for doors and window 
frames came from India, that pottery clay came from Iran, that there is a strong 
African influence in ‘Arabian’ music, that falcons for the national sport of 
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falconry were caught in Pakistan, or that ‘traditional’ henna designs originated in 
the subcontinent” (Vora, 2013: 59); and all nationals (or aspirants to becoming 
nationals) are expected to adopt that constructed identity in order to integrate in 
the community, to be recognised as real or ‘pure’ (as some like to call 
themselves) Emiratis, no matter what their cultural backgrounds are and how 
long they have lived in the territory today known as the UAE.  
As a result, a discourse emerged “of some citizens being more citizens than 
others” (Baharoon, 2012: 1), thus showing that citizenship and national identity 
policies contribute to society being, not only hierarchical, heterogeneous and 
ethnocratic, but to a large extent xenophobic. In 2004, the Dubai think tank 
B’huth conducted a study that “warned of ‘back-fire’ potential of maintaining a 
discourse of the threat against UAE National Identity from other cultures in the 
UAE” (Baharoon, 2012: 1) and launched a social development program called 
‘Watani’ (my nation), which aims at creating “a discourse of National Identity 
that does not collide with multiculturalism in a diverse community” within “a 
framework where National Identity can be maintained through inclusion rather 
than exclusion” (Baharoon, 2012: 2). However, the emphasis is mainly on the 
Emirati-Non Emirati divide, and little attention is paid to the plural cultures that 
have historically contributed to the shaping of the multiple Emiratis Identities, 
something that would enhance the feeling of inclusiveness and acceptance of 
differences as enriching rather than threatening.  
5. UAE Social Stratification 
Optimists argue that, having diverse cultural backgrounds, Emiratis have 
“amalgamated into what has become the Emirati identity” over the last four 
decades and that being Emirati has, as Al-Qassemi puts it, “started to 
denote…a way of life, a sense of common destiny” (Al-Qassemi, 2013) 
However, while the feeling of belonging to the federation has surely been 
enhanced since its inception, ethnicity, social background, and wāsṭa 104 still 
determine to a large extent the hierarchical character of the UAE social system.  
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As with state-society relations, class formation in the GCC states has been 
predominantly studied through the lens of the Rentier State Theory (RST) that 
puts the emphasis on external rent as the main factor shaping structures and 
dynamics (Mahdavy (1970), Niblock (1980), Beblawi and Luciani (1987), al-
Naqeeb (1990), Gause (1994), Ayubi (1995), Crystal (1990), Herb (1999), Ross 
(2001), Hertog (2010a), Gray (2011).105 Certainly, by becoming economically 
independent, the Gulf rulers developed new relations with the people as the 
providers of subsidies and social services (al-Naqeeb, 1990) and as a result 
differentiated levels of government beneficiaries emerged, which are however 
also heavily conditioned by other factors. In this regard, Ahn Nga Longva 
identifies in her study of the Kuwaiti society “internal power asymmetries” that 
run along sectarian and cultural-historical lines –both among nationals and non-
nationals-, and describes the social system as an ‘ethnocracy’, which she 
defines as one where there is a tendency for the elite “to posit their own 
physical characteristics and cultural norms as the essence of the 
nation…excluding all those…who do not exhibit the same characteristics”, thus 
giving importance to ethnic and ideological factors (Longva, 2005: 120).  
Similarly, Nora Colton observes that social stratification in the Gulf is based 
primarily on affiliation to the ruling family and to nationality, but she sees further 
divisions related to economy, religion, tribal connections, regional location and 
gender (Colton, 2011: 39), supporting the idea that the RST is useful to explain 
some dynamics but that the analysis of Gulf socio-politics requires that we apply 
a holistic approach. Complementing the former, Michel Herb sees ‘ascriptive 
status’ and control over the rent as determinant for the position people occupy 
in Gulf societies. He first differentiates between people of tribal and not tribal 
origin, but also distinguishes between sharif or aṣilī and non-aṣilī tribes (of 
‘noble’ or ‘subordinate’ origin), as well as between the badu and hadhar sectors 
of society. In line with the RST, his view is that through the control of the petro-
state, the ruling families gained paramount power that allowed them to 
determine which elements of the population to promote and which not (Herb, 
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 Rentier state theory says that in states that derive most of their income from external rents 
rather than from taxes, and where people are engaged in the consumption and redistribution of 
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Framework section (Chapter 1). 
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1999: 51-65). Adam Hanieh, however, puts the focus on Gulf capitalism for he 
considers Gulf class formation to have “evolved alongside and within the 
development of a global capitalist system” and that nor oil neither the state are 
the only catalysts for social change (Hanieh, 2011: 15-16). Additionally, and 
addressing the Emirati case, Khalid Almezaini argues that “it is clear that to a 
large extent, it is wasta (connections) that determines the financial status and 
class of many members of society” (Almezaini, 2013: 65).  
Taking these approaches into account and following the theoretical approach of 
‘sociology of power’ (Izquierdo, 2008),106 I hereafter present a discussion of 
Emirati social stratification.  The following classification looks into the several 
layers that exist within the national and foreign populations and their formation, 
which are conditioned by all the above mentioned factors: history, ethnic origin, 
culture, demography, ideology, ascriptive status/genealogy, wasta, control over 
resources of power, and regional and global socio-economic and political 
dynamics. Firstly, I agree with Izquierdo (2008) that the establishment of socio-
political hierarchies primarily implies a division between the members of society 
who rule and compete for the control over resources of power, and those who 
are governed; between the elites and the population. This is those whose 
primary interest is the differential accumulation of power and those who 
generally rely upon decisions made by the elites, except when they become 
aware of a necessity or feel unhappy about a situation, and therefore mobilise 
to obtain their claims. Thus, social actors “establish relations with one another, 
according to their capacity to utilize given resources of power…whether 
political, economic, informative, coercive, ideological or of any other nature” 
(Izquierdo and Lampridi-Kemou, 2012: 8). 
In the UAE case, the Emirs and those members of the ruling families closer to 
them are at the top of the social pyramid, and can be considered the ‘rentier 
oligarchy’, for it is the elite in control of the main resources of power: the state 
and the rent from oil. The ruler of Abu Dhabi and his closer relatives occupy the 
highest layer above all other rulers, followed by those of Dubai and, then, by the 
rest of the emirates’ ruling elites. The state is the most important resource of 
power because it is through it that the elites administer the rest of resources 
                                                            
106
 The Sociology of Power approach is explained in the Theoretical Framework section 
(Chapter 1). 
100 
 
that allow them to accumulate power and therefore is the main instrument that 
helps them consolidate their position (Izquierdo, 2007: 5). Only members of this 
elite hold key governmental positions, being the more sensitive reserved to 
members of the Al Nahyan family of Abu Dhabi and Dubai (i.e. president, vice-
president, prime minister, and ministries of interior and defence). The ruling 
elites of the seven emirates have competed for power since pre-British, pre-oil, 
and pre-federation times, with the Al Nahyan of Abu Dhabi finally taking the lead 
as they are in control of the largest oil fields among the seven, and therefore of 
the second resource in importance: the rent generated by oil exports (i.e. the 
capital). However, the main objective of the ruling elites is not primarily to 
accumulate capital from that rent and invest it to generate benefits, but to 
distribute it effectively among the population in order to legitimise their role and 
to accumulate more power. Ideology–which is mainly transmitted by the family, 
and through education and the media–107 has been a useful resource of power 
since the establishment of the Federation through the promotion of a 
constructed national identity that invite citizens to emulate the rulers and display 
loyalty to them. Finally, having full control over the state, the ruling elite controls 
to a large extent the information channels, manages the security apparatus, and 
is ready to resort to coercive measures if any opposition arises that threatens 
their power.  
The rest of social strata organise in subordinate positions and maintain clientele 
and patrimonial 108  relationships with the ‘rentier oligarchs’. Members of the 
extended ruling families and of major tribes (of aṣil/noble origin)–led by tribes of 
the historical Bani Yas tribal confederation and their closest allies–form the 
social class immediately below the ruling families, who are the most benefited 
by oil rents, and occupy most key governmental positions. I therefore call them 
the ‘tribal aristocracy’. Both the Al Nahyan ruling family of Abu Dhabi and the Al 
Maktoum ruling family of Dubai fall under the Bani Yas umbrella, having been 
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patronage (and not on merit), and civil servants are only responsible to the political leadership. 
Finally, patronage is the distribution of government jobs or other favours to reward political allies 
or kin (Weber in Mommsen, 1992; Eisenstadt, 1973; Clapham, 1985; Roniger, 2004). 
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the Al Nahyan its paramount rulers during centuries. Additionally, some of the 
most influential tribes of the Bani Yas in contemporary society are the al-
Suwaidi (plural Sudan), who used to be involved in pearling and trading along 
the coasts of Dubai and Abu Dhabi; the al-Mazrou‘i (plural Mazari’a), which 
used to be the main Bedouin section and settled in Liwa, but also engaged in 
the seasonal pearling industry in Abu Dhabi; and the al-Mansoori (pl. 
Manaseer), who settled mainly in Abu Dhabi and Dubai.109 Members of all these 
tribes have been appointed as ministers of the UAE Cabinet along the years, 
thus reflecting the confidence rulers have historically had upon them. As 
explained above, Arab clans already had an important legitimizing role during 
pre-British and pre-oil days, but could change their allegiance from one sheikh 
to another if they considered it appropriate. However, the nation-state set 
borders that could no longer be easily trespassed, and consequently citizens 
have become linked to specific rulers to whom they are expected to be loyal. 
Moreover, the rulers went from being tax collectors and wealth distributors to 
being exclusively oil rents distributors, and allegiance of prominent tribes to the 
ruling elite was “secured through several means such as subsidies (…), 
intermarriage with the ruling family, and the distribution of government posts” 
(Peterson, 1977: 9), hence incorporating them into the patrimonial system of 
government administration. As Table 9 shows, the most sensitive ministries 
(interior, defence, oil and energy, and foreign affairs) have been run since 1971 
by the rentier oligarchy and the tribal aristocracy, and the most represented 
clans or families are those related to the Bani Yas confederation.  
Additionally, as Jill Crystal explains for the cases of Kuwait and Qatar, the newly 
established nationality and commercial laws, benefited greatly the old trading 
families (Crystal, 1990: 8), including members of the tribal aristocracy, but also 
Arab non-tribal and non-Arab families who were historically engaged in 
commercial activities, and were granted nationality. Especially those who 
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stayed loyal to the rulers during the hardship period between the 1930s and the 
1970s became a privileged class among the ‘national bourgeoisie’ after the 
UAE independence. However, Abdulkhaleq Abdulla pointed in his 1984 
dissertation at a subgroup of “nationalistic-minded internal bourgeoisie and local 
businessmen who [were] excluded and negatively affected by the dependent 
nature of the UAE economy” and saw them as a potential “force of change” 
(Abdulla, 1984: 286). 
Table 9: Main ministers by family name (1971-2013)
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Year Interior Defense For. Affairs Oil/Energy 
1971 
Al Nahyan  
(Bani Yas, Abu 
Dhabi ruling 
family) 
Al Maktoum 
(Bani Yas, Dubai 
ruling family) 
al-Suwaidi 
(Bani Yas) 
Al Maktoum 
1973 Al Nahyan Al Maktoum al-Suwaidi 
al-Otaiba 
(al-Marri tribe, 
Bani Yas) 
1977 Al Nahyan Al Maktoum al-Suwaidi al-Otaiba 
1979 Al Nahyan Al Maktoum al-Suwaidi al-Otaiba 
1990 
Bin Ali 
(al-Dhaheri) 
Al Maktoum 
al-Nuaimi 
(Ajman ruling 
family) 
Bin Yousef 
(al-Muhairi) 
1997 
al-Badi 
(al-Dhaheri) 
Al Maktoum al-Nuaimi al-Nasseri 
2004 Al Nahyan Al Maktoum al-Nuaimi 
al-Hamli 
(Bani Yas) 
2006 Al Nahyan Al Maktoum Al Nahyan al-Hamli 
2008 Al Nahyan Al Maktoum Al Nahyan al-Hamli 
2013 Al Nahyan Al Maktoum Al Nahyan 
al-Mazrou’i 
(Bani Yas) 
 
More recently, Davidson divided the national bourgeoisie in two groups: the old 
and the new rentiers (Davidson, 2005: 225). Representative of the first group 
are mainly members of the tribal aristocracy closely related to the Al Nahyan 
who “remain reliant on oil-derived rent” and aim at “maintaining the status quo,” 
such as the Dhawahir, the Bani Yusefs (al-Muhairi tribe), the Mazari’a, the 
Hawamil, and members of the al-Jaber, the al-Otaiba (both of the al-Marri tribe) 
and the al-Fahim (Davidson, 2005: 225-227). Conversely, the ‘new rentiers’ 
tend to come from non-tribal backgrounds and to seek “fresh and finite sources 
of economic rent from non-oil-related activities” and therefore advocate for 
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economic “liberalizing reforms” (Davidson, 2005: 225-227), such as Muhammad 
al-Abbar (owner of Emaar Properties), and the al-Futtaim, al-Habtoor, al-
Ghurair and al-Tajir families in Dubai; the Bukhatir and al-Midfa‘ in Sharjah; the 
Hamarain in Ras al-Khaimah; and the Behruzian in Fujairah. Among this ‘new 
rentiers’ and below the well-positioned Arab businessmen are the leading 
merchants of Persian origin who are well connected to the ruling families and/or 
the tribal aristocracy, such as the al-Khoori in Abu Dhabi; the Galadari, the 
Gargash, al-Gergawi and the al-Rostomani in Dubai; and the al-Fardan family in 
Sharjah (Abdulla, 1984: 148-156; Almezaini, 2013: 56-57; Davidson, 2005: 225-
227).  
Members of the national bourgeoisie, and most significantly those of Arab 
background, have been appointed to state institutions such as the FNC or 
ambassadorial positions, but not so often to positions in key or sensitive 
ministries, which are kept in the hands of the rentier oligarchy and its tribal 
aristocracy allies. Emiratis of Persian have punctually been given prominent 
positions as in the cases of Mohammed Abdullah al-Gergawi, who was 
appointed Minister of Cabinet Affairs in 2006, and Anwar Mohammed Gargash, 
who holds the positions of Minister of State for Federal National Council Affairs 
and Minister of State for Foreign Affairs (although the latter is subordinated to 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sheikh Abdulla bin Zayed Al Nahyan) (See 
Annex 6).  
As oil revenues started to flow, the rulers engaged with the businessmen in the 
developmental projects and the emerging private sector activities. Thus, as in 
the past, it was a symbiotic arrangement by which the political and economic 
elites supported each other; while at the same time prevented any potential 
bourgeoisie political dissent, as the experienced in Dubai during the previous 
decades.111 Moreover, since this ‘capitalist class’ is “inclusive of state personnel 
and individuals from the ruling families” (Hanieh, 2011: 14-17), it could be 
argued that the merchants are the closest to an elite that competes for private 
capital as a resource of power. However, the national bourgeoisie is kept in a 
clientele relationship because private capital still depends upon rent, which is 
controlled by the oligarchs. In this regard, Steffen Hertog argues that most Gulf 
capitalists’ “activities still amount to more sophisticated rent recycling rather 
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than autonomous diversification…[and that this explains their] weak role in 
today’s political arena despite a strong pre-oil history of collective action” 
(Hertog, 2013: 1). Additionally, as explained by Khalid Almezaini, “there are no 
clear-cut boundaries defining government ownership” in the UAE private sector, 
and “the patron-client relationship between regime and business actors [is] the 
result of a number of motivating factors including both economic gains and non-
economic objectives, such as national security and regime survival” (Almezaini, 
2013: 50-51). 
The non-national bourgeoisie is in a similar position, with the difference that 
they do not enjoy the privileges of being citizens, but they are nevertheless very 
well situated within society and enjoy a high degree of independence. Long 
established Indian businessmen mainly compose this social layer, such as Tony 
Jashanmal, Sunny Varkey or Ram Buxani (in the UAE since the 1950s) (Gulf 
Business, 2013, July 24), while Iranian businesses do also have a major 
presence in the UAE (there are over 8,000 companies and tradesmen 
registered by Iranians in Dubai, which is the main point from which re-
exportation of product to Iran takes place).112 Additionally, some Arab, Western 
and, increasingly, East and Southeast Asian entrepreneurs are also making 
vast profits in the UAE. 113  National and non-national bourgeoisies play an 
important role as accomplices of the ruling elite “in producing social and 
economic hierarchies that benefit both citizens and elite expatriates while 
maintaining a structure of labor migration that significantly disadvantages the 
majority of foreign residents living in the United Arab Emirates” (Vora, 2011: 
122). However, neither of them can really be considered political elites because 
they do not have any real capacity to compete for political power. Significantly 
too, through the presence of multinational corporations in the UAE, and the 
increased foreign investment of Emirati companies and Sovereign Wealth 
Funds (mainly Emirates and Etihad airlines, the Abu Dhabi government-owned 
Mubadala Development Company, and the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority) 
contributes to the insertion of the Emirati economy in the global financial and 
commercial circuits. Thus, the rentier oligarchs and the national bourgeoisie are 
directly linked to the international bourgeoisie and, since they share the 
                                                            
112
 See: www.iranian-uae.com 
113
 The richest businessmen among the UAE bourgeoisies are currently Abdulla bin Ahmad and 
Saif al-Ghurair, Majid and Abdulla al-Futtaim, Mahdi al-Tajir and the Gargash family, in addition 
to non-national resident Indian tycoon Micky Jagtiani (Forbes, 2014). 
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common interest of guaranteeing the smooth flow of oil, the regime counts on 
the support of the global elites, which can therefore be considered another 
resource of power (Izquierdo, 2007: 5-8). 
Access to jobs among nationals also depends on tribal ascription, ethnic origin, 
and wasta. Senior ranks in the security forces are kept in the hands of members 
of the ruling families and closely allied tribes, and “military employment has 
often been used as a tool of patronage rather than capacity-building” as 
reflected by the size of GCC military budgets, where “the focus is on acquiring 
high-tech kit rather than training” (Hertog, 2011). Historically, sheikhs relied on 
the Bedouins/tribes for military protection of the territories under their influence 
For instance, the Mazari’a and ‘Awamir “offered security and protection for the 
connecting route between the coast and inland” settlements of the Al Nahyan, 
and became “military forces when conflict with outsiders occurred” (Ono, 2011: 
28). However, the abovementioned Trucial Oman Scouts’ personnel included by 
1971 forty percent “local Arabs” (i.e. tribes affiliated with the Trucial sheikhs), 
thirty percent Omanis (i.e. probably also tribal), and the remaining was made up 
of Indians, Iranians, and Pakistanis (mainly Baluchis) (Peck, 2010: 28).  
Figure 6: Key tribes in Abu Dhabi defense and security organizations
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While many of these soldiers were granted nationality upon the formation of the 
UAE or, even if not, continued to work in the federal armed forces, those of non-
Arab background were gradually relieved from their duties and replaced by 
Emiratis from Bani Yas tribes and other allied tribes (See Figure 6), as well as 
by other tribal Arabs who were invited to join and granted nationality (mainly 
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Omanis and Yemenis).115 The reason behind this could be that authorities have 
higher trust in the loyalty of Arabs of badu background, than in those with other 
backgrounds, and especially in those of Iranian origin after the Islamic 
Revolution.  
Next in the scale are the ‘national middle class’ and the GCC and Western 
‘technocrats.’ These three groups enjoy similar social status, although the first 
one is the more benefited by the direct distribution of rent in the form of salaries, 
services and subsidies, through which they establish a patrimonial relationship 
with the ruling elite. The people who were recognized as citizens in 1971 and 
their progeny form the national middle class, which is the bulk of the national 
population. As mentioned earlier, these are the Hawla (non-tribal Arab hadhar) 
and the non-Arab hadhar (‘Ajami; Balushi and African former slaves) among 
which some used to be -and some still are- Shiʿa;116 in addition to members of 
subordinate nomadic tribes (non-aṣilī Arab badu). As nomadism declined aided 
by official policies of sedentarisation, and many of the old economic activities 
were abandoned, new jobs became available, first in the oil companies, then 
gradually in the newly established federal and local state institutions, and 
gradually also in the private companies covering a wide range of sectors. Local 
“sailors, pearl-divers and nomadic shepherds…turned into state employees” 
(Longva, 2005: 128), while agriculture, farming or fishing activities that persist 
have been gradually taken over by lower income groups of new migrants.  
Although the majority of the middle class are state-employees, there is a 
growing number of Emiratis, which encouraged by the exemption from taxes 
and the profitable kafāla, or sponsorship system,117 have established their own 
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businesses. This is what Abdulkhaleq Abdulla has called the “entrepreneurial 
middle class” (Abdulla, 2010: 15), and which Ferrán Izquierdo explains is 
subject to discrimination by the ruling elite that privileges the national, and even 
the non-national bourgeoisies (Izquierdo 2007: 5). In this regard, Almezaini too 
explains “marginalized families such as the al-Sa’idi, al-Kalbani, al-Riyami or al-
Khatri, have received less support from the government owing to their limited 
historical and social connections with the ruling families” (Almezaini, 2013: 51). 
However, members of this social layer have occasionally been appointed as for 
governmental positions in order to incorporate potential political opposition into 
the system. For instance, several leftists-nationalists and Islamists were 
appointed as ministers in the 1970s, including Abdullah bin Omran Taryam 
(Minister of Education and of Justice 1970s), and Mohammed Abdulrahman al-
Bakr (Minister of Justice 1977-1990) respectively.  
The GCC and Western technocrats enjoy a similar status to the national middle 
class with regards to access to jobs, the treatment they receive from authorities 
and, in many cases, GCC migrants receive preferential treatment from 
authorities if they are related to the ‘tribal aristocracy’. Something similar 
happens with Western migrants who are generally given better treatment and 
salaries than other nationalities, just for the sake of originating ethnically from 
the former and current metropolis (and neighbouring countries). In this regard, 
members of the national middle class often complain that foreign technocrats 
are preventing them from accessing jobs and better salaries in the private 
sector, or even that they (especially westerners) enjoy more freedoms than 
nationals actually do, and they therefore feel that the system is benefiting non-
nationals in many ways. Indeed, the influence and contact networks (wasta) 
that, not only higher national classes, but also some expatriate groups enjoy in 
the UAE are stronger than those of members of the national middle class, and 
generates dissatisfaction among them. Education, moreover, has produced a 
generation of educated Emiratis, who are aware of and disapprove their 
subordinate position in society, and who are developing new equality 
aspirations, as shown by the responses of students to the interviews and survey 
conducted for this dissertation. UAEU students express high concern regarding 
the large numbers of foreign workforce and the perception that this causes 
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unemployment, threatens local culture, and generates a lack of safety and 
stability.118 
Below the mentioned strata are the Arab migrants, making up the most 
significant number of workers after the establishment of the Federation, who 
came especially from Egypt, Palestine, Lebanon and Yemen. In a chapter on 
the impact of post-oil Arab migration on Gulf societies, Melikian addresses how 
the ‘socio-political life-styles’ of Gulf citizens or ‘khalījī’ were amazingly 
influenced by their presence. The perception they had of their Arab fellows was 
that they were more qualified and educated, so they had the necessity to 
progressively develop “compensatory life-styles”, which are cumulative and 
have, as this author predicted, “become identifiable and self-generating” 
(Melikian, 1988: 113-114). However, due to the attachment of many of these to 
Arab nationalistic and leftist movements that begun to challenge the Gulf 
regimes, Arabs were since the 1970s gradually replaced by Indian sub-
continent and other Asian migrants, which exercised less political influence 
upon nationals.119 Especially in the 1990s, many Arab residents were expelled 
from all GCC states under the pretext that their governments had supported 
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, and by 2002 “the Arab proportion of migrant workers 
in the GCC had fallen from 72 percent in 1975 to around 25-29 percent” 
(Hanieh, 2010: 79). Red lines were drawn for the Arabs who stayed or came 
later, and those who are caught speaking local or regional politics are deported. 
The most recent examples of this reality have taken place after the so-called 
Arab Spring, when many Arabs were warned not to get involved in politics, or 
directly asked to leave the UAE. For instance, Syrian citizens received mobile 
text messages reminding them they should not engage in political activities and 
a Syrian Imam was given 24 hours to pack and abandon the country after he 
had been commenting on some issues related to the situation in his country.120 
However, they still represent an important sector of society and are better 
situated than workers coming from Asia or Africa (they can, for instance, 
migrate with their families more easily), although they enjoy fewer privileges 
than GCC or western technocrats. Arabs are hired for different at a wide range 
of employment sectors, depending on their educational backgrounds and 
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professional experiences, and their salaries are normally lower than the 
Westerners’ but higher than others’. The attitudes of Gulf citizens towards other 
Arabs have also changed significantly, as there is a general feeling that they no 
longer have a superior ‘life-style’. Since the Arab Spring uprisings started to 
take place, many Arabs were warned not to speak politics in the workplace or 
by the authorities, and several were dismissed from their jobs in the UAE. 
Moreover, some companies and institutions stopped hiring Arabs, especially 
from Egypt and Syria.121 
The aforementioned bidun or stateless people form a liminal class situated 
between the national middle class and the expats. Exact figures are unknown, 
but according to Refugees International there are between 10,000 (the official 
number) and 100,000 bidun in the UAE (Lynch, 2010, January 12). Depending 
on their wasta they can access more or less benefits, but have in general 
limited access to public medical care and education, cannot be issued marriage 
certificates or driving licenses, and struggle to obtain birth and death certificates 
(Shahwari & Almadani, 2011: 29) that could later serve as evidence of long-
term residency. Moreover, without passports and other basic identity 
documents, their movement is restricted and employability is constrained, 
making them a discriminated and therefore vulnerable social group, and hence 
many live in poverty. Similarly, the children of those residents of the Trucial 
States who had a passport from other countries and did not apply for nationality 
early enough must stick to their father’s nationality, even if they have been born 
in the UAE, and even if their mothers are Emiratis.  
This issue has been debated openly in the local newspapers and online bogs 
and social media during the last two decades and, although many Emiratis 
consider that citizenship granting should be restricted as much as possible,122 
the opinion exists too that it is “insulting to question the loyalty of Emiratis who 
are born to a foreign parent. It is also unfair, un-Islamic and ultimately…un-
Emirati to generalise about people of any background (Al-Qassemi, 2010, 
August 29). In response to the pressure from significant sectors of society, in 
2008 new family books were issued for the first time since 1971 for those who 
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 For a discussion among Emiratis about how should nationality be granted or not, see The 
Daily Dubai blog (2010, June 20). 
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could “prove their pre-1971 ancestry” (Davidson, 2009a: 130-131) and, on the 
occasion of the 40th National Day (2011), the President Sheikh Khalifa Bin 
Zayed Al Nahyan issued a decree allowing children born to Emirati women 
married to foreign or stateless fathers to seek UAE citizenship on their 
eighteenth birthday if they met certain conditions (university education, police 
record clearance, etc.). However, the process is not very transparent and 
people complain that nationality is being given to some individuals rather than 
whole families, thus creating conflicts between family members. Moreover, 
residents of Iranian origin find it almost impossible to obtain the nationality even 
if they meet the requirements; and many young bidun or ‘Gulf Dreamers’123 feel 
increasingly frustrated as they grow and discover that they cannot access 
certain studies or jobs, that they cannot travel, that they are an inferior category 
of Emiratis. In this regard, the daughter of an Emirati national woman married to 
a non-national expressed her frustration for not being granted the nationality:  
“We are raised in a fairy tale, but all coins have two faces… I grew 
up thinking I was Emirati, playing with my Emirati friends, learning 
we should be grateful for what the Sheikhs have done for us, being 
proud of my country. Only when I went to high school I realised I 
was different… I could not do many things others could do for the 
simple reason of not having the Emirati citizenship… For medical 
test I should go to the same queue as the maids… I could not 
choose to study engineering or medicine at university (there are 
reserved quotas for nationals). But I always had a high GPA… I 
consider myself Emirati, but you go by the passport, you know… It 
really breaks my heart… The UAE has given me many things: 
education, everything…! But we also give things back to them! 
Lately I started to feel rejected… I started to be angry.”124 
Technocrats of other nationalities (mainly East and Southeast Asians) have 
been migrating to the UAE since the late 1980s. Their salaries are normally 
lower than those perceived by Westerners in their same positions, and they are 
often subject to discrimination due to the similar appearance they have to 
services sector and blue-collar workers, who are unfortunately generally 
mistreated in the Gulf states. The latter form the lowest societal layer, are the 
most affected by the abovementioned kafāla sponsorship system, receive the 
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lowest salaries and live in the worst conditions. Many are forced upon arrival to 
sign contracts with lower salaries than promised, and acquire huge debts to pay 
for the administrative expenses and the flight to get to the working destination. 
Sadly, most employers regard them as temporary workforce that can be 
exploited under the threat of deportation and occasionally avoid paying them 
their salaries, with the migrants not having access to legal assistance to claim 
their money (labour unions are illegal).  
Matsuo Masaki has described this practices as a form of internal colonialism 
(Masaki, 2011: 35-40), in the sense that workforce is exploited inside the 
country rather than abroad. The situation of lower income workers in the Gulf 
has been repeatedly denounced by international human rights organizations125 
but, since the domestic awareness on the issue, and therefore the pressure for 
change is very limited, the reforms accomplished to improve the working and 
living conditions of this social group has been minimal. In fact, there is a 
widespread attitude among khalījī that “if expatriates are unhappy with their 
situation, they can always return home and be [easily] replaced” (Colton, 2011: 
32). This precarious situation of the majority foreign population adds to the 
controversy around nationality and identity policies. 
The huge demographic imbalance in which Emiratis are a minority, helps 
explain the emergence of asymmetrical social relations in the UAE, which are 
not only conditioned by history, culture, ascriptive status/genealogy, control over 
resources of power, and regional and global socio-economic and political 
dynamics; but determined by ethnic origin, wasta, and governmental ideology 
and national identity campaigns. The main objective of the oligarchic, 
aristocratic and bourgeois elites is to maintain the status quo and accumulate 
more power, while the different sectors of the population are aware of the 
differences that divide them and aim at fulfilling their individual wishes but not at 
any cost. Within this context, can we really say that in the UAE “the only tribe is 
the Emirati.”126  
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6. Rentierism and Political Socialisation in the UAE  
There is no doubt that both pre-oil and post-oil rentierism –understood as the 
process by which a government receives a substantial percentage of the 
national revenues from external rents on a regular basis (Mahdavy, 1970; 
Beblawi & Luciani, 1987)- was the main catalyst of socio-economic and political 
transformations that materialised in the form of autocratic or oligarchic regimes 
in the Gulf. In these regimes the rulers are supposedly politically autonomous 
from the population, provided they allocate a share of the rental wealth among 
them and it is unlikely that political opposition emerges (as stated by the early 
rentier state theory). 127  However, the discussion presented in the previous 
pages demonstrates that other pre-oil and post-oil factors are crucial to fully 
understand how social relations develop in these states and therefore these are 
not only determined by rentierism.  
In this regard, the perspective adopted by Adam Hanieh (2011: 15-16) that oil is 
the “major factor differentiating the region from any other in the world”, but that it 
should be regarded as “a commodity embedded in a set of (globally 
determined) social relations” is certainly valuable for the purpose of this study. 
This perspective explains that it cannot be assumed that rentierism, or the 
actions and decisions by rentier elites, determine social relations (and political 
orientations) by themselves (Hanieh, 2011: 15-16). By the same token, I argue 
here that rentierism fast-forwarded the incorporation of Gulf society into the 
globalisation processes, not only in its economic dimension, but understood as 
the growing interconnectedness between people and places worldwide, and 
between time and space. As Giddens asserts, these connections take place “in 
such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring miles away 
and vice versa” (Giddens, 1990: 64), and the processes of change connecting 
time and space “underpin a transformation in the organization of human affairs 
by linking together and expanding human activity across regions and 
continents” (Held et al., 1999: 16). In this regard, James Rosenau (2008: 12-15) 
explained: 
“…as information technologies, jet aircraft, and other innovations 
make the world more intimate, so too do people and the roles they 
occupy increasingly serve as foci of concern”, “[w]e have entered 
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the era of the individual, an era that I bound to be different from 
those in the past and that will doubtless witness intense upheavals 
as governments have to be more responsive to domestic pressures; 
there is a ‘skill revolution’ by which ordinary persons…are 
increasingly competent.” 
In the UAE, those spatial-temporal processes of change and of global 
interconnectedness have taken place in a record time period, which has 
transformed fishing towns and rural villages into cosmopolitan cities with 
international weight in less than half century. As rentierism took root and the 
population grew, the different social layers were defined and new spaces for 
interaction emerged. External rent was not only distributed in the form of 
subsidies and services, such as health care, public housing, subsidised food or 
cheap petrol, but was also invested in projects for the development of 
infrastructures, industry, education and culture. Accordingly, oil wealth has been 
visible in urbanisation and the physical redistribution of cities, the emergence of 
new job opportunities, massive increase of literacy rates of both men and 
women, as well as on the enhanced chances to interact with people from all 
over the world. Foreign domestic workers were hired to raise the children; kids 
from different nationalities shared the classrooms at schools;128 and nationals 
shared the workplace with expatriates from a wide range of countries. Wealth 
quickly brought the radio and the television into most households–and later the 
satellite channels, and the Internet–through which the people gained access to 
all kinds of information from all around the world. Furthermore, people started to 
travel a lot, went to study abroad, and brought properties in other countries, 
where they spend several months yearly.  
Thus, rentierism and the interlinked incorporation into globalisation have 
introduced a large variety of new cultural elements and mechanisms to child 
and adult general socialisation and political socialisation. The latter is the 
learning process by which people acquire political cognition, attitudes, and 
behaviours (Greenstein (1965), Hyman (1959), Niemi (1974, 1995), Sapiro 
(2004), Sigel (1965), et al.) or, in other words, the process by which a given 
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‘political culture’ 129  is attained (Almond & Verba (1963, 1980), Pye (1971), 
Inglehart (1988, 2000), et al.). All these new ways of interacting form part of 
both the ‘manifest and the ‘latent’ processes of political socialisation, for they 
involve the direct communication of information, values or feelings towards 
political objects, for instance, through school curricula; while they also entail the 
transmission of non-political values that affect attitudes towards analogous roles 
and objects in the political system, for example, through family interaction 
(Almond & Verba, 1963). 130 It is within this context that, adding to the debate 
around the validity of the rentier state theory for the study of state-society 
relations in the Gulf (Aarts & Nonneman, 2005; Gray, 2011; Foley, 2010; Herb, 
2009; Hertog, 2010a & 2010b; Hudson, 1995; Niblock, 2007; Ross, 2001), I 
suggest that rentierism should not be considered the only or main factor 
determining political culture in rentier states, for it inevitably brings attached 
unexpected or ‘collateral effects’ that affect the process of political socialisation. 
Thus, I argue that the rentier nature of a state does not necessarily keep people 
uninterested in politics indefinitely, but does actually enhance political 
awareness in the long term through the exposure to new or reshaped ‘agents of 
political socialisation’131 (i.e. the people and institutions that transmit political 
values to society).  
“Look around and be grateful” goes a say often repeated by both Emirati 
nationals and long-term middle and high-class residents. This thinking falls 
within the RST argument that state-society relations in rentier states are based 
in a social contract by which the ruled renounce to political rights in return of the 
wealth distributed by the rulers. Contrary to this, however, some Emiratis 
explain that there is a real sense of respect and pride for the leadership among 
nationals; a perception that arouses from the consideration of many that it was 
the rulers’ “wisdom and vision” that made it possible for Emiratis to live as they 
do today, and that even if oil depleted they would “stay loyal to them”. 132 
However, despite nationals generally displaying a high level of respect towards 
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their rulers, this seems to be especially the case among the elder generations, 
but feelings tend to be slightly different when it comes to those born from the 
1970s onwards. Being raised in the welfare state, the younger generations of 
Emiratis have developed a concept of citizenship that brings attached 
governmental services and benefits but very few responsibilities, and this 
creates higher expectations but less compromise.133 As the survey exploitation 
presented in Part II of this dissertation shows difference in perceptions of 
leadership also varies among Emirates, being the people of the Northern 
emirates more critical of authorities (and especially of Federal institutions) than 
in Abu Dhabi or Dubai (see chapter 5). In this regard, it can be argued that a 
gradual detachment from the ruling elites is taking place among some sectors of 
society, which has to do with age, socio economic differences between 
Emirates, as well as with the changes that the agents of political socialisation 
have undergone since the establishment of the UAE. Moreover, some Emiratis 
express their opinion that the rulers should not be regarded as “superior human 
beings” but as “equals to their people”134 and, as is further explained in Chapter 
3, there are important sectors of society that support political reform. 
Regarding foreigners, Vora (2013) has explained how Indian businessmen and 
middle-class long-term Indian residents who describe Dubai as a place of 
“freedom” where they find better business opportunities than back home, regard 
the country as a second home and points “to a need for scholars to understand 
how multiple logics of belonging and citizenship circulate not only in the Gulf, 
but within all contemporary spaces” (Vora, 2013: 115). Similarly, several UAEU 
students with passports from different countries, but who were born and raised 
in the UAE, expressed their feeling of belonging to the UAE and the detachment 
from their parents’ homeland, which they regard as a place for vacation. In this 
regard, a Pakistani student said to be grateful for the chance she was given to 
study a university degree, as it was something she would have probably not 
have been able to do in Pakistan; while an Egyptian student said to be worried 
about the cultural shock she would go through if she had to go to live to Cairo in 
case her family was expelled from the UAE due to the Arab Spring events.135  
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6.1. Political socialisation within the Emirati family 
Parents and schools socialize individuals in the dominant values of the society 
in which one grows up, and are therefore generally considered to be the main 
shapers of basic attitudes. Even though education is fundamental, since it is at 
schools where official discourses are transmitted, the first stage of political 
socialisation takes place within the family. Reasonably, in households where 
parents often discuss political issues children are expected to become politically 
active adults, whereas in family environments where political conversations are 
rare, children are discouraged to engage in politics. According to my informants, 
political conversations are rare within the Emirati domestic environment or, and 
that families tend to teach their children “there are some taboo topics, including 
politics and religion.”136  Moreover, and falling within the latent verge of the 
process of political socialisation, children are raised in a patriarchal environment 
that teaches them to follow strict rules and not to question those above them in 
the family, and therefore in the social hierarchy, hence inculcating a submissive 
attitude towards political authorities.  
Figure 7: Individuals per household by emirate (2005)
 137
 
Abu Dhabi 8.5 
Dubai 7.6 
Sharjah 6.9 
Ajman 6.8 
UAQ 7.8 
RAK 6.8 
Fujairah 8.6 
Average 7.6 
 
The extended family remains important and its members are to a large extent 
asked to respond to kinship ties affiliation. The average of individuals per 
household is of 7.6 (see figure 7). In this regard, Sara A. Crabtree has 
explained how in the UAE “access to institutions, jobs and government services 
is often through family connections” (Crabtree, 2007: 575). Similarly to other 
Arab countries, in the UAE one’s destiny is intrinsically linked to the connections 
and influence him/herself of his/her family have within the community: the 
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wasta. This is regarded, “especially by those who do not have wasta, as a 
means to gain what seems an undeserved advantage or as a mechanism that 
yields decisions based on connections instead of merit;” while academics 
consider it “a source of nepotism, cronyism and corruption generally” (Barnett, 
Yandle & Naufal, 2013: 41-43). Likewise, and related to wasta, appears the 
issue of family reputation or honour, which implies that the individual must take 
into consideration the impact that any of its actions will have on the rest of the 
family, which is directly linked with the image the community at large holds of 
one’s family  (Joseph, 1996: 199). Thus, the tribe and/or family one belongs to 
are of crucial importance for Emiratis. 
Figure 8: Percentage distribution of employed Emiratis by age and sex
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Nevertheless, kinship relationships have been affected to a large extent by 
rentierism. Government housing has not always taken into account tribal 
affiliation and, therefore, members of the same tribe do not necessarily live in 
the same neighbourhoods (Longva, 2005: 128). Thus, “the structural system of 
the city (…) separates the individual from the environment of local community 
relationship” (el-Haddad, 2003: 2), providing citizens with new spaces for 
interaction and allowing the younger generations to act more freely, away from 
the extended family scrutiny. However, it has been argued that in the past 
women had to contribute to the economy and therefore had to participate in 
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public life, enjoying more social freedom (especially in the rural areas), and that 
urbanisation has to some extent limited their freedom of movement (Tetréault, 
2000; Willoughby, 2008). Nevertheless, governmental policies have encouraged 
and promoted women’s incorporation into the educational system and the job 
market, thus creating new spaces where women have found ways of exercising 
their freedom individually. In this regard, Figure 8 shows how the younger 
Emirati women have become more employable than their mothers. Moreover, 
women from conservative families, which are reluctant to allow their girls to 
study or work, are grateful for the role that the authorities have played in 
encouraging the education and employability of national women officially.139 
Regarding marriage, it is customary that families arrange them and, although 
the current law states that both parties must be willing to marry, family pressure 
often makes people accept undesired marriages. On the other hand, some 
women choose to marry early to attain freedom from their families, either 
through an early divorce –divorced or widowed women have more liberty in 
choosing a new husband (Kour, 1991: 191)–, and even sometimes Emiratis 
marry in agreement with a friend just to content both families (and perceive the 
governmental subsidy). For instance, a student in her early twenties confessed 
to be considering marriage with a friend from childhood who would be 
acceptable for her parents, just to avoid being married to a relative that was 
proposing and under the agreement of getting a divorce shortly after; another 
young woman was thinking of either failing on purpose to stay one more year at 
university, or leaving the country to avoid being forced to marry someone she 
had not chosen after graduation;140 and an administrative assistant at UAEU 
shared with me the hardship she was going through after having accepted to 
marry her Omani cousin under the promise that she would be allowed to study 
postgraduate studies if she did.141 Thus, despite the legal framework has been 
reformed in ways to recognise more women rights, the UAE remains a very 
segregated and male dominated society and many young women feel they have 
not yet achieved the right to self-determination or real freedom of choice. 
Consequently, women tend to prolong their studies to avoid facing marriage 
proposals and the attached family pressure. 
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The fact that family structure is gradually changing affected by urbanism and 
education, among other factors, towards a more individualistic model that 
distances young nationals from their parents’ social patterns reflects the 
development of critical thinking, which in turn is expected to impact upon the 
concept of authority and, ultimately, upon political behaviour. Moreover, it is 
indicative that other agents have undertaken a more important role in children's 
socialization, significantly reducing the family's role in this process. In this 
regard, the educational system constitutes a “powerful source of socialization 
that competes strongly with traditional family roles” (el-Haddad, 2003: 4), due to 
the exposure to alternative perspectives of peers and teachers, who are 
respected sources of information. 
6.2. Political socialisation through education 
Education in authoritarian contexts is generally assumed to strengthen 
attachment and loyalty to the political status quo since it is often controlled or 
influenced by the ruling elites (Nisbet & Myers, 2010: 142). It can be therefore 
considered not only an agent of political socialisation, but also a further power 
resource. However, even if the UAE government has carefully designed school 
and university curricula to avoid controversial political topics that could elicit 
doubts in students regarding the established political system, as well as to 
prevent the development of critical thinking capacity, political views are 
influenced indirectly by the exchange of ideas that takes place with local and 
foreign professors with different ideologies, and with peers from different 
backgrounds. As Melikian has put it, “besides the transmission of knowledge, 
teachers may consciously or otherwise transmit some of their political, social 
and religious attitudes to their students (...) since they are often taken as 
models, with whom their students identify” (Melikian, 1988: 122). This is part of 
the cultural globalisation Emirati students are exposed to, which included the 
flow of symbols, images, languages and other forms of cultural expressions that 
connect regions, civilisations and continents, and which is gradually creating a 
sense of global identity or belongingness (Held et al., 1999: 16).   
Until the early 1900s, education in the UAE was carried out at homes or at the 
kuttāb (elementary school attached to the mosque), where the curricula were 
based on the Qurʾan and the Hadith or teachings of the Prophet (Kour, 1991: 
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253). 142  The first formal schools for boys were established by merchant 
philanthropists in Sharjah were the al-Tatwiriyya (1907) and al-Qasimi (1923) 
schools; and in Dubai, the al-Ahmadiyya (1912), al- Salmiyya (1923) and al-
Falah (1926) (Davidson, 2008: 24-27). However, during the hardship years that 
followed the decline of the pearl industry many socio-economic projects went 
into decline, including formal education institutions that were briefly reinstated in 
1938. After the Dubai Reform Movement succeeded, the merchants regained 
some political power and set up a proper education department, which again 
was undermined once the movement was put down and did not recover until the 
1950s. During that decade aid arrived from the wealthier emirate of Kuwait, 
which financed the salaries of teachers (predominantly Egyptian and 
Palestinian) and provided with school uniforms and stationary (Davidson, 2008: 
31-32). Some of the old schools expanded (al-Ahmadiyya in Dubai had around 
820 students in 1951) and new ones opened, including al-Falahiyya and al-
Batin in 1961 in Abu Dhabi. Around that time also, the first school for girls was 
opened in Dubai: the Khawla bint al-Azwar School. In parallel, Saudi Arabia 
opened several Islamic education institutions in Dubai (1962), al-Ain (1967), 
Ras al-Khaimah (1967), and Ajman (1969). Likewise, the Shah of Persia 
government and the Indian merchants established their own schools, to provide 
education to their communities.  
Figure 9: Population by Educational status (1975-2005)
 143
 
 
                                                            
142
 This education system was also known as the muṭawa’a system. The muṭawa’a was the 
religious man, often an imām or cleric, who taught the children (Davidson, 2008: 25). 
143
 Source: National Bureau of Statistics (census data). 
0
100000
200000
300000
400000
500000
600000
700000
800000
900000
1000000
1975 1980 1985 1995 2005
 Illiterate
 Secondary
 University
121 
 
Finally, after independence, the ministry of education was set up and the 
number of schools rapidly raised, an increased proportion of which was for girls 
(Davidson, 2008: 30-36). As Figure 9 reflects, literacy rates have increased very 
rapidly during the last four decades. Although each Emirate initially designed its 
own school curricula, matching the tendency towards political federal 
centralisation all national schools eventually unified textbooks. In response to 
questions of religious legitimacy, following the Islamic Revolution of Iran, the 
UAE rulers appointed several religious people to the Ministry of Education, as 
well as to others. Arguably, many of them had become influenced by the 
ideology of the Egyptian organisation of the Muslim Brotherhood and, 
consequently, education was until the late 1990s very much influenced by 
Islamist ideas.144 Finally, these elements were fought against especially fiercely 
after the 9/11 attacks, and more are since the Arab Spring is being 
indiscriminately persecuted.145 
School political socialisation in the UAE depends much in whether you attend a 
public or private school, and there are a variety of views on the issue. Some 
parents prefer to enrol their children in private schools because it offers proper 
English education, which facilitates access to universities and enhances job 
opportunities, while they also think that the international mix in private schools 
will definitely be useful when their kids work with people from different 
nationalities. However, other parents worry about the influence foreign teachers 
and classmates might have on their children on their children’s discipline (al-
Mulla, 2011: 21-22). Additionally, there is a widespread concern that the 
growing impact of English language is damaging the Arabic language 
competence, and that the younger generations cannot express themselves 
properly in neither English nor Arabic, and over the erosion of religious 
orientations.146 However, it should be noted that, the number of Emirati students 
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 Personal interviews with Emirati professor. Dubai (March 2014). 
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 See section on Political Activism in Chapter 3. 
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 Personal interview with an Emirati professor. Al-Ain, UAE (April 2011). The Arabic spoken in 
the Gulf already includes words from the languages of the peoples they have interacted with, 
including Farsi, Urdu, Hindi, and Swahili, and people even use variations of words and accents 
in different UAE regions. Nevertheless, the influence of English is currently the most visible. In 
this regard, Beeman mentions a Gulf form of ‘Sprachbund’ (Beeman, 2009: 148), a linguistic 
situation where there is strong influence between different languages, even from different 
linguistic families. Since the influence of English has become so prominent, Gulf Arabic has 
begun to be called ‘Arabish’. 
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attending private schools has been gradually increasing over the last 10 years 
to over fifty percent (al-Mulla, 2011: 21).  
The United Arab Emirates University of al-Ain was the first to open in the 
country in 1977, but the opening of other public higher education institutions has 
proliferated during the last two decades, including the federal Zayed University 
and Higher Colleges of Technology; as well public local universities in each 
emirate, such as the University of Sharjah, the University of Ajman or the 
Khalifa University in Abu Dhabi; and branches of international private 
universities, such as the American and the British Universities in Dubai, or the 
New York University and the Sorbonne University in Abu Dhabi. Another 
particular aspect of higher education has been (and increasingly is) the periods 
of study that Emirati students spend in foreign (mostly western) countries. By 
spending several years living abroad, many students develop positive 
perspectives about the possible enhancement of participatory politics and 
transparent practices in their countries. In fact, there is a generation of 
“Western-educated technocrats”, some of whom are “no longer so closely in 
touch with the traditional social system” (Heard-Bey, 2005: 369). However, 
others have developed anti-Western feelings due to bad experiences in those 
countries, or disapproval of their liberal customs, thus becoming more religious 
and recruitable by Islamist organisations.147 
Regarding higher education, the exchange of views over more controversial 
topics is likely to form, reinforce or challenge existing political beliefs among 
students. Thus, it is considered the environment in which people become more 
engaged in politics (Niemi & Hepburn, 1995: 7-16). In the UAE, even though the 
curricula are government supervised, the majority of professors teaching at both 
public and private universities are either Arabs from outside the Gulf or 
Westerners. This makes it difficult to avoid students from being influenced by a 
wide range of ideas that compete with what they have been taught at home and 
the school. Interestingly, the gender imbalance is huge when it comes to 
national university registration. While women find university as way out of the 
tight control families generally exercise over them, and therefore try to attend as 
many years as possible; men attain their independence through their 
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 This is reflected in the comments of some Islamist Emiratis in the media (See section on 
Political Tendencies in Chapter 3). 
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incorporation to the job market and the perception of a salary of their own. In 
fact, male students underperformance takes place at all levels, with Emirati 
schoolboys dropping out of high school at four times the rate compared to the 
girls, twice as many boys failing high school compared to the girls, and only 
30% of men enrolling in higher education compared to 70% for women (Ridge, 
2009).148 In a paper exploring the reasons for low male university enrolment, 
Fatma Abdulla and Natasha Ridge explain that “males view connections in 
pursuit of employment opportunities as more potent in achieving social and 
economic mobility than attainment in higher education” (Abdulla & Ridge, 2011: 
12). The fact that Emirati men can access well-paid governmental jobs with 
basic education contributes to the development of a ‘rentier mentality’ (Beblawi 
& Luciani, 1990: 87-88) and can therefore be interpreted as a governmental 
redistributive measure intended at preventing men from becoming “too” 
educated (see Table 10).   
Table 10: Percentage Distribution of Emiratis Employed by Educational Status
149
 
Educational Status Male Female Total 
Illiterate 3.01 0.89 2.58 
Read & Write 4.1 1.01 3.46 
Primary 8.0 1.2 6.6 
Preparatory 19.6 4.3 16.4 
Secondary 41.4 30.4 39.2 
Below University 4.7 9.8 5.7 
University 16.7 48.8 23.3 
Above University 2.5 3.4 2.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
In a lecture delivered by Omar Ghobash (2013, March 18), he explained how he 
realised, as he became an adult and was confronted with regional and 
international events that touched him, that he had not been given the analytical 
instruments to understand why those things happened and where he stood in 
relation to them. An analysis of his own experience made him recognise that in 
the UAE (and in other Arab countries) “all politics starts off as personal to each 
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 Higher dropout and university no-show rates of young men are higher in the poorer northern 
emirates than in Abu Dhabi or Dubai (Abdulla & Ridge, 2011: 12). 
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 15 years and over. Source: National Bureau of Statistics (census data). 
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individual as he finds himself faced with questions and situations that puzzle 
him.” For him this happened in several stages: while he was conducting 
university studies in the UK and engaged in conversations with friends about 
Middle Eastern issues; when the 9/11 attacks took place; and with the 
assassination of Lebanese politician Rafiq Hariri in 2004. In his public lecture, 
Ghobash explained how he decided to take the responsibility of finding answers 
to the existential, socio-political, historical and ethical religious questions he was 
being puzzled by.   
This is very similar to the experiences described by many of the students I 
interviewed in the UAE, who said to have begun searching for answers to 
similar questions since they entered university, and as they became aware of 
regional socio-political events that involved Arab and Islamic neighbouring 
countries, 150  hence reflecting the importance that higher education has on 
political socialisation in the UAE. In fact, political activism at the UAEU campus 
reflects the general Emirati political standpoints (see chapter 3), with two groups 
being predominant: the Islamists and the liberals. Interestingly, in October 2011 
a “final warning” letter was sent to female students to stop giving lectures that 
included political topics in the campus mosque (see Annex 13); and a booklet 
against the Muslim Brotherhood doctrines started to be freely distributed among 
UAEU students since the Spring of 2014 (see photographed cover in Annex 5). 
6.3. Political socialisation through the media 
Additionally, it has been argued that the mass media, and especially the 
Internet and the online social networks, are playing a decisive role in the 
engagement of the younger generations into cultural globalisation, and 
therefore in the development of political awareness (Nisbet & Myers, 2010: 
142). Although the UAE population had had access to regional radio broadcasts 
during decades, it was not until 1966 that the first official radio station was 
established in Abu Dhabi (Boyd, 1999), and other since mushroomed. Followed 
by Abu Dhabi Television in 1969, Dubai gained their first channel in 1972, one 
English channel in each of the former emirates a few years later, and Sharjah 
Television in 1989 (Ayish, 2013: 14). The content offered by the very few 
channels available showed censored local news, Arab soap operas and 
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 Personal interviews with Emirati UAEU students. Al-Ain (UAE April 2011-March 2012). See 
Survey Analysis in Part II of this dissertation. 
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religious and cultural programmes, but since the early 1990s the UAE 
broadcasters went international on satellite (Ayish, 2013: 15) and people started 
to watch a wide range of contents. Naturally, rentierism accelerated the process 
by which the Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) reached the 
Emirati household and today they are among the highest media exposed 
societies (see Table 11). 
Table 11: ICTs Penetration Rates (2012)
 151
 
 
Fixed line 
telephone 
subscriptions 
Mobile-
cellular 
telephone 
subscriptions 
Computers/ 
household 
Internet 
access/ 
household 
Individuals 
using the 
Internet 
World 17% 91% 41% 37% 36% 
Developed 43% 124% 75% 74% 73% 
Developing 11% 84% 28% 24% 28% 
Arab States 9% 102% 34% 30% 34% 
UAE 50% 98% 85% 72% 85% 
 
Regarding the Internet, it was the people who first complained about the content 
accessible after public access became available in 1995 throughout the UAE. In 
Dubai, for instance, the Parent-Teachers Association “complained that 
addresses for pornographic websites were being circulated around schools” 
(Murphy, 2006: 1072). As a consequence, the government did initially not face 
popular opposition to the monitoring of Internet traffic. However, as Emiratis 
became more educated and exposed to the influence of other agents of political 
socialisation, concerns raised over media censorship and freedom of 
expression among some sectors of society. Especially the very Internet savvy 
Emirati youth is very critical of these policies and have learned how to curtail 
governmental censorship. Not surprisingly, an Emirati student complained that 
many Internet sites are blocked in the UAE and confessed that they therefore 
have to use proxies to find their way around to get hold of some information, 
especially to gain access to objective opinions regarding UAE politics.152 In fact, 
most political debate in the UAE (and the Gulf) currently takes place over the 
Internet, where young people (and increasingly adults) find spaces where they 
can express their opinions more freely and, if they will, anonymously, in addition 
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 Personal interviews with UAEU student. Al-Ain, Abu Dhabi, UAE (March 2012). 
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to being able to engage in gendered mixed discussions, which are rare in the 
still very segregated Emirati national society.  
Overall, the Arab public is exposed to three main discourses over the ICTs: 
First, regime’s nationalistic propaganda is continuously delivered through 
national television, newspapers and magazines, as well as on radio programs, 
on Internet websites, and through social media. Secondly, the Islamist tenets 
also reach Arab households through all media outlets. Finally, Western 
principles and values are currently dominant in the entertainment media 
consumed by the Arab youth (Mellor, 2005: 5), including most of the American 
or European films, television comedies and dramas, music, and video games, 
which also contain much political content. Moreover, Nisbet and Myers (2010) 
find evidence that “exposure to transnational Arab TV increases the probability 
of transnational Muslim and Arab political identification at the expense of 
national political” (Nisbet & Myers, 2010: 347). In this regard, after the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait, the development of Gulf TV satellite channels (first the 
Saudi MBC channels and al-Arabiya, then the Qatari al-Jazeera) rapidly 
unfolded to prevent the influence of the Iraqi television propaganda upon the 
local, and more broadly the Arab populations. Moreover, these channels 
challenge the dominant Western perspective over regional events by presenting 
information from an Arab or Muslim perspective. More specifically, al-Jazeera 
has played during the last decades an important role in forming more politically 
critical Arab public opinion because it “challenge(s) traditional social norms as 
much as they do the state, breaking taboos by discussing controversial topics” 
(Murphy, 2006: 1069-70).  
Regarding the Gulf, Murphy has examined the possible role played by the ICTs 
(mainly satellite television and the Internet) in stimulating political liberalisation, 
and concludes that since modern ICTs have the potential to expand the existing 
public sphere, they do create new opportunities for political activity (Murphy, 
2006: 1059). Nonetheless, she appropriately explains “any democratising 
impact of the new ICTs is limited by a combination of…the capacity of the state 
to utilise those same ICTs in its own defence” and “the introduction of new non-
state actors seeking to assert their own hegemony-directly or non-directly-over 
the consumers of the technologies” (Murphy, 2006: 1066).  
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Figure 10: Facebook penetration rates (2013)
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The Internet and the recent social media networks differs from other ICTs 
socializing agents in that it allows for high degree of individual choice among a 
wide and diverse range of materials. In turn, however, the many material and 
ideological options available may sometimes cause disorientation (Jensen, 
1995:  519-530). In this regard, the Arab Social Media Report (ASMR) series 
has explored the growth of social media in the Arab region, and the change 
from social to a wider, more political and civic, usage (Mourtada & Salem, 2012: 
2-3). According to ASMR data, the UAE has the highest Facebook penetration 
rate in the region (41.66%) with Jordan, Lebanon, Qatar and Tunisia trailing 
behind, and has the third highest Twitter penetration rate (4.89%) after Kuwait 
and Saudi Arabia (see Figures 10 and 11). 
Figure 11: Twitter penetration rates (2013)
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Moreover, it loosens governmental (and parental) control over the contents of 
the media consumed, creating new spaces for discussion and the exchange of 
ideas, and promotes transnational political identities and mobilization (Lynch, 
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2006: 52). In this regard, Murphy has noted “Arab use of ICTs and the emergent 
Arab public sphere are fostering (multiple) identities among Arab populations 
which overlap or integrate with more global identities, and (are) reconfiguring 
Arab notions of self and otherness” (Murphy, 2009: 1141-1142). Despite 
censorship and surveillance still prevents the Arab physical and virtual public 
spheres from being an open space for debate, Arab regimes have had to adapt 
to the growing ability of Arab citizens to access uncensored information 
(Eickelman, 2002: 20), and “can no longer ignore the reality of the emerging 
public sphere that is growing in strength and vitality in the Arab world” (al-
Jenaibi, 2008: 58-59). In the UAE, the recent detentions of political activists 
were intrinsically linked to their political activities over the Internet, therefore 
showing that both liberal and Islamist Emirati activists have been using online 
forums and social networks for political discussion. Finally, the reform of the 
media law to strengthen the regime control over these activities is a clear 
evidence of its potentiality to influence citizens’ political culture, and of the threat 
it represents for the maintenance of the status quo.155 
To sum up, we can see how the transformation of old and the emergence of 
new agents of political socialisation were fast-forwarded by the rentier nature of 
the UAE, in addition to the ensuing incorporation of its society into the global 
capitalist system in both its economic and cultural spheres, as well as by the 
access of people to education, international media and new means of 
communication. Although the family is generally the most influencing agent, the 
generational gap that exists in the UAE between the rather conservative adults 
and a more globalised and open-minded youth, has contributed to the 
educational environment (especially the university) and the ITCs to become 
more determinant in the acquisition or awareness of political standpoints. The 
impact these developments have had on the process of political socialisation of 
Emiratis can therefore be considered an unexpected collateral effect of a rentier 
state apparatus aimed at manipulating social-political mobilisation through the 
control of the state and the rent, and by constructing a national identity 
discourse (i.e. the ruling elite’s three main resources of power).  
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Conclusion 
UAE society has changed from being eminently tribal in its socio-political 
organisation, but multicultural in its composition and connected to the world 
through maritime trade over centuries; across a period of socio-economic 
stagnation and isolation from the world during the British protectorate; and to a 
phase of reconnection with the world (and with new worlds) since the discovery 
of oil, and the subsequent integration into global capitalism. Those dynamics 
have influenced the conformation of the contemporary socio-political structures 
and explain the establishment and endurance of authoritarian rule in the UAE. 
Moreover, the federal institutional setting and legal framework, as well as the 
‘state-crafted’ policies of citizenship and national identity, have been directed at 
portraying the ruling Emirs as the legitimate and ideal ruling elite, and at 
nurturing a feeling of affection and loyalty towards them, and a feeling of 
belonging to the UAE among the population.  
Despite the differences between historical coastal and inland oriented societies 
and, although they have influenced each other, the tendency has been towards 
a hierarchical social organisation that primarily organises along tribal and ethnic 
lines; and which is supported by legislation that privileges the tribal aristocracy 
and limits nationalisation to a select group of people. Additionally, these 
experiences and strategies that serve to legitimise the rulers, have at the same 
time caused several social problems such as the demographic imbalance, 
national identity issues, the discrimination towards nationals of non-Arab or non-
tribal backgrounds, the social exclusion of the children of Emirati women 
married to foreign fathers, or the situation of the bidun.  
To conclude, state and society formation have taken place in parallel to the 
transformation of the basic shapers of political culture: the family, the 
educational system and the mass media (the main agents of political 
socialisation). Effective redistribution of oil rents has prevented political 
awareness and activism in the short term, but has also facilitated and 
accelerated the exposure of citizens to new or reformed agents of political 
socialisation since the 1970s: the unexpected outcomes of rentierism. Thus, 
rentierism is regarded here as indirectly enhancing political awareness in the 
long-term, hence affecting state-society relations. 
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Chapter 3: RULERS APPROACH TO POLITICAL SOCIALISATION  
The previous chapter explains how merchants were key political actors in the 
coastal towns of the Gulf during pre-British days: rulers depended on custom 
duties and pearling taxes, often needing to ask merchants for financial 
assistance; rulers, in return, protected merchants’ trade with their armed forces. 
However, if rulers’ tax levies were too heavy, merchants could move to another 
town to carry out their commercial activities. Therefore, rulers had no other 
option but to consider their opinions, to the point of granting them 
representation in advisory boards or Majālis.156 Merchants, both Arabs and non-
Arabs, tribal and non-tribal, have been hence seen as associated to the ‘de 
facto government’ led by the ruler during pre-British times (al-Sayegh, 1998: 90-
91). This interdependent relationship was gradually lessened as rulers began to 
perceive external rents, first from the British and then from oil exports, making 
them less economically dependent on merchants.  
However, the latter did not accept the new reality without revolting, and several 
political movements emerged during the 20th century demanding popular 
political participation. The first section of this chapter presents a historical 
account of political activism in the UAE from the 1920s until today, while the 
second discusses the most recent events regarding the ruling elites’ response 
to demands for political reform during the last decade (2005-2014). It also 
includes a section explaining the government’s plans for gradual political 
liberalisation, which were announced in 2005, and examines the main steps 
given in this direction; an analysis of the 2006 and 2011 Federal National 
Council (FNC) elections; and an evaluation of the post-Arab Spring landscape. 
1. Historical political activism in the UAE 
Several political movements emerged during the 20th century, mainly in Dubai 
although closely related to the other emirates, especially Sharjah and Ras al-
Khaimah (RAK), which had a longer tradition of maritime trade than the 
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 The Arabic term Majlis (pl. Majālis) is used to name the social gatherings that men (and 
increasingly women, or mixed) hold in a specific section of the family house which is designed 
for this use, and in which people discuss all kind of issues, including politics. Also this term is 
used to name the consultative forums held by the rulers or senior members of the ruling families 
to meet their people and listen to their grievances, which although not so often as in the past, 
still take place in the Gulf. By extension of this second use, Majlis has been used to name the 
councils or parliaments of many contemporary Arab and Islamic states. 
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predominantly inland oriented emirate of Abu Dhabi. As described in chapter 
two, Dubai had become the main port of the Trucial Coast and therefore had 
the largest population, which was ethnically heterogeneous and well connected 
with other regional ports. Among the most notable merchants were members of 
the Al Maktoum ruling family who suffered the 1930s economic depression and 
the British restrictions to their activities. In contrast, through the signature of 
agreements and concessions with the British, the ruler’s position was 
strengthened and his personal finances improved. Accordingly, it is not 
surprising that a merchants-led political movement emerged at a time when not 
only their wealth, but also their political influence in society was diminishing. In 
fact, the account of the events by Rosemarie Zahlan (1970) shows how, even 
though the movement was “naive in political concept, [it] insisted on the 
formation of a representative Council with executive and administrative powers 
[and conducted reforms of] commercial, political and social nature, [hence 
belying] the accepted tradition of political apathy [in the UAE]” (Zahlan, 1970: 
249-263).  
1.1. The Dubai reform movement 
The first uprising against the authority of the ruler of Dubai, Sheikh Sa’id bin 
Maktoum Al Maktoum, took place in 1929 when some members of the Al 
Maktoum (led by Mani’ and Hashar bin Rashid, and Suhayl and Sa’id bin Butti) 
allied with notables of the ruler’s council who opposed his policies and 
relationship with Britain. The anti-colonialist movement succeeded in 
proclaiming Mani’ bin Rashid ruler of Dubai on 15th April of that same year, but 
without the agreement of the British, Sheikh Sa’id was restored in power only 
three days after (Zahlan, 1970: 250-251). However, his authority continued to 
be questioned by his cousins as reflected by a series of events that took place 
during the following years. In 1931 a boat of the British India Steam Navigation 
Company collided with one of the boats of Sa’id bin Butti, who threatened and 
refused to meet the British officers, despite finally accepting to apologise and 
make reparations. Only three years later (1934) members of the Bin Rashid and 
Bin Butti families unsuccessfully attempted on the ruler’s life. Again, the British 
reasserted their support to Sheikh Sa’id bin Maktoum and, for the first time, 
overtly intervened in a local struggle, providing the ruler with fire arms and flying 
Royal Armed Forces fighter planes low over the town (Davidson, 2005: 39 and 
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2008: 31-32). A majlis held by the ruler, during which families of the Al Bu 
Falasah clan recognised his position, was followed by a visit paid by members 
of the Manasir tribe, forcing rebellious Bin Rashid and Bin Butti to take an oath 
of loyalty to Shaikh Sa’id. Moreover, the ruler wisely appointed Sa’id bin Butti as 
governor of Deira, which in turn infuriated Mani’ and Hashar bin Rashid (Zahlan, 
1970: 250-252).  
Nonetheless, further opposition to Sheikh Sa’id bin Maktoum emerged within 
the Al Bu Falasah shortly after. This conflict was above all related to the ruler’s 
contention with policies imposed by the British, such as measures to reduce 
slave trade and arms traffic, which were important sources of income during the 
interwar period.  Additionally, in 1937 Sheikh Sa’id signed oil and air 
agreements that guaranteed him fixed annual incomes, which he was neither 
sharing with his extended family nor had an impact on the town’s development. 
Consequently, in May 1938, the Al Bu Falasah presented a petition to Sahikh 
Sa’id that listed their demands: “a Budget and Civil List; proper arrangements 
for health and sanitation in the town of Dubai; a Watch and Ward service; re-
organisation of the Customs department; fixed allowances for members of the 
Ruling Family; the abolition of the monopolies held by the Ruler, his wife and 
son,” etc. (Zahlan, 1970: 256-257). Since there was no positive response to 
their demands, the most significant upheaval took place during the summer of 
1938, which was known as the Dubai Reform Movement: The Bin Rashid, Bin 
Dalmuk, al-Ghurair, and Bin Thani families, encouraged by the Kuwaiti Reform 
Movement, mobilised about 400 people (Davidson, 2008: 32-36), who occupied 
several towers, the Deira side of the town (including its customs house), and 
placed the ruler in a weak position. 
After long negotiations, an agreement was reached in October 1938 with the 
mediation of several sheikhs and the British, through which the self-called Dubai 
Reform Movement (Thawrat al-Islah) succeeded in achieving many of their 
demands. A Council or Majlis was set up, which was “made up of fifteen 
members selected by the ‘principal people’ of Dubai, and any operative decision 
had to be passed by a majority” (Zahlan, 1970: 258). The ruler was recognised 
as its president, but he was forced to share 85 percent (seven-eighths) of the 
total revenue, which was to be spent to improve social conditions and to 
enhance economic activity in the town. They further established a Council of 
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Merchants (Majlis al-Tujjar), as well as the first Municipal Council (Baladiyya) of 
the Trucial States, and invested particularly in developing the education sector.  
However, the decision of the Majlis in 1939 to limit even more the ruler’s income 
coincided with the gradual manifestation of resentment among some people 
who reportedly felt “that for one despot there had merely been substituted a 
board of despotism” (Political Resident, cited in Zahlan, 1970: 261), as they felt 
their ideals and good intentions were “dissipated by self-interest” (Zahlan, 1970: 
261). Relying on British and Bedouin support, Sheikh Sa’id bin Maktoum 
resorted to force killing or imprisoning most members of the Majlis and, 
therefore, bringing to an end what was regarded at that time by British Officials 
and other Arab countries’ journalists as a ‘popular’, ‘democratic’ or ‘liberal 
modernist movement’. The main leader of the movement, Mani’ bin Rashid, who 
acted as the spokesman of the Majlis and the Director of Education, together 
with around half of the members, fled to Sharjah and finally moved to Bombay. 
By the end of the 1940s, a new Merchants’ Council was created that continued 
developing some of the previous council initiatives, but had no executive power 
at all (Davidson, 2005: 39-41 and 2008: 32-36; Heard-Bey, 1982: 256; al-
Sayegh, 1998: 95-96; Zahlan, 1970: 247-263).  
1.2. The Dubai National Front 
During the 1950s, Gulf opposition movements were “directly influenced by 
political movements in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Egypt” (Melikian, 1988: 119). 
Newspapers from these countries that openly criticized the British presence in 
the Gulf and their close relations to the rulers already reached the UAE 
populations (al-Sagri, 1988: 143), as did programmes air waved especially to 
the Gulf by Egyptian transnational Arabic-language radio Ṣawt al-‘Arab 
(Rayyes, 1988: 78). Moreover, Arab schoolteachers (mainly from Egypt, Iraq, 
Syria, and Lebanon) transmitted pan-Arab nationalistic views and raised 
awareness of the anti-imperialist Arab movements and the Palestinian conflict, 
significantly influencing the political thinking and behaviour of Gulf inhabitants. 
Thus, Gulf revolutionary movements grew “out of, and in conflict with, the 
policies of Nasserism” (Halliday, 1974: 26). In the UAE, a nationalist 
organisation emerged in the early 1950s led by foreign Arab teachers (Front for 
the Liberation of Occupied Eastern Arabia) that advocated to ”end British 
colonialism and overthrow the ruling oligarchy” (al-Nabeh, 1984: 121-123). 
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Local and foreign students were encouraged to demonstrate with Arab 
nationalistic banners and flags, and carried out some violent actions such as 
the attempt to burn the British base in Sharjah (Davidson, 2008: 42). Schools in 
Dubai even started to display pictures of Egyptian president Gamal Abdel 
Nasser on the walls, and celebrated the creation of the United Arab Republic, 
something that concerned both the rulers and the British agent (Hawley, 2007: 
116-200), and which was probably the genesis for an indigenous Arab 
nationalism movement in 1953: the National Front.157  
The Dubai National Front was formed by a group of predominantly Sunni Arab 
merchants (mainly the al-Futtaim and the al-Ghurair families, supported by 
Sheikh Juma bin Maktoum Al Maktoum158). They had connections in Kuwait, 
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and “opposed the growing influence of 
Persian and Indian merchants” (al-Sayegh, 1998: 98),159 as well as sought “to 
reduce the power of the ruling family and British interference in domestic 
matters” (Davidson, 2008: 43). The National Front, which had around 500 
supporters, perpetrated several violent attacks, including the burning of part of 
the British agent’s house, an attempt to destroy British transmitters near the 
base in Sharjah, an attack to the car of the Chief of the Trucial Oman Levies, 
and an assassination attempt against the ruler of Sharjah, Sheikh Saqr bin 
Sultan al-Qasimi (Davidson, 2008: 47-48). The movement became very 
powerful and was only appeased when Sheikh Rashid bin Said Al Maktoum 
succeeded his father in 1958 and, being himself a trader, adopted a more 
inclusive approach to the conflict with the merchant community. 160  Sheikh 
Rashid re-established the Dubai Municipal Council by integrating National Front 
supporters (al-Sayegh, 1998: 99). Despite the fact that all decisions taken by 
the new institution had to be approved by the ruler, this integration reflected the 
rulers’ awareness that, in order to soothe political opposition, they had to 
somehow integrate the prominent merchant community into the political system. 
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 Personal interview with Emirati professor, Dubai (March 2014). 
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On the other hand, the merchants became aware that British support to the 
ruler would impede any further political advantages and chose to work within 
the new framework. This enhanced the resentment felt by the Bedouin towards 
the merchants, with whom they lived in relation of semi-dependency since they 
employed them during the pearling season (al-Sayegh, 1998: 98). Moreover, it 
probably determined that the rulers also made efforts to strengthen alliances 
with the Bedouin by distributing valuable gratuities and by recruiting them into 
the military establishments (Herb, 1999: 61). 
Islamism and Salafism took root in the Gulf alongside leftist and nationalistic 
ideologies. It is well known that, as in other Arab countries, “Egyptian teachers 
who had to leave Egypt in the 1950s [for being at odds with Jamal ʿAbd al-
Nasir’s government], were primarily responsible for promoting the politico-
religious ideologies of the Muslim Brotherhood” (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun) in the 
Gulf (and other Arab countries); and that most “preachers, many of the imams 
and speakers on radio and television or writers of religious articles in 
newspapers [were] primarily from Egypt” and Syria (Melikian, 1988: 122-123). 
Thus, many Emiratis (especially from Dubai, Ras al-Khaimah, and Sharjah) 
developed either pan-Arab or pan-Islamic standpoints influenced by Arabs living 
in the UAE or while studying abroad (mainly in Egypt, Kuwait or Saudi 
Arabia).161  
In Abu Dhabi, more inland oriented and with a more homogeneous, and less 
progressive society, Sheikh Shakhbut did not face such political opposition from 
the smaller merchant community during the decades prior to the federation. In 
fact, he was to some extent an anti-imperialist who resisted British desire to 
control domestic affairs and the investment of oil rents in speedy developmental 
projects that would damage the ‘traditional’ lifestyle; and was therefore more 
concerned about the opposition represented by members of his own family who 
opposed his views. After deposing Sheikh Shakhbut with British assistance, his 
brother Sheikh Zayed–who had gained a reputation for the initiation of the 
developmental projects as the governor of al-‘Ain–, carefully incorporated the 
main branches of the Al Nahyan family and the most powerful Bani Yas tribes 
into the system through a combination of distributive and inclusion politics 
(Davidson, 2005 and 2012; Heard-Bey, 1982; Lienhardt, 2001: 177–179). 
                                                            
161
 Personal interview with Emirati professor, Abu Dhabi (March 2014). 
136 
 
Meanwhile, in order to contain Arab nationalist influence, other Emirates’ rulers 
worked closely with the British to strengthen security forces and the control over 
local courts,162 as well as to restructure the educational sector by removing 
more conflictive leftist teachers (Hawley, 2007: 295). In this regard, the 
government threatened non-oil producer Arab countries “to expel these workers 
and replace them with a more docile and cheaper workforce,” while Arab 
leaders “threaten to use their expatriates (...) to destabilise” the Gulf populations 
(Rayyes, 1988: 86).  
More importantly, the early 1960s oil concessions’ rent and the incorporation of 
the UAE into world-capitalism were key factors for the decline of Arab 
nationalism. Indeed, “the combination…of welfare programs and repression was 
one factor that enabled a smooth transition” (Halliday, 1974: 461). Oil revenues 
allowed the rulers to free their population from all forms of taxation, and to 
provide people with public services across the emirates, which helped to 
consolidate the Federal government’s legitimacy early on (Peck, 2001: 154). 
Consequently, the rulers became the providers of welfare, and the merchant 
families “lost much of their power base” (Davidson, 2008: 47-48). However, as 
explained in the previous chapter, they were given their own role in the new 
socio-economic and political setting as service suppliers, for they were awarded 
important developmental projects, and ultimately regained limited political 
influence (al-Sayegh, 1998: 99-101).  
1.3. The Memorandum Movement 
Despite the surrounding unstable regional setting (Nasser’s death, Arab–Israeli 
Wars, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Islamic Revolution of Iran, Iran-Iraq war), 
the 1970s and 1980s came marked by the readjustment of power relations 
among the rulers of the seven emirates. The process of integration into a 
federal state was not easy and several constitutional crises took place, with Abu 
Dhabi pushing for centralisation, while the other emirates resisted giving up 
sovereignty. During the summer of 1978 the FNC invited the Council of 
Ministers, which as mentioned above integrated several members of the non-
tribal bourgeoisie and the educated middle class since January 1977, to a 
“closed session that resulted in a joint commission ‘to remove the obstacles to 
Federal progress’” (Fyfe, 1989: 191). This resulted in two members of the FNC 
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and two of the Cabinet drawing up a ‘Joint Memorandum’ in February 1979 
(Fyfe, 1989: 192), which coincided with the conflict that arose after Sheikh 
Zayed unilaterally merged the Abu Dhabi Defence Force into the newly created 
Union Defence Force.163 At the centre of the movement were Khalfan Rumi, 
Minister of Health from a prominent family in Sharjah and who has been a 
member of the commission drafting the constitution; Taryam and Abdullah 
Taryam, FNC Speaker and Minister of Education respectively, and owners of 
the daily al-Khaleej; Abdullah Mazrou‘i, Minister of Labour and Social Affairs; 
and Said and Saif Ghobash, Minister of Planning and Minister of State for 
Foreign affairs respectively, originally from Ras al-Khaimah, and owners of the 
“radical” weekly ‘al-Azmena al-Arabiya’ (Fyfe, 1989: 188-189). 
The petition urged the Supreme Council to build up proper federal armed 
forces, to transfer more of its decision-making powers to the Council of 
Ministers, and to give the Federal National Council more control over legislative 
ratification (Davidson, 2009a: 64). Moreover, although not explicitly, the 
petitioners questioned the future of hereditary regime (Fyfe, 1989: 210). The 
Supreme Council set up a committee to evaluate the petition in March 1979, 
since it appeared to have wide popular support as reflected by the 
demonstrations that took place across the country. Marches were especially 
significant in Ras al-Khaimah, where the ruler Sheikh Saqr finally asked the 
protesters to write a list of their demands. The ‘People’s Committee’, as it 
became known, “called for total fusion to replace federation, for Sheikh Saqr to 
endorse the [Joint] Memorandum unreservedly and for the formation of a 
consultative council” (Fyfe, 1989: 198). After Supreme Council negotiations, the 
appointment of Sheikh Rashid of Dubai as Prime Minister in April 1979, and the 
subsequent reshuffle of the Cabinet that removed some of the petition’s 
initiators from their positions, weakened the movement; and Sheikh Zayed 
postponed any further moves towards more integrated and representative 
institutions, arguably in order to deter other rulers from federation withdrawal.164  
1.4. The UAE Muslim Brotherhood 
Moreover, since the late 1970s, religious intellectuals were given prominence in 
the UAE to counterbalance the rise of leftist (and anti-imperialist) ideologies. 
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Likewise, they were conferred political importance in response to the 
emergence of questions regarding rulers’ religious legitimacy and the new 
alliance forged with the USA, following the fall of the Shah of Persia and the 
establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In 1974, the Association for 
Reform and Social Guidance (Jam‘iyya al-Islah wa tawjih al-ijtima‘iyy or just al-
Islah)–which was formed by Emiratis who adopted Islamist views in 
collaboration with Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood exiles– was registered as a 
religious, charitable and cultural association in Dubai–just after Law No. 6 was 
issued to govern ‘associations for public benefit’ (Jam‘iat nafi‘ ‘amm) (Krause, 
2008: 36). 165  Sheikh Rashid bin Said Al Maktoum of Dubai welcomed the 
establishment of the religious association and engaged its members as 
government officials in the ministries of Islamic Affairs and Awqāf, education, 
justice, and labour and social affairs,166 assuming this “would incorporate them 
politically and by extension, aid the state in its projection of a conservative and 
Islamic image” (Partrick, 2009: 15). In this regard, the most significant 
appointments were those of Saeed Abdullah Salman (reportedly the head of al-
Islah at the time) as Minister of Education; Mohammed Abdul Rahman al-Bakr 
as Minister of Justice, Islamic Affairs and Awqāf since 1977; and Saif al-Jarwan 
as Minister of Labour and Social Affairs (being all from Ras al-Khaimah), for the 
third cabinet formed in 1979. In addition, al-Islah members with Law studies, 
who were the best prepared at the time, became influential within the Ministry of 
Justice.167  For more than 20 years al-Islah worked side by side the Emirati 
government, cooperating in areas of social and cultural development. During 
this period, it benefited vastly from its privileged relationship with the rentier 
oligarchy, and was a key element to contain the spread of leftist ideas by the 
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inheritors of the aforementioned leftist Dubai National Front, some of who 
eventually evolved into what is today known as ‘liberals.’  
Since the 1990s, however, this temporary synergetic relationship deteriorated 
for several reasons. First, there were allegations that religious people with 
connections to al-Islah received a treatment of preference in accessing jobs and 
scholarships through the ministries under their control. In this regard, some 
consider that authorities realised that “the UAE's judicial and education sector 
was effectively a state within a state [and that] the student councils and 
professional associations…were turned into Muslim Brotherhood outposts 
dedicated to advancing their interests”(al-Qassemi, 2012, December 14). 
Second, they opposed the increasing presence of non-Muslim foreigners in the 
country, to whom they referred as a ‘fifth column’, and started to criticise the 
rulers for deviating from Islamic values, hence becoming a potentially 
threatening force for the legitimacy of UAE leadership. Finally, allegations made 
by Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak in 1994, during a visit to the UAE, that al-
Islah members were funding violent groups like al-Yihad in Egypt, were followed 
by a UAE authorities’ investigation and a warning that they should cease any 
involvement with foreign organisations.168  
Consequently, in 1994 the al-Islah board of directors was dismissed and 
replaced by government supporters (al-Teniji, 2012, 2 October), officials with 
affiliation to the organisation were removed from key ministerial positions, and 
people with links to it started to be transferred to other institutions (Salama, 
2013, April 13). Al-Islah leaders then turned to the ruler of Ras al-Khaimah, 
Sheikh Saqr bin Muhammad al-Qasimi, who allowed them to legally establish in 
that emirate and appointed his relative Sheikh Sultan bin Kayed al-Qasimi 
(recently sentenced to 10 years of prison169) as chairman of the Ras al-Khaimah 
branch. Reportedly, they also opened another branch in Fujairah around that 
time.170 Yet, the perceived threat that political Islam could represent for internal 
and regional stability–and foreign relations–became more evident when in 2001 
two Emiratis participated in the 9/11 attacks in New York (CNN Library, 2013, 
July 27). It was then when the UAE authorities decided to reform the 
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educational system and school curricula, the preachers were required by the 
Ministry of Justice and Islamic Affairs to adhere to sermons pre-approved by the 
Ministry (Sison, 2004, November 10), and surveillance was conducted over 
people suspected of participating in Islamist activities to prevent them from 
spreading their ideology. Although it was not very much publicised, according to 
Amnesty International over 250 people with Islamist leanings were detained by 
the State Security Apparatus (Amn al-Dawla, SSA)171 in the aftermath of 11th 
September 2001 and many others have been detained since (Amnesty 
International, 2004, June). Moreover, many lawyers, judges, teachers and 
university professors –with different levels of attachment to al-Islah– have since 
faced restrictions on work opportunities, and some of them have reportedly 
been warned not to participate in seminars or public events (Amnesty 
International, 2004, June), in addition to having been threatened with having 
their professional licenses removed.172 Likewise, hundreds of employees of the 
Ministry of Education and school directors and teachers were forced to take less 
significant functions or retire early during the following decade (Amnesty 
International, 2004, June). Commenting on these events, Mohammed al-Roken 
and Muhammad al-Mansoori, both former heads of the UAE Jurist Association 
and holding Islamist views, lamented in a 2007 interview with the Washington 
Post that the ruling families had distanced themselves from those they govern 
and that the space for freedom had  “become smaller and smaller” (Shadid, 
2007, May 22).  
1.5. Other pro-reform movements 
Simultaneously, liberal views supporting reform were consolidating being 
“grounded in the growing political awareness produced by a better education 
system and a freer media environment, [which were enhanced by] local 
observation of reform measures implemented elsewhere in the region, [and] 
accelerated by pressures from globalization and political fallout from events 
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such as the 9/11 and the Iraq War” (Koch, 2011: 173). Many voices emerged 
asking for political participation in the UAE, which concentrated in the need to 
enhance the powers of the FNC and to make it an elected institution. Contrary 
to the Islamists, liberal intellectuals were allowed to express their ideas for 
years within a broad margin of freedom, as reflected by their active participation 
in the local media and public events. For instance, Dr. Khalifa Bakhit al-Falasi, a 
former Ambassador to Australia and former Undersecretary at the Ministry of 
Education, wrote in the Arabic daily al-Bayan that people should be “given the 
right to elect FNC members in line with the UAE constitution that allows for 
holding polls to elect members of the house.” Furthermore, Saeed Hareb, 
professor at UAEU, said that it was “embarrassing that Iraqi expatriates had 
voted in the UAE for their country’s election, but the UAE nationals [did] not 
have the right to franchise” (Ahmad, 2005, March 4). Similarly, Abdulkhaleq 
Abdalla stated that it had become “embarrassing for the UAE to lag behind 
others politically in the region [and that] at the time when more than 10 million 
Arabs in Palestine, Iraq and Saudi Arabia exercised their right to vote and be 
elected, it is completely unacceptable that the UAE still has an appointed 
house” (Salama, 2005, February 23).173 
Table 12: UAE Petitions 
Year Signatories Addressee Demands 
1938 
Merchants of 
the Al Bu 
Falasah 
Ruler of Dubai 
- Budget and civil list 
- Health and Security services 
- Reorganisation of customs department 
- Fixed allowances for ruling family 
- Abolition of ruler’s monopolies 
1979 
FNC and CoM 
members 
UAE Supreme 
Council of 
Rulers 
- Proper federal armed forces 
- More executive powers for the CoM 
- More legislative powers for the FNC 
2008 
UAE 
Intellectuals 
President 
- Halting of the federal Media Law  
- Freedoms of opinion and expression 
2011 
UAE 
Intellectuals 
+ 
Associations 
President 
- Universal franchise for 2011 elections 
- Legislative powers for the FNC 
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Emirati political activists have put two more petitions together in more recent 
times, and participated in a third one that brought together civil society groups 
of all GCC states. Several unspecified civil society organisations met in parallel 
to the 2009 GCC summit and put together a statement that was submitted to 
the leaders of the GCC. The document appealed for the implementation of 
economic integration, and emphasized the need for the participation of the 
peoples of the GCC countries in policy and decision-making through elected 
parliaments (Mansoor, 2008, December 26). During the same year, a number of 
Emirati academics and significant cultural and media figures submitted a 
petition to the President, which focused on the need to stop the controversial 
Media Law that was being discussed by the FNC, and called for the lifting of the 
ceiling of freedoms, especially freedom of the press, of opinion and expression, 
which they presented as a major concern for those involved in writing in the 
UAE. Importantly, this was the first petition bearing the names of specific people 
(Abdulla, 2009, February 10).  Finally, as further explained in the section on the 
post-Arab Spring landscape, a petition asking for universal franchise and FNC 
legislative powers was sent to the President of the UAE in March 2011, which 
was followed by a similar plea signed by several associations (see following 
section). 
 
2. Political standpoints in contemporary UAE 
Gulf political standpoints have ranged since the 1950s “from Arab Nationalists 
to socialists, from secularists to religious fundamentalist and from conservative 
traditionalists to the modern technocrats” (Melikian, 1988: 119). In the early 
1980s Abdulla identified four potential opposition forces, including the already 
mentioned nationalist-minded internal bourgeoisie, the nationalist and reform-
minded element of the young intellectuals, the Islamic fundamentalist groups, 
and the military establishment, which he considered the least challenging 
(Abdulla, 1984: 286-287). However, the former have evolved into four main 
tendencies in contemporary society: the liberal, the religious, the capitalist, and 
the ultranationalist (Al-Qassemi 2011).174 In this regard, Davidson has explained 
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how “politically opposed blocs and differing elite orientations do exist 
underneath the surface of UAE politics, and that (...) the political elite is far from 
being a single unit” (Davidson, 2005: 227-228). As an example, he presents 
how the election of Muhammad al-Habtoor as speaker of the FNC in 1998 was 
fiercely fought in the council with voting patterns that did not reflect regional or 
family origin. 
Opposition exists primarily within liberal and religious circles that support 
political reform, but from radically opposed standpoints; while the capitalist and 
ultranationalist segments align with the ruling elite for the maintenance of the 
status quo. Since political parties or associations are not legal in the UAE, these 
groupings are nothing but organised or cohesive (with the exception of some 
religious organisations) and, since there are very few academic works on the 
issue, their different positions hereafter presented are extracted from interviews 
and newspaper articles. More recently, different opinions have been expressed 
through Internet’s social media, as most people mentioned below have Twitter 
(and to a lesser extent Facebook accounts and/or blogs).175  
Liberals may be considered the inheritors of anti-colonial and nationalist 
ideologies that where behind the first reform movements since the beginning of 
the 20th century in the UAE, for they mainly demand more representative and 
transparent institutions.176  Those movements were initiated by merchants in 
response to seeing their position in society weakened; but, with their 
incorporation into the federal system as the main capitalists in charge of the 
developmental projects, they lost interest in reforming a system from which they 
have been benefiting since then. However, with the growth of the national 
population base and its improved education, as well as its increased exposition 
to new or updated agents of political socialisation,177 many found responses to 
their concerns in the liberal thought, ranging from radical to more conservative, 
and from secular to more religious views. Accordingly, some intellectuals argue 
that the UAE liberal faction “is made up of the educated elite, the newly 
                                                                                                                                                                              
(nationalists), or ‘wataniyun’/’wataniyun al-jadid’ (patriots/new patriots) to differentiate them from 
the 1900s nationalists, whose ideas were closer to the contemporary liberals’. 
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 In this regard, for example, a debate was held over Twitter under the hashtag #uaefiveforum 
in which the pardoned UAE5 detainees (see section on Post-Arab Spring landscape) discussed 
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assertive middle class and the younger generation inspired by the current Arab 
Spring, [being their main arguments that] political reform has been delayed for 
too long already [and that the UAE would be] better off with a fully elected and 
empowered Federal National Council” (Abdulla, 2011, June 22).   
Despite some argue that Emiratis are ready for a democratic system and 
therefore oppose the governmental gradual approach,178 others have adopted a 
more cautious view over reform, especially since the Arab Spring. Although they 
do not think democracy is urgently needed, they claim it is “metaphorically, the 
oxygen that sustains political stability and shields economic prosperity” 
(Abdulla, 2011, June 22). Followers of this line of thought do not organise 
themselves into any kind of structured collective action. In this regard, and in 
comparison to the more organised religious groups, the failure to join forces 
around some kind of organisation is identified by some of them as their major 
weakness.179 
Popular support to this tendency remains limited in the UAE, since liberals carry 
“the negative connotation of secularism, which loosely translates in some 
people’s minds as an equivalent to atheism” (Al-Qassemi, 2011, August 8).  
Moreover, for some Emiratis the term ‘democracy’ also has attached “negative 
connotations resulting from the belief that it is primarily a US mechanism for 
imposing an external system of rule on the country” (Koch, 2011: 184). 
Nevertheless, intellectuals belonging to this group have been calling for political 
reform on local media and at national and international public events and 
conferences during the last two decades, if not more. Moreover, they are being 
active on Internet social media, putting the emphasis on the enhancement of 
accountability, transparency and the rule of law. Importantly, liberals’ different 
socio-economic backgrounds (tribal aristocracy, educated middle class, national 
bourgeoisie and even rentier oligarchy) show that political ideology transcends 
the ethnic and rentier social hierarchy.  
Among these, the most visible intellectuals are Ebtisam al-Kitbi, professor of 
political science at the UAE University, who has advocated for democratisation 
of the Emirati political system and was a signatory of the 2011 3rd of March 
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petition;180 Abdulkhaleq Abdalla,181 former professor of political science at the 
UAE University, who has also repeatedly expressed his support for political 
liberalisation; and Ahmed Mansoor al-Shehhi,182 who describes himself as a 
liberal-secular human rights activist, was one of the first 2011 detainees, and 
one of the founders of the online discussion forum ‘UAEHewar’.183 Others who 
may be included in the liberal group are the younger newspaper columnists 
Sultan Al-Qassemi184 and Mishaal al-Gergawi.185 Although these two do not 
make very strong public statements about political change in the UAE, they 
both support regional democratization. For instance, Al-Qassemi was quoted in 
February 2011 as having said: “People say the youth of the Gulf aren't 
concerned or prepared...but they have the same ambitions as the young people 
elsewhere” (Malas, 2011, March 9). Although he is a supporter of universal 
suffrage and a parliament with legislative power in the UAE, Al-Qassemi says to 
be more interested in Egypt and Saudi Arabia (KSA) because he thinks, “when 
change comes to these countries it will come to the rest of the region, especially 
KSA with regard to the Gulf” (Malas, 2011, March 9).186  
As explained in the section on the post-Arab spring landscape, most liberals 
have silenced their calls for reform or, at least moderated their discourse amid 
the detentions that have been taking place since March 2011. Even though 
some liberals were detained at the beginning, the crackdown then concentrated 
on Islamist reformists and, not wanting to be associated with that ideology, 
liberals decided to step back or did so due to pressure from authorities. 
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Commenting on these issues, a liberal UAEU student (personal communication 
in Facebook [Page type], May 2014) explained:  
“Some liberals convince themselves that the government is doing a 
good job and those Islamists are gonna compromise the stability we 
have so let put them in jails… I can’t ignore the positive aspect of 
this crackdown against Islamists: It’s the ‘top-down’ movement 
toward a more liberal, anti-religious sphere in UAE society… But I 
think it’s hypocritical. It’s selective concept of justice... Some liberals 
have no choice cause they’re under a lot of pressure, and 
sometimes tweet pro government and sometimes against 
government. This so called Arab spring is a bless, it revealed all the 
masks of those who we call public figures… Wallah [(really)] 
everyday I scratch a name off my list of Emirati 
writers/journalists/academics.”  
Some of them have even justified the fact that the government is persecuting 
Islamism for the sake of stability, and have interpreted it as the support of 
authorities to a liberal rather than religious approach to reform. 187   Others 
however, consider that liberals are under much pressure and have no other 
option but to keep a balanced discourse even if they do not agree with the way 
in which detentions are being carried out. In relation to this, al-Qassemi 
explained that this was especially the case with regards to Emiratis of non-tribal 
or of mixed origins, whose loyalty to the country was being questioned by some 
nationalist people. In this regard, a tweet by al-Gergawi (of Persian and mixed 
origin) shows how he had to clarify his loyalty to the country after it was 
questioned by ultra-nationalist Dherar Belhoul (al-Gergawi, 2011, April 25):  
“@dbelhoul Don’t presuppose anything while you’re not following me. 
I declared my standpoint here before, I stand with God and the 
Nation and the President as our father Zayed taught us.”  
In line with liberals, religious groupings arise from all social layers, but the bulk 
of its supporters belongs to the educated middle class. Religious associations 
or organisations exist, although they are not supposed to engage in political 
activities. However, as stated by an Emirati citizen: “Everybody is in the UAE, 
from the Ikhwan to al-Qaʿida” (cited in Krause, 2008: 97). Among UAE religious 
groupings, the best organised and most supported is the aforementioned al-
Islah, whose declared goals are to promote Islamic social and cultural values 
and engage in charity activities (Pekka, 2012).  
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At the same time, it has proven to also be, or at least some of its members, the 
most active in promoting human rights and the rule of law in the UAE and, as in 
other Arab countries, advocates for political reform as a means to gain legal 
political influence. Moreover, their publications call for the establishment of a 
social order that follows Islamic principles, and for the shariʿa (Islamic law) to be 
more strictly applied. As summarised in table 13, members of the association 
claim they subscribe to the values of moderate political Islam, oppose violence, 
and are not directly linked to organisations abroad. Conversely, the UAE 
government’s current views over the nature of al-Islah, its objectives and 
intentions are very different from what the association claims, as they portray it 
as a movement disloyal to the state, that seeks to overthrow the regime, and 
that includes an armed wing (Hakala, 2012, November 15). 
Table 13: Nature of al-Islah Association
188
 
 al-Islah UAE government 
General 
view of the 
movement 
Inspired by the values of moderate 
political Islam, al-Islah’s aim is to 
provide moral guidance and 
discourage extremism. From its 
origins as an association first 
registered in 1974, al-Islah has 
opposed violence and favoured 
reform. 
The movement is disloyal to the 
state, a threat to political stability 
and endangers the results reached 
by the Emirati leadership through a 
‘transformation of a tribal society to 
a modern state, creating synergy 
between people in a multinational 
society in a very short period of 
time’. 
Links to 
other 
movements 
Shares ideological compatibilities with 
other movements such as the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt, but has no 
direct links with any movement 
abroad. 
Linked financially and politically to 
the international Muslim 
Brotherhood movement and 
orchestrated from abroad. The 
movement is engaged in clandestine 
activities. 
Main 
objectives 
The establishment of an elected 
national assembly with real powers. 
Reform of the political system in the 
UAE and for an end to government 
interference in all spheres of public 
life, including the media and the 
judiciary. 
The movement’s aim runs counter to 
religious and cultural tolerance and 
to rapid economic and social 
development already established in 
the country. 
Methods Non-violence. 
The movement includes an armed 
wing. 
 
Prominent members of the association are:  Sheikh Sultan bin Kayed al‐
Qassimi, last president of al-Islah and member of Ras al-Khaimah’s ruling 
family; and his deputy, Muhammad Ali Saleh al-Mansouri,189 supervisor of the 
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London-based Islamist website Emirates Media and Studies Center 
(EMASC)190–both sentenced to fifteen years of prison in the UAE94 case.191 
Some of the tweets the latter posted in defence of al-Islah during the months 
before his arrest were as follows:  
“Dawat al-Islah is against sectarianism and against Iranian 
hegemony in the Arab islands” (al-Mansoori, 2012, April 28).  
“I say to all of those who lied and made up false stories: I am proud 
of al-Islah” (al-Mansoori, 2012, April 30).  
Others linked to the association, but allegedly not directly involved, are: Nasser 
bin Ghaith,192 former Abu Dhabi’s Sorbonne University professor, and one of 
the UAE5 detainees; and the abovementioned Muhammad Abdullah al-Roken, 
sentenced to ten years of prison in the UAE94 case. 193  As the UAE’s 
demographic imbalance grew, a national debate emerged in the 1990s that 
“questioned the thin line between modernization and Westernization [and] 
whether the West was really worth imitating. [In response to this issues,] some 
thought that it was time to return to one’s roots, specifically Islam [as a mean] of 
regaining one’s true cultural identity” (al-Sayegh, 2004: 113-116). Thus, Islamist 
views found wide support among important sectors of the UAE society, which 
does not necessarily mean they support political Islam or the Muslim 
Brotherhood rationale. In this regard, Al-Qassemi stated that, according to 
official estimates, the number of people that subscribe to political Islam in the 
UAE reaches currently 600 members (Al-Qassemi, 2012, May 20), while al-
Islah has claimed to have some 20,000 sympathisers (Ulrichsen, 2012, August 
5), constituting around 20% of nationals. 
Both the capitalist and the ultranationalist groups fall under what Abdulla has 
called the anti-democracy segment of society which “seems to be content with 
the political status quo and would oppose any sudden move to rock the boat”, 
whose “main concern is political stability, which is viewed as paramount to 
economic prosperity” (2011, June 22). Capitalists are essentially citizens 
belonging to the national bourgeoisie and the tribal aristocracy, in addition to 
the rentier oligarchy. 194   Among them, a good representative is Nasser al-
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Shaikh,195 member of a prominent business family of Dubai whom Al-Qassemi 
describes as a “social media star in the UAE”; his “balanced Tweets and 
Facebook updates have garnered him wide support” (Al-Qassemi, 2012, May 
20). This collectivity shows interest in economic liberalisation and is currently 
happy with the political status quo that benefits their businesses and social 
status. An example of al-Shaikh’s online political activism was a tweet posted 
on March 2012 in relation to developments in Egypt: 
“The biggest loser from these events is the Islah movement in the UAE 
which has not issued a statement denouncing the threats of the 
[Egyptian Muslim] Brotherhood to the UAE thereby wasting a golden 
opportunity to distance suspicion from itself” (al-Shaikh, 2012, March 
10).  
Under the ultranationalist category falls an emerging group that frantically 
defends the ruling elite–especially since the 2011 petition was sent to the UAE 
President–196 in face of calls for political reform, which is portrayed as a threat 
to the establishment. They have been repeatedly declaring their loyalty to rulers 
and the political system during the last years, and openly and aggressively 
expressing disapproval of any criticism to the UAE government on the press 
and social networks. The patriotism of some of them has translated into violent 
actions, such as threatening opponents over social networks and even 
physically attacking some of them.197 Again, according to Al-Qassemi (2011, 
August 8), ultranationalists are also referred to as ‘conservatives’, the UAE's 
‘Tea Party’ or as he has dubbed them in Arabic: the ‘Qahwa’ (Arab coffee) 
party. 198  Among this segment of society, he mentions Dherar Belhoul 199 
(General Manager of Watani200 and host of a popular Arabic radio talk show) as 
a well-respected Emirati and “an authority on various aspects of UAE culture 
and tradition” (Al-Qassemi, 2011, August 8). Another representative of this 
standpoint, who has caused several national and regional controversies, is 
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Dhahi Khalfan Tamim,201 Head of General Security for the Emirate of Dubai, 
and former chief of the Dubai Police Force. These are the tweets of a 
conversation between him and liberal Ahmad Mansoor about one detainee in 
March 2012: 
“@Ahmed_Mansoor. Challenging the prosecution procedures does 
not serve our law, brother Ahmad. Don’t challenge the justice from the 
perspective of one person. Ask God to guide you” (Khalfan, 2012, 
March 9).  
“@Dhahi_Khalfan. Dear Sir, I wish to hear the full details of the story 
of brother Juma’ al-Falasi. There are enough reasons to say there is 
selective application of law” (Mansoor, 2012, March 9).  
Under a broader classification that looks into Emirati citizens’ support to 
democracy, Abdalla has observed that society can be divided into three main 
categories: the pro-democracy advocates, the anti-democracy segment, and the 
silent segment of society; each of them possibly representing one-third of the 
national population. With regards to the silent segment of Emiratis, which has 
not been covered above, he identifies that it “has no strong views on the issue 
of democracy in the UAE [and] are mainly an apolitical bunch…happy to defer 
the whole issue to the government” (Abdulla, 2011, June 22). Finally, he 
considers the perspective of this group “is mostly situational and varies 
according to turn of events [and] easily swings from one end, the advocates of 
democracy, to the other extreme, the anti-reform pundits”(Abdulla, 2011, June 
22).  
3. Towards political liberalisation? 
The two international events that raised concern worldwide about the lack of 
democracy in the Gulf were the 9/11 attacks and the invasion of Iraq in 2003, 
encompassed by the promotion of democracy by the US, and especially the 
Greater Middle East Initiative. Accordingly, external pressure to democratise, as 
well as to put down Islamist movements, has played an important role during 
the last decade. However, the message sent to Gulf rulers has often been 
contradictory and more rhetoric than a real and final goal: the US openly ask 
them to liberalise politically but also to control any potential rise in extremist 
Islamism because they fear any possible destabilizing effect, making the 
enhancement of liberties complicated (Crystal, 2005: 4). Additionally, UAE’s 
                                                            
201
 Twitter account: @Dhahi_Khalfan 
151 
 
participation in global economy, such as the conditions for membership 
established by organizations like the World Trade Organization has been a 
catalyst for the signature of international agreements by which states agree to 
adopt ‘good governance’ practices. Other external actors for the embracement 
of the international law codes are international, non-profit and human rights 
organizations. Concerned with the image UAE projects outside their borders, 
authorities have been pushed to sign treaties and adopt policies that they might 
have otherwise not agreed to. In any case, these factors “can either facilitate or 
obstruct political liberalization, not determine outcomes on its own” (Nonneman, 
2008: 25). External factors are expected to have an influence on the evolution 
of internal actors and structures, which ultimately can have an effect on 
policymaking, but “the driving force for democratisation has been internal” in the 
Gulf (Crystal, 2005: 5). Thus, the promotion of democratic practices by foreign 
forces cannot really be considered a determinant factor for political reform but 
only an added pressure element. 
The 21st century was the time when a younger generation of Gulf monarchs had 
to assume power under increasing pressure from economic and cultural 
globalisation; and who “lacking the charisma of the older generation, recognized 
the need for institutional legitimacy to complement traditional and charismatic 
sources of legitimacy” (Abdulla, 2010: 18). By 2004 all Gulf states but the UAE 
had held elections (or announced them in the case of Saudi Arabia) and had 
conducted some ‘cosmetic’ reforms that were interpreted as an “upgrading of 
authoritarianism” (Heydemann, 2007). Thus, adding to globalisation, regional 
trends were also putting pressure on the UAE to liberalise politically. 
Furthermore, the way in which the succession of Shaikh Zayed, first President 
of the UAE, was to be handled, became a vital concern for leaders during those 
(Ehteshami, 2003: 70).  
Although rumours and speculation about alternative succession scenarios 
unfolded during the months prior to Zayed’s death (Albright, 2004, October 27), 
Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan took office smoothly in 2004. Nonetheless, 
one of his first announcements was on political reform, probably in response to 
the growing domestic calls for political liberalisation. During the country’s 34th 
national day celebrations on 2nd December 2005 he proclaimed, in his address 
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to the nation, that elections would be implemented shortly to choose half the 
members of the FNC, as part of a project to improve the UAE political system: 
“Considering the developments in our region, which is now witnessing 
transformation and reforms, the years ahead in our blessed march 
require a bigger role for the Federal National Council by empowering it 
(...). We have decided to start activating the FNC role through electing 
half of its members through councils for each emirate.” 202 
Appealing to the need to consolidate developments achieved by the federation, 
the speech called for all federal institutions to face, with the highest degree of 
responsibility and transparency, the “challenges confronting the nation.” It also 
established that the process would require the revision of all bodies and 
structures, and that it should be done “by ensuring the entrenchment of Shura” 
(Islamic consultation) in a “gradual and organised way" to culminate in more 
public participation.” Such a declaration of intentions meant the adoption of a 
new discourse by UAE rulers; the recognition, at least rhetorically, that changes 
were necessary to address economic and social needs of the increasingly 
complex Emirati society; and the initiation of a new stage in the history of the 
UAE. However, the statement did not specify the actual implications of the 
reform programme and several steps had to be given before some light was 
shed on the rulers’ plans.  
Reactions to the presidential announcement were polarized. Some saw the 
‘partial’ elections as a historic move and others considered them too limited, 
while government officials and rulers repeated in their speeches and 
declarations that it was the first step of the President’s vision to develop the 
country's participatory political system. For instance, Minister of Economy and 
Planning, Shaikha Lubna al-Qasimi (the first ever Emirati female minister), said 
that the President’s decision strengthened “the relationship between the rulers 
and the people”; Mohammad al-Gergawi, CEO at Dubai Holding and Chairman 
of Dubai Development & Investment Authority (DDIA), considered that through 
the decision we would “see a tremendous improvement in productivity and 
quality across all sectors”. Similarly, Hamad bin Sultan al-Darmaki, a former 
FNC member from Abu Dhabi, described it as “a decision that wins hearts” 
(Hoath, Za'za', al-Jandaly & Nazzal, 2005, December 2).  
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The day following the presidential speech the Supreme Council endorsed it as 
national law, and approved a framework for the establishment of the necessary 
regulations and institutions to put the decision into effect. Accordingly, in 
February 2006 the Ministry of State of Federal National Council Affairs203 was 
created in a cabinet reshuffle and was given three main functions: coordination 
between the government and the FNC; participation in drafting legislations 
related to the role of the FNC; and supervision of media affairs linked to 
parliamentary practice.204 The process got under way in August with the issuing 
of a presidential decree, which called for the setting up of the National Electoral 
Committee (NEC). 205  The NEC would be chaired by the newly appointed 
Minister of State for FNC Affairs, Anwar Gargash (a Dubai citizen of Persian 
ancestors), and would be in charge of the preparations, organization and 
supervision of elections. Moreover, the NEC was entitled to set up the timeline 
for registration of candidates, the date and method of conducting the election in 
every emirate, and to announce the results of the elections within three days 
after the polls. The Executive Election Instructions were issued next as the legal 
framework for conducting indirect FNC elections, in which only a small 
percentage of the population would be allowed to participate, and polls were 
announced for December 2006.206 
The announcement that not all nationals would be allowed to vote in the first 
UAE elections, and that only half of the seats would be elected, brought about a 
generalised feeling of confusion and disappointment.. The main aspect 
criticized by Emirati analysts was the Electoral College system. Ebtisam al-Ketbi 
repeatedly expressed her discomfort with the path chosen by authorities. Some 
days before the elections she wrote an article in the national newspaper Khaleej 
Times under the title “Tryst with democracy,” in which she said that the system 
of voters’ selection contradicted Article 25 of the UAE Constitution (“...all 
individuals are equal before the law, and there is no distinction between the 
citizens of the federation...”), because clearly “distinction has been made and 
consolidated” (Al-Kitbi, 2006, October 20). Abdulkhaleq Abdulla stressed that 
Emirati society was “divided into two categories –a lucky minority and a 
disappointed majority, which is embarrassing for both sides, since the UAE’s 
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small and coherent society cannot tolerate this kind of unprecedented political 
division” (Abdulla, 2006, October 23). Mohammed al-Roken, was quoted by the 
US Embassy as having said that, as long as the FNC was not given more 
powers and FNC members were not elected directly by the citizens, the process 
was merely “a public relations gesture,” and that voting rights should have been 
given to all citizens (Sison, 2005, December 5). He also explained that the main 
reason the government had opted for controlled election was the fact that “the 
Muslim Brotherhood could currently win seats if direct elections were held 
today” (Sison, 2006, June 27). In a more measured position, Muhammad 
Abdullah al-Mutawa, professor of Sociology at the UAE University, argued that 
although the majority of Emiratis would have to wait longer to exercise their 
electoral rights, “the election of half of the FNC’s members [was] a very crucial 
step, paving the way for greater political participation and wider representation 
of citizens” (al-Mutawa, 2006, October 22).  
Journalists also gathered the opinions of young Emiratis at that time. Some 
expressed their willingness to see a representative government implemented, 
and showed enthusiasm and optimism with regards to the process: “This is a 
great and new idea in the country. The people of the UAE have so many issues 
and problems, which they need to bring to the Rulers' attention. By electing 
people who know about our needs we can achieve that,” said Aisha Al Zahmi, 
business sophomore at Zayed University (ZU). Aisha Shukrallah, a 
pharmacology sophomore at Dubai Women's College (DWC) noted that: “The 
concept of shura or consultation in Islam has existed since the days of the 
Prophet Mohammad (PBUH). The participation of the people in the council will 
not only affect the nation, but also each coming generation” (Saffarini, 2006, 
December 30).  Nevertheless, there were others, like 19-year-old Emirati citizen 
Samir Marzouqi, who thought the system in place needed no improvements 
and, when speaking to a European journalist, affirmed that the UAE was “the 
best democracy ever”, arguing that citizens were able to convey their concerns 
to the rulers at the majalis (Sharp, 2005, July 29).  
The president’s programme was planned to take place in a three-step process:  
the first stage being the election of half of the FNC members through an 
Electoral College (EC); the second expanding the powers of FNC members and 
the enlargement of its members – an important step because it would require 
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constitutional amendments; in phase three, an electoral law would be issued 
and universal elections for half the council would be held. The three phases 
were planned for a four-year period (MEED, 2006, December 1), meaning it 
should be completed before the following FNC elections in December 2010. 
However, more than one year after the announcement of reforms, no clear 
programme had been presented to the public. It was not until April 2007 that a 
Government Strategy was publicly unveiled by Sheikh Muhammad bin Rashid 
Al Maktoum, Vice-President and Prime Minister of the UAE and Ruler of Dubai, 
to explain the direction that would be taken during the following three years in 
order to implement the presidential project. The event took place in presence of 
the president of the federation, all Emirati rulers, the cabinet ministers, the 
members of the Federal National Council, and over 1,000 senior government 
officials (Khaleej Times, 2007, April 17), probably to project an image of unity 
and support from all UAE authoritiesto the presidential project. The document 
explaining the strategic aims (UAE Cabinet, 2007, April) focuses on six major 
areas: social development; economic development; government sector 
development; justice and safety; infrastructure; and rural areas development. 
Moreover, it states the general principles of the strategy:  
- Continuous maintenance of cooperation between federal and local 
authorities. 
- Revitalization of the regulatory and policy making role of the ministries, 
and improve decision making mechanisms.  
- Increase of the efficiency of governmental bodies, and upgrade the level 
of services through focusing on customer needs.  
- Development of civil service regulations and human resources, focusing 
on competence, effective ‘emiratization’ and leadership training.  
- Empowerment of ministries to manage their activities in line with public 
and joint policies.  
- Review and upgrade of legislations and regulations.  
In particular, the policies announced for the reform of the government included 
four aspects: a focus on strategic planning and the building of an integrated 
performance management system; the upgrade of the civil service system, 
emphasising the principles of competency as the main criteria for recruiting, 
promoting and retaining employees; the development of government services 
based on international best practices and the promotion of a culture of 
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excellence in service delivery; and the strengthening of e-government 
programmes, adopting a new approach and encouraging the private sector’s 
participation in delivering central services.  
Unfortunately however, this document was neither specific nor clearly 
understandable for the public. Although the introduction to the document 
reaffirms the regime’s compromise with a needed reform project “to maximize 
efforts and introduce radical changes to the existing practices within the UAE 
Government”, in the preface Sheikh Muhammad stresses that it “is a living 
document which paves the general direction towards the future we all aspire to, 
and is therefore flexible and adjustable if need be”. Accordingly, the language 
employed along the document is grandiloquent but does not present specific 
plans or schedules to enhance the legislative powers of the FNC. Nonetheless, 
while statements of the rulers and strategies presented seemed to use empty 
words, some facts displayed intentions to reform the political system and to 
improve its performance, at least to some extent. Lawrence Groo, executive 
director of Musanada (a company recently established by the Emirate of Abu 
Dhabi to improve the efficiency, quality and transparency of government 
services)207 highlighted in 2009 the fact that there “is probably not a single 
government entity in Dubai and Abu Dhabi that hasn’t, over the last three or 
four years, come up with a new strategy or strategic plan” (Groo, 2009, May 28) 
such as the 2030 Vision Abu Dhabi or the Dubai 2015 Plan, which outline the 
key initiatives of the government’s plans for the following years. Groo also 
provided his own estimation that 10-15% of the annual public sector budget 
outlays are being employed for the reform project, adding to an amount “never 
used before by any government in the world” for the same kind of programme 
(Groo, 2009, May 28).  
3.1. Law amendments  
Moreover, the Constitution, which has been amended a few times without any 
move towards enhancing the power of the FNC or the Cabinet,208 was reformed 
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in that direction in 2009. Amendment no. (1) of that year introduced changes in 
six articles of the constitution as follows: 
- Article 1: One of the Prime Minister deputies will exercise and assume all 
powers of Prime Minister when he is absent for any reason by an order 
from Supreme Council chairman and upon recommendation from Prime 
Minister. 
- Article 62: The Prime Minister, his deputies, or any federal minister 
should not indulge in any professional work, commercial, financial or any 
trade deal with the federal government or local governments while on 
duty. However, they can hold board membership of a commercial or 
financial company. 
- Article 72: The membership duration of the FNC was extended to four 
years instead of two.  
- Article 78: The annual ordinary session of the FNC should not be a 
period inferior to 7 months, beginning in the third week of October each 
year.  
- Article 81: A general secretariat for the FNC was created. Its functions 
are specified by bylaws. 
- Article 91: The government should report to the FNC the international 
treaties and agreements, which are to be discussed by the FNC before 
their ratification. 
The Minister of State for Federal National Council Affairs said that the 
constitutional amendment “is a reiteration of the leadership's efforts to enhance 
the participation of the FNC in strategic decisions (…) [it would] further boost 
the process of political empowerment launched by the President (…), and help 
the members strengthen their involvement in the political process” (UAE 
Interact, 2009, February 3). Indeed, the approval of these constitutional 
amendments by the FNC, the Supreme Council and the President meant the 
endorsement of all national authorities to the enhancement of the powers of the 
FNC, even if only to a very limited extent.  
As explained in chapter 2, the FNC is responsible for examining and suggesting 
amendments to all proposed federal legislation (draft by the cabinet) prior to 
their submission to the Supreme Council and the president, it can summon and 
question ministers, and it reviews and approves the annual budget.209 Adding to 
this list, the supervision of international agreements is a small but nevertheless 
relevant concession as the council is thereby integrated in the foreign policy 
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decision-making process. The extension of the ‘legislature’ term to four years 
was a positive reform, because its members would have more time to become 
familiar with the functioning of the body, hence earning more experience, and 
eventually the council would become more efficient. Finally, the impediment of 
ministers to hold other positions or establish any deal with federal or local 
governments was a measure intended at reducing corruption and 
mismanagement, as well as at making officials more responsible for their 
federal duties.  
Thus, although the reforms implemented during the first decade of the 2000s 
were overly cautious the enhancement of transparency and accountability of 
governmental institutions (which have been increasingly required to present 
their plans and report on progress to the public); the reforms in education and 
health services; the ‘emiratization’ programme to improve employment 
opportunities for nationals; and the vivid debate that took root on the media 
around elections and the need to expand FNC powers they signalled that the 
leadership was moving toward liberalisation. In this regard, the US Ambassador 
in Abu Dhabi reported in November 2007 that: “As the UAE moves rapidly 
forward in an era of high prosperity, it is becoming somewhat more open, 
tolerant, and willing to address issues that define its international reputation” 
(Sison, 2007, November 8).  
However, many of the pre-existing governance problems remained unresolved, 
despite the presidential announcement of gradually reforming the political 
system to enhance participation. Incongruence and anachronism are very 
visible regarding rule of law, as the impartiality of the judiciary and the police 
force 210  is not clear, and the protection of human rights is not sufficiently 
applied. The Press and Publications Law (Federal Law No. 15 of 1980) is a 
good example of the incongruence inherent to the government strategy. It is 
considered one of the most restrictive press laws in the Arab world for “it 
authorizes the state to censor both domestic and foreign publications prior to 
distribution, and prohibits criticism of the government, rulers and ruling families, 
                                                            
210
 Example of this was the case of a member of the ruling family of Abu Dhabi who was 
acquitted despite a video, which was recorded by a policeman, showing him beating and 
torturing an Afghan man in 2004 (See al-Jazeera (2010, January 10) for details); or the more 
recent cases of political activists that are detained by the State Security Apparatus and kept 
incommunicado and in unknown locations for long periods of time (See section on Post-Arab 
Spring landscape). 
159 
 
and friendly foreign governments”, and violations of this law can result in fines, 
prison sentences, or prosecution under the penal code (Freedom House, 2013).  
Moreover, self-censorship is very much in place since most journalists are 
foreign residents with temporary contracts that can be easily cancelled, thus 
they generally avoid touching upon potentially sensitive topics, and are 
extremely cautious in their activities.  Similarly, it has been argued that the 
judiciary is largely comprised of Egyptian and Sudanese nationals working on 
fixed-term contracts and that are, therefore, “less likely to make rulings that 
might antagonize their hosts” (Sison, 2007, November 8).  
Furthermore, in the years following the 2006 FNC elections, the closing down of 
Internet sites, blogs and forums, as well as the confiscation of newspaper 
issues, reflected that the space that appeared to have emerged for discussion 
of national affairs, and expression of disagreement with governmental policies, 
was fading. This probably had to do with the increased use of social media 
among Emiratis (the UAE has one of the highest Internet penetration rates of 
the Middle East), which made it more difficult for authorities to monitor and 
contain the exchange of ideas. 211  The crackdown on websites initially took 
place under Federal law no. (2) of 2006212 on the Prevention of Information 
Technology Crimes (abrogated later by Federal Decree-Law no. (5) of 2012),213 
which was the first law of this kind enacted in a GCC state. In addition to 
criminalizing acts commonly associated with “cybercrimes” such as hacking, 
phishing and other forms of financial fraud, the law explicitly criminalized the 
use of the Internet to commit a wide variety of crimes and provided fines and 
prison terms for Internet users who violated political, social and religious norms 
in the country. In 2008 there was an important clampdown on the Internet, with 
thousands of websites being blocked en masse (AKI, April 2008), which has 
steadily continued during the following years in the absence of procedural 
transparency or judicial oversight regarding the blocking or removal of online 
content. Among the most controversial websites blocked were the famous blog 
of the atheist Emirati blogger Ben Kerishan (www.benkerishan.blogspot.com); 
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the ‘Secret Dubai Diary’ blog, which dealt with different UAE issues, including 
politics, and which had won the Middle East and Africa prize of Bloggies 2007 
Weblog Awards (www.secretdubai.blogspot.com); or ‘UAE Torture’ website that 
posted the video of a member of the ruling family of Abu Dhabi torturing a man 
(www.uaetorture.com). An example of the extreme sensitivity of authorities 
toward criticism of members of the ruling families was the temporary 
suspension in July 2009 of the website and newspaper al-Emarat al-Youm 
(www.emaratalyoum.com) for having published a story about the doping of a 
horse owned by two sons of the UAE president (Freedom House, 2013).  
The apparent opening of spaces for debate in the national media, in addition to 
the virtual spaces that emerged on the Internet, encouraged many Emiratis to 
participate in political discussions both in person or online. Among others, the 
aforementioned online discussion forum ‘UAEHewar’ was established by a 
group of liberal Emiratis. The aforementioned liberal Ahmed Mansoor came up 
with the idea of establishing an online discussion forum with, as he explains it, 
“high freedom of expression and that included different school thoughts in one 
place, and where all opinions were respected.”214 Other young people, with 
whom he had been in touch over other Internet forums and blogs –such as 
‘Mujarrad Insan’ or ‘Abstract Human’–215 that commented about political reform 
or human rights issues in the UAE but which were frequently censored by sites 
administrators or the authorities, liked the idea and they decided to open it and 
run it together. Notably, none of the five people initially involved knew each 
other personally. Fearing reprisals for their political commentaries, most of them 
wrote online under pseudonyms and were not willing to reveal their identities.216 
Today it is known that among the three men and two women who started the 
forum, the three most active were Ahmed Mansoor, Rowda al-Balushi,217 also 
known by her literary pseudonym Rawdah Hamed, an Emirati (bidun) writer 
from al-‘Ain, in addition to a younger student whose name might better not be 
revealed at the moment.218 
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The forum became operative in August 2009 and quickly became one of the 
preferred sites among opinionated Emiratis who otherwise could have not 
exchanged their ideas so openly. Moreover, the forum intentionally did not 
require registration in order to participate, so those who preferred to stay 
anonymous could do so. In this regard, Ahmed Mansoor explains that “people 
were happy to have this space for discussion…they saw it as a chance to 
discuss many topics that were never discussed in such an open way 
before…people before would speak behind closed doors, but not in public…”219 
The forum had several discussion ‘rooms’ including: National Affairs, The UAE 
in the eyes of others, Arab and International Affairs, Literary Affairs, and 
People’s Talk (or ‘kalam al-nas’), where people expressed a wide range of 
opinions which were only removed by the administrators if criticism was directed 
towards individuals rather than public figures or policies. By 2011, it had around 
2,000 members registered, and more than 45,000 threads, subjects and 
comments of members and guest users.220 
Apparently the authorities considered that the expressed opinions crossed red 
lines and, only three months after the forum went online, a post was blocked for 
the first time, which was written by an agnostic under the title “Ma waraʾ al-sirat 
al-dhatiyya li-Allah?” (What is behind the CV of Allah?). Three other months 
further, the site was blocked in the UAE, redirected to another link by 
administrators, and finally completely blocked five months later, together with its 
Twitter and Facebook accounts.221 The blocking of the website was done in an 
unusual way, by which a ‘technical glitch’ message was displayed instead of the 
normal blocking message. This could have had two objectives: first to identify 
the owners of the site if they complaint, and second, to not publicly disclose that 
it was being blocked by authorities. In March 2010 a complaint was filed to the 
prosecutor general in Dubai against the Telecommunication Regulatory 
Authority (TRA) for blocking the forum, but access from the UAE has been 
disrupted since February 2010. Moreover, by the summer of 2010, the SSA had 
identified some of the people participating in the forum, including Rowda al-
Balushi and some UAEU students, who were interrogated and warned to stop 
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spreading their ideas through the Internet. 222  Ahmed Mansoor was to be 
detained later under allegations of having insulted the authorities of the 
country,incited others to revolt through UAEHewar and social media, and for his 
blog publications.223 
Also in 2010, the electronic magazine “Hetta” (www.hetta.com) became the first 
UAE e-magazine that was ordered to shut down, under allegations of 
defamation on an article published entitled “Abu Dhabi TV: Emirate TV only in 
name,” which criticised the way the emirate's TV channels are being 
administrated (Salama, 2010, January 16). On the same year, issue No. 11655 
of the Arabic newspaper “al-Sharq al-Awsat” was reportedly confiscated for 
containing an article written by Abdulkhaleq Abdulla criticising the Abu Dhabi 
Vision 2030 project. The project was accused of reflecting the intention of 
concentrating investment in local development under the banner of “Abu Dhabi 
first,” hence leaving aside federal development, and Abdulla argued this would 
contribute to the enhancement of population imbalance, which would ultimately 
contradict Sheikh Zayed’s approach (Abdulla, n.d.). Therefore, limits to free 
expression of political ideas were clearly set, for both Islamists and liberals, 
years before the Arab Spring exploded. However, it was only then when 
prominent members of both ideological groups were detained and when 
previous silent ostracism of potential opponents became, thanks in part to the 
new ITCs, widely publicised domestically and internationally. 
It was around this time when, as the second FNC elections of the country were 
not being announced, that more Emiratis started to get nervous and to question 
the authenticity of the reform project. Intellectuals and members of the FNC 
urged the government to expand the FNC’s power and to start preparing for the 
next polls as promised. Nevertheless, it still took authorities a while to announce 
the dates and procedures for the new election, scheduled for September 2011 –
over six months after expected. 
3.2. The Electoral Experiment 
Among the reforms put forward after 2005 National Day presidential speech, the 
most visual one was calling for elections to choose half of the Federal National 
Council (FNC) members. Although it did not really affect the decision-making 
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power structure, it generated much debate surfacing many of the citizens’ 
concerns. In this regard, and in agreement with Andreas Shedler (2006: 12), 
Luciano Zaccara explains that the observation and analysis of electoral 
processes in authoritarian regimes are important “for assessing the value that 
authorities give to the opinions and wishes of their subjects, and for evaluating 
their commitment to implementing transparent mechanisms to collect those 
views” (Zaccara, 2013: 83). Using Zaccara’s adapted version of Rafael Bustos’ 
Qualitative Criteria for Democratic Electoral Assessment,224 the following pages 
discuss the two electoral processes that have been held in the UAE–the first 
one in December 2006 and the second one in September 2011.  
In the absence of a specific Electoral Law in the UAE, the Executive Election 
Instructions 225  regulated the 2006 and 2011 FNC elections in the following 
terms: Only 20 of the 40 FNC members should be chosen by Electoral Colleges 
(EC), and only these EC nominated by the rulers of each Emirate could 
participate. Likewise, the EC should be appointed by the rulers of the seven 
emirates “in multiples of hundreds relative to the number of seats apportioned to 
that emirate in the FNC” (al-Dabbagh & Nusseibeh, 2009: 22). This involved 
having to nominate at least 100 times the number of its representatives. As a 
result, the very limited EC selected for the 2006 FNC elections –only 6,595 
voters– which has been labelled as “the most partial electorate ever invented 
(...) in the entire world since the Greeks” (Sadiki, 2009: 77). Although the 
number of eligible voters was increased significantly to 129,000 for the 2011 
FNC elections, and the selection mechanism was supposedly random, there are 
serious doubts as to how the electorate is nominated. Although the quantitative 
analysis of the B’huth research and consulting centre did not identify clear 
patrons in the selected voters that could have reflected tribal or political 
allegiances with the ruling families,226 other sources explain that the rulers of 
each Emirate put together an initial list of participants that was then sent to the 
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central government and revised by the SSA, which removed any sensitive or, 
according to them, potentially dangerous names.227 
In accordance with electoral instructions, the country was divided into seven 
electoral districts representing the seven emirates. Four candidates were to be 
chosen in the electoral district of Abu Dhabi and four in Dubai, three in Sharjah 
and Ras al-Khaimah and two in Fujairah, Ajman and al-Qawain (UAQ). Thus, 
each voter in Abu Dhabi or Dubai could vote for one or up to four candidates, a 
voter in Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah between one and three, while in Fujairah, 
Ajman or Umm al-Qawain could vote for one or two candidates.  
Also, since political parties are illegal in the UAE, candidates run as 
independents, and only EC members could contest the FNC seats allocated to 
their emirate, provided they were qualified for the position as specified by the 
constitution: all FNC members should be UAE citizens, permanent residents of 
the emirate they wish to represent, 25 years of age or older, literate, and have 
no criminal record. Finally, voting is not compulsory and electors should 
basically be part of their emirate EC, as to be entitled to vote: they must be 
Emirati citizens, reside in the country at the time of election and be at least 25 
years old. 
The 2006 FNC Elections   
The 2006 elections were held in three stages: 16th December in Abu Dhabi and 
Fujairah, 18th December in Dubai and Ras al-Khaimah and 20th December in 
Sharjah, Ajman and UAE; and in seven polling stations–one in every emirate–, 
which is a very small number considering the extension of some emirates, such 
as Abu Dhabi, in comparison to smaller ones, like Ajman or Umm al-Qawain. 
With around 400,000 nationals eligible to vote, a total of 6,595 members of the 
EC were entitled to vote: 1,741 from Abu Dhabi, 1,520 in Dubai, 1,061 in Ras 
al-Khaimah, 1,017 in Sharjah, 436 in Ajman, 417 in Fujairah and 403 in Umm 
al-Qawain. This means that only 2.2 percent of nationals eligible to vote were 
allowed to participate (Abdullah, 2006), and thus only this percentage of people 
was to be represented by the winners of the elections. Moreover, only 18 
percent of the EC were women (Abdurabb, 2007).  
 
                                                            
227
 Personal interview with university professor, Dubai (November 2011); and with Emirati 
independent intellectual, Dubai (March 2011). 
165 
 
Table 14: Electoral Colleges and candidacies 2006 FNC elections
228
 
Emirate 
Total 
EC 
Women 
in EC 
Candidates 
Registered 
Female 
Candidates 
Seats by 
election 
Total 
seats 
Abu Dhabi 741 - 100 14 4 8 
Dubai 1,520 - 82 15 4 8 
Sharjah 1,017 - 101 29 3 6 
RAK 1,061 - 83 3 3 6 
Ajman 436 - 24 2 2 4 
Fujairah 417 - 37 1 2 4 
UAQ 403 - 29 1 2 4 
TOTAL 6,595 1,162 456 65 20 40 
 
The participation rate nationwide was 74.4 percent (al-Dabbagh & Nusseibeh, 
2009: 23),229 reasonably high in comparison to other countries, but very low if 
we take into account the restricted number of voters, how they were previously 
selected by the rulers, and the number of Emirati citizens in age of voting. 
Astonishingly, a government official said that the turnout was “disappointing 
given that all of the candidates and participants were from very good families, 
and were all personally approved by the UAE’s rulers” (Davidson, 2008: 166). It 
has, however, been reported that some of these potential voters decided not to 
participate in the polls because they considered it a pointless exercise 
(Davidson, 2009b). The highest participation rates were recorded in Fujairah 
and Umm al-Qawain, followed by Ajman, Sharjah, Ras al-Khaimah, Dubai and 
Abu Dhabi. Interestingly, in Umm al-Qawain, all female members of the 
Electoral College cast their ballots.230  
The EC system limited the possibility of any real competition: Candidates had to 
present a copy of their ‘family book’ (khulasa al-qaid) for registration purposes, 
meaning that women had to ask permission from their husbands, fathers or 
brothers (legal holders of this document). This would obviously hinder female 
candidates without family support to present their candidatures.231 A total of 456 
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candidates,232 including 65 women, contested the elections. A report published 
by the MFNCA in May 2007 revealed that more than the 50 percent of 
candidates had a university-level degree and that the majority worked in the 
government sector (Abdurabb, 2007). Furthermore, candidates had a two-week 
period prior to the Election Days to run their campaigns, which had to be self-
funded. Some candidates were critical of the uncertain criteria employed in EC 
selection process, which favoured people from certain tribes and families. The 
main drawbacks candidates faced were that the campaign period was too short, 
as well as the lack of training (specifically on how to raise funds and how to 
manage their budgets) and the difficulty in accessing voters (especially of the 
opposite sex due to social barriers) (al-Dabbagh & Nusseibeh, 2009: 33-38). 
Table 15: Elections 2006 participation rates
233
 
Emirate Male (%) Female (%) Total (%) 
Abu Dhabi 64.75 43.98 60 
Dubai 71.33 69.47 71.5 
Sharjah 82.38 81.75 82.20 
Ajman 85.22 83.33 85.09 
UAQ 88.64 100 88.83 
RAK 79.54 75.66 78.98 
Fujairah 90.77 88.89 90.41 
 
Regarding transparency, Minister Gargash “ruled out any possibility of foreign 
observers being allowed to monitor the elections” when he argued that the UAE 
could not copy the practices of others and affirmed the UAE did “behave in a 
transparent and reliable manner” (UAEInteract, 2006, December 13). However, 
local associations had the chance to observe the process if they had requested 
it. For instance, the Dubai Establishment for Women's Development monitored 
the elections in Dubai (WAM, 2006, December 18). Moreover, the UAE News 
Agency (WAM) established a media centre equipped with the latest IT systems 
catering for local and international media covering the elections. Voting stations 
were open from 8am to 7pm or until all voters in the stations had cast their 
ballots; all votes were cast and counted electronically, making the UAE the first 
                                                            
232
 The data related to candidates, EC and results for 2006 elections, varies from one source to 
another, with numbers varying from source to source. Therefore, I have chosen to use the data 
from the DSG report, which refers to official documents. 
233
 Source: al-Dabbagh & Nusseibeh (2009: 52). 
167 
 
Arab country to introduce e-voting. The voting process included checking 
identification, e-voting, printing out votes cast, and putting their out-print ballot 
into the box. No problems were registered in any of the voting stations, the 
Election Days passed smoothly and no particular complaints were raised. The 
only alleged irregularity was that some names in the EC corresponded to 
people aged under 16, and to others who were no longer alive (Davidson, 2008: 
166).  
Nonetheless, in light of the procedures employed to run the elections and the 
people allowed to participate, the main aim any election should seek, that of 
electing candidates representing citizens, was not met. Ebtisam al-Kitbi noted 
that the 2006 electoral outcome did not “reflect the different intellectual, social, 
economic and political spectrum” but it instituted “the control of the elite 
belonging to any of these groups” (al-Kitbi, 2006, October 20), hence not 
meeting minimum representation standards.  
The awareness-raising campaign launched by the Ministry of State for FNC 
Affairs (MFNCA)234  in order to promote knowledge on the aims of national 
elections and to develop a culture of political participation in the country, as well 
as several other initiatives implemented between October and December 2006, 
generated popular debate around the process.235 The main means used for 
targeting EC members was media. Moreover, a number of training seminars 
were held for both voters and candidates, as well as voting simulations in the 
weeks prior to the polls; and a call centre was established to solve any doubts 
the EC could have regarding the process.236 The Internet was also an important 
resource during the preparatory stages of the electoral process. EC members 
had on-line access to timetables and regulations through the websites of the 
MFNCA and the NEC, and could also send inquiries by e-mail.237 Besides the 
scheduled training sessions, and after the candidates had requested more 
training, several seminars were organized in cooperation with independent 
organizations, such as the aforementioned Watani programme that works to 
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reinforce national identity, the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), and the UAE General Women’s Union (GWU).  
Openness of the process was very limited, since not having opposition 
candidates and having all candidates pre-selected by the authorities, allowed 
no possibility of surprise or unexpected results. The only uncertainty was about 
the turnout and, even if voters were handpicked by the government, 
participation showed that disinterest in the process or unconformity with how the 
elections were handled also existed within this select group. In fact, the limited 
openness of the process was acknowledged by some prominent Emirati officials 
when inquired about the FNC elections during a meeting with the US 
Ambassador in Abu Dhabi, Higher Education Minister Sheikh Nahyan bin 
Mubarak was quick to correct: “elections, or selections?” (Sison, 2006, June 
27). 
Table 16: Elections 2006 results
238
 
Emirate Elected candidates Votes 
Abu Dhabi 
Muhammad Ali Fadil al-Hamali  304 
Ahmed Shabib Muhammed Hilal al-Dhaheri  302 
Amal Abdullah Juma al-Qubaisi  265 
Rashid Musabah al-Kindi ‘Ali al-Marrar  194 
Dubai 
Jamal Matar al-Hai  340 
Khalid ‘Ali Ahmed bin Zayed  227 
Sultan Saqr al-Suwaidi  208 
Hussein Abdullah al-Shaafar  196 
Sharjah 
Obeid Ali Obeid bin Butti al-Muhairi  165 
Khalifa Abdullah bin Sa’id bin Huwaidin  141 
Hamad Harith Hamad al-Midfa  139 
RAK 
Abdullah Ahmed Salem al-Shehi  219 
Abdul Rahim Abdul Latif Abdullah Shahin  133 
Yousif Obeid ‘Ali bin Isa al-Nuaimi  133 
Ajman 
Hamad bin Abdullah bin Sa’id al-Ghafli  187 
Khalid Hamad bin Muhammad Bu Shihab  68 
Fujairah 
Sultan Ahmed Abdullah al-Danakhani  122 
Ahmed Sa’id Abdullah al-Danakhani  94 
UAQ 
Sultan Saif al-Kubaisi  120 
Yousif ‘Ali Fadel  97 
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The National Elections Committee (NEC) held its ninth meeting on 24th 
December after the elections, and endorsed the list of successful candidates 
(see table 16). But a quick look at the family names of members of the FNC 
shows they mostly belong to families and tribes close to the ruling families. A 
few intellectuals and important businessmen not related to the rulers were 
however also included. Only one woman, Ms. Amal Abdullah Juma Karam al-
Qubaisi, Professor of Architecture at the UAE University, won a seat (in Abu 
Dhabi). Eight women were later appointed to the FNC: Abu Dhabi appointed 
one and Dubai three, while the emirates of Sharjah, Ras al-Khaimah, Ajman 
and Al-Fujaira appointed one woman each, making a total of 9 FNC female 
members.239  
The 2011 FNC Elections  
The year 2010 was one of uncertainty regarding the presidential ‘gradual’ 
reform project. It was the last year of the 2006 formed FNC term, and yet the 
government had not announced plans to hold elections to renew the members 
of the body. Intellectuals, political activists and council members alike were 
concerned with the fact that the government was not mentioning the matter and 
that an electoral law had not yet been issued. In this regard, there were 
speculations about three possible scenarios once its last session expired in 
February 2011: First there was a possibility of postponing elections and 
extending the term four more years; second, the council could go on 
“parliamentary holiday” (i.e. suspension of it sessions) as had already been the 
case during the 23-month-period prior to the 2006 elections; and third, which is 
what happened, elections would take place during the months of recession of 
the FNC (Shaheen, 2011, January 10). 
Moreover, although a majority of FNC members seemed to be in favour of the 
gradual approach to reform–especially seeing Kuwait’s powerful parliament as a 
regional example, which has halted many economic reforms–,240 there was a 
general agreement among members of the FNC and Emirati intellectuals 
around three points: that the number of the council members should be 
increased to match the population increase; that the electorate should be 
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extended; and that the FNC should be given more legislative powers, such as 
making their recommendations binding. For instance, in March 2011, Abdul 
Raheem Shaheen, a deputy from Ras al-Khaimah, claimed that “the preamble 
of the Constitution states the establishment of democratic governance” but that 
“four decades later, we have states that have started after we did and they’re 
ahead of us.” He thought that the UAE was ready for democracy, which for him 
“resembles swimming, you can’t learn to swim if I don’t throw you into the 
water.” In a different opinion, Ali Jasem –the longest-serving member and from 
Umm al-Qawain–, did not believe the country was ready for dramatic change: 
“The Emirati society is not politically mature yet,” he said; “intellectuals say that 
we’ve reached political maturity, but I think the majority are not there yet,” and 
“people still don’t understand the political process or the role of the federal 
council (Habboush, 2010, March 11). Later that year, Sultan Saqr al-Suweidi, a 
member from Dubai, was quoted as having said: “The council should be able to 
propose laws,” and “the Government rejection shouldn’t be final” (i.e. the FNC 
should have the right to question government decisions). Similarly, the FNC 
Speaker at that time, Abdul Aziz al-Ghurair who was an advocate of the 
‘gradual’ approach, believed that the process was turning “too slowly” (The 
National, 2010, April 15), and, in October 2010 during the first session of the 
majlis urged that a “clear and defined programme for the development of the 
election experience” was necessary (The National, 2011, January 10).  
However, despite the mounting pressure, the announcement of elections did 
not take place until few days after the FNC term had ended, when Presidential 
Decree No. (2) of 2011 was issued to amend some provisions of the 
Presidential Decree No. (3) of 2006 on the method to select representatives of 
emirates in the FNC (WAM, 2011, February 15), and specific details were not 
announced until one month later. Elections finally took place on 24th September 
of 2011. In this occasion, the right to vote was extended to 129,274 people, still 
supposing only a representation of 28% of the country’s population aged over 
21 (eligible to become part of the EC). Hence, it is clear that the government 
privileged stability and the prevention of undesired opposition empowerment 
before extending participation. As Gargash clearly expressed: “We are aware of 
the Islamic fundamentalism sweeping through the region, and are careful to limit 
its influence here” (Sison, 2006, June 27). This concern was also expressed by 
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the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, to the US 
authorities in June 2006, as follows:  
“The victory of Palestinian Hamas in 2006 elections should be a 
lesson to the west which encourages us to establish democracy and 
hold free elections. We assure you that if there were a real election in 
Dubai tomorrow; the Muslim Brotherhood would win it. We do not 
want democracy that brings them to power. Certainly, we are at war 
with the Muslim Brotherhood and have a huge challenge to find a 
way to liquidate them forever so they never return” (MEMO, 2013, 
November 24). 
The privileged minority was, according to official sources, randomly selected to 
vote among the Emirati citizens eligible to take part of the EC. As it had 
happened in 2006, the way by which the selected people were informed about 
their right to vote was not clear enough and, apparently there was no direct 
regular or electronic mailbox notification from the electoral commission to the 
EC members. In fact, several EC members said they only knew they were 
eligible to vote through the list published in local newspapers or through family 
members.241 Although the EC list was available on the FNC website and it was 
possible to check its members searching by name or with the ID number, this 
meant you had to be aware of how the process was actually taking place, which 
was not the case among the majority of the population. Not all the eligible 
voters received direct information about the elections neither about their right to 
vote or to run as candidates. Several Emiratis consulted those days were not 
aware of the existence of elections,242 which reflects that the official effort to 
inform about the process was not effective enough to attract the attention of 
citizens, which may in part explain the very low participation rate (27.75%). 
Comparing the EC members of 2006 and 2011 elections, some features are 
worth mentioning. Firstly, the overall proportion of women significantly 
increased, from 17.6% in 2006 to 46.4% in 2011. Intriguingly, the percentage of 
female voters was much higher in Abu Dhabi and Dubai (51.6 and 52.5 
respectively) than in the smaller emirates such as Umm al-Qawain and Fujairah 
(32.7 and 30.4 respectively). Secondly, the increased number of EC members 
significantly differed if we compare across the seven emirates: While in Abu 
Dhabi members increased 26.3 times and in Dubai 24.3 times, Ajman and Umm 
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al-Qawain members increased 8 and 7.2 times respectively. These figures 
could represent the interest of ruling elites in extending the vote in those 
emirates in which the potential political opposition would represent a serious 
challenge to the country’s stability. However, this variation could also reflect 
their decision to not franchise more people in the poorer emirates, with allegedly 
more opposition.  
Table 17: Electoral Colleges FNC 2011 elections
243
 
Emirate Gender              Number            Percentage 
Abu Dhabi 
Males 22,952 48.4 
Females 24,492 51.6 
Total 47,444 100 
Dubai 
Males 19,713 52.5 
Females 17,801 47.5 
Total 37,514 100 
Sharjah 
Males 7,237 51.9 
Females 6,700 48.1 
Total 13,937 100 
Ajman 
Males 2,391 61 
Females 1,529 39 
Total 3,920 100 
UAQ 
Males 2,212 67.3 
Females 1,073 32.7 
Total 3,285 100 
RAK 
Males 10,378 61.6 
Females 6,472 38.4 
Total 16,850 100 
Fujairah 
Males 4,400 69.6 
Females 1,924 30.4 
Total 6,324 100 
UAE 
Males 69,283 53.6 
Females 59,991 46.4 
Total 129,274 100 
 
In order to assess participation we have to bear in mind that, as stated above, 
the participation rate nationwide was very low (27.7%), a very pronounced 
decrease compared to the 2006 FNC elections (75%). The highest turnout was 
in Umm al-Qawain (54.7%), the smallest emirate in the UAE and the only one 
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where a woman was elected. The lowest turnout was in Abu Dhabi (21.3%), the 
most powerful and richest emirate in the UAE. Only 11,719 women out of 
59,991 voted, a 19.5% turnout of the selected voters, representing 31% of the 
total final voters. The male turnout was 35% of selected voters (24,260 out of 
69,283), which represented 69% of the total voters. This imbalance might reflect 
an increased lack of interest among female voters as well as any obstacles for 
participating these might face in the more conservative families. 
 
Table 18: Voter turnout FNC 2011 elections244 
Emirate Voters Turnout Men % Women % 
Abu Dhabi 10,155 21.3% 6,617 65% 3,538 35% 
Dubai 9,276 24.7% 5,973 64% 3,303 36% 
Sharjah 5,904 42.2% 3,872 66% 2,032 34% 
RAK 5,109 30.2% 3,778 74% 1,331 26% 
Ajman 1,563 39.8% 1,140 73% 423 27% 
Fujairah 2,176 34.3% 1,699 78% 477 22% 
UAQ 1,796 54.7% 1,181 66% 615 34% 
Total 
/Average 
35,979 27.75% 24,260 69% 11,719 31% 
 
As in the 2006 elections, the Electoral College system limited the possibility of 
any real competition in 2011, since candidates still needed to be part of the 
selected EC members in order to apply. In spite of the participation 
effervescence coming from the Arab Spring and the increase in EC members, 
figures of candidates practically remained the same as in 2006. A total of 469 
candidates (compared to 456 in 2006), including 85 women, contested the 
elections. 
Although Emirati authorities made a big effort in guaranteeing the transparency 
of the process, some dozens of complaints related to technical problems on the 
electronic voting system could have hampered the whole process. Not only 
were there inconveniences in checking the validity of the desired vote by 
touching a screen without a printed prove and some problems related to the 
identification of voters, but also doubts were raised  with regards to recounting 
electronic votes. This last issue provoked that some candidates appealed the 
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results (Zaccara, 2013: 86). However, the National Election Committee (NEC) 
headed by Anwar Gargash, rejected any formal complaint, reassured that the 
“electronic voting system ensures transparency and credibility” of the Emirati 
elections, and confirmed the results (UAENEC, 2011, September 25). 
Table 19: Candidates for FNC 2011 elections
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Emirate Candidates 
Female 
Candidates 
Abu Dhabi 117 22 
Dubai 124 26 
Sharjah 94 16 
RAK 60 9 
Ajman 34 5 
UAQ 19 4 
Fujairah 21 3 
Total 469 85 
 
The number of polling stations246 in the country was raised to 13, which is still 
considered a very reduced number keeping in mind the extension of the country 
(Zaccara 2013: 84). Only three polling stations were located in the emirate of 
Abu Dhabi, two in Dubai, and the remaining eight distributed among the 
remaining five emirates. Voting stations were open from 8am to 7pm, one more 
hour than planned due to technical problems experimented in some polling 
stations. The elections were held in the presence of local media representatives 
with no foreign media covering the event. Moreover, there were neither 
international nor national mechanisms of electoral monitoring, like in the 2006 
elections, although candidates and some of their representatives were allowed 
to directly observe the whole process. As in 2006, the fact that the electorate is 
not made up by all citizens in age of voting makes it impossible for the 
candidates to represent the real Emirati political spectrum. Some candidates 
participated in TV programs to discuss their proposals, and representatives of 
the MFNCA held university lectures and talks around the country. Interestingly, 
at one of these lectures at the UAEU, students inquired the speaker about the 
impossibility imposed on the majority of Emiratis to exercise the right to vote, 
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and pointed out this was contrary to the constitution. Similarly, in another talk, 
professors and candidates attending the event raised their voices to articulate 
the several pitfalls they found in the gradual implementation of representation 
mechanisms and share them with the audience (al-Mazrouie,247 2011, May 22; 
and Gargash,248 2011, May 29).  
The existing debate focused around the need to extend the FNC powers, as 
well as the disenchantment with regards to the limitation of franchise for only a 
part of the citizens. However, the fact that since April 2011 the government had 
been detaining several intellectuals and activists who had published their 
opinions against the way in which the electoral process was to be held –among 
them Ahmed Mansoor, one of the founders on UAEhewar online discussion 
forum who had called for a boycott of the elections in February249–, prevented 
many critics from openly expressing their thoughts before, during or after the 
campaign. Moreover, although candidates’ photographs were visible on streets, 
many people did not know why they were there, 250  thus showing that the 
information available and the possibility of debate were limited. 
Furthermore, openness of the process can only be said to have been very 
limited, since the selection of voters and nomination of candidates allowed no 
possibility of surprise or unexpected results. A complaint was presented over 
the possible alliances or arrangements that could have taken place in Abu 
Dhabi, where three candidates from the ‘Awamir (sing. al-‘Amiri) tribe were 
elected. This family belongs to one of the most powerful families in al-‘Ain, and 
holds good relations with the Al Nahyan ruling family of Abu Dhabi. According to 
electoral instructions, political parties are forbidden, as well as electoral lists and 
tribal and primary elections. Thus, the complaint in this case was supported by 
the idea that these ‘familiar arrangements’ were a kind of ‘party’ or ‘list’ 
forbidden by law. Hence it affected the openness of elections but, nevertheless, 
the complaint was rejected. Moreover, none of the incumbents was re-elected, 
although comparing their surnames it is possible to say that there are some 
family trends in the electoral results of 2006 and 2011. As it happened in the 
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2006 elections, only one woman obtained a seat trough electoral competition: 
Sheikha Eisa Ghanem, from Umm al-Qawain. 
 
Table 20: Elections 2011 results
251
 
 
 
Considering the powers granted to FNC by the constitution of 1996 (and 2009 
amendment), it is clear that the overall significance of elections does not reside 
on the capacity that new elected members will have to change policies or the 
political system. The fairness of the electoral processes is unclear in three 
ways: first, because of the obscure mechanism of selection of voters and 
candidates; second, because of the inefficient notification of their enfranchised 
status to voters; and third, because of the suspicion over voting procedures and 
vote counting, mainly during the second elections. 
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Emirate Winning candidates 
Votes 
obtained 
Abu Dhabi 
Salim Mohammed al-Amiri 2,815 
Mohammed Moslam al-Amiri 2,380 
Mohammed Buti al-Qubaisi 1,199 
Ahmed Mohd al-Amiri 1,153 
Dubai 
Hamad Sultan al Rohomi 1,327 
Marwan bin Ghalita 1,195 
Ahmad Abed Malik Ahli 1,164 
Rashad Bukhash 1,077 
Sharjah 
Ahmed Mohammed Ali 
Huweidan 
805 
Ahmed Mohammed Rashid al-
Jarwan 
766 
Misbah Saeed Ali Harb Al Katbi 652 
RAK 
Ahmad Abdullah al-Amash 1,449 
Saed al Khatri 957 
Faisal Abdullah al-Teniji 717 
Ajman 
Sultan al Shamsi 296 
Abdullah Hamad Rashed al-
Shamsi 
287 
Fujairah 
Gharib al-Saridi 436 
Sultan al-Samahi 396 
UAQ 
Sheikha Eisa Ghanem 536 
Obaid Hassan Rakad 332 
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Participation was very low in both electoral processes due to a combination of 
lack of interest and awareness among a sector of the Emirati population that 
was invited to participate, and of disenchantment of others with the process 
itself. In this regard, one must remember that the Electoral College only 
represented 2.2% and 28% of the potential electorate in 2006 and 2011 
respectively, and that some of the more politically aware sectors of society were 
probably not invited to participate. In particular, the 2011 turnout was very bad 
news to the ‘legitimating appeal’ of the UAE rulers, who did not expect such low 
participation 252  and even hired experts to gauge Emirati perceptions of the 
election process.253  
Finally, given that the powers of the FNC were not to be extended during the 
new ‘legislative’ term, the democratic ethos of the electoral process was further 
doomed; it remained as a mere experiment to test citizens’ stand towards 
reform, as well as a strategy of authorities to respond to growing internal and 
external pressures. However, these elections were significant for having been 
the first change introduced in UAE political structures since its establishment in 
1971, as well as for having surfaced UAE socio-political dynamics and, maybe 
unintentionally, encouraged people to discuss politics more openly. The latter, 
as the next section explains, might have played against the interests of the 
ruling elite.  
4. The post-Arab Spring landscape 
The calls for and late announcement of the 2011 elections were taking place 
just as the Arab Spring sparked. This might have influenced the leadership’s 
final decision to actually hold elections and to enlarge the Electoral College, 
while at the same time keeping a firm grip on the process. This would be done 
by not opening the polls to all adults in age of voting,254 nor further enhancing 
the powers of the FNC. In fact, as popular uprisings began to take place in 
several Arab countries, including Bahrain, since the end of 2010 –and smaller 
protests in Oman, Kuwait and KSA-, Gulf rulers became nervous and 
surveillance of pro-reform, especially Islamist, sectors of society became of 
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utmost importance. Resembling other Gulf states,255 the UAE adopted some 
measures which, although interpreted by some as “simply business as usual, 
not a pre-emptive response to a potential Arab Spring contagion” 
(Forstenlechner et al., 2012: 55), are regarded by others as a redistributive 
measure to appease potential revolt (and even as an insult by some more 
opinionated Emiratis).256 The measures included a visit of Sheikh Mohammed 
bin Zayed, crown prince of Abu Dhabi, to the poorer northern emirates 
(February 2011), the subsequent announcement that more than $1.5 billion 
would be invested in utilities infrastructure in those emirates (March 2011) (Kerr, 
2011, March 2), the creation of jobs for more than 6,000 unemployed UAE 
citizens (June 2011) (WAM, 2011, June 18), the fixing of prices of 400 major 
commodities until the end of 2011 (May 2011) (WAM, 2011, May 27), an 
increase of salaries of federal government employees by 35 to 100 per cent, 
and the setting up of a $2.7 billion fund to help pay debts of some low-income 
citizens (December 2011) (WAM, 2011, November 30). 
As in 2006, opinions were divided with regard to the fact that only a small 
percentage of citizens had been invited to participate in the electoral process 
(28% in this occasion). Najla al-Awadi, one of the youngest FNC members 
appointed in 2006 considered that “if the leadership decided to move at a 
slower gradual pace, then there were good reasons for it” and thought “each 
country has to move at its own pace” (al-Huneidi, 2011, February 17). 
Contrarily, a former FNC member from Dubai stated that they were “with the 
leadership in moving gradually, but we should take steps forward, [and added] 
How many years is it going to be before everyone can vote? It must be open for 
everyone” (Shaheen, 2011, March 8). Ebtisam al-Ketbi was less concerned 
about the number of people participating in the process than about the fact that 
the FNC remained “an advisory unit for the Government, rather than a 
legislative one” (al-Huneidi, 2011, February 17); while Abdulkhaleq Abdulla 
thought “the glass [was] half-full from the perspective that there [was] an 
increase in the number of people that are eligible to vote, [but that it was]  half-
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empty in that there [was] absolutely no reason why the government [did not] 
allow everybody to vote; [and considered that] the really big issue [was] not the 
voting, [but] the power of the FNC” (Hall, 2011, August 24). Moreover, in an 
interview during the Al-Jazeera Forum, Abdulla warned that because “the Gulf 
is geographically and culturally part of the Arab world…and the winds of change 
[had] already taken root in the Gulf…[they] should not be dismissive of 
anything, [and he thought there was] plenty of room for political reform, [and 
that although] people [were] not calling to put down the regimes…, everybody 
would support a banner for political reform in the Gulf” (Abdulkhaleq Abdalla, in 
Aljazeeraforum, 2011, March 12). 
In agreement with the need to implement reform faster, a group of liberal and 
Islamist nationals put together a petition asking the president to reconsider his 
decision, grant legislative powers to the FNC and franchise all citizens. The text, 
later known as the 3rd of March petition,257 was signed by 133 Emiratis, and 
included former members of the FNC, former government officials, university 
professors, writers, lawyers, human rights activists, and members of UAE’s 
limited civil society. Among them the entire political spectrum was represented, 
although there was an undetermined but significant number of Islamists. 
However, it was the aforementioned liberal Ahmad Mansoor, who had also 
been calling for a boycott of the elections for considering the announced 
procedures unconstitutional, who wrote a first draft and who was its custodian 
during the process of gathering signatures. Other people from different political 
tendencies and emirates also participated in its writing or revision, as Mansoor 
considered it was important to have all groups’ opinions represented.258 One 
year earlier, he had tried to bring liberals and Islamists together in a meeting to 
discuss issues of national interest and common concern, such as the lack of 
freedom of expression or association, but the group failed after liberals withdrew 
due to disagreement on many aspects.259 As in other Arab countries, the two 
tendencies have tried to unite forces, but ideological clashes are frequent and 
the liberals’ fear that Islamists will eventually betray them is high.260 
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Nonetheless, when the petition was put forward, and since the text appealed to 
issues of common interest, people from all sides decided to sign. Among the 
signatories were: Liberal Ebtisam el-Ketbi, who did not sign until the last 
minute;261 Abdullah Ali al-Sharhan, businessman and former appointed FNC 
member from Ras al-Khaimah with nationalist views, who was allegedly 
involved in the previous 1979 petition; Abdullah bin Loquies al-Shehhi, a 
nationalist, head of the Shuhuh Culture and Heritage Association; Abdulhamid 
Ali al-Kumaiti, lawyer and human rights activist closer to liberal views; Dr. 
Mohamed al-Roken, lawyer, former UAEU professor, and last elected head of 
the Jurists Association with Islamist views but not directly linked to al-Islah; 
Muhammad al-Mansouri, lawyer, former head of the Jurists Association, 
administrator of the EMACS website,262 and member of al-Islah; Dr. Abdulla 
Muhammad Rahma al-Shamsi,  Islamist, Vice-Chancellor of the British 
University in Dubai; and Mohammed Saqer al-Za’abi, a judge with Islamist 
views, who was very active online.  
In a somehow uncommon practice, the petition was sent by postal mail to the 
Presidential Office rather than handed in personally by a representative of the 
group. This was taken as discourteous by authorities and used as an argument 
to publicly undermine the image of petitioners.263 Moreover, the petition was 
sent to local, regional and international press, as well as to international HHRRs 
organisations, and some of the signatories appeared in TV satellite and online 
channels speaking about it. Consequently, it rapidly became a trending topic 
among local and Gulf social media communities, which emboldened the 
leadership even. Popular division of opinions regarding the petition among the 
national population is reflected in the comments of anonymous people on an 
entry of Ahmed Mansoor’s blog: 
Amal: “The Federal National Council is of utter importance to the 
country. And I trust our leadership would not appoint a person 
unworthy of such responsibility. A lot of people are driven by ulterior 
motives, whether its fame or money- I don’t trust the entire population 
of the UAE to make the right choice if given the opportunity to vote. If 
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the FNC makes a mistake, it takes decades to fix that mistake. And 
we don’t want any in this country. Mostly everyone thinks they’ll make 
a great job as a FNC member, myself included. But we need to ride 
the ladder one step at a time. We cannot jump the gun and go for 
complete democracy, that’s a jungle. Democracy leads to social 
segregation and ultimately civil war. I hope the people who signed the 
petition think wisely before they did and have more trust in your 
leaders.” 
Aljameye: “Exactly for the same reason that you mention FNC is of 
‘utter importance to the country’ then be assured that the best way to 
ensure its effectiveness and transparency is through democratic 
election by participation of all the citizens. I wonder what makes you 
think one person is better able to elect a number of people than the 
whole population. Your logic is flawed as contrary to what you claim 
and propose has proved to work in majority of the countries of the 
world, from rich Scandinavian countries to so called resource-
constrained countries such as Bangladesh. By the way do you think 
till now FNC has not made any mistake? Then you are completely out 
of touch with reality!” 264 
Further challenging the leadership’s decision, four associations –Jurists, 
Teachers, UAEU professors and al-Shuhuh for National Heritage– launched 
another petition in April 2011, which called for universal franchise. The 
authorities’ reaction was revealing of their determination to put down any further 
political activism: associations were accused of having violated section 16 of the 
UAE’s 2008 Law on Associations, which prohibits associations and their 
members from interfering “in politics or in matters that impair state security and 
its ruling regime” (HRW, 2012, January); and their elected boards were 
disbanded and replaced.  
Simultaneously, some of the most outspoken pro-reform Emiratis criticised the 
handouts that were being distributed by the rentier oligarchy through different 
means. For instance, Ahmed Mansoor made a comment on US TV al-Hurra in 
which he referred to the recent investments and benefits announced as 
“economic or social bribes.”265 Similarly, Dr Nasser bin Ghaith, a lecturer of 
economics at Abu Dhabi Sorbonne University (and one of the first post-Arab 
spring detainees) who holds Islamist ideas but is not a member of al-Islah, was 
quoted as having said: 
                                                            
264
 Anonymous comments on Ahmed Mansoor’s blog (2011, March 9). 
265
 Personal interview with Ahmed Mansoor, Dubai, UAE (March 2012). 
182 
 
“They have announced 'benefits and handouts' assuming their 
citizens are not like other Arabs or other human beings, who see 
freedom as a need no less significant than other physical needs.  So 
they use the carrot, offering abundance. But this only delays change 
and reform, which will still come sooner or later...  No amount of 
security - or rather intimidation by security forces - or wealth, 
handouts, or foreign support is capable of ensuring the stability of an 
unjust ruler” (Davidson, 2011, April 11). 
There was never a formal response whatsoever to any of the petitions, which 
were portrayed by the government as illegitimate claims coming exclusively 
from the Islamists.266 As the debate became more vivid on the Internet, and 
people from different political tendencies were commenting on the issue, 
authorities initiated a series of investigations to track some of the more 
politically active people and soon started calling them for interrogation or 
detaining them. First, it was Ahmed Mansoor,267 who had rejected an offer to 
take a job abroad from his boss at one of the state-backed telecommunications 
company, and was subsequently arrested on 11th of April 2011 by State 
Security Apparatus (SSA) officers –some of which were reportedly un-
uniformed and non-Emiratis– without being informed of the charges against 
him. His house was searched, his passport, computer and other electronic 
material seized; he was taken to an unknown location, and later held in al-
Wathba prison in Abu Dhabi. 268  The same happened shortly after to 
abovementioned Nasser Bin Ghaith and other people who were expressing 
their frustration online. Among them: Fahad Salim Dalk Al-Shehhi, liberal, close 
to secular views; Hassan Ali Al-Khamis, a moderate, neither Islamist nor liberal; 
and Ahmed Abdulkhaleq al-Balushi, a bidun blogger with religious views, but 
not from al-Islah, who was active in speaking for the rights of the bidun.269 
Importantly, among these detainees, only Mansoor had been involved in writing 
the 3rd of March petition and had signed it, and none of them had been involved 
in the associations’ petition, hence pointing to an initial targeting of people 
closer to liberal views and not belonging to civil society organisations.  
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Ahmed Mansoor’s discourse, as a supporter of human rights and political 
reform, had gained popularity among the young educated middle class during 
previous years and, coupled with his links to international human rights 
organisations (he was, and still is, a member of Human Rights Watch advisory 
board), a global campaign was carried out that called for the liberation of the 
group, which became to be known as the ‘UAE5’. Other people who had been 
active, and had signed the petition or were supporting the cause of the five 
detainees were summoned by the SSA for interrogation and warned not to 
continue with their activism. Interestingly, the treatment of women involved was 
quite different to that of men and, instead of putting them in jail, their families 
were informed of the situation and made responsible for their behaviour. This 
was the case of several UAEU students, who had been actively participating on 
the UAEHewar forum, and of its co-founder Rowda al-Balushi (or her literary 
pseudonym Rowda Hamed), who had been actively supporting the five 
detained activists on Twitter and joined them on the hunger strike they 
underwent (Kareem, 2011, November 19).   
Nevertheless, liberals’ support for the five students and for Rowda winded down 
due to the warnings many of them received from the SSA, and an ever-growing 
clash between Islamists, who defended the detainees and their alleged good-
willing,270 and the ‘ultra-nationalists’, that started a smear campaign against 
reform advocates, especially against the figure of Ahmed Mansoor. The 
campaign was intended at damaging their image by portraying them as traitors 
to the nation, as foreign agents or ‘ameel,’ by alluding to their ethnic 
background, and by associating them with al-Islah. In this regard, while there is 
no available evidence to prove the government’s involvement in hiring people to 
spread propaganda, “a large number of anonymous Twitter users appear 
dedicated to harass and intimidate political dissidents and their families online” 
(Freedom House, n.d.). The following tweets are an example of that type of 
messages:  
 
Rozez_r_rEd: “Rowda Hamed is Iranian not Emirati. She has nothing 
to do with the UAE.” 
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AliAlisaeed5: “You Muslim Brotherhood groups want to play on us. I 
spit on you. You are calling on people to stand against the state with 
this Iranian woman. The truth will come out as usual.”271 
 
After eight months in prison, where the UAE5 were reportedly subject to solitary 
confinement and different types of physical and psychological torture (HRW, 
2012, January; and Amnesty International, 2004, June), Mansoor was 
sentenced to three years and the other four to two years of prison for “breaking 
laws and perpetrating acts that pose a threat to state security, undermining the 
public order, opposing the government system, and insulting the President”272 
through their social media accounts, their blogs or other websites and forums, 
including the aforementioned UAEHewar website. Mansoor was additionally 
charged with inciting others to break the law by calling for an election boycott 
and for demonstrations (al-Jazeera, 2011, November 28) and, contrary to what 
many think, neither the petition nor his bribery allegations were part of the 
prosecution.273 In what some considered a magnanimous act, and others a 
legitimating strategy that acknowledged the disagreement of many citizens with 
these detentions, the president issued a decree pardoning all five the following 
day, which coincided with the 40th Anniversary of the establishment of the 
Federation. The charges against them, however, were not withdrawn and their 
passports not returned, thus making it complicated for them to find jobs and 
limiting their freedom of movement.274 They all continued being active on social 
networks following their release, but the pressure they and their families have 
been put through since has forced them to smoothen their voices. Moreover, 
Ahmed Abdulkhaleq was stripped of his residency papers, given a passport 
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from the Comoro Islands,275 and deported to Thailand. He was later granted 
political asylum by Canada where he is currently living.276 
In order to show domestically and internationally that the UAE leadership’s 
legitimacy rested on solid popular support, authorities resorted to the tribal 
aristocracy, and hordes of members of some of the largest tribes, including al-
Dhawahir, al-Shawamis, al-Za’ab, al-Ka’ab, or al-Balushi, publicly declared their 
loyalty to the Sheikhs and compiled allegiance documents which were signed 
by thousands of people. Some of the senior members of these tribes said 
(Hoath, 2011, May 16):  
“All the tribes have expressed their loyalty to the leaders and the 
government – like they have always done. The hosting of these 
meetings or majlis is a common tradition of the country where tribes 
get together from time to time and assure their full support for their 
rulers and leaders. It is an ancient trend of hosting such meetings.” 
“We have full trust in our leadership and the decision they make for 
the interest of the people of their country. We stand united for the 
country. We continue hosting and holding these gatherings to 
express our solidarity for the interest of national unity and prosperity.” 
“All these people are here to sign a document reiterating their full 
support to their leadership, government, the country and for the 
national unity. This is our tradition to express our loyalty to our rulers 
and country, both in good and bad times. It is a spontaneous pledge.” 
Unlike the opinions of liberal and Islamist pro-reform activists, the national 
media extensiely covered these allegiance pledges, which encouraged other 
tribes and members of the national bourgeoisie to follow. However, reactions 
among the educated middle class were still diverse: some supported the 
signatories; some agreed with the content but not with the manner in which it 
had been handed in and publicised; others were against the petition as a whole. 
For instance, a UAEU student argued: “They only want to create instability; they 
want to take the power from the Sheikhs…Why? We have everything we need!” 
Another one, however, said: “I agree with the petition, but we cannot yet have 
open free elections because the Islamist will win;” and another one thought that 
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“although political reform is necessary, maybe it is not the best moment to call 
for it, especially in the way they have done it.” A third student expressed her 
uncertainty with regards to Ahmed Mansoor who she had been following 
through the Internet, and agreed with the need to reform the political system, 
but was no longer sure of his intentions: “I don’t know what to think about him 
anymore.”277 
The SSA then launched a State Security campaign mainly against Islamists with 
links to al-Islah, and detentions started to take place. First a group of seven 
Islamist critics, some of whom had signed the 3rd of March petition, were 
detained and stripped of nationality. The group, which became known as the 
‘UAE7,’ 278  claimed they were “unjustly targeted for their political views” 
(Davidson, 2012, September 18). However, an unnamed source at the General 
Administration for Naturalisation, Residency, and Ports Affairs was quoted as 
having said that they were targeted for threatening “the national security of the 
UAE through their connection with suspicious regional and international 
organisations and personalities” (al-Jazeera, 2011, December 22). The seven, 
who had been granted citizenship once the federation was already established, 
reflected the vulnerability of the status of naturalised people within the UAE 
social system. Consequently, citizenship was utilised as another resource of 
power of the rentier oligarchy and a message was sent to other potential 
activists that they risked their passports (and their families) in this battle. In this 
regard, nationals that could not believe the authorities would go as far as 
removing their citizenship received the case with surprise. For instance, a 
UAEU student expressed her concern as follows:  
“I never feel safe because of their presence [the SSA], they are the 
ruin of the state, it is not safe. I hope that the nationality will be 
restored to the citizens of the 7 Emiratis [the UAE7] as I see a lot of 
mistakes in this decision. The Emirates were not like this during the 
great era of Zayed. We did not expect this from the UAE rulers and 
their highnesses. There is a lot of injustice in our state, but no one 
can speak about it because they fear the so-called ‘state security’.  
We do not want to prejudice the security of our nation, but in reality it 
would be better to call to court every undisciplined minister, dictator 
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and thief of the state, and to establish strict laws for all ministers of 
discipline.”279 
Regardless of these views, and in reaction to the growing online activism of 
Emirati Islamists, and non-Islamists like Ahmed Mansoor that claimed for the 
respect of HHRRs in their cases, who supported the UAE7, indiscriminate 
detentions escalated. Al-Islah association’s board was dismantled and some of 
its former members established a parallel non-registered organisation under the 
name of Da‘wat al-Islah (or Call of reform, in the Islamic sense of plea to God), 
which was arguably the main target of authorities.280 By the summer of 2012 the 
SSA had arrested more than 60 people over charges of founding, organising, 
and administering an organisation aimed at overthrowing the government. 
Eventually, the number of people detained reached 94, hence becoming known 
as the UAE94 case. Many of the detainees were members of very well-known 
Emirati families and some thought this would make the case “a landmark in the 
UAE [and a] hard case” (Ghobash, 2013, March 18). However, according to 
FNC members, nobody “really knew what was really going on,” but that they 
had been briefed on the issue, and understood that the government had “made 
many efforts to engage prominent members of al-Islah in the community” before 
resorting to the crackdown.281 
Da‘wat al-Islah’s (Da‘wat from now on) position towards detentions was 
however very different: They alleged the people arrested were human rights 
defenders and civil liberties activists who had no intention to topple the rulers 
and did not have an armed wing (Bayoumy, 2013, July 2). These claims were 
heard by the International HHRRs organisations that published several reports 
on the case, but which anyway focused on the human rights violations 
perpetrated during the arrests, detentions, and trial, rather than on the political 
tendencies of the activists. Nonetheless, some Emiratis raised their voices to 
explain to the world that the UAE94 were not human rights defenders but 
members of an extremist organisation,282 being one of the most solid comments 
that of Sultan al-Qassemi who asked the international community to properly 
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refer to them as “right-wing, exclusionary political movements [and explained he 
had been] following their rhetoric —in Arabic—…on social media with great 
concern [and] found it to be xenophobic; anti-Semitic; sectarian; exclusionary; 
racist toward Asians, Africans and other Arabs and overall repugnant, [which 
could hardly be considered] the language of ‘human rights defenders’” (al-
Qassemi, 2012, October 25).  
However, he exclusively provided a selection of tweets by Hassan al-Diqqi, one 
of the hardliners of Dawat who had announced the establishment of an 
organization called the Islamic Umma Party (Hizb al-Umma al-Islami) during the 
summer of 2012, without elaborating on more moderated discourses of other 
Emirati Islamists who were also detained, such as Mohammed al-Roken. 
Moreover, although nobody can really be certain about the intentions of al-Islah 
or Dawat members, there is enough evidence that proves that, as in the UAE5 
and UAE7 cases, detainees were held for long periods of time incommunicado 
and in unknown locations where they were allegedly tortured, and held in 
dubious conditions; and only local observers and press were allowed access to 
the trial.283 Thus, even if al-Islah had really become a violent group, the opacity 
in which the case has been handled, in addition to the fact that detentions of 
family members and sympathisers of the UAE94, and harassment of the 
pardoned UAE5, are still taking place almost on a daily basis,284 logically rests 
credibility to the official account.  
Many sympathizers and family members of the detainees continued to express 
their support primordially through social media. This caused many of them to be 
threatened, harassed, and ultimately detained. Moreover, the government 
decided to issue Decree Law 5/2012 on cybercrimes on 12th November, which 
replaced an earlier decree from 2006. This decree “criminalizes a wide range of 
online activity commonly accepted within international norms” and “contains 
punishments for offending the state, its rulers, and its symbols, or for insulting 
Islam and other religions” (ex. calls to change the ruling system are punishable 
by life imprisonment) (Freedom House, 2013). Several people have already 
been detained and convicted under these allegations, thus affecting the 
                                                            
283
 See Amnesty International (2004, June), HRW (2012, January) and Robertson, Irvine, 
Oborne & Naik (2013, April 24: 28). 
284
 Email correspondence with Emirati Human Rights activist Ahmed Mansoor. 
189 
 
provision of freedom of expression significantly. Accordingly, people have 
reduced their online appearances. 
Finally, the UAE94 trial took place in March 2013 only under the scrutiny of local 
media and a few family members, since international trial observers and 
international media representatives were denied entry to the trial. The primary 
charge against the 94 defendants was founding and administrating an institution 
aimed at overthrowing the government, as per Article (182/1) of the Federal 
Penal Code (No. 3) for the year 1987 and its amendments: “Shall be sentenced 
to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years, whoever exploits religion to 
propagate verbally, by writing or by any other means, ideas that may give rise to 
commotion or prejudice national unity or social peace” (Federal Law No (3) of 
1987 on Issuance of the Penal Code, 2013, April 3). However, according to the 
Emirates Centre for Human Rights (ECHR), a London based organisation, the 
prosecution case was based on the confession of one of the detainees, Ahmed 
bin Ghaith al‐ Suwaidi, which apparently was given under torture, hence resting 
legitimacy to the accusations. In court, al‐ Suwaidi denied all charges against 
him and stated to the judge: “I am scared. Scared for my life and for my family, 
and I request the court to extend its protection because I am denying all these 
charges.” 285  Among the defendants, 25 were acquitted and 69 received 
sentences of between seven and 15 years in prison. Of the 69 condemned, 
eight were convicted in absentia and 24 of them had signed the initial 3rd of 
March petition. Again, female defendants were treated with more deference, 
some of them being on bail at the time of the trial, and all of them having been 
acquitted.286 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has first presented a historical approach to political activism in the 
UAE, with a focus on the different political ideologies adopted at different times, 
and the responses of ruling elites to the movements. It has then outlined the 
different political standpoints of politicised Emiratis, which might be divided in 
two main groups: supporters of the status quo and supporters of political reform. 
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Among the later, two further divisions have been identified: the Islamist and the 
liberal tendencies.  
The third section goes into the more recent calls for reform that were more 
visible on the press and online social media since the 2000s and the liberalising 
responses given initially by authorities, including the call for elections to select 
half of the members in the consultative Federal National Council. The 2006 and 
2011 electoral processes and socio-political dynamics attached have been 
discussed, before finally covering the more repressive measures adopted by the 
UAE government since domestic calls for reform became more demanding after 
the so-called Arab Spring took root in the region.  
Supporting the hypotheses outlined in chapter 2, this chapter has shown how 
political activism exists in a rentier state like the UAE. I have argued that 
rentierism is not sufficient to appease calls for reform in an increasingly 
educated and globalised society, but rather enhances the flow of ideas and 
therefore the political awareness of citizens in the long term. 
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PART II: UAE POLITICAL CULTURE: THE CASE OF UAEU 
STUDENTS 
More often than not, and in consonance with the ‘gradual’ approach to political 
reform of the Emirati ruling elite, analysts have regarded the political culture in 
the UAE as “parochial and traditional” (Abdulla, 1984: 288) since the 
establishment of the federation. The previous chapters have explained how 
rentier state theory (RST) considers the state to be independent from society as 
long as wealth is distributed among people effectively. Following this 
perspective, most specialists of Gulf studies assume that citizens (and 
residents) of these rentier states are kept politically unaware, and do not 
demand political representation, hence making authoritarian rentier states 
stable. However, the socio-political historical accounts discussed and the 
analysis of the current socio-political landscape of the previous sections 
demonstrate that political activism has existed in the UAE since pre-oil days, 
and that the ruling elites have historically had to resort to a combination of 
mechanisms to contain political opposition. 
Accordingly, this dissertation argues that the study of political culture in rentier 
states is pertinent in order to evaluate to what extent citizens are actually 
supportive of the regimes by which they are ruled, and of the status quo in 
general. As such, and as explained in the theoretical and methodological 
section (see chapter 1), a survey was conducted to measure political attitudes 
in this country. Since it was not possible to run a nation-wide survey that 
covered all UAE social groups, the educated youth was chosen as the target 
population of this research. Through the analysis of quantitative (closed 
questions) and qualitative (open questions) data gathered among non-first year 
undergraduate students at the United Arab Emirates University (UAEU) 
between March and April 2012, the following two chapters discuss the 
cognitive, affective and evaluative orientations of respondents 
(input/subjects/agency) towards the political system, as well as authorities and 
governmental policies (output/objects/structures). The analysis also takes into 
account qualitative data that was obtained through in-depth semi-structured 
interviews and informal conversations. 
As explained above research on political culture on the UAE is very scarce, 
especially analysis of data gathered through surveys and that explore the link 
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between political orientations and government policies or regime types. Except 
for the more specific polls done punctually, such as the Dubai School of 
Government survey on the role of women in the 2006 FNC elections (al-
Dabbagh & Gargani, 2011; referred to in chapter 3), or the government-ordered 
survey on Emiratis’ perceptions of the 2011 election process (results not 
available to the public), 287  the only available ones exploring issues at the 
national level that are of concern for this dissertation are the 2007 survey on 
‘Arab Views of Leadership, Identity, Institutions and Issues of Concern’ by the 
Arab American Institute Foundation (AAI, 2007) and the 2011 Zogby Research 
Services’ one on ‘Political concerns and Government’, which included data from 
previous years (Zogby, 2011). Although some of the data include responses of 
both Emirati nationals and Arab residents, these are an indicator of the general 
attitudes of Emiratis towards the political system. Accordingly, some of the 
results are presented here as an introduction to the analysis of political 
orientations of UAEU students.  
Table 21: Confidence in national institutions (2007)
 288
 
Confidence in… UAE (Emiratis only) 
Religious institutions 
Confidence 47% 
No confidence 41% 
Police 
Confidence 41% 
No confidence 51% 
Press/Media 
Confidence 52% 
No confidence 38% 
Judiciary (courts) 
Confidence 48% 
No confidence 42% 
Parliament 
Confidence 43% 
No confidence 49% 
Armed forces 
Confidence 63% 
No confidence 29% 
 
One of the most interesting questions of the AAI survey was the level of 
confidence in national institutions. Responses highlight that opinion was very 
divided on the level of confidence in all institutions but the press/media and the 
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armed forces were chosen by 50% of respondents (only Emirati nationals). 
However, the only institution obtaining over 50% no confidence responses was 
the police (see table 21).  
Moreover, two questions in the Zogby survey reflect higher trust in the political 
system are especially relevant. First, when asked about satisfaction with the 
pace of change in the government, 88 percent of respondents claimed to be 
satisfied. Second, although responses regarding the importance of national and 
regional issues reflect low concern over democracy and political reform, they 
show growing preoccupation over civil rights (from fifth position in 2009, to 1st in 
2012 and 2011) and over political debate (from the lower position in 2009, to 
second and third in 2010 and 2011, respectively). Finally, the issue of 
corruption was rated as not very important by a majority of respondents, while 
education dropped from the first position in 2009 to the eighth in 2010 and 
2011(see table 22).  
Table 22: Importance of issues (2009-2011)
 289
 
Rank 
UAE (350 Emiratis + 150 Arabs) 
2011 2010 2009 
1 Civil rights Civil rights Education 
2 Israel/Palestine Political debate Israel/Palestine 
3 Political debate Health care Health care 
4 Health care Israel/Palestine Employment 
5 Employment Employment Civil rights 
6 Women’s rights Women’s rights Women’s rights 
7 Democracy Democracy End corruption 
8 Education Education Terrorism 
9 Political reform Political reform Political reform 
10 End corruption End corruption Democracy 
11 Terrorism Terrorism Political debate 
 
An examination of the orientation of UAE elites’ was conducted by Muhammad 
Khalfan in his PhD dissertation (1997). It assessed the practicality of having the 
FNC become an elective body, surveyed the members of the FNC and all 
UAEU professors who had graduated from Western universities. Interestingly, 
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his main conclusion was that a majority of respondents agreed the FNC should 
become elective (see table 23) and be given legislative powers (see table 24).  
Table 23: FNC should be elected
290
 
 Agree Disagree 
Professors 80% 20% 
FNC members 91% 9% 
 
Table 24: FNC should be given more power
291
 
 Agree Disagree 
Professors 88% 12% 
FNC members 80% 20% 
 
Thus, the results of surveys on political orientations in the UAE reflect that, 
despite showing general high support for the system, citizens’ confidence in 
national institutions was far from homogeneous in 2007, that there was a slight 
growth in concern about political issues and civil rights between 2009 and 2011, 
and that members of parliament and intellectual groups’ support for political 
reform was high in 1997. With the aim of adding to the knowledge about 
political culture in the UAE, the following pages analyse the orientations of the 
Emirati educated youth. Despite the shortcomings of this survey, which are 
acknowledged in the methodology section (see chapter 1), and taking into 
account the high rates of enrolment at tertiary education in the UAE and the 
high ratio of young people in the overall population, the responses of the 
sample of university students polled may be considered fairly representative of 
the young generation of Emiratis.  
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CHAPTER 4: POLITICAL INTEREST AND CONCERNS  
Coinciding with most analysts of Gulf political affairs, foreign UAE long-term 
residents often express their view that Emirati nationals are not interested in 
politics and are content with the political status quo. For instance, a European 
employee in her thirties, working for a company related to UAE governmental 
institutions at the time of the 2006 elections, stated that her Emirati colleagues 
and friends did not express any opinion regarding the electoral process; that 
she hardly ever discussed political matters with them; and that she thought they 
were not interested at all in politics. In line with this view, an Arab postgraduate 
student born and raised in the UAE considered that there are some Emiratis 
who follow politics, but that there is also “a big part of the society/students and 
youth whom (…) are not really interested in this.” However, an American 
professor teaching at Zayed University, and who has lived for more than ten 
years in the UAE, observed that some of his students expressed an interest in a 
more representative government, but that the majority opinion seemed to be 
that “things [were] working pretty well”. 292  Similarly, a foreign professor at 
Khalifa University, and long-term resident in Abu Dhabi said, “Why would any 
Emirati want real change? It won’t benefit them… Speaking to students I feel 
they are content with status quo… But maybe who I see is not 
representative…”293 
Emiratis concerned about UAE politics often express the feeling that other 
nationals are not interested in politics. In one exchange with an Emirati political 
science postgraduate student, the desire to see the UAE eventually become a 
democracy was expressed. However, he thought that any change introduced to 
the political system at that time would “bring chaos” and was therefore 
“inapplicable.” In his view, the FNC’s decisions “are not taken seriously and 
public does not understand the real duties of this body,” and the rules regulating 
the elections “serve political elites interests,” thus highlighting the fact that UAE 
society is not interested in and/or does not understand politics. 294  Another 
Emirati graduate thought “the majority of Emiratis don’t care about freedom of 
expression when it comes to political matters. They've delegated this right to the 
government, they don’t even wanna think. And the key characters in royal 
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families in Abu Dhabi and Dubai have charismatic personalities, despite 
everything (Mohamed bin Zayed and Mohamed bin Rashid).” However, this 
student was unable to answer when asked if she thought there were other 
Emiratis, like her, who care about politics but do not speak about it openly.295  
During the fieldwork for this research, it was confirmed that Emiratis (especially 
the youth) are reticent to discuss political issues, and most interviewed were 
initially surprised and suspicious when asked about their opinions or feelings 
regarding the policies carried out by their government, or even when asked 
about the Arab Spring events or other political developments. However, it was 
later discovered that, after understanding the nature of the present research 
project, they developed confidence and openly shared their thoughts and 
beliefs about international, regional, and local events. Yet they were, in general, 
unwilling discuss politics  with other people, in some cases not even friends. 
This already elucidated that the lack of political interest was not as widespread 
in the UAE as it might seem at first, and that these impressions depend very 
much on the environment in which one interacts, and on which type of 
relationship one builds with Emiratis. What then are the reasons for the lack of 
political discussion in the UAE? What is the real level of political interest? And, 
what knowledge do Emiratis have of their political system?  
This chapter analyses the responses to survey and interview questions related 
to UAEU students’ political knowledge and interest (i.e. cognitive orientations), 
and explores the link between these two variables. In order to identify the main 
agents involved in students political socialisation process, it examines the 
perception of respondents regarding the acquisition of political knowledge and 
interest. Finally, the chapter assesses how students rank domestic socio-
political problems in order to evaluate their feelings and experiences in relation 
with those issues.  
 
1. Political interest 
As explained in the methodology section (see chapter 1), the largest number of 
respondents came from the Engineering department, followed by those enrolled 
in Business, and then those studying Political Science and Law. However, when 
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collapsed into colleges, the Humanities and Social Sciences College (Huss) 
was the most represented, followed by the College of Engineering (CoE) and 
the College of Business and Economics (CBE), reflecting the Spring 2012 
UAEU enrolment percentages. This indicates that a larger number of students 
from these colleges participated in the study, but is most likely due to the larger 
numbers of students enrolled in these colleges, not because they were 
necessarily more interested in politics.  
Figure 12: UAEU Students Interest in Politics 
 
Remarkably, 65% of respondents expressed to have interest in politics, which 
(even if we cannot infer from this that this is the case among the whole studied 
population)296  constitutes a noteworthy starting point for the analysis of the 
survey. Moreover, the fact that 414 students answered the survey on the first 
day of its distribution (and a total of 689 responded) is in itself indicative that 
there is more interest in politics among university students than it is generally 
thought.  Initial scrutiny of responses of students showed that political interest is 
actually spread among students of all disciplines and that, in absolute numbers, 
most respondents with an interest in politics were from the HuSS College, 
followed by students of the CoE, and then by those of the CBE. Moreover, in 
most colleges, there was greater number of respondents who expressed 
interest in politics than those who were disinterested.  
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Figure 13: Interest in politics by college (absolute numbers) 
 
However, an analysis of the same data in percentages (after the weighting was 
made) shows a slightly different picture: the largest per cent of students 
interested in politics actually corresponded to the College of Law (CoL), then to 
HuSS and CBE, followed by students of the CoE. Moreover, a chi square test 
showed that the difference between categories is large enough to assume that 
there would be similar results if the whole population were surveyed (p-value of 
.000). 297  Not surprisingly, highest interest rates were concentrated among 
students of humanities and social sciences disciplines, except for those of 
engineering that also fall under the group with more than 50% respondents 
showing interest (see figure 14). 
These results may be explained by the fact that in rentier economies there are 
large proportions of nationals that choose to study engineering in order to 
access jobs in the hydrocarbon industry. Moreover, some studies suggest there 
is a high percentage of political Islam ideologically oriented individuals (i.e. with 
high political interest) who “have no theological training or knowledge” and that 
hold “degrees in engineering, medicine, or law, leading to the sometimes 
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mocking term of ‘engineer Islam’” (Johnson, 2011: 43).298 This is something that 
would, nevertheless, require further examination in the Emirati case, but which 
might explain the high interest among students of engineering.  
Figure 14: Interest in politics by college (percentages) 
 
Figure 15: Interest in politics by degree (percentages) 
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Additionally, a cross tabulation of interest by degree of study299 shows that all 
students of Political Science and Tourism affirmed to be interested in politics, as 
did the majority (over 75%) of respondents enrolled in Media Studies, Law, 
Geography, and Social Work. Over 50% of students of Literature, Business, 
Economics, Engineering, Linguistics, History, and Sociology (in this order) also 
responded that they had interest; whilst less than 50% of participants from 
Biology, IT Sciences, Education, and Mathematics expressed interest (see 
figure 15). 
Differences in political interest among sexes was statistically significant at the 
10% level (.073 p-value) showing that, although over 60% of both groups said 
that they were interested, male students tend to have a slightly higher interest in 
politics than female students. This is perhaps due to the fact that men have 
traditionally occupied the political sphere in the UAE. However, the high 
percentage of interested female students (62.8%) is relevant for the same 
reason, and is indicative of change in the UAE socio-political structures, which 
is increasingly experiencing female involvement and participation (see figure 16 
and table 25). 
Figure 16: Male & Female Students Interest in Politics 
 
Table 25: Male & Female Students Interest in Politics 
 
Male Female Total 
Not interested 27.4% 37.2% 35.2% 
Interested 72.6% 62.8% 64.8% 
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Figure 17: Interest by social class 
  
Interest by social class300 was similar for students considering themselves as 
the middle and working classes (65% and 63% respectively interested), but 
different for the upper class (75% interested). Thus, the upper class seems to 
have more interest than the other classes. However, there were only 16 
respondents who consider themselves as belonging to the upper class, which is 
too few to claim this is indicative of the whole population, and a likely the reason 
that the result of the chi-square test was non-significant. This implies there was 
simply not enough data to establish a significant difference, and it can only be 
claimed that there may be a tendency that the highest class is more interested. 
Other variables, such as income, did not show significant differences (p-value 
0.93), thus not being statistically significant (see figure 17 and table 26). 
Figure 18: Interest by income
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Table 26: Interest by income 
 
Under 50,000/month Over 50,000 
Not interested 35.20% 35.70% 
Interested 64.80% 64.30% 
 
As such, it could be argued that the fact that the higher classes show a slight 
higher interest in politics supports the main hypothesis of this dissertation that 
wealth does not necessarily cause a lack of political awareness, but differences 
are unfortunately too small to make such claim. However, differences between 
respondents of the different emirates shed some light on this matter. Overall, 
political interest is evenly spread among Emirates. In each of them less than 
40% of respondents were not interested in politics, but it was in the northern 
emirates302 where the lowest rates of interest were found. The chi-square test 
run turned to be not significant but, since the responses from Abu Dhabi, Dubai 
and Sharjah were very similar (~30-33% not interested), it was possible to 
collapse them and make a comparison between the Northern emirates and the 
rest of the UAE. The test run after this merge confirmed that interest is slightly 
higher in AD, Dubai and Sharjah. Moreover, this might be due to major 
governmental investment done in education in these emirates, which provides 
more opportunities for political socialisation, in addition to the more 
cosmopolitan nature of these cities, and the international exposure of its 
citizens. This may indicate that other factors, apart from high income per capita 
accrued from oil rent, affect political culture. These are further explored below. 
The p-value of .049 indicates that the difference between the responses of 
students born in the Northern Emirates and the rest of the UAE was large 
enough to infer that this would probably be the case among the population 
studied (see figures 19 and 20). 
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Figure 19: Interest by emirate of origin (percentages) 
 
Figure 20: Interest by emirate of origin (Northern vs. Rest of UAE) 
 
It is also noteworthy that students from Sharjah align with those from Abu Dhabi 
and Dubai, differentiating themselves from the poorer northern emirates. This 
might be explained by the proximity of Sharjah to the Emirate to Dubai, as well 
as by the development of thriving cultural initiatives in this emirate, which gives 
the students the opportunity, and provides them with the spaces, to exchange 
ideas and meet scholars from all around the world.  Finally, it is interesting that, 
contrary to what one would expect if, as the RST argues, the higher the income 
level, the lower the interest in politics (see chapter 1), students from the 
wealthier emirates (i.e. benefiting more from welfare) are the ones more 
politically oriented. This indicates that very possibly other factors influence 
change in political culture in this country (as happens in others), apart from the 
high per capita income of citizens or the lack of a taxation system; hence 
supporting the idea that rentierism can actually facilitate change in the agents 
involved in the process of political socialization.  
0%
25%
50%
75%
100%
Northern
Emirates
Abu Dhabi Sharjah Dubai
Not interested
Interested
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Northern Emirates
Rest of UAE
Interested
Not interested
205 
 
2. Knowledge of politics 
In the UAE, photographs of the rulers are present in every possible setting. 
They are seen upon arrival in the country in the airports, on billboards in the 
streets, at the front desks of hotels, at governmental institutions, public offices, 
and at school and university halls. They also appear repeatedly on local TV 
channels, their agendas are explained in radio news bulletins, and are covered 
by national newspapers. It is therefore difficult not to know who your rulers are if 
you see their images and hear about them several times per day. All efforts are 
made by the government to ensure people know who the ‘fathers of the nation’ 
(as they are dubbed) are, and to portray them as benevolent and 
magnanimous. 
Conversely, there is not much effort placed on teaching how the Emirati or other 
political systems around the world work either at schools or at universities, 
which explains why the knowledge of UAEU students is weaker when it comes 
to institutions. What is taught at public schools in the UAE about politics is 
mainly the official version of the foundation of the federation and the history of 
the Islamic world, and the structure of the political system is only broadly taught. 
Additionally, topics are not explained in comparison to experiences of other 
countries and there is very little discussion on issues. Rather, lecturing is the 
main teaching method and memorising the main learning technique, thus 
leaving little space for the development of critical thinking skills. Special 
emphasis is placed on the role of Sheikh Zayed and Sheikh Rashid as the 
‘fathers’ of the nation, as well as on the importance of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council and the Arab League. Finally, much emphasis is put on the ‘traditional’ 
Emirati customs and traditions, and  the privilege it is to be part of the national 
population and the opportunities given to foreigners. 303  In this regard one 
student expressed her experience at school at follows:  
“Books were always about what good our country did and the royal 
family whether it’s locally or globally! They never gave us the 
tools/methods to explain the political system. It was all about being 
patriotic, learning the traditional culture and how it evolved from 
being tribes to our current time. Having those memories in my head 
made my mind as a kid to be thankful and grateful to have our 
Sheiks and for their great practices in our country. It’s been always 
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praising the good side of them, NEVER the bad side. My personal 
experience was filled of patriotism more for being local, and not 
knowing a thing about politics and what actually happens to non-
locals and some of the poor locals in the country!”304 
Statistical analysis confirms that knowledge about domestic politics is weak 
among Emirati students. As expected, the data reflecting knowledge about 
political authorities showed that most respondents were familiar with the figures 
of the President and the Prime Minister of the Federation (over 98% and 90% of 
both male and female, respectively). However, many were unsure who the Vice-
president was (over 65% of both male and female got it right). Regarding 
ministers, more students were familiar with who was running as Minister of 
Foreign Trade at the moment the survey was conducted (79.5% knew the 
name), than those who the Minister of Education was (86.9% did not know). 
The latter possibly responds to the fact that the Minister of Foreign Trade, 
Sheikha Lubna bint Khalid bin Sultan al-Qasimi, was the first woman to hold a 
ministerial post in the United Arab Emirates (since November 2004), something 
that was extensively broadcasted by local and international media (see table 
27). In this regard, an information technology student said, “female UAE 
nationals entered the government a long time back. Shaikha Lubna al-Qasimi 
(...) has proved to everyone what women are capable of.”305 
Table 27: Knowledge of Authorities (percentages) 
 
President PM VP 
Minister of 
Education 
Minister of 
Foreign Trade 
Incorrect 0.2% 8.3% 32.2% 86.9% 20.5% 
Correct 99.8% 91.7% 67.8% 13.1% 79.5% 
 
Table 28: Knowledge of Institutions & Elections (percentages) 
 
Most Pow. 
Inst. 
FNC Power First Election 
Month of 2011 
elections 
Incorrect 47.8% 55.3% 69.6% 62.6% 
Correct 52.2% 44.7% 30.4% 37.4% 
 
When asked to designate the most powerful institutions, only around 50% of 
students could identify the most powerful, and less than 45% understood the 
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power of FNC. Moreover, they were neither very familiar with the year that the 
first election held in the UAE, nor with the month in which elections were held in 
2011 (see table 28). In this regard, most of the chi-square tests showed that the 
discipline of study variable is not determinant of the general knowledge of 
institutions.  
However, when with regards to the 2011 elections, it is significant at the 5% 
level that over 40% of the students from HuSS, CoL and CoE (in this order) got 
the answer right, while at the other colleges over 60% answered incorrectly (p-
value .015). Thus, HuSS, CoL and CoE coincides with the high rates of political 
interest, while CBE goes down in the list to the sixth position, even below the 
CoE, and the Colleges of Information Technology (IT) and of Sciences (CoS) 
(see figure 21).  This indicates that even if a large percentage of students of 
Business and Economics claim to have political interest, not many are 
knowledgeable about the political developments taking place in their country. 
Also, the fact that Education students are very uninformed about UAE politics 
poses doubts as to how they will be able to teach it to future generations. 
None of the crosstabs run by emirate of origin was statistically significant, which 
indicates there were no important differences between students from the seven 
emirates regarding political knowledge. Thus, it can be claimed that knowledge 
of federal institutions, authorities and the role of citizens is evenly weak across 
students of all emirates. However, a trend was observed that students from 
Sharjah and RAK were slightly more knowledgeable regarding the power and 
role of federal institutions specifically (see tables 29 and 30).  
Interestingly, the data collected indicates that those more familiar with the 
political history of the UAE were from RAK and Dubai. Thus, it seems to be the 
case that students from RAK are slightly more politically aware than students 
from other emirates, both regarding institutions and when it comes to the UAE’s 
political history (first election ever). We have explained in chapter 2 how RAK 
(and Sharjah) has a long history of settled communities that engaged in 
maritime trade for centuries before oil was discovered, and that this came into 
decline, as Dubai and Abu Dhabi became the main cities of the federation. 
Moreover, and hoping to be able to survive as an independent state, RAK only 
joined the federation a year after it was established. Very possibly the political 
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history of RAK is the main reason behind the slightly more profound knowledge 
of federal institutions and trajectory.   
Figure 21: Month of 2011 FNC election 
 
Table 29: Most powerful institution 
 
AD Dubai Sharjah RAK 
Fujairah, 
Ajman & UAQ 
Incorrect 47.4% 50.0% 44.7% 46.3% 48.7% 
Correct 52.6% 50.0% 55.3% 53.7% 51.3% 
 
Table 30: First election in UAE 
 
AD Dubai Sharjah RAK 
Fujairah, 
Ajman & UAQ 
Incorrect 70.9% 64.7% 71.7% 63.0% 75.3% 
Correct 29.1% 35.3% 28.3% 37.0% 24.7% 
 
Figure 22: Name of Prime Minister 
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On the other hand, it was surprising to discover that the lowest rate of correct 
answers to the question asking for the name of the Prime Minister was Dubai 
(89.3%) (Emirate from which the Prime Minister originates). This indicates that 
students from Dubai (and possibly all Emiratis) still identify more with local 
politics, as they surely know Sheikh Muhammad bin Rashid as the Emir of 
Dubai, but are not familiar with his role as Prime Minister or Vice-President. The 
highest rate was again from RAK (97.5%), followed by the other northern 
emirates, thus indicating these respondents were more familiar with the federal 
political structures (see figure 22). 
With regards to sex, it was observed that male students tended to be more 
knowledgeable. 60% of male students knew what the most powerful institution 
of the UAE was; while only 50% of females got it right (p-value of .075). 
Moreover, although not statistically significant, when asked about the powers of 
the FNC, only 51% of male and 43% of female answered correctly (see graphs 
23 and 24). These low rates of correct answers demonstrate that the knowledge 
of the political system is limited among the population studied, but that males 
have a slight better understanding.   
Figure 23: Most powerful institution by sex 
 
Furthermore, awareness of the electoral processes that have taken place in the 
country is even weaker. Approximately 70% of respondents did not know when 
the first FNC election was held in the UAE, and it was interesting to note a 
significant difference between sexes when it came to the 2011 elections: 65% 
of female and 53% of male students did not know in which month they took 
place (p-value of .022), meaning the trend was also evident that men were 
better informed about political developments (see figure 25). These numbers 
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are especially striking bearing in mind that respondents were over 21 years old, 
and therefore could have been nominated to vote. 
Figure 24: First FNC election by sex 
 
Figure 25: Month of 2011 FNC election by sex 
 
Figure 26: First UAE Election by class 
 
The social class of the individual was statistically significant for knowledge of 
institutions and elections at the 10% level- the highest rate of correct answers 
by the self-selected upper class and the lowest among the lower class. Only 
26% and 31% of the general working and middle classes respectively knew the 
year of the first UAE election, compared to 53% of the upper class (p-value 
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.075) (see figure 26); while 29%, 38% and 65% of lower, middle and upper 
classes respectively gave the correct answer for the month of 2011 elections (p-
value .010) (see figure 27). Furthermore, over 75% of the upper class knew the 
most powerful institution compared to 40-50% of the middle and lower classes 
(p-value .058) (see figure 28). 
Figure 27: Month 2011 FNC election 
 
Figure 28: Most powerful Institution by class 
 
These percentages show that the upper class is better informed both regarding 
institutions and political developments, which reflects the failure of the 
government’s claimed political awareness campaigns (see chapter 3), 
especially among the middle and lower classes. In this regard, it is interesting to 
note that among the students interviewed, many did not know they could have 
been entitled to vote; and some who voted only knew about the process by 
chance and did not know what they were voting for. For instance, one student 
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reported she only knew about the elections, and the fact that she could actually 
vote, because her sister saw the list of voters by chance in a newspaper.306 
Likewise, the income variable was relevant for knowledge of recent political 
events (p-value .010), and showed that students from higher income families 
had better knowledge than those from lower income families, again supporting 
the hypothesis that high income does not necessarily cause political apathy 
(see table 31). In fact, these results partially support the main research 
hypothesis of this dissertation that rentierism can actually facilitate political 
socialization and, therefore, enhance political awareness. 
Table 31: Month 2011 FNC election 
 
Household income Under 50,000/month Over 50,000 
Incorrect 65.1% 47.4% 
Correct 34.9% 52.6% 
 
2.1. The link between knowledge and interest 
An analysis of the relationship between interest in politics and knowledge 
shows that those interested tend to know more about UAE politics. Responses 
were quite similar among groups regarding the names of authorities, but there 
were statistically significant differences between those interested and those 
who expressed not to be interested in politics when it came to institutions and 
electoral processes.  
Figure 29: Most powerful Institution by interest 
 
The difference with regards to knowing the most powerful institution was not 
large, but showed that over 50% of students who gave the correct answer also 
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said they have an interest in politics, while among those with no interest, less 
than 50% were right (p-value .051) (see figure 29). 
Figure 30: Month of 2011 FNC election 
 
Differences were more important in the questions about the election days, 
where the differences between both groups were of 9.2 points for the month of 
the 2011 election, and of 26.8 for the year of the first UAE election (p-value for 
both .00) (see figures 30 and 31). This implies that the more knowledge UAEU 
students had, the more interested they were, and vice versa, although we 
cannot precisely determine which one causes the other.  
Figure 31: First UAE election by interest 
 
 
However, if the knowledge of the political system (which is mainly acquired at 
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knowledge of recent political events is more profound among those students 
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investigate…you can find. Most of the things are blocked [in the internet], so 
you have to use proxies… But you can find your way around. We all do!”307 
Which variables affect political interest is yet another question.  
 
3. Factors influencing political awareness 
When asked about the factors determining interest in politics, most students 
considered ‘watching the news through satellite channels’ the most important 
factor among the options provided in the questionnaire. This issue therefore 
deserves special attention. Other factors ranked as important were what they 
learned at school and university, followed by the discussions they had with 
relatives at home, and then the debates with friends (see table 32). Thus, the 
hypothesis that the agents of political socialisation also influence political 
culture in rentier states seems plausible.  In this regard some students’ 
comments are illustrative: 
“Till I took ‘Introduction to Politics’ at University, I never knew a thing 
about politics and how it runs in our country”.308 
 “By conducting this survey I realized that I am far away from lots of 
matters related to the politics of my state, which is something 
unpleasant.”309 
Table 32: Factors determining interest in politics 
Factors determining interest in politics Mean Mode Median 
1) Watching the news through satellite channels like Al-
Jazeera or Al-Arabiya 
1,5102 1 1 
2) What I was taught at school and university 1,7679 2 2 
3) The discussions I have at home with my parents and 
relatives 
1,9043 2 2 
4) The discussions I have with my friends 2,1069 2 2 
5) Being in contact with people from different cultural 
backgrounds 
2,1324 2 2 
6) The foreign movies and series I watch on TV 2,2149 2 2 
7) Awareness seminars organized by the government 
to explain issues regarding UAE politics 
2,2500 2 2 
(1=Very important; 2=Important; 3=Not very important) 
                                                            
307
 Personal interview, Al-Ain (March 2012).  
308
 Facebook communication (31
st
 December 2013). 
309
 Open question 24. 
215 
 
Traditional media (newspapers and television) was identified as influencing 
significantly the political knowledge and interest of the Emirati youth. When 
asked about the frequency with which the students follow the news on TV or 
newspapers, around 50% followed regularly (at least once a week) while the 
other 50% do so only occasionally and only a few recognize that they never 
read newspapers or watch the news on TV (see figure 32). When crossing the 
responses about level of interest in political issues with the frequency of 
following news more than 60% of those with interest in politics said they read 
the newspaper and over 50% watch the news on TV more than once a week; 
while over 60% of students not interested in politics do this only occasionally or 
never. Thus, a p-value of .0 allows us to affirm that following the news 
frequently is a determinant factor influencing the interest in politics of Emirati 
youth.  
Figure 32: Traditional media 
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When questioned about the use of social media, around 70% said that they 
used Twitter and Facebook (FB) at least once a week. Data shows that there is 
a link between Twitter and political interest, but this is not the case with 
Facebook. Unfortunately, this research cannot determine whether this 
correlation works in one direction (Twitter has an effect in the development of 
political interest) or the other (political interest leads people to be more active on 
Twitter). Percentages are very similar between those using Facebook regularly 
and those using it only occasionally and therefore the chi-square test does not 
provide statistical evidence that it affects the interest of students in politics. 
Nonetheless, a p-value of .012 makes the frequent use of Twitter statistically 
significant (at the 5% level), which is enough to claim this would be the case 
among the same percentage of all UAEU students (see figure 33). 
 
Figure 33: Social media 
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Moreover, the most commonly mentioned factor among students in response to 
the open questions about what influenced their political interest was the 
Internet.310 Interviews supported this view as many students expressed how 
they had found a platform for debate on the Internet, and how they learned 
about political issues through Twitter and Facebook, as well as websites they 
learned about through their virtual contacts (see chapter 3 for details on online 
political activism). One of them describes the Internet as: 
“The space where opinions can be expressed freely and 
anonymously; and where men and women can talk, without being 
judged or put in risk of being targeted by authorities if discussing 
sensitive issues”.311  
These feelings were, however, expressed before the new Decree on 
cybercrimes was passed on 12th November 2012 (see chapters 2 and 3). If the 
same question were asked now, respondents would most likely respond that 
they have realised that the Internet is no longer a safe space to speak up, 
although they would possibly still regard it as a valuable source of information. 
Some had actually already become aware of the potential risks of expressing 
opinions online: a student who had been involved in the controversial al-Hewar 
online forum (see chapter 3) had already stopped posting when interviewed, 
after having been warned by the State Security to abandon those activities.312 
 
4. Major socio-political concerns  
Some questions on the survey sought to identify the major social problems that 
concerned the Emirati youth. Of the provided options, students regarded the 
non-national overpopulation as a ‘very important’ problem (over 60%), but the 
issue considered ‘important’ by more students was the outcomes of wasta (over 
90%) (see figure 34). 
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Figure 34: Perceptions on socio-political problems 
 
Another issues which caused concern among the students was unemployment, 
with more than 50% of respondents considering it ‘very important’ and almost 
37% ‘important’, followed by economic disparities between emirates (over 25% 
said it is ‘very important’ and almost 55% ‘important’). Finally, more than 50% of 
respondents considered federal-emirate relations and unequal rights between 
men and women as not very important (see figure 34 and table 33). The gender 
of the respondent was not statistically significant for this question, but emirate of 
origin, social class and income were significant in some cases, as explained 
below. The descriptions of an ideal society by a couple of students summarize 
well the issues concerning the Emirati youth:  
“A society that recognizes the citizen's rights and duties and defines 
the goals of the state and its facilities. A society free of wasta and 
favouritism at the expense of work and the general welfare of the 
country; a society that gives priority to the nationals in all fields, and 
then to the residents and foreign workers; that gives importance 
and value to the citizens, passing laws for guaranteeing their rights 
inside and outside the state. I think the ideal society (…) an 
institutionalized society that does not depend on the tribal 
system.”313 
“A society that conserves customs and traditions with the ability to 
change for the better... That acts in the interest of the nation and 
the community, providing help and assistance to those in need, not 
to the greedy... A society that seeks state security with respect for 
the residents of the national territories... A society that does not rob 
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the resources of the country and is oppressive to the non-
beneficiary class... A society without wasta and racial 
discriminations among citizens and newcomers... Whose first 
concern is the Emirati citizen and not a foreigner who has many 
rights to the land of others... A society where businessmen or great 
politicians do not tyrannize over ordinary citizens.” 314 
Table 33: Perceptions on socio-political problems 
 
Very 
important 
Important 
Not very 
important 
Non-National overpopulation 60.7% 27.6% 11.7% 
Wasta outcomes 51.4% 40.1% 8.6% 
Unemployment 51.4% 36.5% 12.2% 
Emirates econ. disparities 26.4% 54.6% 19.0% 
Federal-Emirate relations 13.9% 28.8% 57.3% 
Men-women rights 9.3% 17.1% 73.6% 
 
4.1. Non-National overpopulation 
It is no surprise that being a minority group in their own country, demographic 
imbalance is a source of concern for Emiratis, as it generates feelings of 
insecurity and uncertainty. This is a topic much discussed among Emiratis who 
express “the fear of being outnumbered by large crowds of people coming to 
live in their country from all around the world, threatening their culture and 
worsening the employment situation”315 (see figure 35). 
Figure 35: Non-National overpopulation 
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especially concerned about this issue : 100% of them considered it important, 
while around 20% of respondents from the lower class said it is not very 
important, followed by around 15% of the middle class not finding it so worrying 
(p-value .052) (see figure 36). This significant , especially taking into account 
that those who self-selected themselves as upper class presumably belong to 
the tribes and business families closer to the rulers, and therefore might see a 
potential threat to their privileges in an expanding foreign population. On the 
other hand, the middle and lower classes were most likely made up of members 
of the less influential tribes, and by citizens that were naturalised at different 
stages of the history of the UAE, hence carrying different cultural backgrounds 
and being slightly more tolerant of non-nationals than the upper class. 
Figure 36: Non-National overpopulation 
 
Many students expressed their concern about non-national overpopulation 
when were questioned about what they would ask the UAE rulers to change 
regarding the current social and political situation of their country. One student 
said that she “would put a limit to the number of new entries, simply due to the 
fact that our state has become similar to a colony because of the exceeding 
number of persons who arrive. This causes unemployment for the children of 
Emirati people.”316 In line with this view, other students affirmed: 
“The increase in the number of foreigners (non-Arab) impacted 
negatively on the country and led to a marked deterioration in many 
sectors (most importantly education, insofar as these strangers 
destroyed the minds of an entire generation, the sons of the nation). 
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The process of attracting such people must be reduced before the 
matter gets worse and uncontrollable later on.”317 
“There must be a control on foreign workers, both in education, 
administration and any other field. Really, there must be a control 
on them because they are plundering the country, they say 
‘goodbye’ (go in safety) but they are wicked. I'm not talking about all 
of them but the majority. There is no control on foreigners; their 
salaries are higher than the nationals' ones, why did we get to this 
situation? Where is control? Where, where? Our state is a united 
Arabic emirate, but I think that nowadays foreigners have 
conquered it. Many of us complain about this but in vain.”318  
Some proposed solutions included “passing strict legislation regarding 
foreigners as to their possibility to enter the state, whether for visiting or 
residence and setting up rigorous procedures for entering, and forbidding 
foreigners from owning land in the UAE by law,”319 or “to pass a law preventing 
the marriage between Emirati men and women not from the Gulf, except with an 
official permission from higher authorities.”320 Others, however, considered that 
there are other solutions to the demographic imbalance: 
“In the future (you know we are having a great number of Indians) 
we should be imagining like one time they will come and ask we 
should be having our rights, and they’re going to ask for citizenship, 
but I think citizenship is a special case, is given for certain people, 
like not for all… I would give citizenship to the one who is born and 
raised in UAE, the one who is familiar to the culture of the UAE, and 
the one who speak Arabic… Everyone who can serve the 
country…”321  
“Facilitating the naturalization process only for those who deserve it, 
in order to increase the demographic structure”, while a female 
student said: “I wish they sought a solution to the problem of the 
demographic structure, that they speeded up the process of 
granting citizenship to the children of female citizens because they 
are considered sons of this country.”322  
Granting citizenship to the children of Emirati women married to foreigners was 
identified as an important societal problem by some students who think these 
“should be given the Emirati nationality because they live in this state and 
contribute to its development” 323  (see chapter 2 for details on citizenship 
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issues). A UAE born student of Emirati mother and Yemeni father expressed 
her frustration:  
“There are a lot of cases of people with no Emirati nationality, so 
this makes a generation who is really angry… Like, my loyalty is to 
the UAE since I was born and raised here, and I want to do good 
things for this country, but I am rejected! So all this good feelings 
change into anger, and you ask yourself why… Why they have us 
defend the country, work in their army and police forces, but then 
they don’t give us the passports?” 324 
In a similar way, another student of Emirati mother and Iranian father expressed 
her suffering of having to carry an Iranian passport even though she has no 
connections with Iran and she feels 100% Emirati:  
“The worst time of my life is when I have to go to the Iranian 
embassy to renew my passport… I’ve got a phobia I want to change 
my passport to any nationality… I hate it… They give me a hard 
time every time I travel… The checking points are horrible… Why 
do I have to hold an Iranian passport if I am by heart Emirati?! I 
think the government is doing their best… But when I look at my 
father, it breaks my heart… Because he worked here for more than 
40 years and they never recognise him… In any country they would 
give him the nationality… He never even had a parking ticket… He 
doesn’t care anymore, but he want’s to make sure we are all ok 
[before he passes away].”325 
4.2. The outcomes of wasta 
Wasta refers to the connections or influence one has in society (see chapter 2). 
It is the conceptualisation of a reality that exists in all societies, but that is very 
much present in the Emirati everyday life. Wasta is often discussed among both 
Emiratis and foreigners. Whether you (and your family/business) have the right 
level of wasta or not determines many things in life, from what school you are 
accepted at, what you study at university, whether or not you get a scholarship, 
to being hired for one job or another, etc. An individual’s (or family’s) position in 
society is determined by wasta. Thus, a ‘greater amount’ of wasta indicates that 
the individual (or family) has closer connections with the sheikh, and therefore is 
better positioned in society Survey data highlights that ‘wasta outcomes’ is 
considered an important problem by a large majority of respondents (91%) (see 
figure 37). 
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Figure 37: Wasta outcomes 
 
By emirate, students from Dubai and RAK were the most concerned about 
wasta, which might reflect that these groups were the most affected, or the fact 
that they have better knowledge of politics (as explained above) makes them 
more aware of the unfairness of this practice. These differences are statistically 
significant at the 5% level (p-value .017) (see figure 38).  
Figure 38: Wasta outcomes by emirate 
 
 
Interestingly, students seeing themselves as upper class that considered wasta 
‘important’ (92.8%), but only 35.7% of this group said it was ‘very important’, 
compared to more than 53.2% and 50% of the middle and lower classes, 
respectively (p-value .052) (see figure 39). This is quite understandable given 
that the people affected by the negative consequences of wasta are the less 
connected, who are usually the less wealthy and those who do not belong to 
the oligarchy or tribal aristocracy.  
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Figure 39: Wasta outcomes by social class 
 
Moreover, although most students agreed that the elimination of corruption and 
wasta should be a priority of reform, it was the upper class that showed the 
largest disagreement (over 10%), being significant at the 10% level (p-value 
.089) (see figure 40). This coincides with the previous question in which less 
upper class students rated wasta as a ‘very important’ issue (figure 39).    
Figure 40: Elimination of corruption and "wasta" as priority of reform 
 
Many students took the opportunity to respond to the open questions and reflect 
on this issue. For instance, when describing their imagined ideal society some 
wished for:  
“An integrated society free of wasta and personal interests, where 
the public interest prevails over the individual's one...[and where 
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there is] equality among all the Emirates because we all live in one 
state.”326  
“A society that does not discriminate between its members by 
means of wasta or anything else... Where ruler and ruled live in the 
same way... Where all are equal, even the head of state... Where, 
similarly, legislation is enacted only after the approval of the 
community members.”327  
However, as explained by a member of the FNC, wasta is such an 
institutionalised practice in Emirati society that it has become a social 
requirement for those holding higher positions. As responses show, one is 
expected to take care of relatives, and it is not well regarded if you can offer 
positions to members of your family/tribe but you do not.328 In this regard, some 
students expressed their discontent with political corruption and nepotism, and 
their desire that rulers changed “the wasta system (nepotism, cronyism) that 
nowadays is everywhere and annihilates all the efforts made by qualified 
citizens”, and that they “stay away from wasta and punish those who carry out 
such a thing.”329 Moreover, they wish authorities would “evaluate the people 
who hold positions connected to the president and the deputies, and the 
situation of the people. To get rid of the wasta;”330 and that “ministers and 
heads of ministries and departments [were designated] depending on the 
academic qualifications (it is not correct, for example, to designate as Minister 
of Health a person who has nothing to do with Medicine).”331  
Moreover, it cannot be ignored that not only Emiratis have wasta, and that some 
foreigners enjoy its privilege more than some nationals. It was quite shocking to 
realise that in some professions Westerners earn more than nationals when an 
employee of the UAEU said: 
“I am less than a foreigner…my salary is lower than the salary of a 
westerner!”332 
4.3. Unemployment 
Students from all emirates considered unemployment to be a major problem 
with over 70% considering it an important problem (see figure 41). 
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Unemployment among Emiratis is currently approximately 14%333 with youth 
unemployment being expectedly much higher and, therefore, a growing 
challenge for the UAE government.  Although several initiatives have been 
implemented to increase the number of Emiratis in the workforce, especially in 
the private sector, a recent study established that ‘Emiratisation’ would not 
succeed so long as it focused “on increasing the incentives for jobless Emiratis” 
rather than on addressing “the deep-rooted, institutional and socio-cultural 
causes of high unemployment” (ICOS: 1-2). Moreover, this report identified 
concerning levels of youth frustration, sadness, insecurity and anger related to 
the growing unemployment rates (ICOS: 4-5), which explains the fact that it 
constitutes such a concern for UAEU students.   
Figure 41: Unemployment 
 
One would have expected greater concern about unemployment in the northern 
emirates since they are the poorest. However, statistically relevant differences 
between some emirates at the 5% level (p-value .030) revealed otherwise.. 
Approximately 25% of students from RAK and Sharjah thought that the 
unemployment amongst Emiratis was ‘not very important’ an issue, while only 
10-15% of respondents from Abu Dhabi and Dubai agreed. Moreover, 
respondents from Fujairah, Ajman and UAQ had similar perceptions of the issue 
to those from AD and Dubai. (see figure 42).  
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Figure 42: Unemployment as a problem 
 
Unemployment rates among UAE nationals do not really explain these 
responses, since the highest rates correspond to Fujairah and Ras al-Khaimah 
(20.6% and 16.2% respectively), followed by Sharjah and Abu Dhabi (both with 
15.3%); and the lowest to Dubai, Ajman and UAQ (8.7%, 7.3% and 6.3%) (see 
table 34). The larger number of foreigners living in AD and Dubai compared to 
the other emirates might be more significant as a reason for this. However, a 
student said what she would ask of the rulers: 
“The elimination of unemployment, especially in the Emirate of Ras 
al-Khaimah characterized by severe lack of jobs, both in the private 
and public sector. I would be glad if this question was considered, 
as well as equality among all the Emirates in terms of job availability 
in every sector. Since the Emirate that is suffering the most from 
unemployment is Ras al-Khaimah, I wish it was supplied with many 
jobs.”334 
Table 34: UAE Nationals’ Unemployment rates
335
 
Abu Dhabi Dubai Sharjah Ajman UAQ RAK Fujairah Total 
15.3 8.7 15.3 7.3 6.3 16.2 20.6 14.0 
 
Furthermore, responses to open questions regarding unemployment made 
emphasis to the lack of opportunities that nationals are given in the place of 
foreigners. Many said they would like to ask from their rulers to solve “the 
problem of unemployment among nationals, that they excluded foreigners from 
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the jobs which basically are a citizen’s right,”336 and that they give “nationals the 
priority in higher positions...in companies and governments...for I see that in a 
lot of institutions the managers and the officials are foreigners.” 337 Expressing a 
similar sentiment, another student insisted that “excluding the foreign workforce 
from administration, jobs and so on, giving priority to nationals, priority to 
nationals in education and only afterwards to foreigners, without giving 
importance to the latter more than to the former. Also, the salaries of nationals 
should be higher than foreigners or equal, the contrary would not be right.”338 
Finally, another said priority should be given to “UAE nationals instead of 
foreigners, because there are well qualified citizens who are not given any 
chance… and a careful designation of some officials in some positions.”339 In 
this regard, the fact that there are higher number of foreigners in Dubai and Abu 
Dhabi partially explains why respondents from these emirates express greater 
concern about unemployment.  
Table 35: Unemployment 
 
Some differences were also observed between social classes, with (quite 
logically) the lower class the most concerned about unemployment, and the 
upper class the least concerned (p-value .042): 95% of the working class 
considered it as important or very important, compared to less than 70% of the 
upper class (figure 35). The perception of a direct link between unemployment 
and the lack of wasta was evident, as some further responses to open 
questions reflected desire for:  
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“A labour legislation since most graduates or high school graduates 
are unemployed because they don't have wasta.”340  
“A change in the perspective about work which is now based on 
personal wasta (connections)…and [that takes] into account work 
experience and qualifications.”341 
4.4. Economic disparity between emirates 
The economic disparity between emirates is due to the lack or hydrocarbon 
resources of the northern emirates, as explained in chapter 2. Federal 
investment has taken place in the northern emirates since the establishment of 
the federation (the basic necessities such as health services or schools are well 
covered), but to a much lesser extent than in Abu Dhabi, Dubai or Sharjah.  
Figure 43: Economic disparity between emirates 
 
Thus, economic disparity has been a source of tension between the seven 
emirates and its inhabitants since the establishment of the federation. Survey 
data showed that over 80% of respondents considered this an important 
problem, with 26% finding it ‘very important’ (see figure 43). Not surprisingly, 
students from the northern emirates were more concerned with this issue, 
although there was high concern in all emirates. Nonetheless, a high 
percentage of students from Dubai (even more than some of the northern 
emirates) saw it as an important problem. This might be the due to the 
competition that exists between Abu Dhabi and Dubai, and the higher federal 
investment that takes place in Abu Dhabi as compared to Dubai.  
                                                            
340
 Open question 24. 
341
 Open question 24. 
Very 
important 
26% 
Important 
55% 
Not very 
important 
19% 
230 
 
Figure 44: Economic disparity between emirates 
 
Differences between the level of concern in Abu Dhabi and Dubai (less than 
25% said it was ‘very important’) and the northern emirates (where over 25% 
thought it was ‘very important’) are large enough to claim that similar results 
would be obtained among the whole population studied (p-value .055) (figure 
44). Responses to the question on federal-local governments relation was also 
statistically significant (p-value .027), thus supporting the above (figure 45). 
Figure 45: Relation federal-local governments 
 
Surprisingly, students whose household earn more than 50,000 AED 
considered the economic disparity problem more important than those earning 
less than 50,000 AED (p-value .029) (see figure 46). Again, those with higher 
income show more concern about socio-political issues, thus supporting the 
main hypothesis of this dissertation. 
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Figure 46: Economic disparity between emirates 
 
The opinions of students in relation to differences between emirates provide 
more input on this issue. Some hoped “to see all the remote areas at the same 
level of the others or, at least, supplied with the basics;”342 for “equality among 
all the seven Emirates, as I do not feel that there is equality but advantages 
only for certain Emirates although we are one nation and its entirety consists of 
seven Emirates! Features must be the same, and there has to be the same 
degree of development in all the UAE… In this way, we would increase people's 
well-being in many ways without discrimination nor racism;” 343  and to see 
adjusted “the economic disparities within the UAE as some of the Emirates are 
suffering from huge deficiencies due to these internal differences; citizens 
wages are poor.”344 Others said they would like the rulers to bring about “social 
and economic equality among all the UAE, [and that they change] some of the 
officials who take advantage of their position for personal purposes and are not 
the right persons for their roles;”345 while one respondent explained how “there 
are plenty of good jobs but only in Abu Dhabi and Dubai… Jobs available in the 
other Emirates are characterized by little income, which does not meet the 
needs of the individual and their families, [and asked for] equality between 
nationals.” 346  Finally, one student related to the royal family of one of the 
emirates acknowledged that: 
“The budgets in Abu Dhabi and Dubai are very good, but the other 
emirates they don’t have the same facilities or opportunities, [and 
that] there is the voice of the people than live there, they cannot go 
and share their opinions; and they don’t have the same facilities like 
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in AD and Dubai. This is why you see most of the people from 
Fujairah and RAK moving to AD and Dubai. “347 
4.5. Other problems raised 
Besides the problems questioned about in the survey, other issues were raised 
by students when answering the open questions and during interviews. Among 
them, the most common were education, language and culture (including the 
abandonment of religious practices and/or local customs), salaries, the rising of 
prices, the provision of housing to nationals, marriage and divorce rates, the 
problem of the bidun and the children of Emirati mothers married to foreigners, 
and the UAE relations with other countries. 
Concern was expressed about the threat that non-national overpopulation 
problem arguably poses to culture and traditions. Some thought the main 
problem was the ways in which curricula are implemented, therefore blaming 
the authorities for deciding to adopt “foreign” practices. They expressed their 
opposition to “adopting foreign systems which are distant from our customs and 
traditions [and their support for] teaching the Arab culture without concentrating 
on foreign cultures and languages.” 348  Others affirmed that “the Arabic 
language should be the official language while studying academic and school 
subjects; the English language should be a secondary language, without 
importance. The curricula in universities, schools and colleges should be 
controlled, because they change constantly and uncontrollably.”349  
In this regard, an Emirati professor complained that most of her nieces and 
nephews were unable to speak and write proper Arabic or English, and argued 
that this had a negative effect on the generation of ideas and, ultimately on the 
development of the country.350 Related to this, one student said:  
“What I have to add refers to the school curriculum and commitment 
to credibility, since these suffer from defects. It is necessary to 
control those who have weak minds, what they do and what they 
instil through the curriculum in the minds of our children, from the blur 
of history to other things we don't even know.”351  
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Others focused more on materialistic rewards by wishing for “a greater interest 
in higher education and providing material and moral incentives for each Emirati 
student who wants to complete his education from a federalist and not local 
point of view.” 352  With regard to the concern over the rising of prices, the 
salaries of nationals, and the provision of housing by the state (and other 
welfare benefits), students would like the rulers to make changes in “the 
conditions of education, health, housing and the problems of the demographic 
structure by passing legislation to facilitate the process of marriage.” 353 
Students mentioned that “public housing that rewards beneficiaries should take 
into account the size, according to the entitled family…and also rise in prices. 
As a matter of fact, we don't want salary increase with an increase of prices. 
What would be the advantage then?”354 ; and that the state should provide 
“nationals who are about to marry with residential land and public house above 
all.”355 This reflects the existence of a rentier mentality among sectors of the 
youth population, which expect the state to guarantee the provision of the broad 
range of services they have been given since birth.   
Some students were more worried about how the presence of foreigners, rather 
that the policies implemented, negatively affected local customs and traditions 
of Emiratis, and who found solutions to this problem in religion. These wished 
for “a society free of migrations that corrupts customs, traditions and norms;”356 
“a technologically advanced society that preserves the values of the Islamic 
civilization and is ruled by security and stability;”357 “a peaceful society that 
preserves its religious values, on the basis of which decisions are taken. Where 
there are plenty of ways to make the individual live in prosperity. I do not mean 
comfort and luxury, but giving people all the rights that help them persevere in 
their duties towards the community. And a sense of belonging through love and 
mutual pride between the individual and the society.”358 A few found a solution 
in “granting the right of nationality to the children of female citizens provided 
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that they persevere on the straight path, and they care to spread the religious 
awareness according to the Salafi approach.”359 
Similarly, other religious approaches were identified. Some described their ideal 
society as one that “adheres to the Islamic principles, customs and traditions 
more than to the principles of ‘politics’. [One that] believes in freedom of 
expression and opinion, a believer society;”360 “a society based on the true 
religion, ruled by justice and equality, that enjoys political freedom and freedom 
of expression, where the people determine their destiny, the individual gets the 
job he deserves and there is no place for the wasta;”361 “a society committed to 
the whole Islamic law that gives us the right to denounce anything that touches 
our religion or our bashfulness negatively. Also, a society where people strive to 
improve it, they are educated, conscious and open within the boundaries of the 
Islamic law;”362 “a society ruled by security, freedom of expression and adoption 
of ideas... [One] that values the citizen and gives him rights, although a right is 
not a gift from someone...a society that values the citizen for his competencies 
not ancestry...a cooperative society that seeks the elevation of religion and the 
nation...a society where everybody respects each other... A Muslim society.”363 
Furthermore, some thought that “devoting the state resources to the 
development of society in all respects, but keeping in mind that the starting 
point are the Islamic principles and not the imperialist ones or others;”364 was 
necessary and some saw a need “to forbid strong drinking, dance, gambling, 
usury and bribery that stain and corrupt the country.”365  
In a more conciliatory position, there were students who hoped to achieve a 
society that follows the Islamic values and Emirati traditions and which also 
respects other cultures and religions. These called for “a democratic, 
confederate and simple society, [where] its rules are in line with the religion of 
the state and its customs, thus creating an atmosphere of love and intimacy 
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between the members of the community. Also, it accepts other religions’ rights 
and their nationalities;” 366  and insisted that: 
“It is necessary to reduce foreign workforce and to increase national 
workforce, and to be less open towards the Western influence, 
which affects our principles and our religion in a negative way, such 
as: hosting singers who distort the minds of young people, and 
putting huge Christmas trees in the commercial centres. But there is 
nothing wrong if every believer such as Christians and others 
practice freely their religious rites in the scope of their homes, 
families and cult houses.”367  
Additionally, some respondents expressed their preoccupation about the high 
divorce rates and the obstacles making marriage difficult. As discussed in 
chapter 2, many young Emiratis get married as a mean of achieving greater 
independence from their families and to obtain governmental benefits attached. 
As a consequence of these marriages of ‘convenience’ the divorce rate has 
steadily increased during the last decade and is seen by many as a social 
problem that should be addressed (see chapter 2).  
Finally, a number of students identified the UAE’s foreign policy as a problem 
that deserved attention by the authorities. A student said:  
“The modification of the political situation in terms of concern about 
strengthening ties with foreign countries that do not cause any long-
term problems or destabilize the people and the government, or 
affect negatively the economy of our state.”368  
Some thought it was necessary “to examine the problem between Iran and the 
boundaries of our state and its unwarranted interventions;”369 and wished the 
rulers “dealt firmly, without negotiating, with Iran that is occupying our 
islands;”370 and hoped they took “our islands back from Iran, and the initiative to 
help Syria.”371 These opinions reflect awareness of and concern about regional 
political events among a number of students. In this regard, some wanted to 
see the GCC strengthened and more links with other Arab states, and saw a 
necessity: 
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“to defend ourselves from the occupying countries, consulting with 
the Gulf countries and other countries, to meet all the needs of the 
Peninsula Shield Force, to protect the sibling states not only the 
Gulf countries, since before being Arab we are a Muslim 
community, we are all linked by an Islamic blood, not only to 
support them with aids that help them to live, but also to put our 
hands close to theirs and free them from the slaughterhouses they 
are in. Maybe I am not talking logically, but is it logical that we see 
Arabic blood bleeding in front of us and we stand still, where is our 
humanity, how can we say that we are an Arab nation, one single 
community?”372 
Overall, these additional concerns expressed by respondents show that 
awareness of national and regional socio-political issues is instilled in the minds 
of some sectors of the educated youth, and that they believed that these issues 
should be addressed by the authorities. As such, these are signs that, even if 
knowledge of the political system and of specific political developments of the 
country is weak, ‘post-materialistic’ and ‘self-expression’ attitudes exist among 
the studied population.   
 
5. Perceptions of Human Rights 
Respect of human rights is a controversial topic in the UAE (and the Gulf in 
general). The conditions under which migrants live in this region are 
internationally criticised, especially construction and domestic workers, whose 
illiteracy makes them the most vulnerable and therefore the most affected.373 As 
explained in chapter 2, the kafala system places the workers under the 
responsibility (and in the hands) of the employer, and leaves them migrants little 
opportunity to seek legal assistance at a governmental institution if any abuses 
or mistreatment occurs. Domestically, however, this issue does not seem to 
cause much concern. Many Emiratis benefit economically from the kafala 
system and, as such, do not desire a reform of  the law regulating it. Moreover, 
the post-Arab Spring detentions and trials have also put under scrutiny the 
respect of human rights by the UAE authorities (see chapter 3).  
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Nevertheless, despite the dubious respect for human rights in the UAE, 
responses of the students reflected a high confidence in the fact that human 
rights and individual liberties are guaranteed in the UAE (83%) (see figure 47). 
None of the variables showed statistically significant differences in responses to 
this question, implying that a similar opinion is held regardless of gender, 
emirate of origin, or social class.   
 
Figure 47: Human rights respect and individual liberties guaranteed in the UAE 
 
Linked to this is the feeling of insecurity that Emiratis have developed (and 
which is enhanced by the official discourse) for being a small and young country 
surrounded by the regional powers of KSA and Iran, as well as for being a 
minority within their own population. This feeling of insecurity contributes to the 
fact that Emiratis accept higher levels of censorship and the curtailing of civil 
and human rights.  This is reflected in the data, and could be due to the fact that 
Emiratis are educated to be grateful for what they have (as compared to the 
pre- oil period, or in comparison with other countries), and lead to believe that 
they could lose everything if the security of the nation was damaged. In this 
respect, 77% of the students agreed that “preserving the security of the country 
is the most crucial duty of the government, even if it needs to curtail some 
human rights” (see figure 48). For instance, one student claimed that “human 
rights and freedom of opinion are safeguarded and the ruling system treats 
everybody equally.”374 
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Figure 48: “Preserving security...even if curtailing human rights" 
 
There is, however, a statically relevant difference between the opinion of 
women and men on this issue, with less than 75% of female respondents 
agreeing compared to almost 90% of male students (p-value .001) (figure 49). 
This highlights the fact that women tend to be more aware of the infringement of 
human rights that occurs in the UAE, and are less willing to accept this situation 
even if national security is threatened. Moreover, the fact that women are more 
affected by the curtailment of freedom in the UAE may also contribute to this 
perception. Finally, Emiratis form the northern emirates are more in favour of 
curtailing rights if necessary to preserve security in the nation, followed by those 
of Dubai and Abu Dhabi (over 75%); while Sharjah students are the less 
supportive of this idea (~60%) (p-value .051) (see Figure 50).  
Figure 49: “Preserving security...even if curtailing human rights" 
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Figure 50: “Preserving security...even if curtailing human rights" 
 
Regarding more specific individual liberties and rights, such as freedom of 
expression, choice or movement, and women’s rights, Emiratis tend to praise 
the rulers for their efforts in delivering the people with what they need; and 
criticism is very limited. As one student put it:  
“The majority here are like babies, they have been raised as babies, 
they give them everything and they become greedy…and this is 
why they say ‘look around and be thankful’… [Gulf] Arabs do like 
birds, and they act like them sometimes…they are so proud, so full 
of it, like falcons, they worship them; [and] at the same time they 
are like ostriches: they are big, they have things, but they hide their 
heads…and this is so obvious.”375  
However, as has already been explained, and as the following data shows, the 
perceptions of UAEU students include discontent about the limiting of their 
freedoms. Perceptions about freedom of expression were measured through a 
question on how free respondents felt to speak politics in the UAE. Although 
over 80% of respondents expressed their confidence in the fact that human 
rights and individual liberties are guaranteed in the UAE, this dropped down to 
62% when questioned about the freedom to speak politics (see figure 51). 
Thus, 38% of the students feel they do not enjoy freedom of expression, 
contradicting the high belief in the respect for human rights, which is possibly 
due to a lack of understanding about the concept of human rights. In this 
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regard, one student said rulers should “grant citizens the freedom of expressing 
their views through newspapers or social networks”.376  
Figure 51: Feeling of freedom to speak politics 
 
Emirate of origin and gender were not determinant variables in this regard. 
Regarding social class, differences between groups were large enough (p-value 
.084) to affirm a tendency for the upper class to feels the less free to speak 
about politics (47.1%), followed by the lower class (55-5%), with greatest 
percentage of respondents in the middle class believing that they had the 
freedom to speak about politics (64.9%) (see figure 52). 
Figure 52: Feeling of freedom to speak politics 
 
During interviews, students expressed the opinion that individuals need to be 
careful when speaking politics in front of others “because it can bring 
unexpected consequences.”377 Students from countries where the Arab Spring 
popular unrest or the overthrowing of rulers was taking place, such as Tunisia, 
Egypt, Libya or Bahrain were very cautious not to speak about the 
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developments in their countries in public, and were even warned by professors 
not to express their feelings in public. A Tunisian student, for instance, reported 
that she was shushed by her long-term UAE resident Palestinian professor 
when she made a comment about the Tunisian revolts in the classroom and 
explicitly told (after the class) that she should keep that thoughts to herself, that 
expatriates “should not speak politics or they could get in trouble.” 378  This 
shows that politics is not only a taboo topic for Emiratis, but also for foreign 
residents. However, in the right setting most students shared their thoughts, and 
appeared to have interest in regional and local political events, even if most 
were not willing to become an active part of these. In regard to this, an Emirati 
student said:  
“There is a lot of injustice in our state, but no one can speak about it 
because they fear the so-called ‘state security’. We do not want to 
prejudice the security of our nation, but in reality it would be better 
to call to court every undisciplined minister, dictator and thief of the 
state, and to establish strict laws of discipline for all ministers.”379  
It was pointed out earlier that gender inequalities are not a major concern of 
Emiratis. Further data confirms this reality, and 95% of respondents agreed that 
women's rights are guaranteed in the UAE. Nonetheless, although differences 
between groups were not statistically significant, a trend was observed that a 
larger percentage of females (over 75%) than of males (67%) said gender 
inequalities were not an important problem (see figures 53 and 57). 
Figure 53: UAE laws guarantee women’s freedom of choice and movement 
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Figure 54: Unequal rights of Emirati men and women by sex 
 
In contrast, substantial differences were found between male and female 
students when asked about the roles of women in society and in politics. 
Women were more supportive of their participation in the public, job market, and 
political sphere (p-values .000 - .010) (see figures 55, 56 and 57).  
Figure 55: Women can be president or PM 
 
 
Figure 56: Women can work outside home 
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Figure 57: Men make better political leaders than women 
 
Conservative views over the role of sexes in society persist in the UAE, but 
there is also a high level of pride (or face saving) in these responses. Interviews 
and responses to open questions showed that many male and female students 
are not very happy about some of the gender-related political practices in the 
UAE (or with the ways in which these have evolved). One student said she 
would like the rulers to guarantee the “freedom for women, adequate financial 
aid to complete the study in the country, or a personal salary;”380 while another 
one blamed it on the families rather that the authorities or laws:  
“The government gives the full opportunity and the full freedom for 
the woman, but it’s a family restriction, is not about the government 
restriction… it depends… There should be like a feminism; you 
know, there should be like an organisation for them who is calling 
for their rights and protecting them… Women should organise 
better and I will be willing to do this… I think about starting this kind 
of association that informs girls better about their rights and so on… 
who protects the rights of women…”381 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has assessed the cognitive orientations of UAEU students, 
explored the main agents of political socialisation as identified by respondents, 
and discussed their feelings with regards to domestic socio-political problems 
(i.e. affective orientations). It was observed that, although cognitive political 
orientations are weak among all groups forming the sample, there is significant 
                                                            
380
 Open question 23. 
381
 Personal interview, Al-Ain, March 2012.  
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Male
Female
Agree
Disagree
244 
 
interest in politics among some sectors, and that factors other than income, 
influence youth political socialisation in the UAE. Among these, the most 
significant is the media, followed by the university experience. This was 
confirmed by several chi-square tests: those following the news regularly have a 
higher interest in politics and vice versa as do those using Twitter habitually. 
Statistically significant differences between social classes and income groups in 
response to cognitive and affective questions reveal that the upper class, higher 
income individuals, and those from wealthier emirates have better knowledge 
and more interest in politics than the middle and lower classes. Responses of 
students from the seven emirates about interest in politics reveal new 
information about the actual orientations of Emirati educated youth. Students 
from Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Sharjah expressed a higher interest in politics than 
students from the rest of the UAE.  Moreover, the survey reflects that interest in 
politics is higher among Law and HuSS students, and especially among 
students of Political Science, Tourism and Media Studies and there was enough 
statistical evidence to claim that male students tend to have more interest than 
female students (72.6% and 62.8% respectively).  
Similarly, although knowledge of the political system was in general low, there is 
a tendency for greater understanding by male students. Knowledge of 
authorities is very high (90%-98% of correct answers); knowledge of political 
institution not so high (50%-55%); and knowledge of elections quite low (40%-
30%). Interesting disparities were identified between students enrolled in the 
different colleges, with those in HuSS, Law and Engineering being the best 
informed. While, there were no significant differences between students of the 
seven emirates, students from RAK seem to have a better understanding of the 
politics of the UAE. Moreover, the self-selected upper class is the most 
knowledgeable about the political system (+75%), as well as the most aware of 
the electoral processes (50%-60%).   
Regarding socio-political problems, the upper class is the most concerned 
about non-national overpopulation, while the middle and working classes worry 
more about wasta, corruption, and unemployment. The majority of UAEU 
students did not express concern about the human rights situation in the UAE. 
However, when asked if these should be curtailed to preserve domestic 
security, women are (statistically) less supportive of this idea, with students 
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from Sharjah being the least supportive, followed by Abu Dhabi and Dubai. 
Moreover, there is not much concern about the legal situation of women. In fact, 
95% of students thought that law guaranteed women’s freedom of choice and 
movement. Surprisingly, men show slightly higher concern about the situation of 
women in the UAE. However, when asked about the roles of women in society 
and politics, men are more reluctant than women. Finally, around 40% of 
respondents claimed that they did not feel free to speak politics in the UAE, with 
the upper class feeling the least freedom and the middle class the most.  
Overall, the analyses conducted in this chapter support the main hypothesis 
that the rentier nature of a state does not necessarily determine its peoples’ 
lack of political interest, but can actually contribute to it through the exposure to 
agents involved in the process of political socialisation (especially education 
and the media). Data reveal important differences between the different social 
classes, hence highlighting that this variable is very relevant for the 
understanding of political orientations in the UAE. Concerns of the different 
social classes coincide with issues affecting them in similar ways, but vary 
according to their status and, in some cases to gender. As such, the wealthier 
and better-positioned social layers are more concerned about ‘post-materialistic’ 
issues than the rest of society. However, concern of the middle and lower 
classes over ‘post-materialistic’ problems is also present, hence indicating a 
tendency towards ‘self-expression’ attitudes within all social strata  (further 
discussed in chapter 5).  
  
246 
 
CHAPTER 5: SUPPORT FOR THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 
Chapter 2 explains that although the first article of the UAE’s constitution 
expresses that its rulers aimed at preparing UAE nationals “for a dignified and 
free constitutional life while going ahead towards a full-fledged representative 
democratic regime in an Islamic and Arab community free of fear and 
anxiety”,382 very little has in fact been done in this direction. There have been 
calls for political reform since the inception of the federation (and even before), 
and more specific demands to enhance the powers of the FNC and to make it 
an elected institution. Nevertheless, the authorities have insisted on the 
necessity to follow a gradual process of political liberalisation, and only partial 
elections for a consultative council have been held in the country. Throughout 
the analyses of survey and interview data, this chapter is primarily concerned 
with affective and evaluative orientations of UAEU students, trust, tolerance and 
efficacy -values that have been associated with regime stability in cross-national 
political culture research. Therefore, it assesses the support of UAEU students 
for UAE authorities and their evaluation of governmental policies, perceptions 
regarding political reform and, more specifically, the elections held in the 
country in 2006 and 2011, as well as their adherence to self-expression values, 
since this is an indicator of ‘post-materialistic’ views and concern over political 
participation and the rule of law (or the lack of these) (Inglehart, 2005; 
theoretical framework, chapter 1).  
 
1. Perceptions of authorities and governmental policies 
Comments on online social networks and governmental official websites are 
filled with messages of admiration and pride for the rulers, and especially to late 
Sheikh Zayed, to whom Emiratis refer to as ‘Baba Zayed’.383 Whether all posts 
are genuine or if there is a regime effort to fill the Internet with this kind of 
comments, fieldwork observation and interviews confirm there is widespread 
respect for the founders and current leaders of the country. Messages of love 
and admiration can be read on the Twitter and Facebook profiles of Emirati 
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students, many of whom carry photographs of the leaders on their folders or 
laptop cases, and speak about them with affection. Examples of this are the 
comments by some during the UAE National Day thanking Sheikh Zayed for 
what he did for the nation, or the one made by a UAEU student on Facebook 
about a BBC interview of the ruler of Dubai:  
“#MomentOfPride 
The five statements made by Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid to the 
BBC are just brilliant! 
#ThankYouSheikhMo”384 
Support for the rulers was also expressed in the open questions of the survey 
and throughout the interviews conducted. For instance, one student wrote:  
“Thankfully, we are an ideal society as mentioned, ruled by security 
and above all care for the honourable elderly, where we are offered 
everything we need in our lives and, most importantly, Sheikh 
Zayed bin Sultan, God rest his soul and allow him to enter paradise, 
who made every effort to please the sons of his nation, and this is 
what our elderly are accomplishing nowadays, God preserve them 
all.”385  
This, of course, is a reflection of the extent to which the portrayal of the rulers 
as the fathers and protectors of the nation is effective. Some, however, 
acknowledge some societal necessities while still praising the ruler’s ‘vision’:  
“Thanks God our government is wise and our elders desire all the 
best for the Emirati society. Inevitably, every society has negative 
sides and, God willing, with the cooperation of everybody we will 
overcome them.”386  
“The UAE and its government is one of the best countries in the 
world and, God willing, will be achieved. All we need is young 
people awareness of their role and a change in their ideas, and 
creating the opportunity for these young people to show their 
abilities.”387  
In a more critical position, other Emiratis express mixed feelings towards the 
current rulers, and some discontent with them, or the way in which things are 
run today as compared to the glorious old days, when Sheikh Zayed was the 
president. One student, for instance, wished for the establishment of “an open a 
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council responsible for receiving complaints from the citizens as during the days 
of Zayed, may God have mercy on him…with no interference from third parties 
between the ruler and the ruled.”388 Similarly, another one though: 
 “A lot of things could be changed. First, the situation of UAE 
citizens since it is not right that foreigners or newcomers are 
preferred to UAE citizens, is it? And also the policy of ‘state 
security’, I never feel safe because of their presence, they are the 
ruin of the state, and it is not safe… The Emirates were not like this 
during the great era of Zayed. We did not expect this from the UAE 
rulers and their highness.”389  
However, regarding the lack of open expression of discontent, a foreign 
university professor explained that people seemed comfortable with the system 
as it is and are “hesitant to begin the messy business of devolution of absolute 
power.” Further, he observed there was “a conflict-avoidance tendency among 
the population, and perhaps a bit of pre-emptive face saving: the rulers are not 
to be dithered with.”390 The following sections explore what quantitative data 
reveals about UAEU students’ orientations towards institutions, authorities and 
policies, as well as about the reasons behind the little, or discreet, criticism of 
authorities. This is complemented with excerpts from interviews and responses 
to survey open questions.  
1.1. Perceptions of institutional roles 
In response to survey questions about the effectiveness of political institutions, 
students show a high level of trust, although this varies significantly from one 
institution to another. The Federal Supreme Council and the Council of 
Ministers were considered effective by more 70% of respondents, but this 
percentage dropped to 56% for the FNC. The latter is possibly related to the 
general lack of knowledge about this institution and its functions. Moreover, 
around 30% said they did not know whether these were effective or not, again 
reflecting the weak knowledge of the system (see figure 58).  
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Figure 58: Effectiveness of FSC, FNC and Council of Ministers 
 
 
Figure 59: Effectiveness of Judiciary, Police and Governmental offices 
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When questioned about trust, data showed high levels in the judiciary and the 
police (81% and 90% respectively), but lower levels for governmental offices 
(69%) (see figure 59)., Females had greater belief in the role of the FNC that 
males (80% and 69% respectively; p-value .019), reflecting the larger support of 
women towards political participation. Secondly, although trust was high 
towards the judiciary, students from the different emirates had varying opinions 
(p-value .033) (see figures 60 and 61).  
Figure 60: Effectiveness of FNC 
 
 
Figure 61: Effectiveness of the Judiciary by emirate 
 
Again RAK and Sharjah (followed by Dubai) stood out from the other emirates 
and, in this case, had higher distrust in the judiciary (see figure 61 and table 
36).  This might be due to the obscure circumstances of detentions of 
individuals from those emirates by the State Security Apparatus at the time the 
questionnaire was distributed (see chapter 3), or the preferential treatment that 
Emiratis feel AD and Dubai citizens are afforded. 391  In desire for the 
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improvement of the judiciary, a student wrote: “Fairness should be the 
distinctive quality of the judicial departments of our state. If we don't find 
fairness in those places, where can we find it?”392 
Table 36: Effectiveness of the Judiciary by emirate 
 
RAK Sharjah Dubai AD Fujairah, Ajman & UAQ 
Not effective 8.8% 6.5% 6.1% 5.6% 1.3% 
Effective 64.9% 76.1% 90.9% 82.7% 82.1% 
Don't know 26.3% 17.4% 3.0% 11.7% 16.7% 
 
1.2. Impact of Federal policies 
The opinions of students about the impact that federal policies have in their 
hometowns revealed significant differences between emirates at the 5% level 
(p-value .001), and between social classes at the 10% level (p-value .054). 
Here again we see how students from RAK are more critical of federal policies, 
followed by the other northern emirates and Dubai, while Abu Dhabi citizens 
hold the federal efforts in the highest esteem (see figure 63).  
 
Figure 62: Impact of Federal policies in your Emirate 
 
Moreover, the students who described themselves as higher class were actually 
unhappier about the impact that federal policies have in their emirates. This, 
again, supports the hypothesis that there might be unexpected outcomes of 
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rentierism, for a significant percentage of those benefiting most from the system 
were the most critical of it (see figure 64).  
 
Figure 63: Impact of Federal policies in your Emirate 
 
1.3. Unconditional support? 
Overall, students were supportive of their rulers. However, only around 50% 
thought that they should support government policies even if they disagreed, 
which reflects that support is not unconditional in the eyes of all young educated 
nationals, and that many thought they should instead follow their own principles. 
The following is an example of a student who supports the rulers but would like 
to see some changes in the system:  
“We cannot deny we should have changes to meet global 
standards, but most of the people here (I’m not gonna say all of 
them) are satisfied with the UAE government, with the UAE political 
system here, but I cannot deny there should be some changes. For 
example, the freedom of speech and the participation.”393  
Data again revealed that support for authorities and governmental policies is 
high. 90% of respondents agreed that the government of the UAE “does all it 
can to provide citizens with all necessary services and infrastructure” (see figure 
64). Importantly, however, less than 50% thought “people should always 
support the decisions of the government if they disagree with their decisions”, 
thus showing independent and critical thinking and a significant level self-
expression aspirations (see figure 65).  
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Figure 64: Government does all it can 
 
 
Figure 65: Support government decisions even if disagree 
 
Cross tabulations and chi square tests of these questions showed important 
differences between groups. Difference between male and female respondents 
is significant at the 5% level, with percentages of 61% and 46% respectively, 
agreeing that they should support the authorities (p-value .009). This means 
that there is enough statistical evidence to state that men’s support was more 
unconditional than that of women and that men tended to show more support 
the government even if they disagreed with its policies (see figure 66).  
Moreover, although not statistically significant, a trend was observed that 
respondents with the lowest degree of support for authorities were students of 
Law and Humanities and Social Sciences degrees (almost 60%), followed by 
students of Business and Economics (over 50%), and then by students of 
Engineering (50%) (see figure 67). Bearing in mind that students of these 
disciplines had higher rates of interest and knowledge of politics, we can 
conclude that there is a relationship between these variables: the higher the 
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knowledge and interest in politics, the lower the unconditional support for 
governmental policies. Accordingly, a tendency was observed that those 
interested were more critical of governmental policies. 
 
Figure 66: Support government decisions even if disagree 
 
Figure 67: Support government decisions even if disagree 
 
The differences of opinion of respondents from the different the emirates of 
origin for support of government decisions when disagreeing with them were not 
large enough to be statistically significant. However, results reflect a tendency 
that those more supportive come from the emirate of Dubai (60%), and that the 
least supportive respondents were from Sharjah and RAK (45%), also 
coinciding with the analysis of previous questions that showed students from 
these emirates were the most critical of the system (see figure 68). 
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Figure 68: Support government decisions even if disagree 
 
Moreover, a significant difference between the upper class (over 75% agreed) 
and the middle and lower classes (less than 50%) allows confirmation that the 
support of the former is more unconditional than that of the latter (p-value .064) 
(see figure 69). The compliance of the higher class with governmental 
decisions, even if they disagree with these, fits to some extent the rentier state 
theory model that explains the political quiescence in return for public services, 
subsidies, public jobs and no taxation.  
Figure 69: Support government decisions even if disagree 
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selected themselves as upper class form part of the Emirati oligarchy, tribal 
aristocracy, or even the well-connected national bourgeoisie, they would not be 
interested in political change, even if they have interest in and are 
knowledgeable of politics. On the other hand, the relatively low support among 
the middle and working classes, who occupy less privileged positions in society 
but nonetheless enjoy extensive welfare, is related to the enhancement of 
political awareness among these sectors through the exposure of reshaped 
agents of political socialisation (see chapters 2 and 4). Education, access to 
media and Internet, and general increased interconnection with the world seem 
to play an important role in the adoption of ‘self-expression’ and ‘post-
materialistic’ (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005) attitudes such as the lack of support for 
decision they do not agree with. This confirms the third hypothesis of this 
dissertation to some extent, as it ultimately shows an important development of 
critical thinking among Emirati citizens.  
 
2. Support for political reform and elections 
Another objective of the survey was to evaluate the feelings of students towards 
political reform and the electoral processes of 2006 and 2011. Responses 
showed a large agreement with the government’s official ‘gradual approach’ 
(90%). There were no significant differences between any of the variables, thus 
indicating that this perception is very similar among all societal groups. In this 
regard, many respondents shared the opinion that:  
“Society is still not fully developed and faces many social problems 
that need to be tackled before going into politics. So better social 
reforms should take place first before political;”394  
“Changes are needed if the people want them, but if you make a 
survey you will see people are satisfied… At universal scale we 
don’t have autonomy, or freedom of speech, but people are content 
with what they have. Change should come from the people, but not 
from the outside.”395 
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Figure 70: Political reform step by step 
 
On the other hand, some students expressed their hopes “that the government 
of the UAE will listen to young people because they are the leaders of the 
future. I hope it will give them freedom, so that they will be able to stay away 
from useless hypocrisy and praise;”396 and asked for “the creation of an efficient 
regulatory system in order to check each employee, director or minister, the 
development of the health sector and non-discrimination in the family 
relationship between citizens.”397 Further, some suggested solutions to tackle 
socio-political problems: “a website related to social, political and labour issues 
faced by the country and its citizens should be created, with the aim of solving 
these problems.”398 In a middle position one student related to one of the ruling 
families said:  
“In some emirates there are people trying to make changes, it 
depends in the emirate itself, but there are only a few. Lots of 
people from Sharjah and RAK, even from the royal family, for 
example, who are trying… Even, I am not going to mention them, 
but you can see them on Twitter and Facebook what they are 
writing, what they are calling for. There are some people within the 
same families who oppose political change, for the safety of the 
country…you know, like in everything you have two sides: 
opponents and supporters. And those members of royal families are 
meeting now with rulers from AD and Dubai, to discuss all these 
issues, about participation, as well as about improving the services 
in the northern emirates.”399 
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Thus, although quantitative data did not offer significant differences between 
groups to establish links between variables, qualitative data shows there are 
various approaches to the issue even among those in agreement with gradual 
reform. Moreover, some of the opinions above reflect that alternative factors to 
blind confidence in rulers are also important. The following sections look into 
some of these. 
2.1. Fear toward political liberalisation 
While agreeing with the governmental ‘gradual approach’, 70% agreed that 
competition and disagreement among people with different political ideas is not 
a bad thing for the UAE, thus expressing their support for the creation of spaces 
for debate between people with different opinions (see figure 71). 
Figure 71: Competition and Disagreement not bad 
 
This was the opinion of many students interviewed in 2011-2012, but since the 
post-Arab spring crackdown on political activists and the reform of Internet law 
in the UAE, many people who supported and called for reform have stepped 
back or changed their discourse. This, they explain, happens either because 
they fear the possible consequences, or because they agree with the authorities 
that the open expression of political ideas other than those of the establishment 
may, at least at the moment, generate security threats to the state.400  The 
above, together with the fact that the fear of Islamism and neighbouring Iran 
has been strengthened after the Arab Spring upheavals, has convinced many 
pro-reform citizens that it is necessary to wait a number of years before 
participation and the rule of law is properly established in the country, even if is 
preferable for it to happen sooner.  
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Even at the time the survey was distributed, some students articulated fear to 
express their desire for reform and fear of the possible consequences of having 
expressed their opinions through the survey. One student confessed to be 
“afraid [he had] been very frank and this could cause [him] some problems;”401 
and another thought “the ideal society is free of oppression and fear of 
expressing an opinion.”402 
The unsuccessful political participation experiences of neighbouring states such 
as Kuwait and Bahrain, and the other Arab countries, as well as the alternative 
Islamic Republic of Iran, also play a role in acceptance of the status quo.403 
Embedded in a lack of understanding of the Arab Spring people’s claims, and 
the concept of democracy itself, some reproduce the ‘national security’ official 
discourse as follows:  
 “Authorities should take [detain] all those tempted to act against 
state security to destabilize it.” 404 
“The Arab countries are undergoing a difficult phase, a phase of 
great changes and many around us are attempting to destabilize 
the security of our nation. But thankfully God has given us unity, 
love for the country and our president. For this reason we face 
anyone who thinks to harm our state and our government. 
Nowadays Emirates are united and we protect them from the 
enemies.”405 
 
2.2. The electoral dilemma  
In chapter 3 explained that the UAE was the last of the GGC states to hold 
elections, and that only a small number of citizens (~6,000) were invited to 
participate in 2006, and this was increased to 130,000 in 2011, generating 
conflicting feelings among some of those excluded from the processes. It is 
discussed, moreover, that participation rates were low and awareness of these 
processes is not widespread among the UAEU students (see also chapter 4).  
                                                            
401
 Open question 24. 
402
 Open question 22. 
403
 Personal interviews with students, academics, and activists. Dubai, Al-Ain, Dubai (March-
April 2013). 
404
 Open question 24. 
405
 Open question 24. 
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Figure 72: Elections are useless 
 
Perhaps for this reason, the issue of elections was a more controversial topic. 
Over 40% of students believed these were useless, and 15% said they did not 
know. Thus approximately 50% of those with an opinion on this issue believed 
elections to be useless, and the other 50% disagreed with this (see figure 72 
and table 37). One student said: “FNC doesn’t have the full empowerment, they 
only make suggestions to the government, not like the US Congress or other 
councils around the world…I think there should be more participation and more 
representation of all groups; with full power to make laws;”406 while another one 
said:  
“I think it’s worthless…I don’t want to be so pessimistic, but the 
thing [the 2011 electoral process] was so glamorous. You could see 
the photos of the candidates around, but after all happened, and 
after the nominations, nothing happened. [It was] a pointless 
campaign. I think it is the fault of the system and of the candidates. 
You cannot give this responsibility to someone who is not used to 
this, they don’t know. I’m waiting to see a project with their names 
on it, but until now I don’t see anything.”407 
 
Table 37: Elections are useless 
 
HuSS Edu Law Bus & Eco IT Science Engineering 
Disagree 55.8% 40.0% 57.1% 32.9% 29.6% 37.5% 40.0% 
Agree 32.7% 32.0% 31.4% 53.9% 55.6% 47.5% 41.1% 
Don't know 11.6% 28.0% 11.4% 13.2% 14.8% 15.0% 18.9% 
 
                                                            
406
Personal interview, Al-Ain (March 2012). 
407
 Personal interview, Al-Ain (March 2012).  
Disagree 
44% 
Agree 
41% 
Don't know 
15% 
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Opinions of the use of elections were quite similar among the different colleges. 
However, data showed that students of Law and HH&SS were more supportive 
of elections, followed by students of Education and Engineering, coinciding with 
the previous results that identify these groups as more supportive of political 
reform. Women were significantly more supportive of elections than males (p-
value .028), which corresponds with the higher trust they also expressed to 
have in the FNC and with them being more critical of governmental policies if in 
disagreement (see figure 73).  
Figure 73: Elections are useless 
 
In addition, although 41% of respondents agreed that elections were useless, 
almost 50% (or over 50% if we remove those who said they did not know) 
agreed the FNC members should be selected through elections, and women 
again showed more support of political reform with over 50% of them agreeing 
(p-value .003) (see figures 74 and 75). 
Figure 74: FNC members selected through elections 
 
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
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Figure 75: FNC members selected through elections 
 
Moreover, over 90% of respondents agreed that selection of candidates should 
be based on their qualification and experience, and a significant p-value (.063) 
indicates that women are more supportive of candidates only being allowed to 
run for office on that basis (see figure 76). In this regard one student wrote:  
“In which fields are elections used? Few people participated, isn't 
that true? I participated in the elections, but honestly I didn't know 
what had happened before. I mean, there are people who don't care 
about elections, about the reason why there are university lectures 
on the importance of elections or concerning the candidacies, I'd 
like to mention that in some of the seven Emirates candidates 
weren't nominated with expertise and high educational qualification, 
but they were nominated by means of the wasta or, more correctly, 
as we say colloquially ‘only through the tribes' spells’”.408 
 
Figure 76: Selection of candidates by qualifications and experience 
 
                                                            
408
 Open question 24. 
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Figure 77: All Emirati citizens should have the right to vote 
 
Considering the enfranchisement of Emirati citizens, data clearly showed that 
there is wide consensus that all Emirati citizens should have the right to vote 
with no difference, and the lack of significant differences between groups 
strengthens this conclusion. One student related to one of the ruling families 
thought rulers: 
“should open the elections for the whole nation of the UAE. The 
voice of the people would be listened by the government; the 
government would be aware of the people’s needs. [Currently] for 
some it is reached, for others no. Once you give the opportunity to 
the whole nation of the UAE, then all having a representative of 
their voice, all will be the same… You know, for some people it is 
more difficult to make themselves heard because they don’t have 
the channels, or the relatives or friends, people they know to get 
them there.”409 
 
Figure 78: Non Emiratis should have the right to vote 
 
                                                            
409
 Personal interview, Al-Ain (March 2012). 
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The data revealed the opposite opinion of respondents when it questioned 
about giving the right to vote to non-Emiratis. The majority disagree with this 
(see figure 78). Moreover, a significant difference (p-value of .002) between the 
group that more strongly opposes giving the right to vote to non-Emiratis (Law 
with 77.8%), and the one that more supports this idea (Education with 69.2%) 
was evident and (see table 38).  
 
Table 38: Non Emiratis should have the right to vote 
 
HuSS Education Law 
Bus 
& Eco 
IT Science Engineering 
Disagree 41.5% 19.2% 77.8% 50.7% 63.0% 45.0% 51.1% 
Agree 51.0% 69.2% 19.4% 38.7% 29.6% 40.0% 36.7% 
Don't know 7.5% 11.5% 2.8% 10.7% 7.4% 15.0% 12.2% 
 
Finally, some students expressed their confusion about the electoral processes 
and said they chose not to vote for that reason. Among those who understood 
the process better, some were optimistic that it was a step forward, but others 
expressed their disappointment with the process and saw it as a pointless 
exercise. One hoped there would be: 
“greater awareness among people during the next elections, that 
can be reached by explaining the techniques and ways of voting 
and so on... I also hope that the candidates will be nominated and 
voted on the basis of their experience and qualifications and not 
because of their status and high standard of living as it happened in 
the last elections... If the candidate wins the vote because of his 
education and experience he will be an effective member of the 
Council, with important opinions. On the contrary, if the candidate 
wins because of his position, using money to get people to vote for 
him, and if he wants to be elected only for social prestige... he won't 
be an effective member of the Council, he will be worthless... I 
hope, therefore, that measures will be taken to prevent this kind of 
manipulation in the next elections. I hope that people with 
experience will be nominated, not wealthy people who don't even 
know how the others live... they don't need any help... This is just a 
personal opinion.”410 
                                                            
410
 Open question 24: Please, add any further thoughts that came to your mind while completing 
this questionnaire. 
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2.3. Enough of tribal politics? 
Formal structures are still not widely used to raise concerns to the rulers, while 
informal means of communicating with the authorities are more common. Tribal 
politics have been in place in the Gulf region for centuries. However, as the 
population grows, these are proving to be ineffective in allowing every citizen to 
raise their voice. Moreover, as explained in chapter 2, the way in which tribal 
politics has been practiced in the UAE (and the Gulf) has changed over time 
due to several factors, including the meddling of Great Britain in the region and 
the discovery of oil. Thus, the tribal politics of today bears little resemblance to 
the way in which things were done in the past. Nonetheless, the rulers still 
emphasize the tribal legitimacy of their power and have the support of the main 
tribes living in the UAE, but many (and especially the younger generations) find 
there little reason to maintain old structures, partially without providing the 
spaces for citizens to communicate their aspirations to the rulers.   
Figure 79: Choose candidates belonging to your tribe 
 
Surprisingly, 86% of respondents disagreed that people should vote for 
candidates belonging to their tribes, thus showing a high detachment from the 
reinvented tradition of blind (and unquestioning) loyalty to the ruling sheikhs 
(see graph 5.22). This could possibly be due to the fact that (as explained in 
chapter 2) the majority of the national population does not have tribal origins, 
and therefore a feeling of discrimination by these practices. Moreover, although 
not statistically significant, the fact that the middle and working classes seemed 
to agree more with this statement also speaks in favour of this argument (see 
figure 79). Logically, this is related to wasta, which was perceived as a major 
Disagree 
86% 
Agree 
8% 
Don't know 
6% 
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problem of the Emirati society by 96% of students who agreed that political 
reform should include its elimination as a priority (see figure 80 and chapter 4).  
 
Figure 80: Choose candidates belonging to your tribe by class 
 
 
Figure 81: Elimination of wasta as a priority of reform 
 
Some students wished “to become socially and politically equal, not divided by 
the names of the tribes, and to enjoy individual rights on the basis of 
consciousness and qualifications;” 411  thought “the government should treat 
equally every member of the society in terms of rights, without using the tribal 
system to discriminate against individuals in the economic, political and social 
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sphere;” 412  and wanted “wasta principles, racism and tribalism“ to be 
abolished.413 
These overwhelming positions against tribal politics and wasta practices reflect 
a high degree of disapproval for how things are actually run. However, 
respondents seem not to relate these ways of doing things with the rulers, 
instead deeming them as ‘traditional’ ways of doing things and should be 
altered. In fact, some of the previous results have also shown that most 
students do not identify the rulers as responsible for wrongdoings, but rather as 
the ‘visionaries’ who try to make things work; and there is a tendency to blame 
the people around them (ministers, FNC members, foreign forces, etc.). It might 
be that the general low knowledge of how the system works impedes young 
Emiratis from seeing that the Supreme Council, not the Prime Minister or the 
President, are in charge of most of what happens in the UAE. Some know very 
well that they can only indirectly criticise policies or decision taken by 
authorities. As such, one student hoped: 
“the rulers of the Emirates, especially the Council of Ministers, gave 
qualified young people their right to get a job. Unfortunately, we see 
that the ministers are always the same, what happens is simply a 
switching of chairs.”414 
 
Conclusion 
Affective and evaluative orientations analysed in this chapter are overall 
positive, while cognitive orientations are in general low. The frequency of 
feelings and the evaluation orientations towards the political system is generally 
positive, thus approaching ‘allegiance’. Trust in ruling authorities is high -90% of 
respondents believe government does all it can to provide citizens with all 
necessary services and infrastructure. Belief in the effectiveness of institutions 
is also high in general -less than 5% find them inefficient, except for the FNC 
(16%) and the Governmental offices (12%). 
However, there are signs of ‘alienation’ among students with aspirations for 
political participation. Around 50% think they should not support the government 
if they disagree with their policies. Further, support for government policies 
                                                            
412
 Open question 23. 
413
 Open question 23. 
414
 Open question 23. 
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when disagreeing with it was lowest among students of law and HHSS 
(students of business and economics), and engineering. Moreover, male and 
self-selected upper class students’ support is more unconditional that that of 
female and the rest of the population. 
Finally, although agreement with the gradual implementation of reform is 
widespread (90%), elections are perceived to be useless by only 40% of 
respondents. Female students have a better opinion of the FNC, and significant 
p-values show that they are more supportive of elections, and of reforming the 
FNC so that all of its members are selected through electoral processes. This 
clearly reflects adherence to ‘self-expression’ values among important sectors 
of the population studied, which are seen in political culture research as 
conductive to popular demand for democracy (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). 
However, despite socio-economic development being associated with the 
fading of ‘existential threats’ and the emergence of ‘post-materialistic’ views, at 
different stages might it might be compatible with certain forms of 
authoritarianism.  
Regarding the variables determining differences in political orientations in this 
country, a global look at the obtained p-values allows to claim that the sex and 
social class are the most significant, followed by emirate of origin (see table 39).  
Table 39: Significant p-values by variable 
 Sex Social class Emirate of origin College Income Media 
- .05 9 2 6 4 1 2 
+ .05 3 8 2 0 0 0 
Total 12 10 8 4 1 2 
 
In the light of this conclusions, and following Almond and Verba’s classification 
(1963), the political culture of UAEU students can be described as an ‘aspiring 
participant culture’ taking into account that three types of individuals were 
identified within the population:  
- A majority of ‘subjects’ (showing low frequency of orientations towards 
politics in general and ‘allegiance’ towards the system);  
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- A sector which approaches ‘parochialism’ (with high frequency of 
orientations towards the system and its output aspects, but low 
orientations towards input objects and the self as active participant);  
- And a growing ‘participant’ group (with high frequency of orientations 
towards politics in general). 
 
Results of chapters 4 and 5 reveal important variances within an apparent 
homogeneous population, and support the hypothesis that the rentier nature of 
a state does not necessarily determine its peoples’ lack of political interest, but 
can actually contribute to it through the exposure of people to agents involved in 
the process of political socialisation. Moreover, these chapters also support the 
hypothesis that there is high adherence to self-expression values within 
relevant sectors of the population studied. However, this seems to be limited by 
a sense of insecurity and fear of the possible consequences of change (or of 
demanding change), which also explains the self-censoring attitudes and, 
therefore, the lack of open political debate in the UAE. 
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FINAL CONCLUSIONS 
While there has been little inclusion by Comparative Politics scientists of the 
MENA countries in cross-national qualitative and quantitative research, in the 
studies that have been conducted the tendency has been toward considering 
this region as embedded in cultural and/or religious exceptionalism. The GCC 
states, among MENA area studies, have had a similar fate. They have often 
been treated as a ‘rentier’ exception within the Arab and Islamic exception. 
Moreover, despite the propensity to propose more integrative theoretical 
perspectives for the study of these countries during the 1990s, in practice, most 
studies have paid more attention to ‘structures’ rather than ‘agency’. 
During the 2000s most MENA area specialists focused on the analysis of 
authoritarian structures and elites, as well as on the economic factors behind 
these. As such, important societal dynamics had passed unnoticed, explaining 
why the Arab Spring events took a number of scholars by surprise. Studies of 
the ‘rentier’ Gulf states highlighted the necessity to take into account factors 
other than redistribution of external rent to explain regime stability (as done by 
the RST, Chapter 1). This has mainly translated into the examination of elite 
autonomy through the perspective of historical and International Relations 
paradigms, without considering the perceptions of ordinary citizens, and still 
assuming that rentierism keeps Gulf nationals uninterested in politics.     
In an attempt to address these shortcomings, and adding to the debate around 
the continued significance and scope of RST, this dissertation suggests that an 
important and overlooked dimension in the study of state-society relations in 
authoritarian rentier states, like the UAE, is citizens’ political culture. However, a 
more holistic version of the political culture perspective is adopted. This takes 
into account all six elements suggested by Kamrava’s refined version of the 
state-in-society approach: state, society, political culture, political economy, 
extra-national influences and forces and random occurrences (Kamrava, 2008). 
Additionally, this theoretical framework is complemented with qualitative and 
quantitative analyses of data collected through extensive fieldwork in the UAE. 
This case study demonstrates that rentierism does not solely explain the socio-
political developments taking place in the UAE. Many factors have shaped 
state-society relations since pre-British times, including, but not limited to, the 
rentier nature of the state. Chapter 2 discussed the processes of state and 
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society formation, and the evolution of the relationship between the ruling elites 
and the population diachronically. It evaluated the impact that rentierism has 
had at the local level, by also taking into account regional and global dynamics. 
Therefore, this has led to several conclusions. First, that the multicultural and 
globalised facets of Emirati society are not specifically a post-oil outcome, as is 
generally assumed, and that the movement of people across the Gulf was 
dependant on political, economic, and environmental circumstances over the 
centuries. Second, that British role in the region since the beginning of the 
nineteenth century was a turning point in the UAE’s recent history, and was 
determinant in establishing the power of current ruling families, as well as in the 
adoption of ‘rentier’ state-society relations–later enhanced by oil revenues. 
Third, the ‘rentier’ nature of the newly created state provides citizens, not only 
with material benefits, but with access to education, ICTs, travelling, etc. 
(‘agents of political socialisation’), which inevitably affect political orientations.  
These factors, in addition to massive population growth and integration into the 
global capitalist economic system, determined the establishment of an 
authoritarian political system in 1971, and the configuration of a very 
hierarchical society in which each group (whether ethnic or income related) 
generally plays specific roles, and occupies specific employment areas. The 
resulting socio-economic and political system is legitimatised through a 
reconstructed official discourse that places emphasis on the tribal past of the 
ruling families and closely related tribes, ignoring other identities that form 
Emirati society. Consequently, several social problems have emerged, including 
citizenship, national identity, and demographic imbalance. While these issues 
awake the feelings of ‘alienation’ among the less privileged and the more 
educated social classes, they serve to justify the status quo under the guise of 
preserving ‘national security’. As such, the chapter supports the main 
hypothesis of this dissertation–that the ‘rentier’ nature of a state does not 
necessarily determine political apathy, but instead can actually empower people 
politically through the exposure to reshaped ‘agents of political socialisation’.  
The historical approach to UAE political activism presented here (Chapter 3) 
also reinforces this hypothesis as it demonstrates that aspirations for political 
participation have been present in the country since at least the early twentieth 
century, including under rentier structures. By exploring the current political 
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viewpoints of Emiratis, it also demonstrates that there is no uniform political 
culture in the UAE, but different perspectives regarding politics and political 
liberalisation, hence filling a gap in literature on the UAE. Furthermore, the 
different strategies adopted by the ruling elites to combat political upheaval at 
different times, substantiate the second hypothesis which proposes that 
government performance, and decision to initiate or avoid political reform, is 
mainly driven by domestic pressure. Both in pre and post-oil periods, rulers 
have resorted to a combination of limited power-sharing, redistributive, coercive 
and co-optative measures in response to demands for political change, with the 
main objective being the preservation of control over the resources of power 
that guarantee their position. In recent years, these responses included the 
announcement of a top-down liberalisation project, including the conduction of 
partial elections for a consultative body, but which was halted since unfolding of 
the Arab Spring. These events resulted in a shift toward a security oriented 
approach that has translated into numerous detentions, reportedly unfair trials 
of political activists, and the passing of laws that further restrict civil and human 
rights.  
Within this background, the analysis and measurement of cognitive, affective 
and evaluative political orientations of Emirati UAEU students (Chapters 4 and 
5) reveal that there is high interest but weak knowledge of politics; high concern 
over the population imbalance as well as about wasta and ‘tribalism’; general 
high support for the rulers and the system as a whole; but concern over the lack 
of freedoms; and caution in demands for political reform. The general 
perception of the majority of Western academics–that there is a lack of political 
interest and awareness among Emirati citizens–is probably due to the fact these 
topics are seldom discussed in public. However, qualitative and quantitative 
research shows that there is greater awareness than appears on the surface, 
and that politically aware Emiratis do not speak openly about political issues for 
reasons related to the authoritarian nature of the regime (i.e. fear of domestic 
consequences and regional instability). Confirming hypothesis 3–that there is 
adherence to ‘post-materialistic’ and ‘self-expression’ (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005) 
values among important sectors of the Emirati educated youth–, these chapters 
conclude that UAEU students have high affective and evaluative orientations 
towards the political system, while having low cognitive orientations. Hence, 
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their political culture is described as an ‘aspiring participant culture’ taking into 
account the three types of individuals identified within the population studied: a 
majority of ‘subjects’ (low frequency of orientations towards politics in general 
and ‘allegiance’ towards the system); a sector of society which approaches 
‘parochialism’ (high frequency towards the system and its output aspects, but 
low towards input objects and the self as active participant); and an emergent 
and growing ‘participant’ group (with high frequency towards politics in general). 
This research coincides, to some extent, with Christopher Davidson’s (2012) 
argument that the UAE (and the Gulf) ruling elites do not enjoy uncontested 
legitimacy. It also concurs with Abdulkhaleq Abdulla’s (2010) assertion that the 
region is currently at a turning point of its history (the “Gulf moment”) and that 
the “forces of change” should not be underestimated. However, this dissertation 
does not foresee the “collapse” of these regimes (Davidson, 2012) nor the 
emergent Gulf middle class being able to imminently foster a “democratic 
future” (Abdulla, 2010: 15) any time soon. When examining the congruence 
between political culture and structures, and following Almond and Verba’s 
framework (1963), this study demonstrates that the majority of ‘subject’ 
individuals fairly matches the increasingly centralised authoritarian political 
structure.  
Therefore, the UAE political system is not expected to destabilise or undergo 
significant reforms in the short term. However, the change from a simpler 
pattern of political culture to a more complex one is evident, in which important 
sectors of the educated Emirati youth depict ‘post-materialistic’ critical positions 
and ‘self-expression’ values, as well as ‘alienation’ attitudes towards 
authoritarian rule in general, and specific social problems and policies. 
Accordingly, and since the ruling elites cannot rely solely on redistribution of 
rents to appease criticism or calls for reform, this dissertation concludes that the 
twenty-first century UAE ‘aspiring participant’ political culture has introduced 
some incongruence into the state-society relationship, initially facilitating the 
implementation of cosmetic political reform, but ultimately generating a feeling 
of threat among regime elites and, therefore, resulting in a repressive response. 
For better or worse, significant political change seems unlikely and stable state-
society relations appear to be the most plausible scenario in the UAE presently 
and for the coming years.   
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Annex 1: IJMES Transliteration Chart 
Transliteration of Consonants 
Letter 
Name 
Arabic 
English 
Isolated Final Medial Initial 
ʾAlif ا ﺎ ﺎ ا ʾ / ā 
Bāʾ ﺏ ﺐ ﺒ ﺑ b 
Tāʾ ﺕ ﺖ ﺘ ﺗ t 
Tha' ﺙ ﺚ ﺜ ﺛ th 
Jīm ﺝ ﺞ ﺠ ﺟ j 
Ḥāʾ ﺡ ﺢ ﺤ ﺣ ḥ 
Khāʾ ﺥ ﺦ ﺨ ﺧ kh 
Dāl ﺩ ﺪ ﺩ ﺪ d 
Dhāl ﺫ ﺬ ﺫ ﺬ dh 
Rāʾ ﺭ ﺮ ﺭ ﺮ r 
Zāī ﺯ ﺰ ﺯ ﺰ z 
Sīn ﺱ ﺲ ﺴ ﺳ s 
Shīn ﺵ ﺶ ﺸ ﺷ sh 
Ṣād ﺹ ﺺ ﺼ ﺻ ṣ 
Ḍād ﺽ ﺾ ﻀ ﺿ ḍ 
Ṭāʾ ﻁ ﻂ ﻄ 
 
ﻃ 
ṭ 
Ẓāʾ ﻅ ﻆ ﻈ ﻇ ẓ 
ʿAyn ﻉ ﻊ ﻌ ﻋ ʿ 
Ghayn ﻍ ﻎ ﻐ ﻏ gh 
Fāʾ ﻑ ﻒ ﻔ ﻓ f 
Qāf ﻕ ﻖ ﻘ ﻗ q 
Kāf ﻙ ﻚ ﻜ ﻛ k 
Lām ﻝ ﻞ ﻠ ﻟ l 
Mīm ﻡ ﻢ ﻤ ﻣ m 
Nūn ﻥ ﻦ ﻨ ﻧ n 
Hāʾ ﻩ ﻪ ﻬ ﻫ h 
Wāw ﻭ ﻮ -  w 
Yāʾ ﻱ ﻲ ﻴ ﻳ y 
Hamzah ء ئ/ؤ/أ/إ ِﺎئ /ؤ/أ  أ / إ ʾ 
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Transliteration of Vowels 
Type Arabic English 
Short vowels 
  َ  A 
  َ ‎ U 
 َِ ‎ I 
Long vowels 
 ا  َ ‎ Ā 
 ﻭ  َ ‎ ū 
ﻱ َِ  ī 
Diphthongs 
 ﻱ  َ ‎ ay 
 ﻭ  َ ‎ aw 
Nunation 
ً ـ  an 
ً ـ in 
  ـ un 
 
 
Transliteration of Modified Letters, Gemination, and Nisbī 
Letter 
Name 
Arabic 
English 
Isolated Final Medial Initial 
Modified 
letters 
آ آـ آـ آ ā 
ة ةـ - - a (at in an iḍāfa) 
ى ىـ - - ā 
Gemination 
(shadda)   ّ    ّ    ّ    ّ  (doubled consonant) 
Nisbī (masc)   ي - - - ī / iyy  
Nisbī (fem) ة ي - - - iyya 
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Annex 5: Photograph
 
Men in an ‘abra, Abu Dhabi, ca. 
1950s.  
Picture by Ronald Codrai.
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Women in an ‘abra, Abu Dhabi, ca. 
1950s. Picture by Ronald Codrai.
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Two pearling merchants, Abu 
Dhabi, ca. 1950s.  
Picture by Ronald Codrai.
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 Source: "Water: H2O = Life" Exhibition. 
http://www.waterexhibitionadach.ae/index.php/en/
photo_gallery/11 
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 Source: "Water: H2O = Life" Exhibition. 
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Abras in Bur Dubai Creek, March 2012 
Picture by dissertation author 
 
 
Dubai Skyline, December 2011 
Picture by dissertation author 
 
 
Abu Dhabi, 2011 
Picture by dissertation author 
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 Source: "Water: H2O = Life" Exhibition. 
http://www.waterexhibitionadach.ae/index.php/en/
photo_gallery/8 
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Electoral candidate poster in Abu Dhabi,  
September 2011. 
Picture by dissertation author 
 
 
National Day celebration in Abu Dhabi,  
December 2011. 
Picture by dissertation author 
 
 
Class at UAEU Campus,  
February 2012. 
Picture by dissertation author 
 
 
Polling station in Dubai,  
September 2011. 
Picture by dissertation author 
 
 
National Day celebration at UAEU,  
December 2011. 
Picture by dissertation author 
 
        
Booklet against Muslim Brotherhood 
distributed at UAEU since Spring 2014. 
Picture by informant sent to author via 
Facebook
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Annex 6: Main ministries by tribe
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 914ttocyoB snoitcelE CNF rof llaC - esaeleR sserP :7 xennA
 بيان صحفي للنشر الفوري
 1102-2-71
 دعوة لمقاطعة الإنتخابات الشكلية للمجلس الوطني الإتحادي (البرلمان) في الإمارات
م في شأن  2111) لسنة  4م المتعلق بتعديل أحكام قرار المجلس الأعلى للاتحاد رقم (  1111لسنة  ) 1جاء القرار رقم ( 
تحديد طريقة اختيار ممثلي الإمارات في المجلس الوطني الاتحادي، جاء، مخيبا ًللحد الأدنى من للآمال و الطموحات التي 
 . سية عن بقية دول المنطقةالتي تأخر فيها الإصلاحات السيا –يتطلع لها شعب الإمارات 
و يأتي هذا القرار، الذي لا يختلف عن سابقه سوى من حيث عدد الناخبين الذي تضاعف إلى ثلاث مرات، في الوقت الذي 
تشهد فيه المنطقة ثورات عديدة تطالب بالإصلاح السياسي و الحرية و المساواة و العدالة الإجتماعية و احترام حقوق 
 . عضها في إسقاط بعض الأنظمة الديكتاتورية العتيدةالإنسان، وقد نجح ب
 : على النحو التالي 2111إلا أن القرار جاء ليعيد التجربة الشكلية لعام 
أولا:ً سيتم تعيين من يحق لهم الإنتخاب و الترشح لعضوية المجلس الوطني الإتحادي من قبل الحكومات المحلية (أقل من 
بل حاكم كل إماراة). و هو ما يعني أن الإنتخابات ليست سوى تعيين غير مباشر عشرين ألف شخص سيتم تسميتهم من ق
 .للأعضاء
ثانيأ: يقتصر حق الترشح و الإنتخاب على أقل من عشرين ألف شخص من مجموع مواطني الدولة البالغ عددها تسعمئة ألف 
ناخب كحد ادنى حسب  111011العدد الرسمي % تقريبا ًمن المواطنين فقط. (1نسمة تقريباً؛ أي أن النسبة تمثل أقل من 
 .)عدد المقاعد المخصصة لكل إمارة في الدستور
ثالثا:ً لم يشر القرار إلى نية إصلاح تشريعات المجلس الوطني و إعطائه الصلاحيات التشريعية و الرقابية الكاملة، مما يعني 
 . يات حقيقيةأن دور المجلس الوطني سيبقى كما هو مجلس إستشاري دون أية صلاح
رابعا:ً لم يشر القرار إلى استقلال المجلس الوطني عن الحكومة و مازال عمله يخضع إداريا ًللحكومة عبر وزارة الدولة 
 .لشؤون المجلس الوطني
 .خامسا:ً سيتم تعيين نصف الأعضاء بشكل مباشر من قبل الحكومات المحلية
تفرقة بين أبناء الإمارات، و لعلمنا المسبق بالتدخل الأمني في الموافقة  لهذه الأسباب مجتمعة، و لما يحمله هذا القرار من
على قائمة الأسماء التي سيتم ترشيحها من قبل الحكومات المحلية، أعلن أنا الموقع أدناه عن رفضي القاطع لهذه الإنتخابات 
انتخابات مباشرة لجميع أعضاء المجلس الوطني و أدعو المواطنين المعنيين من أبناء الإمارات بالمقاطعة أيضا ًو المطالبة ب
 .و استقلاليته استقلالية كاملة عن الحكومة
  الإمارات-أحمد منصور
 ناشط حقوقي مستقل
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PRESS RELEASE FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE 
17-2-2011 
A Call for a boycott of the cosmetic election of the Federal National Council (Parliament) in 
the UAE 
Decision No. (1) for the year 2011 on amending the provisions of previous decision of the 
Supreme Council of the Federation (No. 4) for the year 2006 that governs the method of 
selecting representatives of the UAE Federal National Council (“FNC”, the Parliament), 
came to be very disappointment to a wide range of the citizens and was not meeting the 
bare minimum hopes and ambitions, and puts UAE in a very late stage when it comes to 
political reform compared with the rest of the countries in the region. 
This resolution, which does not differ from its previous one except in the number of voters 
which tripled, comes at a time when the region is undergoing many revolutions demanding 
political reform, freedom, equality, social justice and respect for human rights. Some of the 
revolutions succeeded in forcing dictatorial regimes to step down. 
However, a decision was made to re-experience the cosmetic election of 2006 as follows: 
First: All members of the Electoral Committee, who are the only eligible to vote and to run 
for the election, are going to be directly appointed by the Rulers of different Emirates. (Less 
than a total of twenty thousand people will be nominated by the local Rulers); which means 
that the elected members would be indirectly appointed to start with.   
Second: only the right to stand for election is granted to less than twenty thousand people 
of all UAE citizens, which constitute less than 2% of the citizens only. (The official minimum 
number of the Electoral Committee is 12 000 voters as per the decision). 
Third: The decision did not indicate any intention of reform to the legislation of the FNC to 
give it complete legislative and monitoring authorities, which implicitly means that the role 
of FNC will remain as is as an advisory council without any real authority. 
Fourth: The decision does not indicate that FNC would be administratively independent of 
the government, which means it will still remain under the government through the Ministry 
of State for National Council Affairs. 
Fifth: Half of the members of the FNC will still be directly appointed by Local Rulers.   
Thus, for all these reasons, and due to the fact that such selective indirect election unfairly 
discriminates between the people of the UAE, and due our  prior knowledge of  intervention 
of the Security Authorities in screening the names of the nominees before the final 
approval,  I hereby announce my complete rejection of this  elections and I call upon 
concerned citizens to boycott it and to demand for a completed direct election of all 
members of the FNC and its full from the government. 
Ahmad Mansoor – UAE 
Independent Human Rights Activist 
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Annex 8: 3rd of March Petition (2011) 420 
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 Available (in Arabic) at: http://www.ipetitions.com/petition/uaepetition71/ 
297 
 
 
298 
 
 
299 
 
 
300 
 
 
301 
 
 
302 
 
 
303 
 
 
304 
 
 
  
305 
 
  
306 
 
Annex 9: Associations Petition (2011) 
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Annex 10: President’s Statement (2005) 
 
President Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan's Statement on the  
34th National Day of the UAE (2nd December 2005)421  
 
 
In the name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful, My dear countrymen 
and women, today we celebrate the 34th anniversary of a glorious day in the history of 
our nation. On December 2, 1971, we started the march towards these great 
achievements that have covered all parts of our dear nation. It was the day that saw 
the unity of our words and determination giving birth to the United Arab Emirates and 
all what we enjoy today: political stability, strong economy, educated and trained 
manpower resources, progress, prosperity and security, as well as diplomatic, trade, 
cultural and humanitarian relations which extend to all countries of the world, thus 
establishing a sound regional and international ties that are based on vision, 
moderation, balanced policy, support for the truth and justice, and non-interference in 
the internal affairs of others.  
 
We remember on this blessed day, with deep regards and utmost appreciation, 
the history of the founders of our great federation. We remember with prayers the 
founder of this nation: the late Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, the late Sheikh 
Rashid bin Maktoum Al Maktoum, the late Sheikh Rashid bin Humaid Al Nu'aimi, the 
late Sheikh Mohammed bin Hamad Al Sharqi and the late Sheikh Ahmed bin Rashid Al 
Mualla (may their souls rest in perfect peace) and may Allah the Almighty have mercy 
and bless all those who had contributed in one way or the other in building this 
prosperous state. 
 
The federation that we see today as a civil, political, social and economic reality 
did not come as a gift or grant nor did it come on a silver platter. It came as a result of 
good and strenuous efforts by our founding fathers, who translated the idea from their 
heart and mind to the reality that we live in today. They strived to build and consolidate 
the pillars of this nation, to build a system that entrenches the rule of law and due 
process. They strived to establish a federal system of governance capable of 
developing and living up to the test of time.  
 
We owe them great respect and loyalty and to them we express our profound 
gratitude and appreciation for their tremendous contributions to the building of this 
prosperous nation. We pray for Allah's blessings and mercy on the souls of those who 
had departed this world. We also pray for good health and long life for those who still 
live and continue to give their utmost best to this nation.  
The history of those great men is an important source from which this nation derives its 
pride, strength, aspirations, security and capability to face challenges. This is because 
any nation that does not honour its leaders is not worth dying for. Such a nation does 
not have a good future. Good nations maintain their identity and characteristics by 
preserving their history and heritage and seeking inspiration from the good works of 
their leaders. Achieving these objectives requires from us hard and well-organised 
work: all cultural, educational and academic institutions must actively participate in 
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teaching the young generations their ancestors' civil and cultural heritage and the great 
contributions these leaders made in the building of this great nation.  
 
The federation that we celebrate today reflects loyalty, sense of belonging, 
responsibility, national identity, great efforts, selflessness and a reality of a living 
condition. It is an investment in our human resources which is the major target of our 
development and our programmes. This is in continuation of what our pioneers have 
begun. It is to consolidate the development that would judiciously tap the energy of the 
youth and urge them on to work in a good and creative way. The strengthening of our 
federation march and national unity, and our continuous pursuance of sustainable 
development require hard work to boost the existing strong cooperation between the 
local and federal authorities. 
 
We also need to push forward for more fruitful coordination for our common 
good. This is to be done within the framework of mutual trust and highest level of 
cooperation. It also requires all federal institutions to play their national roles in facing 
with the highest degree of responsibility and transparency all forms of challenges and 
problems confronting the nation. Considering the developments in our region, which is 
now witnessing transformation and reforms, the years ahead in our blessed march 
require a bigger role for the Federal National Council by empowering it to be an 
authority that would provide great support and guidance for the executive arm of the 
government.  
We shall work to make the Council more capable, more effective and more sensitive to 
the issues affecting the nation and the people. This would be done by ensuring a more 
participatory process and the entrenchment of "Shura" (consultations) policy. And 
through a gradual, organised course, we have decided to start activating the role of the 
FNC through electing half of its members through councils for each emirate and 
appointing the other half. 
 
By doing this, we will embark on a march that culminates in more participation 
and interaction from all the citizen of the country. My dear countrymen and women, 
Today, we stand at a threshold of a new era, whose ultimate objective is to entrench 
the rule of law and due process, accountability, transparency and equal opportunity.  
 
In order to achieve these objectives the years ahead require the rebuilding, 
restructuring, re-arrangement and rehabilitation of all existing government bodies and 
structures. We have already begun preparing for the new era by promulgating 
legislations, taking some regulatory measures on the existing departments, institutions, 
activities and relations. This is to tighten the lose ends, straighten the curves, put an 
end to wrongdoings, get rid of bad nuts, improve production and services and guide 
efforts in order to develop the institutions, structures and activities, and to encourage 
promising cadres. It is also to prepare the ground for a successful launch to the horizon 
of the 21st century. 
 
It is high time for our political, religious, cultural, information, educational and 
civil society institutions to stand up to their responsibilities to instill in our society the 
values of love for work, to change the negative perceptions about vocational work. It is 
high time to make them understand the true meaning of work - that it means 
responsibility and reflects human, civil and religious values. These institutions also 
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need to work hard to diversify the skills of the national human resources, to raise 
productivity, encourage investment in human resources development, improve 
voluntary work and create awareness on this noble work and its significance to 
individuals and the society in general.  
There is a need to improve the means and methods of voluntary works by encouraging 
and facilitating the establishment of specialised voluntary organizations that aim at 
bringing development to the society. There is also a need for the educational, media, 
cultural and sporting institutions to increase their level of attention and efforts in 
educating UAE nationals about the significance of voluntary works and to urge them on 
to get actively involved in this noble practice. This can be done by including voluntary 
work in the civic education curricula at the various educational levels. 
 
In this regard, the media is also required to highlight on national issues and 
especially those affecting the people. The media need to spread awareness on the 
essence and significance of work as embodying religious, humanitarian, social and 
civic values for the development of individuals and the society in general. This is to be 
done in an atmosphere of responsible freedom and high-level professionalism that is 
built on accuracy and objectivity, professionalism that has great respect for the truth 
and common sense. 
 
Fellow countrymen, Our foreign policy is grounded on firm basis and clear 
principles of mutual respect, good neighbourliness, non-interference in the internal 
affairs of other countries, building of relations that serve mutual interests, promotion of 
the spirit of cooperation, resolution of conflicts through peaceful means, commitment to 
Arab, Islamic and international conventions, promotion of global peace and stability 
and support for just causes. These are the values and principles that continue to guide 
our foreign policy in its four domains , namely the GCC, Arab, Islamic and international 
spheres.  
 
On the GCC level, we will continue to coordinate and consult with our brethren, 
the GCC leaders, with the aim of reinforcing the efficiency of our organisation which is 
now about to celebrate its silver jubilee. We will continue our endeavors to enhance the 
role of the GCC in maintaining regional peace and also in reinforcing socio-economic 
and political integration in a manner that serves the best interests and aspirations of 
our peoples.  
 
In this respect, we look forward to a successful 26th GCC summit which will be 
held in Abu Dhabi from 18-19th this month. It is our hope that the GCC leaders would 
be able to arrive at resolutions that would reinforce the inter-GCC cooperation and 
address current Arab and global challenges. 
 
A common GCC vision and approach to problems will certainly add momentum 
to the role being played by the GCC within the wider regional Arab framework. On this 
occasion, we value and salute the sincere efforts of the GCC leaders to affirm the right 
of the UAE over its occupied islands. In particular, we value the support rendered to us 
by the GCC leaders for devising a mechanism for direct talks between us and Iran , so 
as to reach a just solution that would set the relations between countries of the region 
on a firm basis. This approach underscores our keenness to achieve regional and 
global peace and stability.  
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On the Arab level, we will continue to support common Arab cooperation 
through the Arab League and its specialised organisations. We are also keen to 
promote our bilateral relations with all Arab countries. In this context, we would like to 
re-affirm our support for the unity of Iraq and its people. We are deeply pained and 
concerned by the deterioration of the security situation and the continuous bombings, 
violence, terrorism, kidnappings and killings of innocent civilians.  
 
It is our hope that recent political developments in the country –notably the 
endorsement of the constitution, the convening of the preliminary meeting for the 
national reconciliation conference and the upcoming legislative elections– would 
constitute the basis for a new united Iraq that would hopefully stage a strong comeback 
to Arab and international arena.  
 
A united, stable and secure Iraq is not only an asset to Arab national security 
but also to global peace and stability. On the Palestinian question, we have closely 
been following recent developments, notably the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. 
We hope that this withdrawal would be followed by similar withdrawals from the 
occupied Arab territories so that the Palestinian people would have the opportunity to 
establish their own independent state with Jerusalem as its capital, as provided for in 
the UN resolutions and international peace initiatives, notably the Road Map and Arab 
Peace Initiative. We believe that these two plans constitute the framework for resolving 
the Middle East Conflict. To alleviate the suffering of the Palestinian people, we 
launched our initiative to build a city in Rafah on the ashes of the Israeli settlement. 
This is in addition to other projects. On Sudan, the UAE supports the constructive 
efforts being adopted by Sudan which culminated in the signing of the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement (CPA). We hereby re-affirm our full support to Arab and international 
efforts that are underway to rebuild the war-torn areas. We wish that peace, security 
and prosperity will prevail in that sisterly country. On our relations with Islamic 
countries, it must be noted that these relations are based on mutual respect, 
cooperation, unification of Muslim ranks and reaching out to those in need. It should 
also be noted that our readiness to reach out to brethren who need our support stems 
from our Islamic values. It is against this background that the UAE leadership and 
people stood by the side of their Pakistani brethren when a devastating earthquake hit 
that country recently. It was also in this context that I ordered our Armed Forces to 
urgently dispatch search and rescue teams in addition to urgent relief supplies. We are 
really proud of the role being played by our Armed Forces as well as by the Red 
Crescent Society (RCS) and other charity organisations to alleviate the suffering of 
those affected during the earthquake.  
 
On the issue of terrorism, we have strongly condemned the vicious terrorist 
bombings that hit the sisterly and friendly countries of Egypt, Jordan and the United 
Kingdom.  
We have expressed our full solidarity with the governments and people of those 
countries in the face of this menace. The threat of terrorism requires a strong stand so 
that it is decisively uprooted.  It is a virulent threat that should be weeded out not only 
because it destabilises nations but also because it is inconsistent with all human 
values.  
  
312 
 
Our foreign policy is built on principles of mutual respect, understanding, 
dialogue and cooperation, condemnation of all forms of terrorism, violence and 
fundamentalism, and observance of all international laws and accords. We stand in 
support of every call for peace that can save the world from serious perils.  
 
Fellow countrymen, I take the opportunity of this glorious occasion to 
congratulate and salute my brethren- Their Highnesses Supreme Council Members 
and Rulers of the emirates for transforming our federation into a viable entity. They 
succeeded in realising the aspirations of our people. I also congratulate our young men 
and women in uniform for their patriotism and dedication to protect their country. My 
congratulations also go to our security forces and the police for their vigilance so that 
our country remains an oasis of peace and security.  
  
I also extend my congratulations and salutations to the UAE people and 
expatriate residents of friendly and sisterly countries whose sincere contribution in the 
development of our country is highly valued.  
   
I conclude by reiterating that the formidable achievements that we have made 
over the years must be safeguarded through unity of ranks and tenacity to the spirit of 
federation. It is in this federation that our supreme interest lies. It is also to our 
federation that we owe allegiance. We pray to Allah the All Mighty to grace us with 
success so that we continue lead us people into greater and sustained prosperity.  
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Annex 11: Post-Arab Spring Detainees 
 
 Name 
Signed 3
rd
  
March 
Petition 
Date of detention Sentence 
1
s
t  Hassan Muhammad al-
Hammadi 
N/A 
First detention: 4
th
 
February 2011 
Second: 30
th
 July 2012 
10 years 
imprisonment 
U
A
E
 5
 
Ahmed Mansoor Yes 10
th
 April 2011 
3 years imprisonment 
Pardoned by Pres. 
Decree 
Ahmed Abdulkhaleq No July 2011 
2 years imprisonment 
Pardoned - Deported 
Nasser bin Ghaith No 10
th
 April 2011 
2 years imprisonment 
Pardoned by Pres. 
Decree 
Fahad Salim Dalk al 
Shehhi 
No 10
th
 April 2011 
2 years imprisonment 
Pardoned by Pres. 
Decree 
Hassan Ali al-Khamis No  
2 years imprisonment 
Pardoned by Pres. 
Decree 
U
A
E
 7
 
Dr. Ali Hussain al-
Hammadi 
Yes 9
th
 April 2012 
10 years 
imprisonment 
Muhammad Abdulrazzaq 
al-Siddiq 
Yes 9
th
 April 2012 
10 years 
imprisonment 
Prof. Shaheen al Hosani Yes 9
th
 April 2012 
10 years 
imprisonment 
Hussain al-Jabri No 9
th
 April 2012 
10 years 
imprisonment 
Hassan al-Jabri No 9
th
 April 2012 
10 years 
imprisonment 
Ibrahim al-Marzouqui No 9
th
 April 2012 
10 years 
imprisonment 
Ahmed Gaith al-Suweidi No 26
th
 April 2012 
10 years 
imprisonment 
 
Sultan bin Kayed al-
Qasimi 
Yes 20
th
 April 2012 
10 years 
imprisonment 
Mohamed al Mansoori Yes 16
th
 July 2012 
10 years 
imprisonment 
Mohamed Abdullah al 
Roken 
Yes 17
th
 July 2012 
10 years 
imprisonment 
C
y
b
e
r Abdullah al Hadidi Yes 22
nd
 March 2013 Serving 10 months* 
Waleed al Shehhi Yes 11
th
 May 2013 Awaiting trial* 
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List of UAE Current Political Prisoners422 
 
List of those currently being held by the authorities in the United Arab Emirates 
in relation to political & human rights activism 
(Last updated 07/10/2013) 
 
Convicted Political Prisoners – UAE 94 Trial 
 
Serving 10 Year Prison Sentences 
 
1. Saleh al-Dhufairi, aged 53, from Ras al-Khaimah, detained on April 29th 2012. 
2. Mohamed Abdulrazzaq Alsidiq, aged 49, from Sharjah, detained on April 9th 2012. 
3. Ahmed Ghaith al-Suweidi, aged 52, from Abu Dhabi, detained on March 26th 2012. 
4. Ali al-Hammadi, aged 51, from Abu Dhabi, detained on April 9th 2012. 
5. Shaheen al-Hosani, aged 51, from Sharjah, detained on April 9th 2012. 
6. Husain al-Jabiri, aged 53, from Abu Dhabi, detained on April 9th 2012. 
7. Hassan al-Jabiri, aged 52, from Abu Dhabi, detained on April 9th 2012. 
8. Ibrahim al-Marzooqi, aged 42, from Abu Dhabi, detained on April 9th 2012. 
9. Ahmed al-Zaabi, aged 47, from Abu Dhabi, detained on March 26th 2012. 
10. Sultan bin Kayed al-Qasimi, aged 55, from Ras al-Khaimah, detained on April 20th 
2012. 
11. Salim Sahooh, aged 58, from Sharjah, detained on April 30th 2012. 
12. Ahmed al-Tabour al-Nuaimi, aged 48, from Ras al-Khaimah, detained on May 18th 
2012. 
13. Abdulrahman al-Hadidi, aged 54, from Sharjah, detained on July 16th 2012. 
14. Mohamed al-Mansoori, aged 55, from Ras al-Khaimah, detained on July 16th 2012. 
15. Khalifa al-Nuaimi, aged 25, from Sharjah, detained on July 16th 2012. 
16. Rashid Omran al-Shamsi, aged 34, from Sharjah, detained on July 16th 2012. 
17. Khalid al-Shaiba al-Nuaimi, aged 61, from Ajman, detained on July 16th 2012. 
18. Ibrahim al-Yassi, aged 51, from Ajman, detained on July 16th 2012. 
19. Husain al-Najjar, aged 39, from Sharjah, detained on July 16th 2012. 
20. Mohamed Abdulla al-Roken, aged 50, from Dubai, detained on July 17th 2012. 
21. Essa al-Sari, aged 50, from Sharjah, detained on July 17th 2012. 
22. Salim Hamdoon al-Shehhi, aged 32, from Ras al-Khaimah, detained on July 18th 
2012. 
23. Issa Khalifa al-Suweidi, aged 46, from Abu Dhabi, detained on July 19th 2012. 
24. Juma Darwish al-Felasi, aged 48, from Dubai, detained on July 19th 2012. 
25. Tariq al-Qasim, aged 48, from Dubai, detained on July 19th 2012. 
26. Saif al-Egleh, aged 54, from Sharjah, detained on July 24th 2012. 
27. Hamad Roqait, aged 61, from Sharjah, detained on July 24th 2012. 
28. Tariq Hassan al-Qattan, aged 41, from Umm al-Quwain, detained on July 24th 
2012. 
29. Musabeh al-Rumaithi, aged 44, from Abu Dhabi, detained on July 24th 2012. 
                                                            
422
 Source: Emirates Centre for Human Rights (ECFHR) (2013, October 7). 
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30. Abdulrahmeem al-Zaroon, aged 43, from Um al-Quwain, detained on July 24th 
2012. 
31. Abdulsalam Darwish, aged 42, from Sharjah, detained on July 24th 2012. 
32. Saeed Nasser al-Wahidi, aged 49, from Abu Dhabi, detained on July 25th 2012. 
33. Ali Abdullah Mahdi al-Manie, aged 45, from Abu Dhabi, detained on July 25th 2012. 
34. Khalid Mohammed Alyammahi, aged 34, from Fujairah, detained on July 30th 
2012. 
35. Hassan Mohammed al-Hammadi, aged 52, from Sharjah, detained on July 30th 
2012. 
36. Ahmed Saqer al-Suweidi, aged 47, from Ajman, detained on July 30th 2012. 
37. Saif Aletr, aged 57, from Fujairah, detained on July 30th 2012. 
38. Najeeb Amiri, aged 51, from Sharjah, detained on July 31st 2012. 
39. Fuad Mohammed al-Hammadi, aged 49, from Sharjah, detained on July 31st 2012. 
40. Ahmed Saif al-Matri, aged 47, from Fujairah, detained on July 31st 2012. 
41. Abdulaziz Hareb, aged 45, from Dubai, detained on August 27th 2012. 
42. Ali Abdulla al-Khaja, aged 47, from Abu Dhabi, detained on August 28th 2012. 
43. Abdulla al-Jabri, aged 48, from Abu Dhabi, detained on August 28th 2012. 
44. Rashid Khalfan bin Sabt, aged 42, from Um al-Quwain, detained on August 28th 
2012. 
45. Ali Salim al-Gawws al-Zaabi, aged 54, from Abu Dhabi, detained on August 31st 
2012. 
46. Ali Saeed al-Kindi, aged 36, from Sharjah, detained on September 9th 2012. 
47. Hadif al-Owais, aged 54, from Sharjah, detained on September 11th 2012. 
48. Mohammed al-Abdouli, aged 45, from Abu Dhabi, detained on October 11th 2012. 
49. Abdulraheem Naqi, aged 59, from Ras al-Khaimah, detained on October 12th 
2012. 
50. Khaled Fadel Ahmed, from Abu Dhabi, detained on March 2nd 2013. 
51. Salem Mousa al-Halyan al-Tuniji, from Ras al-Khaimah, detained on March 2nd 
2013. 
52. Ahmed Hajji al-Qobaisi, from Abu Dhabi, detained on March 2nd 2013. 
53. Ahmed Hassan al-Rostomani, from Dubai, detained on March 2nd 2013. 
54. Ahmed Kayed al-Muhairi, from Abu Dhabi, detained on March 2nd 2013. 
55. Ismael Abdullah al-Hosani, from Sharjah, detained on March 2nd 2013. 
56. Ali Mohammed bin Hajar al-Shehhi, from Ras al-Khaimah, detained on March 2nd 
2013. 
 
Serving 7 Year Prison Sentences 
 
1. Omran al-Radhwan, aged 29, from Sharjah, detained on July 16th 2012. 
2. Mahmoud al-Hosani, aged 32, from Sharjah, detained on July 16th 2012. 
3. Abdullah al-Hajiri, aged 29, from Dubai, detained on July 17th 2012. 
4. Mansoor al-Ahmadi, aged 27, from Dubai, detained on October 12th 2012. 
5. Fahad Abdulqader al-Hajiri, from Dubai, detained on March 2nd 2013. 
 
Sentenced to 15 Year Prison Sentences in Absentia 
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1. Mohamed Saqer al-Zaabi, from Abu Dhabi, currently residing outside the UAE. 
Sentenced to 15 years imprisonment. 
2. Abdulrahman Khalifah bin Sobaih, from Dubai, currently residing outside the 
UAE. Sentenced to 15 years imprisonment. 
3. Saeed Nasser al-Tunaiji, from Ras al-Khaimah, currently residing outside the 
UAE. Sentenced to 15 years imprisonment. 
4. Mohammed Jassim al-Nuaimi, from Ras al-Khaimah, currently residing outside the 
UAE. Sentenced to 15 years imprisonment. 
5. Ahmed Mohammed al-Shaibah, from Ajman, currently residing outside the 
UAE. Sentenced to 15 years imprisonment. 
6. Hamad Mohammed al-Shamsi, from Ajman, currently residing outside the 
UAE. Sentenced to 15 years imprisonment. 
7. Jassim Rashid al-Shamsi, from Sharjah, currently residing outside the 
UAE. Sentenced to 15 years imprisonment. 
8. Khalaf Abdulrahman al-Rumaithi, currently residing outside the UAE. Sentenced to 
15 years imprisonment. 
 
Acquitted Defendants in UAE 94 Trial 
 
1. Fatima al-Salaqi, aged 52, from Ajman, interrogated by authorities on January 10th 
2013. 
2. Hadia Abdul Aziz, aged 43, from Sharjah, interrogated by authorities on January 2nd 
2013. 
3. Jameela al-Shamsi, aged 52, from Sharjah, interrogated by authorities on January 
9th 2013. 
4. Ameena al-Shaibah, aged 59, from Ajman, interrogated by authorities on January 
9th 2013. 
5. Huda bin Kamel, aged 51, from Sharjah, currently on bail. 
6. Naeema al-Marzouqi, aged 52, from Abu Dhabi, interrogated by authorities on 
January 2nd 2013. 
7. Naeema Yahya, aged 49, from Sharjah, interrogated by authorities on January 2nd 
2013. 
8. Najeeba al-Hashimi, aged 52, from Ras al-Khaimah, interrogated by authorities on 
January 14th 2013. 
9. Hessa al-Dhufairi, aged 50, from Ras al-Khaimah, interrogated by authorities on 
January 9th 2013. 
10. Mariam al-Dhufairi, aged 55, from Ras al-Khaimah, interrogated by authorities on 
January 9th 2013. 
11. Majidah al-Faris, aged 51, from Fujairah, interrogated by authorities on January 
2nd 2013. 
12. Najeeba al-Refaie, aged 45, from Ajman, currently on bail. 
13. Fatima Humaidan al-Zaabi, aged 50, from Abu Dhabi, interrogated by authorities 
on January 9th 2013. 
14. Ahmed Mohamed Saleh al-Hammadi, from Sharjah, detained on March 1st 2013. 
15. Adel Ahmed al-Zarouni, from Abu Dhabi, detained on March 1st 2013. 
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16. Tawfeeq Yousif al-Sheikh, from Abu Dhabi, detained on March 2nd 2013. 
17. Khamis Saeed al-Sam al-Zyoudi, aged 45, from Fujairah, detained on September 
9th 2012. 
18. Ahmed Awad al-Sharqi, aged 47, from Abu Dhabi, detained on August 28th 2012. 
19. Rashid al-Roken, aged 26, from Dubai, detained on July 17th 2012. 
20. Mohamed Abdan al-Naqbi, aged 37, from Sharjah, detained on July 24th 2012.. 
21. Jamal Awad al-Sharqi, aged 41, from Abu Dhabi, detained on August 28th 2012. 
22. Adnan Julfar, aged 45, from Dubai, detained on July 24th 2012. 
23. Ali Humaid al-Nuaimi, aged 51, from Ras al-Khaimah, detained on July 31st 2012. 
24. Bader Abdulrahman al-Hammadi, aged 48, from Sharjah, detained on July 31st 
2012. 
25. Mohammed Abdullah al-Shaami, from Sharjah, detained on March 7th 2013. 
 
Charged/Convicted Under Cybercrimes Decree 
 
1. Abdullah al-Hadidi, from Sharjah, detained on March 22nd 2013 and serving a 10-
month prison sentence for comments made online. 
2. Mohamed Salem al-Zumer, aged 18, from Sharjah, detained on December 5th 2012 
and awaiting trial. 
3. Waleed al-Shehhi, from Ajman, detained on May 11th 2013 and awaiting trial. 
 
Other Emirati Nationals being Detained in Relation to their Political & Human 
Rights Activism 
 
1. Naji Rashid al-Nuaimi, from Sharjah, detained on December 14th 2012, held at an 
unknown location. 
2. Saeid al-Shehhi, detained on December 14th 2012, held at an unknown location. 
3. Salem al-Baloushi, from Abu Dhabi, detained on December 16th 2012, held at an 
unknown location. 
4. Abdullah al-Sayq, from Dubai, detained on December 17th 2012, held at an 
unknown location. 
5. Saleh al-Naqbi, from Sharjah, detained on December 17th 2012, held at an unknown 
location. 
6. Omaran al-Baloushi, from Sharjah, detained on December 17th 2012, held at an 
unknown location. 
7. Ahmed Hassan al-Hammadi, from Sharjah, detained on December 17th 2012, held 
at an unknown location. 
8. Saud Kulaib, from Ras al-Khaimah, detained on December 29th 2012, held at an 
unknown location. 
9. Essa al-Baloushi, from Dubai, held at an unknown location. 
10. Waheed al-Baloushi, from Dubai, held at an unknown location. 
11. Mahmoud Ahmed Edrees, from Dubai, held at an unknown location. 
12. Owais Ahmed Edrees, from Dubai, held at an unknown location. 
13. Saleh al-Hajiri, from Abu Dhabi, held at an unknown location. 
14. Abdullah al-Suraihi, from Abu Dhabi, held at an unknown location. 
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15. Khalifah al-Baloushi, from Sharjah, held at an unknown location. 
16. Taher al-Tamimi, from Dubai, detained on March 25th 2013, held at an unknown 
location. 
17. Saeed Abdullah al-Buraimi, detained on March 26th 2013, held at an unknown 
location. 
18. Abdulwahid al-Badi, detained on March 26th 2013, held at an unknown location. 
19. Obaid al-Zaabi, from Abu Dhabi, detained on July 1st 2013, transferred to al-Sader 
jail on July 7th 2013. 
20. Hussain al-Ajlah, detained on July 1st 2013, held at an unknown location. 
21. Hithem Jassim, detained on July 17th 2013, held at an unknown location. 
22. Khalifah Rabia, from Fujairah detained on July 24th 2013, held at an unknown 
location. 
23. Othman Ali al-Shehhi, from Ras al-Khaimah, detained on July 24th 2013, held at an 
unknown location. 
 
Emirati Nationals & Stateless Persons Deported to 3rd Party Country 
 
1. Ahmed Abdulkhaleq, stateless person, deported to Thailand on July 16th 2012. 
 
Non-UAE Nationals Detained in the UAE 
 
1. Ahmed Jaafer, Egyptian, detained on December 18th 2012, whereabouts unknown. 
2. Ali Sonbul, Egyptian, detained in the UAE on December 19th 2012, whereabouts 
unknown 
3. Mohammed Shahdah, Egyptian, detained in the UAE on November 30th 2012, 
whereabouts unknown. 
4. Abdullah Ibrahim, Egyptian, detained in the UAE on December 11th 2012, 
whereabouts unknown. 
5. Saleh Faraj, Egyptian, detained on November 21st 2012, whereabouts unknown. 
6. Ibrahim Abdulaziz, Egyptian, detained on December 15th 2012, whereabouts 
unknown. 
7. Ahmed Taha, Egyptian, detained on December 19th 2012, whereabouts unknown. 
8. Murad Mohammed Hamed, Egyptian, detained on December 19th 2012, 
whereabouts unknown. 
9. Salah Rezq al-Meshad, Egyptian, detained on November 30th 2012, whereabouts 
unknown. 
10. Abdullah al-Arabi, Egyptian, detained on November 30th 2012, whereabouts 
unknown. 
11. Medhat al-Ajez, Egyptian, detained on November 30th 2012, whereabouts 
unknown. 
12. Mohammed Abdul Muneam, Egyptian, detained on January 7th 2013, whereabouts 
unknown. 
14. Mahmoud al-Jeedah, Qatari, detained on February 28th 2013, whereabouts 
unknown. 
15. Ahmed Iabeb, Egyptian, detained on December 13th 2012, whereabouts unknown. 
320 
 
16. Abdulmune’m Ali Al Sayed Ateyah, Egyptian, detained on January 3rd 2013, 
whereabouts unknown. 
17. Midhat Rajab Ammar, Egyptian, whereabouts unknown. 
18. Hamdi Nassar, Egyptian, detained on June 3rd 2013, whereabouts unknown. 
19. Mohammed Mousa, Egyptian, detained on June 4th 2013, whereabouts unknown. 
20. Rajab Abdrabuh, Egyptian, detained on June 3rd 2013, whereabouts unknown. 
21. Abdulhakam Mohammed Fathi, Egyptian, detained on June 4th 2013, whereabouts 
unknown. 
22. Ezzat al-Namer, Egyptian, detained on June 4th 2013, whereabouts unknown. 
23. Aiman Zahran, Egyptian, detained on June 4th 2013, whereabouts unknown. 
24. Ahmed Essam Mahmoud, Egyptian, detained on June 4th 2013, whereabouts 
unknown. 
25. Mohammed Refa’at, Egyptian, detained on June 4th 2013, whereabouts unknown. 
26. Aiman al-Adawi, Egyptian, detained on June 4th 2013, whereabouts unknown. 
27. Osama al-Far, Egyptian, detained on June 4th 2013, whereabouts unknown. 
28. Harbi Mahmoud Harbi, Egyptian, detained on June 4th 2013, whereabouts 
unknown. 
29. Osama al-Rwainy, Egyptian, detained on June 4th 2013, whereabouts unknown. 
30. Mohammed al-Jumaily, Egyptian, detained on June 4th 2013, whereabouts 
unknown. 
31. Ahmed Nasif, Egyptian, detained on June 4th 2013, whereabouts unknown. 
32. Nasser Ibrahim, Egyptian, detained on June 4th 2013, whereabouts unknown. 
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Annex 12: UAE’s Political Activism Images 
 
 
A child asks his father about the meaning of the word “freedom;” 
the father shushes him and tells him it is inappropriate to mention 
it.423  
 
 
“Justice for UAE detainees.”424 
  
                                                            
423
 Source: http://www.emasc-uae.com/up_carec/8.jpg  
424
 Source: Khalifa Al-Nuaimi Blog http://kalnuaimi.wordpress.com/  
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Annex 13: Letter sent to UAEU students 
 
(Last warning to female students not to give political lectures  
at the campus mosque). 
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